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Summary of the thesis 
 
The aim of the thesis is contribute to the growing comparative literature on regionalist parties in 
Western Europe, focusing on strategy and ideology. The research questions correspond to the 
three ideological dimensions/domains which are taken into consideration (centre-periphery, left-
right and European integration), as well as to the links amongst such dimensions/domains: 
 
 why are some regionalist parties more moderate (i.e. autonomists) while other are more 
radical (i.e. secessionists)?  
 why do some regionalist parties position themselves to the left, while others position 
themselves to the right?  
 why are some regionalist parties pro-integration, while others are against?  
 are there relationships between regionalist parties‟ positions across the diverse 
ideological dimensions? 
 
The analytical framework brings together sociological theories of political alignments with 
theories of party competition and theories of party change. The empirical section is made up of 
a comparison of four case studies (LN, PC, SVP and SNP), which are analysed in depth, plus a 
final chapter that includes the most important regionalist parties in Western Europe. Data are 
gathered through interviews with prominent party members, party documents (primarily 
manifestos), election studies and secondary sources. 
 
In brief, in the conclusions it is argued that: 
  
 regions that have been independent states in the past and regions with concentrated 
ethno-linguistic minorities tend to produce more radical parties on the centre-periphery 
dimension. Competition between regionalist parties acting in the same region also 
increases radicalism. 
 „working class‟ regions tend to produce leftist regionalist parties, while „bourgeois‟ 
regions tend to produce rightist regionalist parties. 
 positioning on European integration depends mainly on the compatibility of the self-
government project with the process of European integration and on parties‟ satisfaction 
with the policy output of the state vis a vis that of the EU. 
 only weak relationships can be discerned between centre-periphery and left-right 
positioning, and between centre-periphery and European integration. A stronger 
relationship is apparent between left-right and European integration positioning.   
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Introduction 
 
Regionalist parties have become an important feature in the politics of Western 
European states and, to some extent, the politics of the EU. In contrast to their portrait 
as relics of the past (Hobsbawm, 1990), the last four decades have witnessed the 
emergence and establishment of regionalist parties as permanent and sometimes 
influential actors. From a quantitative point of view, Rokkan and Urwin (1983) 
identified about 29 „peripheral parties‟ in the early 1980s, while Lane, McKay and 
Newton (1991) counted 44 „ethnic parties‟ less than ten years later. An updated count 
would bring the number of regionalist and/or ethnic political organizations active at 
some level of electoral politics (local, regional, state and EU) in Western Europe to, at 
least, 93.
1
 
What has made regionalist parties important actors, however, is not so much 
their increasing number but, rather, their capacity to become relevant actors at regional 
and/or national level. In the post WWII Federal Republic of Germany, the Christian 
Social Union has, barring the period 1954-57, governed Bavaria and has been in office 
at national level from 1946 to 1969, from 1982 to 1998 and from 2005 to the present. In 
addition, after reunification in 1990, the Party of Democratic Socialism (representing 
former Eastern Germany) has been in office at regional level in Mecklenburgh-
Vorpommern and in Berlin. In Belgium, regionalist parties representing Flanders, the 
Walloon region and the Brussels region were government partners during the second 
half of the 1970s and in the late 1980s-early 1990s. In addition, since direct election of 
regional assemblies was introduced in 1995, regionalist parties representing Brussels 
and the Flanders have often been in office at regional level. In post-Franco Spain, 
regionalist parties have constituted precious support parties for single-party minority 
governments and have dominated regional governments in the Basque Country, 
Catalonia, Navarra, Cantabria and the Canary Islands. In Italy, the Northern League has 
been an important government partner from 1994 to 1995, from 2001 to 2006 and from 
2008 to now. It has also been in office, as junior partner, in several northern Italian 
regions, primarily in Lombardy and Veneto. In addition, other regionalist parties have 
led the regional executives in Aosta Valley, South Tyrol and, more recently, in Sicily. 
                                                 
1
 It is worth specifying that the present study distinguishes between regionalist and ethnic parties, dealing 
only with the former. The inclusion of ethnic parties in the count, however, facilitates comparison with 
figures provided by previous studies. The distribution of regionalist and/or ethnic parties across Western 
Europe is the following: 25 in Spain, 22 in France, 21 in Italy, 9 in the UK, 5 in Belgium, 5 in the 
Germany, 1 in Finland, 1 in Austria, 1 in Norway, 1 in Portugal and 1 in Greece.       
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In Switzerland, the Ticinesi League has established itself as a permanent party in office 
since 1995, strengthening its position after the last regional election in 2007. In the UK, 
the Northern Irish assembly and executive are dominated exclusively by regionalist 
parties, while, after the 2007 regional elections, regionalist parties attained office in 
Scotland and Wales too. Studying regionalist parties, therefore, no longer means – if it 
ever meant – focusing on marginal political actors. In fact, as noted by previous works 
(Grilli di Cortona, 2001), the impact of these parties on Western European states has 
gone beyond the electoral and the governmental, as they have managed to push through 
substantive and, in some cases (e.g. Belgium), dramatic constitutional reforms for the 
territorial re-distribution of powers with those states (Swenden, 2006). 
This thesis places itself within an established and growing body of scholarship 
which aims to understand and explain the causes and consequences of regionalist 
mobilization in Western Europe. However, in contrast to most studies on regionalist 
parties, it focuses exclusively on party strategy and party ideology. The multi-
dimensionality of regionalist party ideology has been addressed in academic literature 
only very recently. As regionalist actors politicize primarily the centre-periphery 
cleavage they have been treated as single-issue (or single-dimension) parties. Yet, even 
single-issue („prolocutor‟) parties, if they establish themselves as permanent actors in 
the electoral and governmental arena, end up widening their ideological identity to all 
dimensions and issues that matter to voters (Lucardie, 2000, p. 176). While regionalist 
parties‟ ideological positioning on the periphery side of the centre-periphery divide is a 
given, the way they position themselves on that dimension and along other ideological 
dimensions – the left-right dimension and European integration will be analysed in this 
work – is a question which feeds into established theories of electoral alignments and 
party competition, as well as bearing very practical implications for coalition politics at 
regional and national level. One of the conclusions of this study, for instance, is that in 
most West European states, due to a general tendency of left-of-centre national parties 
to be more sensitive to regionalist claims than right-of-centre national parties, left-of-
centre regionalist parties avoid supporting or entering coalitions with right-of-centre 
national parties, while right-of centre-regionalist parties do support and/or enter 
coalitions with left-of-centre national parties. The overall coalition politics of regionalist 
parties, therefore, tends to translate into a diversion of votes from the left to the right.
2
  
                                                 
2
 Whether this systematic bias is counterbalanced by voters‟ choices is a very interesting question which 
goes beyond the remit of this work.  
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This work is divided into two parts. The bulk of the research consists of in-depth 
analysis of and comparison between four regionalist parties: Plaid Cymru – The Party 
of Wales, the Scottish National Party, the Südtiroler Volkspartei and the Lega Nord. In 
the second part of the research the comparative analysis is extended to 43 regionalist 
parties acting in 26 „regions‟ across 7 Western European states. This part of the research 
allows us to evaluate the generalizability of our findings. More precisely, the wider set 
of cases will be used to test hypotheses drawn both from the extant literature and, 
inductively, from the analysis of the four case-studies. 
In Chapter One a terminological and conceptual discussion of regionalist parties 
is presented, followed by a brief summary of the state of the art and the introduction of 
the research questions. Then the research plan, methodology, case selection and data are 
discussed. Finally, the theoretical and analytical frameworks which guide the research 
are presented and discussed. In Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five the four parties are 
analysed in turn. Each chapter is structured in the same way. The first section is devoted 
to a general profile of the party. This includes the historical origins of the centre-
periphery cleavage in the region, the birth, electoral emergence and main political 
achievements of the party, and its internal organizational structure. The following three 
sections are devoted to party ideological positioning respectively on the centre-
periphery, left-right and European integration dimension. Chapter Six provides a 
comparison of the four cases, the presentation of hypotheses and the hypothesis testing 
on the wider set of parties. In the conclusion, the findings of the research are reported 
and discussed, and future avenues of research identified.    
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Chapter 1 
 Studying Regionalist Parties’ Strategy and Ideology 
 
1.1 Regionalist parties in Western Europe: terminology and definition 
The group of parties (or putative party family) that is analysed in this study has been 
labeled in many different ways: regionalist (De Winter and Türsan, 1998; Jolly, 2007; 
Deschouwer, 2009), regional (Newman, 1994; Brancati, 2005), ethno-regionalist 
(Tronconi, 2005; De Winter and Gomez-Reino, 2002; De Winter, 1998a; Müller-
Rommel, 1998; Türsan, 1998); ethno-regional (Newman, 1997; Levi and Hechter, 1985; 
Miodownick and Cartrite, 2006), ethnoterritorial (Rudolph and Thompson, 1989), 
ethnonationalist (Connor, 1977), regional nationalist (Van Atta, 2003), peripheral 
(Rokkan and Urwin, 1983), peripheral nationalist (Gourevitch, 1979), nationalist 
(Coakley, 1992; Erk, 2009; Grilli di Cortona, 2001), minority nationalist (Lynch, 1996; 
Sorens, 2008; Elias, 2009), stateless nationalist (Keating, 1996; Guibernau 1999), sub-
state nationalist (Erk, 2005), ethnic (Horowitz, 1985), autonomist (De Winter et al., 
2006b), secessionist (Sorens, 2005), non-state-wide (De Winter, 1994; Pallares et al., 
1997).  
 In spite of this terminological profusion, conceptual reflections on the core 
characteristics of these parties have provided some common understanding amongst 
scholars, especially as far as the literature on Western European cases is concerned. It is, 
therefore, worth discussing these reflections in order to provide a minimal definition. A 
good starting point is represented by De Winter‟s observation that the core characteristic 
of these parties is their demand for “political reorganization of the existing national 
power structure, for some kind of „self-government‟. In fact, the centrality of this 
demand distinguishes this type of party from other party „families‟” (De Winter, 1998a, 
p. 204-05). Gomez-Reino has built on De Winter‟s definition, stressing that the type of 
self-government sought by these parties is „territorial‟ (Gomez-Reino, 2008). An 
emphasis on identification with some piece of territory is the sine qua non which had 
already been identified by previous studies (Urwin, 1982, p. 427, cited in Türsan, 1998, 
p. 5). The claims of these parties are, therefore, based on territorial identities/interests 
and their challenge to the existing power structure of the state revolves around territorial 
reorganization. Hence, independently of the timing of their emergence these actors 
politicize a very old cleavage which refers to the process of state formation, the centre-
periphery cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). It is not by chance that, before the crisis 
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(or decline) of the modern nation-state became evident, these parties were sometimes 
considered as a sign of revolt against modernity (Lipset, 1985). 
 Given the centrality of „territory‟ (compared to, say, „ethnicity‟, „nationality‟, 
„minority‟, etc.) in defining the core characteristics of these political actors, I have 
chosen the term „regionalist‟ to indicate this group of parties because it is the most 
genuinely geographical amongst those listed above, together with „regional‟ and „non-
state-wide‟. The latter two (i.e. „regional‟ and „non-state-wide‟) can be considered as 
synonymous: they both mean that a party is not active in the whole territory of the state, 
but only in part of it (a region). This is, in fact, an important and empirically easy-to-
spot characteristic of the parties considered in this study. However, it is neither a 
primary nor an exclusive feature of theirs. In other words, while „regionalist‟ parties are 
usually „regional‟, other parties can be „regional‟ without necessarily being „regionalist‟.  
The definition of regionalist parties can, therefore, be formulated as follows: 
first, they are self-contained political organizations that contest elections; secondly, their 
explicit and primary objective is to defend the identities and interests of „their‟ territory 
(region) by achieving/protecting/enhancing some kind of territorial self-government. A 
side-feature derived from their „core mission‟ is that their organization is present only in 
a particular territory (region) of the state and their electoral activity is normally limited 
to that territory. This working definition allows us to sort out the „real‟ regionalists from 
other regional parties, such as regional branches of state-wide parties. In the case of 
contemporary Belgium, for instance, it distinguishes regionalist parties fighting for 
more self-government from all the other regionalized (i.e. regional) parties. 
The level of self-government sought – from mild autonomy to outright secession 
– constitutes a very important source of internal differentiation amongst regionalist 
parties and is one of the ideological dimensions which this research focuses on. 
However, it is not a defining characteristic (De Winter, 1998a, p. 205), nor does it 
matter whether parties consider their territory (and the people living in it) as a nation 
per se or part of a different nation-state. Similarly, self-assigned party labels, per se, 
have little value.    
The above definition also facilitates charting the relationship between regionalist 
parties and two other categories of parties. The first one is the category of ethnic parties, 
i.e. those parties that receive support from an ethnic group (whether that group is 
defined in terms of language or religion, etc.) and aim to defend/enhance the identity 
and interests of people belonging to that ethnic group (Horowitz, 1985, p. 291). 
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Evidently, there is a large overlap between regionalist and ethnic parties, as most of the 
former refer - more or less compellingly and more or less consistently - to ethnic 
identities linked to territory. However, not all regionalist parties “have mobilized issues 
of culture or language” (Hepburn, 2009a). In addition, not all ethnic parties can be 
considered as regionalist, since some of them prefer to protect ethnic identities without 
seeking regional (i.e. territorial) self-government. This is clearly the case, for instance, 
of the Svenska Folkpartiet (SFP) in Finland (Raunio, 2006, p. 126).  
 The second category, which could be labeled as „regional unionist‟, is 
represented by regional (and often ethnic) parties that originated as a reaction against 
regionalist mobilization in bordering regions or within the same region. Genetically 
these parties represent the demands of regionally concentrated ethnic groups who 
identify with the whole state and are keen to maintain the centralized constitutional 
settlement or, at least, a political union between the region and the state. The parties‟ 
original ideology is therefore anti-regionalist and, often, centralist. They often stem 
from the regional branch of the most anti-regionalist state-wide party, before developing 
as independent and self-contained organizations. Sometimes, however, during this 
process, the aims of these parties change: from strenuous defence of state centralism to 
steering constitutional change in a direction which accommodates their concerns. Some 
of them can, therefore, become convinced supporters of regional self-government and, 
on that basis, have to be considered as regionalist parties. However, it is important to 
bear in mind that the reactive logic of their regionalism sets them apart from the other 
regionalist parties in important respects, not least the fact that they eschew secessionist 
positions because they feel safer within the state. Examples of reactive regional groups 
are: the Protestants (Unionists) in Northern Ireland, part of the Italian speaking 
community in South Tyrol, the (Blaverists) anti-catalanists in the Valencian community 
and most of the French speaking community in Brussels. Some of the parties created by 
these groups, such as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in Northern Ireland and the 
Unió Valenciana (UnV) in the Valencian Community, fulfill all the characteristics of 
regionalist parties and have to be considered as such. Others, such as the Front 
Démocratique du Francophonne (FDF) in Brussels and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 
in Northern Ireland, can only be considered as regionalist parties in certain periods of 
their history.
3
 In contrast, Unitalia in South Tyrol cannot be considered as a proper 
                                                 
3
 The FDF can be considered as a regionalist party from 1970, when it abandoned centralism in support of 
federal reforms which would separate Brussels from the Flanders, to 1995 when its survival was 
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regionalist party. Although it ceased to be the regional branch of the state-wide party 
Alleanza Nazionale (AN) in 1996, it has had affiliations with other right-wing state-
wide parties. More importantly, as it will be discussed in Chapter Four, it has kept 
supporting state centralism rather than (an alternative form of) self-government for 
South Tyrol.        
Three other parties, the former Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS) in 
Eastern Germany, the Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (CSU) in Bavaria and the 
Unión del Pueblo Navarro (UPN) in Navarra,
4
 deserve to be discussed, as they 
represent border-line cases. The PDS appears to be a case of a „new‟ party with state-
wide ambitions, which builds on its original territorial „heartland‟ before expanding. 
This ambition is witnessed by the fact that it has always fielded candidates Germany-
wide and finds an ultimate confirmation in the merger with Arbeit und soziale 
Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative (WASG) and the formation of a state-wide party, 
albeit one that still relies heavily on Eastern German votes, Die Linke. However, the 
PDS has de facto built its political project on the protection of Eastern Germany‟s 
interests and political identity (Grix, 2002), while electoral activity in Western Germany 
can also be explained in instrumental terms, i.e. as an attempt to circumvent the 
constraints of the German voting system (Hough and Koss, 2009). On this basis, the 
PDS can be considered as a regionalist party until the advent of Die Linke. As far as the 
CSU and the UPN are concerned, they have certainly acted as de facto regional 
branches of state-wide parties (the German Christlich Demokratische Union and the 
Spanish Partido Popular). However, not only are they formally self-contained 
organizations but they have originated autonomously and then federated themselves 
with state-wide parties. Their history is, therefore, quite different from that of regional 
branches of state-wide parties that have become increasingly autonomous as a 
consequence of regionalist mobilization and devolution of power to the regions. Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                               
underpinned by a stable federation with the Flemish Liberals (Buelens and Van Dyck, 1998). The UUP 
remained affiliated with the Conservative British party until 1985. In 2008, this affiliation restarted (UUP, 
2008). However, the party has been a convinced advocate of Northern Ireland‟s self-government 
throughout its history, except in the period 1979-1995, when its leadership manifested a preference for 
Direct Rule from London (Murphy, 1990, p. 52-3).     
4
 It is worth pointing out that the UPN also displays most of the characteristics of „regional unionist‟ 
parties because of its strenuous opposition to Basque separatism, which sees Navarra as part of the 
Basque homeland and pursues the secession of the enlarged Basque Country (i.e. including Navarra) from 
Spain (Sorens, 2008, p. 338).  
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the CSU and UPN have always been, despite their close relationship with the CDU and 
the PP, rather assertive in demanding and protecting self-government for their regions.
5
 
 
1.2 Studying regionalist parties: State of the art and research questions 
Having formulated the defining characteristics of regionalist parties, explored 
the boundaries that such definition draws and discussed the few cases which find 
themselves straddling those boundaries, I can now turn my attention to the fast-growing 
scholarship on regionalist parties and how my research aims to enhance our knowledge 
on this topic.  
Naturally enough, the literature on regionalist parties has focused on the crucial 
question concerning the determinants of their electoral and political success. These 
determinants can be divided into two analytical classes: external and internal (De 
Winter 1998a; De Winter et al., 2006). External factors refer to the political, 
institutional, economic and cultural environments in which regionalist parties act, while 
internal factors refer to party organization, its capacity to attract human and economic 
resources, party leadership, party strategy and ideology.  
Amongst the studies which stress the importance of external factors, some look 
at long-term historical processes and the resulting structural environments.  In this 
respect, the most influential work amongst the classics of political science (or political 
sociology) is Lipset and Rokkan‟s cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Together 
with the Reformation and the industrial revolution, nation-state formation is considered 
one of the crucial long-term processes which generated deep social and, consequently, 
political divisions in Western Europe. Such divisions (cleavages) entered into mass 
politics with the establishment of universal suffrage, thus ensuring the survival of the 
old alignments between social groups and their respective political actors. The main 
division regarding the process of nation-state building concerned the opposition by local 
and/or regional actors to the project/process of political, economic and cultural 
integration and centralization of power at the centre of the state: the so called centre-
periphery cleavage. In this perspective, which was developed further by Rokkan and 
Urwin, the success of regionalist parties depends on the resources that the historical 
                                                 
5
 In the run-up to German unification, fearing a dramatic shift to the left due to the integration of „red‟ 
East Germany and a loss of economic resources which would be „diverted‟ to the new Länder, CSU‟s 
prominent politicians even flirted with the idea of Bavaria‟s secession (Harvie, 1994, p. 67). For an 
extensive explanation of why the CSU should be included in comparative analyses of regionalist parties, 
see Hepburn (2008b).    
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process of nation-state building or, more precisely, competitive projects of different 
nation-states‟ building left to regionalist actors for mobilisation. These resources consist 
primarily of cultural distinctiveness (linguistic, religious, etc.), resulting from (partially) 
failed standardization across the whole territory of the state; and economic 
distinctiveness due to different paths of economic development, inequalities and/or lack 
of integration amongst different territorial regions of the state (Rokkan and Urwin, 1982, 
p. 3-9; 1983, p. 14-18). This structural-developmental approach emphasises, beside 
culture and economy, the historical process per se, with its timing, its institutional 
legacy and its (often re-elaborated) memories, which represent important elements for 
the success of regionalist mobilization. Therefore, territories with a historical legacy of 
sovereign statehood or extensive self-government in past times may represent 
potentially favourable environments for regionalist parties, even in the absence of 
cultural and economic distinctiveness. 
As far as the economic factor is concerned, it is worth recalling that scholars 
have pointed out two different sources of regionalist grievances against the central state. 
On the one hand, in monocephalic states, where the centre is both politically and 
economically dominant, economically depressed regions may mobilize against state‟s 
„internal colonialism‟ (Hechter, 1975). On the other hand, in policephalic states, where 
the political and economic centres do not coincide geographically, economically 
advanced regions may mobilize in order to turn their economic wealth into augmented 
political power (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Gourevitch, 1979). 
Within the set of studies that focus on external determinants, some have taken 
into consideration the short-term effects of the institutional environment in which 
electoral competition takes place. In particular, some scholars argue that regionalist 
parties would do better at polls under proportional representation (PR) than under 
majoritarian systems (Hauss and Rayside, 1978). Yet, this hypothesis has remained 
rather controversial, given the territorial concentration of electoral support of regionalist 
parties. Recent empirical studies have, indeed, reached more nuanced conclusions 
which downplay the importance of the proportionality of electoral systems as a 
determinant of regionalist parties‟ success (Montabes-Pereira et al., 2004). What these 
studies have pointed out, instead, is that the distinction between PR and majoritarian 
systems is important for the different dynamics of party competition they trigger (ibid, p. 
77) - an important point which will be discussed below. 
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Recently, scholars have extended their attention to the political environments in 
which regionalist parties compete. Tronconi has shown how the electoral success of 
regionalist parties depends not only on culture and economy (which are still very 
important factors) but also on the level of ideological (left-right) polarization between 
state-wide parties (or electoral alliances), on the level of electoral volatility and on the 
type of democratic regime, be it majoritarian or consensual (Tronconi, 2005). More 
precisely, regionalist parties tend to do better in the presence of high volatility, 
consensual regimes and low polarization.  
Academic research on individual cases has devoted more attention to internal 
factors of success. This has also been the case for edited collections, which have pointed 
to the importance of organization, leadership and ideology (De Winter and Türsan, 1998; 
De Winter et al., 2006b), with the latter standing out as “one of the most important 
aspects to cover in future comparative work” (De Winter et al., 2006b, p. 252). 
The general aim of this research is to respond to this call. The concept of party 
ideology is here considered closely to the concept of party strategy in a competitive 
environment. The theoretical and analytical framework within which the research has 
developed, including the relationship between strategy and ideology, will be discussed 
in the next section. In the remaining part of this section I will simply spell out the 
research questions concerning regionalist parties‟ ideology and will briefly outline the 
state of our knowledge on each question to date. In this way I will better explain to what 
extent ideology constitutes an underdeveloped theme in the literature and which aspects 
of the matter I aim to explore further. 
First of all political ideologies refer to different spheres, domains, dimensions 
and aspects of social and political life. As far as regionalist parties are concerned, the 
core of their ideologies pertains to the centre-periphery dimension, i.e. their claim for 
some sort of territorial self-government for their region vis à vis the central state. The 
first question, therefore, concerns this ideological dimension: 
  
Q1. What pushes regionalist parties to adopt moderate (autonomist) or 
radical (secessionist) stances and, possibly, to change position over 
time?  
 
This question has not been completely overlooked in the extant literature. Scholars 
showed that regionalist parties adopt different positions on this dimension, also 
  
11 
 
providing classifications of the different possible stances (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983, p. 
141; De Winter, 1998a, p. 206; van Houten, 2001, p. 7; Sorens, 2008, p. 326-29). 
Empirical quantitative studies have confirmed that regionalist assertiveness is positively 
correlated with the two structural factors singled out in the classic literature – cultural 
(mainly linguistic) distinctiveness and high economic status – (van Houten, 2001; 
Sorens, 2008). Regionalist parties in ethnically distinct and in relatively rich regions 
tend to put forward more demanding claims, all the way up to secession. The economic 
argument has lent itself very well to the formulation of rational choice theories – or 
economic theories of secession – (Boltom et al., 1996). However, as even those who 
have formalized the economic rationality of secession have to admit: “[e]conomic 
grievances may well be among the factors that impel a region to seek full political 
autonomy, but they will rarely suffice to explain why independence is entertained at all 
as a possible option.” (Polese, 1985, p. 112). Indeed, the interplay between structural 
factors, such as economy, ethnicity and institutional history, is rather complex. In 
addition, the institutional/political environment also appears to play a major role. 
Newman argues that regionalist parties acting (as third parties) under majoritarian 
electoral systems within two-party systems face a strong incentive to develop radical 
centre-periphery stances, while regionalist parties acting under PR within multi-party 
systems can choose whether to adopt moderate or radical stances (Newman, 1997). 
Moreover, when it comes to explain changes of position over time, the political 
environment (i.e. the strategic interaction amongst parties competing in the party 
system) is often evoked as a crucial additional factor (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983; De 
Winter, 1998a; van Houten, 2001; De Winter et al., 2006b; Sorens, 2008). Quantitative 
studies, however, are not particularly suitable to investigate strategic interactions within 
party systems. Indeed, according to one scholar: “it is necessary to turn again to case 
studies” (van Houten, 2001, p. 16). Qualitative case studies, however, have often lacked 
a comparative perspective and thrust towards generalization or, at least, hypothesis 
generation. In addition, scholars who have looked at party competition and strategies 
have often taken the analytical perspective of state-wide parties, devoting little or no 
attention to possible counter-strategies of regionalist parties (Levi and Hechter, 1985; 
Rudolph and Thompson, 1989). The present work aims, therefore, to address this 
question through in-depth qualitative analysis on four case studies, taking into 
consideration all factors identified in the extant literature and, as far as party 
competition is concerned, adopting the perspective of regionalist actors. 
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 The second ideological dimension taken into consideration refers to the left-
right schema (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1989). Although the success of this schema rests 
on its capacity to represent party systems in a single dimension, the left-right opposition 
is actually the synthesis of multiple dimensions. Political philosophers have identified 
the origin and the conceptual core of the distinction between left and right in opposite 
evaluations about „equality‟, considered as „natural and good‟ by left-wingers and 
„artificial and bad‟ by right-wingers (Bobbio, 1994). Scholars of Western European (or 
more generally Western) politics have pointed to the salience of two left-right sub-
dimensions: the socio-economic and the socio-cultural (Kitschelt, 1994, 2004; Hix, 
1999; Hooghe et al., 2002). Applying Bobbio‟s conceptual elaboration to these two 
sub-dimensions, it can be argued that the socio-economic left envisages redistribution 
of resources and the pursuit of (more) economic equality, while the socio-cultural left 
accords equal dignity and status to alternative ideas, values, identities and cultures. In 
contrast, the socio-economic right considers economic inequality as the natural result of 
the skill differential amongst individuals and envisages less redistributive intervention, 
while the socio-cultural right claims the right to cultural differences, reserving higher, if 
not exclusive, dignity to traditionalist and majoritarian ideas, values, identities and 
cultures. As empirical studies confirm, religion, as a traditionalist source of ideas, 
values, identities and culture - and especially the dominant religion, as a source of (at 
least supposedly) majoritarian ideas, values, identities and culture - is associated with 
the socio-cultural right (Knutsen, 2004; Norris and Inglehart, 2004). The second 
question, therefore, concerns the traditionally very salient and comprehensive left-right 
ideological dimension: 
 
Q2. What pushes regionalist parties to adopt different positions along 
the left-right dimension and, possibly, to change their position over 
time? 
 
This question has attracted some attention too, especially as far as the relationship 
between regionalism and social class is concerned: “[n]ationalism, whether of the right 
or of the left, is of course never really independent of the class structure” (Nairn, 1977, 
p. 44). Although comparative research has pointed out that left-right ideological 
positions span the whole spectrum and that changes of position are not rare amongst 
regionalist parties (De Winter 1998a, p. 209; De Winter et al., 2006b), scholars have 
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struggled to find a general relationship between regionalism and left-right positioning. 
Jan Erk (2005; 2009), who has explored the question in the most explicit way, points to 
the importance of agency and historical critical junctures that sometimes occurred long 
before the emergence of regionalist parties themselves. John Coakley also stressed the 
peculiarity of each individual case: “In practice, nationalist ideologists tend to adopt a 
particularistic approach, promoting the interests of „their‟ nation. It follows from this 
that the unique context of a particular national struggle shapes the class alliances that 
accompany it” (Coakley, 1992, p. 16).6 Saul Newman (1996) has developed a fourfold 
typology of regionalist parties‟ ideologies, suggesting that the factors shaping the 
ideological blend of each regionalist party are deeply contextual. In a later work, he 
points to the importance of the institutional/political environments in which regionalist 
parties compete, arguing that majoritarian voting systems and two-party systems push 
parties towards (left or right) mainstream positioning, while PR and multi-party systems 
allow regionalist parties to adopt both mainstream and radical positions  (Newman, 
1997). As this brief literature review shows, this question (i.e. Q2) has remained largely 
unanswered in comparative terms. The aim of this study is, therefore, to reach 
generalizable findings and to further our theoretical understanding about the 
relationship between regionalism and left-right positioning.  
The last dimension taken into consideration concerns the process of European 
integration. Conceptually, this ideological dimension is the same as the centre-
periphery one, but applied at a different level.  Indeed, it refers to support or opposition 
towards a process of polity formation which involves a struggle for the distribution of 
powers between the European level (i.e. the centre), the member-states and the sub-state 
level (Bartolini, 2005). The third question concerns, therefore, ideological positioning 
towards European integration: 
 
Q3. What pushes regionalist parties to support or oppose the process 
of European integration and, possibly, to change position over time?       
 
This question has attracted some attention too, especially in the last fifteen years, 
including important comparative pieces of research (Lynch, 1996; De Winter, 1998a; 
                                                 
6
 Coakley, Nairn and Erk use the term „nationalism‟ (or „nationalist‟) meaning „minority‟, „sub-state‟ or 
„stateless‟ nationalism. The political parties they talk about, therefore, fall within the definition of 
„regionalist parties‟ adopted in this work.  
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De Winter and Gomez-Reino, 2002; Jolly, 2007; Elias, 2009; 2008). In addition, other 
studies dealing with the impact of European integration on the regions and the interplay 
between European integration and regionalism result extremely helpful for answering 
the question, as they provide the picture for understanding the opportunity structure 
within which regionalist parties act (Hooghe, 1995; Keating, 1995; 1998; Jeffery 2000; 
2004; Keating and Hooghe, 2001; McGarry and Keating, 2006; Hepburn, 2008a). 
Moreover, studies on political parties‟ positioning towards European integration have 
provided theories, hypotheses and analytical frameworks which may well apply to 
regionalist parties too (Hix and Lord, 1997; Taggart, 1998; Hix, 1999; Sitter, 2001, 
2002; Hooghe et al., 2002; Taggart and Szczerbiak; 2003; Hix, 2007; Taggart and 
Szczerbiak, 2008). Finally, within this literature, some studies have focused on the 
influence of the genetic cleavage on party positioning, thus providing hypotheses and 
empirical evidence on regionalist parties as a distinct family (Marks and Wilson, 2000; 
Marks et al., 2002).  
Summarizing the conceptual elaboration, the analytical frameworks proposed 
and the empirical evidence provided by these three strands of literature is not an easy 
task. In extreme synthesis, four explanatory models can be identified: „geopolitical‟, 
„domestic politics‟, „left-right ideology‟, „genetic‟.7 These models apply to all political 
parties and should, therefore, be expected apply to regionalist parties too (Elias, 2009, p. 
34-38). The geopolitical model refers to substantive differences in support for European 
integration amongst the public opinions of different states, such as traditionally 
Europhile Italy vs. traditionally Eurosceptic UK, or supranational areas, such as 
Europhile Mediterranean Europe vs. Eurosceptic Scandinavia.
8
 The model predicts that, 
notwithstanding internal differences, parties in Eurosceptic states or areas will tend to 
be Eurosceptic and vice versa. The domestic politics model refers to the use of 
European integration in the political debate at state level (or regional) level and focuses 
on party positions within the party system and on the party institutional roles. Put 
crudely, fringe/outsider parties tend to be more Eurosceptic than mainstream parties 
(Taggart, 1998), and opposition parties tend to voice their Euroscepticism more than 
parties in office (Sitter, 2001; 2002). The „left-right ideology‟ model focuses on the 
                                                 
7
 The four models presented here are inspired by Bartolini (2005, p. 321-326). However, only the first 
(geopolitical) and the fourth (genetic) model coincide fully with Bartolini‟s conceptualization. That is 
why different labels were used to identify the second and third models. In Bartolini (2005) these were 
called „institutional‟ and „partisan‟ respectively.    
8
See, for instance, Raunio (2007) on Euroscepticism in Scandinavia.   
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influence of party ideological positions along the two above-mentioned sub-dimensions, 
socio-economic and socio-cultural. Although scholars disagree on the existence of clear 
and stable relationships
9
, there seem to be a general consensus on the overall historical 
trajectories of the main party families‟ stances. Centre and mainstream-right parties, 
such as the Christian Democrats and the Liberals are the political forces that started the 
integration process and supported it throughout (Hix, 1999, p. 88; Marks and Wilson, 
2000, p. 449-453). In contrast, the mainstream-left - the Socialists and Social-
Democrats - were much less supportive in the 1950s and 1960s. However, in the 
following decades, they became strongly Europhile (Hix, 1999, p. 88; Marks and 
Wilson, 2000, p. 445). Other party families, such as the Greens and the radical-left 
parties, have also softened their stances on European integration during the 1990s, 
although they remain rather ambiguous if not openly Eurosceptic (Dunphy, 2004; 
Bomberg, 1998). Finally, radical-right parties, mainly due to their socio-cultural 
traditionalism and authoritarianism, have represented the most Eurosceptic party family 
in Europe over the last fifteen years (Hooghe et al., 2002). At first sight, the „left-right 
ideology‟ model would suggest that parties often confuse their support/opposition to 
EU policies with support/opposition to European integration itself. In fact, this type of 
positioning can be considered as rational, at least to some extent, as the link between 
the level of centralization of any given polity and its policy outcomes is profound and, 
often, systemic biases towards certain policies rather than others are difficult to reverse 
(Hix, 2007).  
Given that regionalist parties have appeared in both Eurosceptic and Europhile 
states (or geo-political areas), that they have occupied different positions within their 
respective party systems and different institutional roles, and that the left-right 
ideological variance amongst them is substantive, these three models would predict 
substantive variance on their positions towards European integration too. Yet, recent 
(quantitative) empirical research has concluded that regionalist parties are consistently 
pro-integration across time, space and issue area (Jolly, 2007), confirming the overall 
conclusions of previous studies (Hix and Lord, 1997; Ray, 1999; Marks and Wilson, 
2000; Marks et al., 2002).
10
 This contradiction can be, at least partially, explained by 
                                                 
9
 In particular the Hooghe-Marks thesis sees a patterned relationship between left-right and European 
integration positions, while the Hix-Lord thesis sees the two dimensions as independent and orthogonal 
(Marks and Steenbergen, 2002).   
10
 Hix and Lord‟s analysis concerns only the parties affiliated to the European Free Alliance (EFA) group, 
thus leaving out important regionalist parties. It is worth pointing out that the converging conclusions by 
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considering the fourth model. Indeed, the „genetic‟ model singles out the only 
characteristic that regionalist parties have in common, namely their origins in the 
centre-periphery cleavage. Such genesis, as discussed in the previous section, translates 
into the pursuit of “some kind of self-government” (De Winter, 1998a, p. 204). 
According to this model, then, European integration will be supported (or opposed) 
insofar as it favors (or hinders) the achievement or extension of regional self-
government and other linked objectives, such as ethnic minority protection and minority 
language recognition.  
As highlighted by Keating, there are “elements of consistency and mutual 
reinforcement” between European integration and regionalism (Keating, 1995, p. 1). 
Such elements have come to prominence during the 1980s and 1990s, due to substantive 
developments in EU institutions and policies which have fostered hopes for a „Europe 
of the Regions‟ (Keating 1998, p. 176). Regionalist parties could take advantage of 
European integration in several respects. Economic integration enhanced the viability 
and therefore the credibility of secessionist projects (Meadwell and Martin, 2004). EU 
regional policies and the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity pushed member-
states to create or enhance regional governments (McGarry et al., 2006; p. 8). The 
establishment of the Committee of the Regions was a sign (probably overestimated by 
some) that a strengthened EU was going to recognize an active role for the regions in its 
policy-making process. European elections became an occasion, for some regionalist 
parties, to enhance their electoral visibility (Lynch, 1996).  
Indeed, the genetic model hypothesized that regionalist parties would be 
strongly in favor of economic integration, as this enhances the viability of regional 
political autonomy, and moderately in favor of political integration because it weakens 
the state and creates a plural Europe in which all nations are minorities (Marks and 
Wilson, 2000, p. 439; Marks et al., 2002, p. 587). The above-mentioned quantitative 
analyses have provided solid empirical evidence for this view that regionalism and 
European integration have been, to a great extent, mutually reinforcing processes during 
the 1980s and 1990s.  However, more recent qualitative research points to a cooling 
down in the relationship between regionalism and European integration (Hepburn, 
                                                                                                                                               
Jolly, Ray, Marks and Wilson, and Marks et al. should not be surprising, as their analyses were based on 
the same datasets.  
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2008a), and even a general shift from pro towards more ambiguous or even Eurosceptic 
positions (Elias, 2008).  
This research aims to provide a comprehensive investigation of the question (i.e. 
Q3) taking into consideration all the explanations put forward by the relevant literature 
and evaluating whether the empirical analysis substantiates them or not. However, the 
additional contribution will concern in particular three aspects. First, more attention will 
be devoted to the influence of party self-government goals. As discussed above, the 
common genesis in the centre-periphery cleavage has not prevented regionalist parties 
setting out different self-government objectives, from mild autonomy to full secession. 
Scholars have already noticed that differences in the self-government projects “are 
replicated at the European level, with parties‟ attitudes towards self-determination 
influencing their position on European integration and the exact institutional shape of 
the European Union” (Lynch, 1996, p. 178). This insight has, however, remained 
largely overlooked in the literature, which has rather focused on how institutional 
developments in the EU have affected parties‟ positions on self-government (Laible, 
2008). Second, the powers accorded by states to the regions vary from member-state to 
member-state and, in the cases of asymmetric devolution, even within member-states – 
something which has implications for the evaluation of further integration by the 
different regionalist actors (Jeffery, 2000). Third, regionalist parties‟ positioning on 
European integration in the current phase, characterized by the „constitutionalization of 
Europe‟ (2000s), has attracted few pieces of research and limited to a very small 
number of cases (Elias, 2009; 2008). In this respect, the main innovative contribution of 
this study comes from the analysis of a much wider set of cases in the last chapter.    
A fourth question concerns the relationships between the three different 
dimensions: 
 
Q4. Are there patterned relationships between regionalist parties‟ 
positioning across the three ideological dimensions? 
 
 This is not really an additional question but, rather, a way of adding a possible 
explanation to positioning on each ideological dimension. As mentioned above, 
positioning on European integration has also been seen as a result different left-right 
stances and one of the stated aims of this study is to investigate more closely the 
scarcely studied relationship between centre-periphery (i.e. regional self-government vis 
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à vis the state) and European integration. In addition to this, the relationship between 
regionalist parties positioning on centre-periphery and left-right will be explored. To my 
knowledge, the only reference to such a relationship is De Winter‟s observation that 
“parties situated to the left… also tend to be the most independentist. The right or 
centre-right parties are less independentist” (De Winter, 1998a, p. 211). However, no 
explanation has been advanced. The present research will investigate the links between 
different ideological dimensions and propose possible explanations. 
 
1.3 Theoretical and analytical frameworks 
In this section I present the general theoretical and analytical frameworks which, 
together with the evidence accumulated by previous research specifically on regionalist 
parties, guide this research. The use of the various theories and approaches in different 
parts of the thesis can be better understood in the light of the next section, where the 
research design is explained. For this reason, this section will often refer to the next one 
and vice versa.  
Given that the ultimate aim of this research is to provide answers to general 
questions, I will first introduce the two different but not mutually exclusive „drivers‟ of 
generalization. These two drivers of generalization are simply two logics expected to 
orientate the behaviour of political parties (taken as unit of analysis) rather consistently 
across cases and across time.  
    The first driver refers to the logic of „rational choice‟, a grand theory imported 
into political science from economics. While the use of „rational choice‟ in studies of 
public policy has always been present, the full introduction of this approach into the 
study of party politics owes much to the seminal work of Anthony Downs (Downs, 
1957). Building on Schumpeter‟s conceptualization of policy output as a function of the 
competitive struggle for power amongst groups of elites (Schumpeter, 1954 [1942]), 
Downs adopted the metaphor of the market to explain the dynamics of party 
competition in the electoral arena. According to this paradigm, policy is the commodity 
which political parties sell and voters buy on the electoral market. Both politicians and 
voters act in a self-interested way, the former seeking power and the latter seeking their 
preferred governmental policies (Downs, 1957, p. 38-40). Voters vote for the party 
which gives them the closest policy to their favorite one and, since in democratic 
systems the key to political power is represented by votes, parties develop their policies 
so as to accommodate voters‟ preferences and win as many votes as they can (ibid., p. 
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35). However, because of information costs, voters look at party ideology, rather than 
the details of party policy, to make their choice (ibid., p. 98-100). The importance of the 
Downsian perspective rests, therefore, in its conceptualization of ideology as a 
dependent variable, influenced by the conditions of the (electoral) environment in which 
the parties act. 
For reasons explained in the following section, this study will try and draw 
generalizations about ideological positioning, on the basis of the socio-economic and 
socio-cultural environments of the regions. This is not the same as applying Downs‟ 
model, which would require the knowledge of the electoral demand for each regional 
party system taken into consideration. As a short-cut, I will rely on the tradition of 
comparative historical sociology which has had the merit of highlighting the links 
between the social structure and party alignments: political preferences depend on 
cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Lipset and Rokkan‟s original theory, which, in 
spite of the widely recognized process of electoral de-alignment, has found confirmation 
in very recent empirical studies (Knutsen, 2004; 2006), has been revised and refined in 
order to take into account of more recent developments concerning the emergence of the 
so called „new left‟ and „new right‟ (Inglehart, 1977; Kitschelt, 1988; Ignazi, 1992; 
Kitschelt, 1994). 
The second driver refers to the morphological nature of political ideologies. The 
structure of any ideology needs a minimum of internal consistency in order to stand as 
an agglomerate of interrelated concepts. As argued by Michael Freeden, “…logic must 
be evident in any articulate presentation of beliefs, and ideologies – because they are 
communicative as well as persuasive devices – will have recourse to some measure of 
logical consistency.” (Freeden, 1996, p. 36). So, while the previous logic focuses on the 
relationship between certain environmental conditions and positioning on certain 
ideological dimensions (e.g. socio-economic status of the regions and party positioning 
on the left-right dimension), this second logic focuses on internal ideological 
consistency, looking at patterns of positioning across the three dimensions (centre-
periphery, left-right, European integration). 
While these two generalizing logics will be mainly used in the last chapter for 
identifying broad patterns amongst a wide set of cases, the central chapters concerning 
four case studies will make use primarily of other theories of party (ideological) change 
which have taken on board a greater deal of the complexity characterizing actual social 
and political processes.  
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There are several ways of departure from the assumptions of „formal models‟ 
based on Downsian approach. The first to be discussed here is the role and definition of 
party strategy. In Downs‟ work, strategy is defined in a very narrow way. Although the 
American scholar takes into consideration competition in multi-party systems, his 
approach is strongly influenced by his familiarity with the typical two-party system 
context, where policy influence depends almost entirely on the capacity to get into 
office and getting into office depends on the capacity to win a plurality of votes. In 
other words, in the two-party system context, the three substantive goals of political 
parties - votes, office and policy – tend to a great extent to overlap or to be 
consequential.
11
 This substantial coincidence between policy, office and votes leads 
Downs to reduce party strategy to electoral marketing, i.e. to restrict the strategic focus 
to the pursuit of votes: “[t]hus all its [i.e. the party‟s] actions are aimed at maximizing 
votes, and it treats policies merely as means towards this end” (Downs, 1957, p. 35). 
However, in multi-party systems important trade-offs can emerge between these three 
goals (Müller and Strøm, 1999). In addition, and crucially for regionalist parties, in 
multi-level systems such trade-offs may be significantly amplified (Deschouwer, 2003). 
Therefore, party strategy is here defined in a broader sense: not only as a plan designed 
to achieve a single objective but also as the dynamic management of the priority order 
between the three goals. The result of strategic decisions has, therefore, a multi-fold 
influence on ideological positioning: in the form of electoral marketing and/or in the 
form of coalition politics (and multi-party government agreements) and/or in the form 
of reacting to policy initiatives of competitors. In any case, whether strategies will be 
based on movements in the electoral demand or on movements in the electoral supply or 
on both, they have a direct impact on party ideological positioning (Mair et al., 2004, p. 
11-13). 
The second way of departure from the Downsian model lies in the consideration 
that electoral demand is not only influenced by exogenous factors, such as the socio-
economic and socio-cultural environments but is also endogenously influenced by its 
relationship with the electoral supply (Bartolini, 2000, p. 35-37).
12
 Political parties, 
                                                 
11
 As it has been pointed out, the three goals do not fully coincide in two-party systems. For instance, 
winning more votes than what it is necessary to get in office may come at the expense of policy 
preferences (Riker, 1962, p. 33). 
12
 Bartolini goes much further, arguing that the existence of party competition itself, even in pluralist 
regimes, cannot be taken for granted (Bartolini, 2000). He pointed to four necessary conditions: a 
reasonably open regulation for entering the electoral market (contestability), a minimal share of fluctuant 
voters on the market, i.e. available for taking into consideration alternative choices (availability), 
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therefore, do not simply adapt to the electoral market but they also engage in attempts to 
drag voters towards their a priori defined ideology/policy positions. The in-depth 
analysis of case studies will allow investigating this complex relationship.    
Thirdly, formal models of party competition consider political parties as single 
and monolithic actors, a very strong simplification vis à vis the actual working of parties 
(Panebianco, 1988). Scholars have, indeed, proposed more nuanced theories of party 
ideological change which, though recognising the explanatory power of „electoral 
Darwinism‟ (Deschouwer, 1992), take into consideration the relationships between 
incentives and constraints coming form the external environment with the management 
of conflicting objectives - policy, office and votes
13
 - and with the dynamics of internal 
party politics (Harmel and Janda, 1994). In this perspective, the role of party strategy as 
an intermediate between external environment and ideological change comes to fore.  
Finally, the dynamics of party competition varies considerably depending on the 
voting systems and the formats of party systems. To be sure, this is not a big departure 
from Downs, as he too discussed the different incentives and constraints posed by 
mutli-partyism as opposed to two-partyism. The relationship between voting systems 
and party systems‟ formats - i.e. the number and size of parties gaining representation 
(Sartori, 1976) -  is a highly controversial topic in political science, not only because the 
direction of causality is debatable (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Colomer, 2005), but 
also because the high number of variants within the former, the interaction of 
„mechanical‟ and „psychological‟ effects (Duverger, 1954), and the interfering of other 
factors – such as the underlying cleavage structure (Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997) - 
make the terms of the relationship rather uncertain. Yet, it is widely recognized that, 
where two-party systems exist, majoritarian voting systems tend to underpin and 
preserve them, while proportional representation are more permissive in translating the 
pluralist positions which are present in the electorate into multi-partyism (Sartori, 1994, 
p. 40-41). What is of interest here is that scholars have discussed the implications of 
these different dynamics for regionalist parties‟ ideological positioning (Newman, 
1997). In particular it has been argued that regionalist parties competing under 
majoritarian voting systems and in two party systems face an incentive to adopt 
                                                                                                                                               
sufficient differentiation of the ideologies/policies on offer (decidability), and potential threat for 
incumbents to lose office at any election (vulnerability).  
13
 Drawing on Strøm (1990) and Deschouwer (1992), Harmel and Janda include „intra-party democracy 
maximization‟ as a fourth possible objective pursued by political parties (Harmel and Janda, 1994, p. 
269). This is defined as the willingness to state loud and clear what party members stand for, even at the 
cost of electoral losses, of not getting into office and of a lack of influence on policy.  
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moderate positions on the left-right and radical positions on the centre-periphery 
dimensions. In contrast, under proportional representation and in multi-party systems, 
regionalist parties can choose whether to adopt radical or moderate positions on both 
dimensions.  
 
1.4 Research design, methodology, case-selection and data. 
The research design combines in-depth analysis of and limited comparison 
amongst four individual regionalist parties - Plaid Cymru - The Party of Wales (PC), the 
Scottish National Party (SNP), the Südtiroler Volkspartei – South Tyrolean People‟s 
Party (SVP), and the Lega Nord – Northern League (LN) - distributed in two Western 
European states, Italy and the UK, with a wider comparative analysis including the 43 
most successful regionalist parties in Western Europe. In terms of time frame, the 
analysis of the four cases covers their entire life span, while the wider comparative 
analysis covers the post WWII period. The rationale of the design serves the purpose of 
theory building: 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 Charles Ragin classifies social and political research as qualitative, comparative 
or quantitative (Ragin, 1994). The first is characterized by in-depth research on one or 
few case-studies, the second compares a medium number of cases with considerable 
loss of information about each case, and the third is characterized by variable oriented, 
statistical analysis on very high number of cases. Qualitative research is particularly 
suitable for exploring difference and developing new theories (ibid, p. 51). The in-depth 
analysis of the four parties aims at understanding the cases in their complexity and to 
compare and contrast them in order to extract (also inductively) potentially 
generalizable patterns. First of all, it allows us to explore in detail the environment in 
which a given party acts, drawing a rather precise picture of the socio-structural, 
institutional, political and electoral context, as well as over-time changes in that context. 
At the same time, the in-depth approach permits us to escape a deterministic inference 
of ideological adaptation from the simple analysis of the environment. Indeed, it gives 
the opportunity to shed light on the interplay of different factors and on the role of 
In-depth analysis 
of 4 cases 
Hypothesis 
generation 
Hypothesis testing 
on 43 parties 
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agency acting not only within, but also upon the environment. It makes it possible to 
appreciate the historical process, stressing the importance of the timing of events. It 
provides the opportunity to analyse parties as complex organizations, with their internal 
politics, generational change, leadership change, etc., thus paying attention to the above 
mentioned (non formal) theories concerning party ideological change (Panebianco, 1988; 
Deschouwer, 1992; Harmel and Janda, 1994). In this respect, the case study approach 
allows us to orientate the research also towards „understanding motivations‟, rather than 
simply „explaining causal relations‟ (Della Porta and Keating, 2008, p. 3). It gives the 
opportunity of investigating decision-makers‟ perception of their environment and, 
therefore, their motives for taking certain strategic decisions rather than others: 
“‟[p]erception‟ is the intermediate variable that has to be placed between objective facts 
and the reactions of parties” (Deschouwer, 1992, p. 17, quoted in Harmel and Janda, 
1994, p. 264). Interviews conducted with politicians of the four parties, as well as their 
writings and internal party documents represent the best sources for grasping the 
perception of the decision makers and how such perception affected strategic decisions. 
Finally, in-depth analysis of the four parties and comparison between them give the 
chance to pick up certain aspects of the cases which might prove generalizable within 
the universe of regionalist parties but to which general theories of party change have so 
far devoted little attention. Indeed, an important aim of this part of the research is to 
generate hypotheses, either by the theoretically driven study of cases or, inductively, by 
the observation of patterns emerging form their comparative analysis. Some of these 
hypotheses can then be evaluated/tested on a much wider set of cases. 
 The logic behind the restricted comparison of the four cases and, therefore, 
behind their selection is to allow a wide exploration of the possible combinations 
between socio-structural and political/institutional environments, on the one hand, and 
party ideologies, on the other hand. The two states taken into consideration, Italy and 
the UK, differ in several respects. Historically, British identity was forged after the 
creation of the British state, while Italian identity, at least amongst elites, was the 
driving force for the creation of the Italian state. These different historical routes to 
„nation-statehood‟ can still be observed in the predominance of the ius sanguinis in Italy 
for the attribution of citizenship, as opposed the predominance of the ius soli in the UK. 
In addition, Italy is a classic example of policephalic state, with the central and northern 
part of the country belonging to the medieval „city belt‟ of Europe, while the UK is a 
classic example of monocephalic states, which emerged in the northern-western 
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periphery of (medieval) Europe. From a socio-cultural point of view, Italy has been a 
classic example of mono-religious Catholic (counter-Reformist) state, while the UK is 
an example of multi-confessional, predominantly protestant state. From a 
political/institutional point of view, (post WW2) Italy has been a classic example of a 
parliamentary regime with a rigid constitution, several veto points, proportional 
representation and multi-partyism. The changes to the voting system in 1993 and in 
2005 have significantly affected the dynamics of party competition but have not led to 
the advent of single-party governments. In contrast, the UK is the classic example of a 
„Westminster‟ parliamentary regime, with a flexible constitution, few or no veto points, 
majoritarian representation and a two-party system. Even in terms of policy, especially 
in the economic area, the two countries have diverged significantly in the last thirty 
years, with Italy being amongst the champions of the borrowing and spending approach 
while the UK led the „neo-liberal revolution‟ in Western Europe. The two states have, 
until very recently, also been at odds on the question of European integration, in terms 
of both government and public opinion positions: Italy having been one of the most 
Europhile states and the UK often taking the lead in opposing further integration.                
 The four regions taken into consideration also present many differences amongst 
themselves. Demographically, South Tyrol represents about 1 percent of Italy‟s 
population, Wales and Scotland represent about 5 and 8 percent of UK‟s population 
respectively. In contrast, Padania (or Northern Italy) represents more than 50 percent of 
Italy‟s population. Even if only the two core regions, Lombardy and Veneto, are taken 
into consideration, they still represent nearly a quarter of the Italian population. In 
economic terms, South Tyrol produces about 1.2 percent of the national GDP and has a 
GDP per capita approaching 140 percent of the national average. Lombardy and Veneto 
produce nearly 30 percent of Italy‟s GDP and their GDP per capita exceeds 125 percent 
of the national average. In contrast, Wales has always been amongst the poorest regions 
in the UK reaching down to 70 percent of national average in terms of GDP per capita. 
Scotland has traditionally been below the national average too (though not as much as 
Wales), although in recent years it has reached a level of GDP per capita in line with the 
national average. In terms of ethno-linguistic distinctiveness, South Tyrol stands out for 
the presence of the German-speaking minority, which represents a strong majority 
within the region. South Tyrol also stands out as a contested territory between two states, 
Italy and Austria, thus representing a case of irredentism. Wales hosts a linguistic 
minority too: the Welsh-speakers. However, they only represent about a fifth of the 
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Welsh population. In contrast, ethno-linguistic distinctiveness is negligible in Scotland 
and Padania. Finally, the institutional history of the four territories is very different. 
Wales has never been a united and independent state. In addition it was incorporated 
within England in the sixteenth century and, as part of England, within the UK in the 
eighteenth century. In contrast, Scotland was a united and independent state until 1707, 
when it joined England to form the UK, and retained some institutional peculiarities 
within the union. South Tyrol was for centuries part of Austria, within which it 
maintained a degree of self-government, before it was annexed by Italy in 1919. 
Padania has never existed as a united and independent state. It has always been 
fragmented and some of its regions fell, in some periods, under foreign (i.e. non Italic) 
rule. The two core regions, Lombardy and Veneto, were united under Austrian rule from 
1815 to 1859 and 1866 respectively, when they were annexed into the newly formed 
Italian state. In spite of all these differences amongst the two states and the four regions, 
the two couples of regions belonging to the same state present some similarities, 
especially in economic terms. The multiple possible comparisons – cross-regional, 
cross-national and cross-regional/intra-national – allow, therefore, the opportunity of 
extrapolating different insights from the analysis of the four cases.          
 Data concerning this part of the study have been gathered from different sources. 
Priority was given to primary sources: party documents, interviews, publications by top 
party members, opinion polls, election studies and newspapers‟ articles. However, 
previous academic publications have also been precious sources, especially for 
analysing less recent periods of parties‟ histories. Party ideology and ideological change 
was evaluated on the basis of party documents (primarily but not exclusively party 
manifestos), public speeches of leaders or prominent members, polls and electoral 
studies, extant literature and interviews. It is worth re-stating that the present study does 
not rely on formal models of party competition and it is not interested in quantitative 
measurement of ideological positioning. What is of interest here is discerning 
ideological repositioning within the party systems these actors are competing in. 
Ordinal positions vis à vis their competitors, therefore, are more important than cardinal 
ones, and qualitative thresholds – such as the distinction between secession and 
autonomy, between radical and mainstream left (or right), between pro and against 
further European integration – are sufficient to chart significant party ideological 
change. Secondary literature and opinion polls have been used to draw a picture of the 
environments in which these four parties act, both in socio-structural and 
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institutional/political terms. Interviews, publications by party leaders and top party 
members, internal party documents and newspaper articles were crucial to grasp the 
perception of the environment and the logic of the strategic responses adopted by party 
elites, as well as the dynamics of internal party politics which accompanied such 
strategic decisions.         
 The last chapter is devoted to comparative analysis with a higher number of 
cases for the identification of broad patterns (Ragin, 1994, p. 51). As mentioned before, 
the generation of hypotheses comes from the comparative analysis of the four cases, 
while the evaluation/testing is carried out by extending the comparison to 43 parties 
acting in 26 regions and 7 different Western European states, with the list of cases 
presented in the last chapter. Suffice here to say that they were selected on the basis of 
their electoral success. More precisely only regionalist parties – that is to say those 
parties which fall within the definition provided above (including the few border-line 
cases) – that have fulfilled the following criteria in the post WWII period have been 
selected: a) electing representatives to the regional assembly on, at least, three 
consecutive occasions; b) in the case of new parties that have not contested three 
regional elections yet, the criterion is either electing representatives on two occasions or 
getting into office (at regional level) at the first election; c) in the cases where an elected 
regional assembly does not exist (or did not exist in the past), the criterion is electing 
representatives to the central parliament. Electoral relevance, as far as the selection of 
the 43 cases is concerned, is not defined, therefore, in terms of Sartorian relevance in 
the party system.
14
 What is of interest here is that the selected parties have been 
successful enough to be sensitive to the electoral driver of party competition. Indeed, as 
discussed in the previous section, one of the two logics that are used in order to reach 
general conclusions is represented by Downs‟ approach, which sees ideology as 
adapting strategically to the conditions of the electoral environment. This approach 
obviously entails a strong loss of complexity, which is almost inevitable if 
generalization has to be achieved.  
One problem is represented by the difficulty of gathering quantitative data on 
the socio-economic and socio-cultural attitudes of the 26 regional electorates. These 
data do exist but just for some of the regions. In addition, they are dispersed and 
available in different languages. Therefore, while the collection of this kind of data 
                                                 
14
 Sartori‟s definition of relevance rests on the „coalitional‟ or „blackmail‟ potential of parties in the party 
system, i.e. it strictly related to conditions for government formation (Sartori, 1976, p. 121-24). 
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should be carried out in the future, possibly as a collective enterprise of country (or 
region) experts, a different approach has been adopted here. The regions have been 
classified in terms of their ethnic distinctiveness, institutional history and economic 
status using secondary sources as well as OECD regional statistics. As specified in the 
previous section, the link between the macro-characteristics of the regions and the 
preferences of their electorates lies in the tradition of comparative historical sociology 
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Case studies on the specific parties, edited collections and 
comparative studies constitute the main source for discerning the ideological 
positioning of the 43 parties.   
The technique used for hypothesis testing is rather rudimentary, as it consists of 
a series of cross tabulations accompanied by a discussion of emerging (or non emerging) 
patterns, as well as a discussion of specific cases either because they fit some patterns 
particularly well, therefore become „paradigmatic‟, or because of their deviance from 
such patterns. However, in spite of the rudimentary technique adopted for the 
comparative analysis, this study reaches interesting conclusions which: a) confirm some 
of the findings of previous research, b) qualify and refine other previous findings, c) 
provide a systematization of the state of the art, d) point out new insights and move our 
theoretical and comparative knowledge of regionalist parties‟ ideological positioning 
forward.  
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Chapter 2.  
Plaid Cymru – The Party of Wales 
 
 Plaid Cymru is an old party, born in the inter-war period. Although from the very 
beginning it aimed to represent the whole of Wales, thus characterizing itself as a 
regionalist party, until the early 1960s it was first and foremost an ethnic party, primarily 
concerned with the protection of the Welsh language and electorally confined to the 
Welsh speaking areas of Wales. To be sure, the strong link between PC and the use of the 
Welsh language has never disappeared, as the electoral geography of the party clearly 
demonstrates. Yet, the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales (NAW) in 
1999 has definitely contributed to make PC a truly Wales-wide party. 
The early 1960s also marked the start of a permanent and primary focus on 
electoral politics. It is from that period, therefore, that the party‟s ideological 
development started to respond to electoral strategies and, hence, to the social and 
electoral environment of Wales, whereas in the previous period it had mainly depended 
on the personal convictions of its prominent figures, almost independently of electoral 
considerations. Since then, especially as far as the left-right dimension is concerned, the 
party appears to have adopted a „fitter‟ ideological position vis a vis the Welsh 
environment.  
 With Wales making up less than 5 percent of the UK population, the core of the 
party‟s activities is definitely the regional and then, some way behind, the local level. 
This is also confirmed by the „dual voting‟ which rewards PC in Welsh elections and 
penalizes it in general elections. The establishment of the NAW has also introduced the 
possibility of multi-party or minority governments with consequent governmental 
agreements amongst parties, thus adding another driver of ideology/policy adaptation. 
After the 2007 Welsh elections the party entered office for the first time as a junior 
partner with Welsh Labour.      
  
 
2.1. Party Profile: Origins and Political Achievements  
 
2.1.1 The historical origins of the centre/periphery cleavage in Wales  
 
The ancient roots of the centre-periphery cleavage in Wales date back to the 
Anglo-Saxon invasion and occupation of (most parts of) Britain. The Britons, under the 
pressure of the Germanic invaders moved westward, remaining confined in three 
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enclaves relatively isolated from each other: Cornwall in the south-west, Cumbria and 
Strathclyde in the north-west, and the west peninsula of Wales. The Britons, who spoke 
Brythonic, a Celt language, were called „the strangers‟ by the Saxon (W(e)alas or Welsh), 
whereas they called themselves „Y Cymry‟, that is „the compatriots‟ in Brythonic (Davies, 
1982, p. 112).
15
 Probably due to its geographical characteristics, Wales remained the 
most resistant enclave to Anglo-Saxon political and cultural penetration. Offa‟s Dyke, 
built in the late eighth century, represented for centuries the territorial divide between the 
Welsh kingdoms, on one side, and the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms, on the other side (Dodd, 
1977, p. 1). The fact that the current „border‟ between Wales and England coincide to a 
very large extent with it, testifies to the importance of the pre-Norman period in 
understanding the genesis of the centre-periphery cleavage. However, to speak of a 
national Welsh identity in the middle ages, intended as a sense of belonging to the people 
living in Wales, would be misleading. At that time, the Welsh freemen were divided 
between a local identity, a sense of belonging to the gwlad („local community‟, at those 
times coinciding with a local kingdom or part of it), and a pan-Briton identity. The latter, 
not only included the other Brythonic enclaves of their time, but referred to the pre-
Saxon, and even to pre-Roman, historical periods when the ancient Britons were the 
masters of Britain (Williams, 1979, p. 5). This ante litteram „British identity‟ of the 
Welsh, which was maintained by the historical/mythological literature portraying them as 
the lawful landlords of Britain, became soon evident to the new Norman invaders. 
According to the author of a fourteenth-century biography of Edward II: 
 
The Welsh, formerly called the Britons, were once noble crowned over the whole 
realm of England; but they were expelled by the Saxons and lost both the name and 
the kingdom. The fertile plains went to the Saxons; but the sterile and mountainous 
districts to the Welsh. But from the saying of the prophet Merlin they still hope to 
recover England. Hence it is that the Welsh frequently rebel, hoping to give effect to 
the prophecy.  (cited in Williams, 1979, p. 11). 
 
  
In fact, it was the fight against Norman invasion (starting in the late thirteenth century), 
the consequent capitulation to alien rule and the great revolt led by Owain Glyn Dwr 
(between the fourteenth and fifteenth century) which contributed to create a Welsh 
national identity. Historian Gwyn A. Williams argues that if “there is doubt about Welsh 
                                                 
15
 The name „Cymry‟ started to be widely used at the time of the Anglo-Saxon invasion but became the 
most commonly used only from the thirteenth century onwards, replacing the term „Brythoniaid‟ 
(Britons). Both names, at least initially, referred to all Britons, not only those living the Wales‟ peninsula 
(Davies, 1993). 
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consciousness, even Welsh nationalism, before the revolt, there can be none after it… 
Modern Wales, in short, really begins in 1410” (cited in Williams, 1979, p. 13). 
However, the failure of Owain‟s great revolt and the annexation of Wales within 
the English kingdom in the following century (1535-42), with the consequent 
replacement of the Welsh law by the English one, ended any residual autonomy. The 
relative ease with which the Welsh accepted absorption into England and the lack of 
subsequent serious attempts to break away can be put down to three factors. First, the 
Welsh had proven unable to sustain military confrontation with England. Second, the 
coming to power of a new dynasty – the Tudors – which could be claimed (at least 
partially) as Welsh, made it easier to accept the London based monarchy, which was 
perceived no more as English but as British (Williams, 1979, p. 17). In addition to this, 
the Tudors‟ accommodating strategy, in contrast with the ruthless abuses pursued by the 
previous monarchs, allowed the Welsh to keep using Welsh customary laws and 
conceded local administration to the Welsh gentry. Thirdly, in contrast to the Irish, the 
Welsh came to accept religious Reformation and the break away from Roman 
Catholicism. In fact, through the wide diffusion of non-conformist denominations at the 
expense of Anglicanism between the eighteenth and the early twentieth century,
16
 Wales 
regained a certain religious distinctiveness vis a vis its bigger neighbour. However, the 
abandonment of the Catholic faith meant that the national Welsh/English divide was 
never underpinned by the Catholic/Anglican clash that poisoned Irish/English relations 
(ibid, p. 18-9).   
In the following three centuries, the union of England (including Wales) and 
Scotland, the common protestant faith, the colonial and continental (European) wars, the 
industrial revolution and growing demographic movements across the three countries of 
Britain, contributed to forge a British national identity which also encompassed the 
Welsh one (Colley, 1992). In addition, the political, administrative, economic and, to a 
lesser extent, religious and cultural assimilation of Wales into England became so 
marked that it led to considering the former as a mere region of the latter.
17
  
As this brief historical outline shows, the complete integration of Wales into 
England was facilitated, if not determined, by the fact that Wales had never been a state. 
Therefore, there was no institutional legacy on which Welsh nationalism could build. 
                                                 
16
 By the middle years of the nineteenth century, three quarters of the Welsh population had abandoned 
the established Church of England in favour of dissenting denominations (McAllister, 2001, p. 45). 
17
 The nineteenth century Encyclopaedia Britannica‟s dismissing note “For Wales see England” is 
particularly telling (Elis Thomas, 1991, p. 57).  
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Only two elements kept the centre-periphery cleavage alive, though largely dormant for a 
long period of time. The first element was actually something external to Wales. That is 
the persisting saliency of the centre-periphery question within UK politics, mainly due to 
the drive of Irish (and in more recent times Scottish) nationalism. The Liberal party‟s 
turn to „Home Rule all around‟ in the 1880s originated primarily from pressures coming 
from Ireland, but it had a very important effect on Wales. It was the first time that a 
British party took up some of the peripheral nationalist grievances and, in Wales, this 
meant the first significant (re)politicization of the centre-periphery cleavage. However, 
by the 1920s, the decline of the Liberal party and the de facto dropping of the „Home 
Rule‟ policy by the rising Labour party left the Welsh nationalist question politically 
unrepresented. The second element was the Welsh language, the very distinctive feature 
of Wales vis a vis England and the whole UK. Despite English penetration, the Welsh 
language remained widely spoken until the late nineteenth century (Jenkins, 1997). 
However, in the first decades of the twentieth century, growing industrialization, 
urbanization and military campaigns determined a sharp decline. In fact, it was the 
combined effect of British parties‟ lack of interest in the Welsh question, the recent 
political developments in Ireland, and the threat posed to the survival of the Welsh 
language that, in the mid 1920s, led a small group of nationalist to take action.  
In 1924, two nationalist organizations were formed (Davies, 1983, p. 35-40). The 
first, a secret organisation led by Saunders Lewis and Ambrose Bebb, was created in 
Penarth, South Wales. This was a group of academics and intellectuals, with little or no 
experience of political engagement, primarily concerned with the fate of the Welsh 
language. The organisation was called Mudiad Cymreig (Welsh Movement). The second 
one was formed in Caernarfon, North Wales, on the initiative of travelling salesman H. R. 
Jones and others, such as Rev. Lewis Valentine. Although the North Wales group was 
also made up of people with little or no political experience, their organization was set up 
with the intention of creating a new political party. Indeed, it was initially called Byddin 
Ymreolwyr Cymru  (Welsh Home Rule Army) but was renamed few months later Plaid 
Genedlaethol Cyrmu (The Welsh Nationalist Party).  
 
2.1.2 Party birth, electoral expansion and political achievements 
After contacts and negotiations between H. R. Jones and Saunders Lewis, a 
meeting was held in August 1925, at Pwllheli in North-west Wales, where the members 
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of Mudiad Cymreig joined Plaid Genedlaethol Cyrmu,
18
 thus giving birth to a unified 
Welsh nationalist party (Davies, 1983, p. 61). It was decided that the leaders of the South 
Wales group would join the executive committee of the new party, while the leaders of 
the North Wales group would retain their previous party posts, with Rev. Lewis 
Valentine as party president, and the party headquarters remained at Caernarfon. 
The first five years were decisive for the creation of a party image which proved 
difficult to change in the following decades. The Mudiad Cymreig group, whose 
intellectual superiority was beyond doubt, assumed the political leadership for what 
concerned the definition of the party ideals and, to a much lesser extent, strategies and 
objectives. Saunders Lewis, the party leader from 1926 to 1939 (see Table 2.1), and most 
of the early leadership were primarily concerned with the rescue and revitalization of the 
Welsh language.  
Lewis was very sceptical about electoral politics, especially concerning UK 
general elections, as a means of pursuing the party primary objective.
19
 His approach to 
political engagement, as well his ideological orientations, was rather elitist, which did not 
make him an ideal leader at the time of the emergence of mass electoral politics. He 
seemed more preoccupied with winning the intellectual argument, thus making the party 
act as a think-tank or a pressure group, rather than with getting support from the voters 
(McAllister, 2001, p. 24-5). This elitist distaste for the electoral market also meant that 
party ideology and policy was shaped entirely by the ideas of the party leaders, in 
complete disregard of voters‟ preferences and concerns. The primary (and for some years 
also exclusive) objective of making Wales a monolingual Welsh speaking region, for 
instance, made the party very unappealing to the non-Welsh speaking majority of Wales‟ 
population, thus creating the worst conditions for electoral expansion. In fact, from an 
electoral perspective, Lewis represented a crucial obstacle for the development of Plaid 
Cymru, which remained for long time de facto a cultural/political organization confined 
to the Welsh speaking areas of North-west and West Wales, rather than a real „Wales-
wide‟ political party. On the other hand, this approach provided the party with a social 
constituency, the Welsh speakers, whose votes could be targeted.  
 
                                                 
18
 The party shortened its name to Plaid Cyrmu in 1945, getting rid of the heavy loaded adjective 
„Genedlaethol‟ (nationalist), and added the English version „The Party of Wales‟ only in 1998 (Van 
Morgan, 2006). 
19
 He was determined to limit the party‟s electoral commitment to local elections in Wales. When the executive 
committee decided to try and contest Westminster seats too, he urged the candidates not to take up their post as MPs 
in case they were elected. This policy was, however, reversed in the early 1930s (Davies, 1983, p. 72).  
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Table 2.1 
Party leaders 1925-2009 
 
Lewis Valentine 1925-26 President 
Saunders Lewis 1926-39 President 
J. E. Daniel 1939-43 President 
Abi Williams 1943-45 President 
Gwynfor Evans 1945-81 President 
Dafydd Wigley 1981-84 President 
D. Elis-Thomas 1984-91 President 
Dafydd Wigley 1991-00 President and NAW group leader 
Ieuan Wyn Jones 2000-03 President and NAW group leader 
Dafydd Iwan 2003-06 President 
Ieuan Wyn Jones 2006- NAW group leader 
 
Source: McAllister (2001, p. 63) up to 2000. 
 
From the 1950s, under Evans‟ leadership, the party started to devote more 
energies and attention to contesting elections but it was only in 1962, when a separate 
Welsh Language Society (Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg) was created,
20
 that Plaid Cymru 
became a „proper‟ political party, fully committed to electoral politics. However, as 
shown in Table 2.2, general election outcomes have generally been rather frustrating, 
both in terms of votes and, even more, in terms of seats. Indeed, the launch of the Welsh 
Office by the Labour government in 1964, which constituted the first significant 
institutional recognition of Wales as a separate entity, can hardly be attributed to 
electoral pressure coming from Plaid. 
  In 1966, Evans managed to win a by-election in the Carmarthen constituency 
becoming the first Plaid‟s MP and the first representative of a (non Irish) minority-
nationalist party to seat in Westminster. It is arguable that such unexpected election 
(combined with a successful by-election for the SNP in Scotland in 1967) influenced the 
decision of the Government in 1968 to set up the Royal Commission on the Constitution 
(mostly known as Kilbrandon Commission) with the aim of discussing a possible 
devolution reform. In any case, Evans‟s election gave a strong boost to party confidence 
in its electoral chances and led it, in the 1970 election, to contest all Westminster seats in 
Wales for the first time in its history. It is also arguable that, although the disproportional 
effects of the FPTP voting system nullified the very good performance of the 1970 
                                                 
20
 The decision to create the Welsh Language Society was urged by a dramatic appeal to save the Welsh language 
launched by Saunders Lewis in a radio lecture (Christiansen, 1998, p. 127).  
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election, when the party obtained its best pre-devolution result (11.5 of the popular vote 
in Wales), such electoral growth added some pressure on the still working Kilbrandon 
Commission.  
 
 
Table 2.2 
UK General Election Results in Wales, 1945-2005 
 
  
Conservative 
 
Labour 
 
Lib Dem 
 
Plaid Cyrmu 
 
Year Votes  Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
 
1945 
 
22.6 
 
4 
 
58.5 
 
25 
 
14.9 
 
6 
 
1.1 
 
0 
1950 27.4 4 58.4 27 12.6 5 1.2 0 
1951 30.8 6 60.5 27 7.6 3 0.8 0 
1955 29.9 6 57.6 27 7.3 3 3.2 0 
1959 32.6 7 56.5 27 5.3 2 5.2 0 
1964 29.4 6 57.8 28 7.3 2 4.8 0 
1966 27.8 3 60.7 32 6.3 1 4.3 0 
1970 27.7 7 51.6 27 6.8 1 11.5 0 
1974 (Feb) 25.9 8 46.8 24 16.0 2 10.7 2 
1974 (Oct) 23.9 8 49.5 23 15.5 2 10.8 3 
1979 32.2 11 47.0 21 10.6 1 8.1 2 
1983 31.0 14 37.5 20 23.2 2 7.8 2 
1987 29.5 8 45.1 24 17.9 3 7.3 3 
1992 28.6 6 49.5 27 12.4 1 8.8 4 
1997 19.6 0 54.7 34 12.4 2 9.9 4 
2001 21.0 0 48.6 34 13.8 2 14.3 4 
2005 
 
21.4 3 42.7 29 18.4 4 12.6 3 
 
Source: Van Morgan (2006); Massetti (2009b). 
 
In the 1974 elections, despite a slight decrease of votes, Plaid elected three (in 
February) and then two MPs (in October). In conjunction with the startling results of the 
SNP in Scotland, the performance of PC pushed the Labour government to try and 
implement the suggestions of the Kilbrandon Commission, which had recommended 
limited devolution of powers to Wales. However, as shown in Table 2.3, Plaid Cymru 
and the „Yes camp‟ were defeated in the 1979 referendum for the final approval of the 
Wales Act, suggesting a very limited capacity to pull the Welsh electorate towards 
endorsing its core political objectives.  
Failure in the 1979 devolution referendum also negatively affected the party‟s 
score in the general election of the same year, leading to the set up of an internal 
Commission of Inquiry devoted to a deep and extensive reflection on Plaid‟s strategy, 
ideology and policy. After two decades of increasing commitment to electoral politics, 
  
35 
 
Plaid had taken full awareness that party strategy, ideology and policy could not be 
developed independently of the electoral market.   
In the 1980s the party managed to hold onto its heartland constituencies in spite 
of overall electoral decline. In 1987 Plaid Cymru entered into an alliance with the 
Scottish National Party, with the hope that in a hung Parliament a group of „Celtic‟ 
nationalist could play an influential role in government formation. A hung parliament has 
never materialized since but the co-operation of the Welsh and Scottish nationalist MPs 
has remained to the present day. Instead, the main political success of the 1980s came 
form extra-electoral activities. In 1981, after Evans had threatened to starve himself to 
death, the Conservative government agreed to establish a Welsh-language TV channel 
(Christiansen, 1998, p. 128).  
The 1990s witnessed a slight increase in electoral support and more importantly 
the major political achievement of the party, the establishment of a National Assembly 
for Wales (NAW) with secondary legislative powers in specified policy areas.
21
 Once 
again, it would be hard to argue that the Labour government‟s initiative to establish an 
elected regional government in Wales was dictated by electoral pressure from Plaid. The 
very narrow victory (see Table 2.3) in the 1997 referendum on the government bill 
testifies to the fact that the Welsh electorate was not solidly won over to the argument of 
Wales‟ self-government, Plaid‟s core mission. 
However, the establishment of the NAW with a slightly more proportional voting 
system
22
 (compared to the traditional FPTP), has changed completely the opportunity 
structure in which the party operates, creating for the first time a „Wales-wide‟ and 
„Wales alone‟ arena for party politics, and thus leading to the emergence of a real Welsh 
party system (Massetti, 2009b). In NAW elections Plaid Cymru has had the chance to 
present itself as the only party that „has no bosses in London‟ and, therefore, the best 
uncompromising defender of Welsh interests. This favourable condition has helped it 
achieve a much higher score in NAW elections (see Table 2.4) than in Westminster ones. 
 
 
                                                 
21
 These are Agriculture, Monuments, Culture, Economic development, Education, Environment, food, 
Health Services, Transport, Local Government, Public Administration, Social Welfare, Sport, Tourism, 
Urban and rural planning, and the Welsh Language. 
22
 The Assembly is made of sixty members (AMs). Forty are elected in FPTP constituency, which 
correspond to the forty Westminster constituencies. Twenty are elected from party lists in regional 
districts (5), so to compensate for the disproportional allocation of the FPTP vote. The voting system is 
therefore a case of Mixed Member Proportional (MMP), also called Additional Member System (AMS).  
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Table 2.3 
Devolution referendum results in Wales (1979 and 1997) 
 
  
% of those who voted 
 
% of the whole electorate 
 
Turn out 
 
  
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
1979 
 
 
20.3 
 
79.7 
 
12 
 
47 
 
59 
 
1997 
 
 
50.3 
 
49.7 
 
25.2 
 
24.9 
 
50.1 
 
 
Table 2.4 
 Welsh Assembly Election Results  
 
 Constituencies Regional lists               Total         
1999 Vote (%) Seats Vote (%) Seats Seats 
Conservative 15.8 1 16.5 8 9 
Labour 37.6 27 35.5 1 28 
Liberal Democrats 13.5 3 12.5 3 6 
Plaid Cyrmu 28.4 9 30.6 8 17 
Others 
 
4.8 0 5.0 0 0 
2003      
Conservative 19.9 1 19.2 10 11 
Labour 40.0 30 36.6 0 30 
Liberal Democrats 14.1 3 12.7 3 6 
Plaid Cyrmu 21.2 5 19.7 7 12 
Others 
 
4.8 1 11.8 0 1 
2007      
Conservative 22.4 5 21.4 7 12 
Labour 32.2 24 29.6 2 26 
Liberal Democrats 14.8 3 11.7 3 6 
Plaid Cyrmu 22.4 7 21.0 8 15 
Others 
 
8.2 1 16.3 0 1 
Source: Massetti (2009b). 
 
  
After the first NAW election in 1999, Plaid emerged as the formal opposition 
party, well ahead of the Conservatives and Liberal-Democrats. For the first time its 
electoral support also spread to South Wales, where it won constituency seats, such  as 
Rhondda and Llanelli, that Labour had held for about eight decades (Scully et al., 2003). 
In 2003, however, Plaid lost votes and seats, largely retreating again to its geographical 
stronghold (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2003).  
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Table 2.5 
Local Election Results, 1973-2008 
  
  
Con 
 
Lab 
 
Lib Dem 
 
Plaid 
 
Indep/Other 
 
Year Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
 
County 1973 
 
12.5 
 
12.0 
 
37.3 
 
48.1 
 
5.3 
 
3.5 
 
9.7 
 
3.1 
 
35.2 
 
33.3 
District 1973 11.0 9.1 33.9 42.0 4.5 2.6 9.1 3.2 41.4 43.1 
District 1976 15.0 14.6 29.1 29.0 4.9 2.6 14.8 8.2 36.1 45.6 
County 1977 22.0 24.4 32.3 34.0 3.8 1.9 16.1 6.8 25.9 32.9 
District 1979 18.6 12.8 37.0 38.5 4.2 2.6 11.2 4.6 29.0 41.5 
District 1983 16.3 13.0 34.8 41.6 12.9 4.1 9.9 4.7 26.1 36.6 
County 1985 15.2 9.1 45.2 53.3 12.9 6.5 8.6 3.6 18.1 27.5 
District 1987 14.1 10.1 37.0 40.2 15.0 6.1 8.7 6.4 25.1 37.2 
County 1989 16.5 7.3 46.0 55.4 7.3 4.4 8.8 5.1 21.4 27.7 
District 1991 13.3 7.6 38.1 41.7 9.4 5.5 11.2 8.3 28.0 36.8 
County 1993 12.5 6.4 47.1 54.2 10.9 6.8 13.3 8.2 16.2 24.5 
Unitary 1995 8.1 3.3 43.6 57.1 10.2 6.2 12.5 8.9 25.5 24.5 
Unitary 1999 10.1 5.9 34.4 44.3 13.4 7.7 18.2 16.1 23.8 25.9 
Unitary 2004 9 8.6 38 37.9 12 11.7 14 13.6 28 28.1 
Unitary 2008 n.d 13.9 n.d 27.2 n.d 12.9 n.d 16.3 n.d 29.6 
 
Source: Van Morgan (2006) for the data between 1973 and 1999. For the 2004 and 2008 election results, 
House of Commons, “Local Election 2004”, Library Research paper 04/49, and “Local election 2008”, 
Library Research paper 08/48 available respectively at: 
www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2004/rp04-049.pdf 
www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2008/rp08-048.pdf 
 
 
 
Table 2.6 
European Election Results in Wales 
 
  
Conservative 
 
 
Labour 
 
Lib Dem 
 
Plaid Cymru 
Year Votes Seat Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
 
1979 36.6 1 41.5 3 9.6 0 11.7 0 
1984 25.4 1 44.5 3 17.4 0 12.2 0 
1989 23.4 0 48.9 4 3.6 0 12.9 0 
1994 14.6 0 55.9 5 8.7 0 17.1 0 
1999 22.8 1 31.9 2 8.2 0 29.6 2 
2004 19.4 1 32.5 2 10.5 0 17.4 1 
2009 21.2 1 20.3 1 10.7 0 18.5 1 
Source: Van Morgan (2006) and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/vote2004/euro_uk/html/20.stm 
 
 
The NAW voting system has also opened the way to coalition and/or minority 
governments, meaning that Labour is not the only party able get into office and/or to 
shape legislation. The opportunity for Plaid to enter a government coalition materialised 
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after the third NAW election in 2007, when the party recovered both votes and seats, 
including the South Wales constituency seat of Llanelli. Initially, the party negotiated an 
agreement with the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats to form a rainbow-coalition 
government, ousting Labour for the first time. However, such a plan did not work out and 
Plaid decided to accept Labour‟s proposal to form a sort of „grand coalition‟. As a result, 
the party finds itself in office for the first time, with the leader Ieuan Wyn Jones acting as 
Deputy First Minister and Minister of the Economy and Transport, plus two other 
ministers in the Welsh executive (Alun Ffred Jones and Elin Jones, respectively at 
Heritage and Rural Affairs).       
The establishment of the NAW in 1999 appears to have boosted Plaid‟s electoral 
performances in the other electoral arenas. In 2001 the party scored its best result ever in 
UK general elections, with 14.3% of votes in Wales and four elected MPs (see table 2.2). 
In the 1999 local elections, as shown in Table 2.5, Plaid obtained 18.2% of votes and 
16.1% of all councillors in Wales. Although the party has always attributed great 
importance to local elections and had always done slightly better in those than in general 
elections, that was the best result ever. In addition, 1999 was a great year for European 
elections too. For the first time the election of members of the European Parliament in 
the UK was to be made by proportional representation. As Table 2.6 shows, Plaid‟s result 
was astonishingly good, capturing 29.6% of votes and two MEPs.  While in the most 
recent elections the party did considerably worse than in 1999 at all level of government 
(with the exception of local elections 2008), its electoral support remains well above of 
the pre-devolution period. 
Beyond the opportunity to enhance its electoral fortunes and get into office, the 
establishment of the NAW provided an institutional driver for Welsh nationalism and 
identity. In addition, the presence of an Assembly allows for an incremental strategy in 
the pursuit of further objectives. Indeed, the Labour-Plaid government agreement 
included the call of a referendum to enhance the legislative powers of the Assembly, so 
to make it de facto a regional Parliament. The process would not require a vote in 
Westminster because the UK government passed a New Wales Act in 2006, which set 
out the procedure for incremental devolution of powers to the Assembly. However, while 
Plaid appears to be in a very positive trend in terms of policy success, its electoral 
success will depend on its ability to challenge Labour. In this respect, having gone into a 
government coalition with its main competitor may prove counterproductive in purely 
electoral terms.   
  
39 
 
        
2.1.3 Party organization 
In the early years, Saunders Lewis made a great contribution in establishing a 
political organisation which was completely autonomous of the established British 
political parties and, at least from a cultural perspective, in competition with them. From 
the beginning, Plaid Cymru‟s members could not join other parties and were not 
supposed to vote for other parties‟ candidates, even in elections where the party was not 
standing (McAllister, 2001, p. 25).  
Lewis‟ „Wales alone‟ and „Welsh Wales‟ approach contributed to give the new 
party a characterising outlook which distinguished it clearly from the „British‟ parties. 
However, it also created a sort of „red line‟ which made expansion beyond Welsh 
speaking areas of Wales difficult. As Table 2.7 shows, party membership remained 
extremely low in the first five years. However, the launch of a new party journal in 
English (The Welsh Nationalist) in 1932 (ibid), together with increased visibility due to 
direct action,
23
 helped the party increase its membership and expand its organization 
territorially. 
For a party whose most important source of revenue has always been membership 
income, increasing the number of fee-paying members was crucial for stabilizing its 
financial situation. Yet, there has often been considerable laxity in collecting fees from 
members. This issue was addressed several times during the party‟s history. In 1964, 
under the leadership of Gynfor Evans, there was a reform of the system which produced 
a significant improvement (Christiansen, 1998, p. 139). Other reforms were attempted in 
order to make the collection system more effective, particularly after the suggestions 
outlined in Report of the Plaid Cymru Commission of Inquiry (1981), but the overall 
results were limited and temporary. In 2004, the party finally decided to tackle the 
problem by moving to a system of direct debit payment, with considerable beneficial 
effects for the party financial stability. Plaid Cymru still relies almost exclusively on 
membership fees and small donations, with virtually no funds coming from businesses or 
unions (interview with then Chief Executive Dafydd Trystan Davies, Cardiff, 01/12/06). 
Under Saunders Lewis‟ leadership, the party worked very much as a top-down 
organization, where the leaders/intellectuals held lectures in party summer schools to 
„educate‟ the followers on the case for Welsh nationalism. 
                                                 
23
 The most famous action was the attack in 1936 to the RAF Penyberth air base, which had just been 
built in the heart of Welsh speaking Wales. 
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Table 2.7 
Number of party branches and membership 
 
Year N. of branches Membership 
 
1925 
1930 
1933 
1939 
1945 
1964 
1970 
1985 
1992 
1995 
1999 
2006 
 
 
 
58 
119 
150 
241 
300 
100 
180 
 
220 
210 
 
 
120 
500 
 
3,750 
6,050 
2,199* 
40,000 
 
7,000 
10,000 
16,000 
8,000* 
 
Source: Davies (1983, p. 270), McAllister, (1981, p. 248), McAllister (2001, p. 97), and interview with D. 
Trystan Davies (Cardiff, 01/12/06). 
 
*Only fee-paying members counted.  
 
However, the organizational structure which emerged from the 1930s
24
 onwards 
was very decentralised, offering party members plenty of autonomy in the local 
branches‟ administration and, at least potentially, a significant say in the policy making 
process. This grassroots ethos has remained a characteristic of the party to the present 
day, carrying important consequences for the way the party has reacted to changing 
external conditions and how it has been affected by waves of incoming new members in 
particular periods.  
The formal organizational structure of the party, despite several reforms carried 
out during its long history, has remained largely the same. The Branches constitute the 
primary level of the organization. Their territorial dimension has changed several times, 
mainly after the drawing and re-drawing of local election districts. At present, they 
should be coterminous with the boundaries of Unitary Authority electoral wards but, in 
fact, there are many exceptions to this general rule (interview with D. Trystan Davies, 
Cardiff, 01/12/06). The Branches, which at present time are formed by a minimum of ten 
members, are responsible for the party activities within their area. They are grouped 
within the boundaries of the electoral constituency and report to the Constituency 
                                                 
24
 The Annual Conference became the supreme venue for policy making in 1933. Until then, it was the 
Executive Committee that drafted party policy (Davies, 1983, p. 85). 
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Committees. The latter, currently based on the forty Westminster/Assembly single 
member districts, coordinate the activities of Branches, run the electoral campaign in 
their area and are involved in the candidate selection process. Beyond the Constituencies 
and the national bodies there also are Local Government Area Committees and the 
Regional Electoral Area Committees. The latter coordinate electoral activities in the five 
regional districts for the additional members elected in the Assembly by party list.  
The three main collective bodies at national level are the Executive Committee, 
the National Council and the Annual Conference. The latter is normally held once a year 
and it is where all party constituencies are represented. Its most important functions are 
the approval of party policies and the election/confirmation of national party officers. 
The National Council implements the decisions that the Conference has taken. It is 
responsible for determining the party strategy and tactics, and for deciding on the 
membership of the National Policy Forum. In addition it also gives the final approval for 
party manifestos. The Executive Committee is the operative organ of the party. It 
manages party organization and finances, coordinates all party officers elected by the 
Conference, and organizes and directs the electoral campaigns for UK and Wales 
elections. It is worth noting that the professionalization of electoral campaigns has been a 
very recent process for Plaid Cyrmu, which has always used its internal staff. In the 
Welsh Assembly election of 2007 the party, for the first time, relied significantly on 
external agencies (interview to D. Trystan Davies, cit.).  
The most important national officers of the party are the party leader, the 
Treasurer, the Director of Policy, the Director of Elections, the Director of Organization 
and the Director of Communication. As shown in Table 2.1, the leader has traditionally 
been the person elected to the post of president of the party. However, in 2006 the 
constitution was changed in order to designate the group leader in the National Assembly 
for Wales as the overall party leader and to reduce the role of the president (interview to 
D. Trystan Davies, cit.). 
The policy process within Plaid Cymru is rather open and inclusive. All organs of 
the party, including individual branches and constituencies, can submit motions to the 
conference, and the designated committee is prone to admit most proposed motions in the 
conference agenda. However, since Plaid became the official opposition party in the 
Welsh Assembly in 1999 and then a government partner in 2007, the leadership has 
tended to exercise more control over policy making. In particular, the shadow or actual 
NAW ministers play a significant role in shaping policies in their respective areas. A 
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National Policy Forum has been set up, which works closely with the director of policy 
and with the party (shadow or actual) ministers, and often policy proposals are also 
discussed in the National Council. Nonetheless, involvement of the party rank and file 
remains comparatively high, including in the way the manifesto is created. Party 
members in the branches and constituencies are likely to see two or three drafts of the 
manifesto and to feed back on them before the central bodies come up with the final 
version (interview with D. Trystan Davies, cit.). 
 
     
2.2. Party Ideology and Policy: The Centre-Periphery Dimension 
2.2.1 The Legacy of the Inter-War Period 
 The centre-periphery cleavage has been Plaid‟s raison d’etre since its birth 
throughout its history. From the very beginning Plaid has worked at professing, justifying, 
encouraging and enhancing Wales‟ distinctiveness and separateness vis a vis England 
(and the whole UK). As a consequence the core of the party ideology lies in the territorial 
dimension. In particular, as the original name (Welsh Nationalist Party) underscores, 
Plaid was born a (minority-)nationalist party and, despite the fact that in particular 
periods it shied away from using the word „nationalist‟ (or „nationalism‟), it has remained 
a nationalist party throughout its history (McAllister, 2001, p. 21). However, Plaid‟s 
nationalism needs to be qualified.  The party has always professed that the Welsh people 
and Wales, as a defined territory, constitute a distinct „nation‟. Yet, while identifying one 
people and its „natural‟ territory as a „nation‟ represents one of the necessary pillars of 
the nationalist ideology, this, at least in its classic nineteenth century version, is 
completed by a second pillar, which is the idea that each nation shall be provided with an 
independent state. This second pillar, which can be labelled the „constitutional element‟ 
of nationalism, has largely remained in the shadow in the case of Plaid Cymru, either 
overlooked or ambiguously phrased.  
 Once again, the origins of such ambiguity can be traced back to the early years 
and to the legacy of Saunders Lewis. Being first of all a poet and a writer, Lewis‟ ideas 
of nationalism were strongly influenced by early nineteenth century German and Italian 
„romanticism‟, where the language, the music, the history, the „civilization‟ and the 
natural landscape of the nation were celebrated as its most important constituents, leaving 
aside the much less poetic constitutional element. Such a „romantic‟ version of 
nationalism, strongly focused on the issue of the Welsh language, meant that institutional 
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self-government for Wales was not a priority for the party. Actually, during the first five 
years there was no mention about any sort of self-government on party membership 
forms (Davies, 1983, p. 82). The party aimed to achieve “just as much freedom as may 
be necessary to establish and safeguard civilization in Wales” (Plaid Cymru, quoted in 
McAllister, 2001, p. 128). Such lack of policy definition can be partially explained as a 
consequence of a general strategy aimed at avoiding both internal divisions and a sort of 
sectarianism from the beginning. Lewis felt, even before the creation of Plaid Cymru, 
that a new political movement should be a „broad church‟, capable of attracting people 
with different views: “Adopting a definite policy would tie us down before we start 
work” (Lewis, 1923, quoted in McAllister, 2001, p. 24). However, he was also convinced 
that the socio-cultural element of nationalism was far more important than the 
constitutional one. As he himself put it, if it were possible to safeguard the language and 
culture of Wales “without any radical change in the relation of England and Wales, then I 
for my part will be content” (ibid.). In a way, Plaid‟s variety of nationalism reflected the 
history of the nation. Wales had never existed as a state. It had been for many centuries 
the „residue‟ of kingdoms that were formed in Britain by new invaders, until it was 
conquered and embodied in the Kingdom of England. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
Welsh nationalism manifested a certain anti-state, sometimes even anarchic, twist: 
“Nationalism is the defence of the individual soul against the oppression of the centralist, 
imperialist state” (Lewis, 1935, quoted in Davies, 1983, p. 59). In fact, from a 
constitutional perspective, the early years of Plaid Cymru represented a step back, even 
compared to the „Home Rule‟ policy of the Liberal party of the late nineteenth century 
(and of the Labour party in the first decades of the twentieth century). 
 It was the drive of electoral politics, although in the very limited form of 
contesting only one Westminster seat in the 1929 general election, that stimulated the 
party to formulate a policy on its constitutional objective. Rev. Valentine, the party 
candidate, fought the election on a platform very short of detail, to say the least. During 
the campaign it tried to widen his blueprint by adding the vague expressions „Free 
Wales‟ and „Home Rule‟ to the party‟s primary slogan „Welsh Wales‟ (Davies, 1983, p. 
83). However, the disastrous election results (only 609 votes obtained) triggered debate 
on the adoption of a clearer policy stance. Internal discussions mainly concerned whether 
the party should ask for devolution, a choice that would implicitly recognise Westminster 
as the only source of legitimate power, or „Dominion status‟, which would set the party 
on a moderately sovereigntist course. The option of outright „independence‟ also had 
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some supporters within Plaid but since the time of first summer school it had been 
banned by Lewis from the party‟s vocabulary for being an anti-Christian, materialist and 
ultimately dangerous concept (Davies, 1983, p. 82). Lewis nationalist ideas drew 
inspiration from the medieval past, characterized by inter-dependence rather 
„independence‟, by „unity in diversity‟ rather than separation amongst homogeneous 
parts. However, they were also very contemporary, in that they took very seriously the 
attempt to create an international umbrella by the establishment of the League of Nations, 
and even forward-looking if one thinks about global international co-operation and 
European integration in the post-World War Two period.  
 The new party policy was adopted in the run up to the 1931 general election. 
Plaid asked for Wales to be given „Dominion status‟, following the examples of Canada, 
Australia, New Zeeland, South Africa and the Irish Free State. This should have been 
achieved by the establishment of a Welsh Parliament with full legislative, administrative 
and financial powers. Wales would remain loyal to the monarchy and to the 
Commonwealth, recognising the right of the crown to control matters relating to imperial 
defence. „Dominion status for Wales‟ headed the new list of party aims, with the 
protection of Welsh language following suit. The third point was an important corollary 
of the self-government policy, as it stated that Wales should have become a member of 
the League of Nations (Davies, 1983, p. 84). The crisis of the League of Nations in the 
late 1930s, in fact, triggered some internal criticism directed at the party policy position 
on self-government, and calling for a more radical stance. However, the policy remained 
unchanged (Davies, 1983, p. 85).  
 
2.2.2 From Dominion status to the Welsh Senate (1940s-1980s) 
In taking over the party leadership in 1945, Gynfor Evans inherited the „dominion 
status‟ policy which had been designed in the early 1930s. From an ideological 
perspective the party had not elaborated beyond the core concept of nationalism. At best, 
the 1930s had brought about some reflections and rudimentary policy formulations on the 
economic and constitutional elements of nationalism, thus completing the cultural and 
linguistic focus of the 1920s. Yet, Plaid‟s outlook had remained, and would remain until 
well into 1960s, that of a party caring almost exclusively about the Welsh language 
(McAllister, 2001, p. 159).  
Evans also inherited a party whose reputation had been discredited by Bebb and 
Lewis‟ positions on the Fascist regimes in Europe and on UK‟s foreign policy in the run 
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up to and during World War Two.
25
 Even perhaps more importantly, the association of 
Hitler‟s lebensraum creed with nationalism, made the latter word very unpopular for 
several decades after World War Two. It was not by chance that the party decided to get 
rid of the adjective „Glenedaethol‟ (nationalist) in its formal name in 1945. The cosmetic 
change, however, did not help much, at least in the short term, and advocating the cause 
of Welsh nationalism proved extremely difficult in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Still in 
1969, a party pamphlet devoted the opening pages to drawing a distinction between 
oppressive nationalism, such as Nazi Germany‟s, and freedom-seeking nationalism, 
carefully explaining the differences between the two kinds and emphasising that the 
Welsh variety belonged entirely to the latter (Plaid Cyrmu, This is Plaid Cyrmu, 1969, p. 
3). Actually, the issue of whether it was appropriate and/or convenient to refer to the 
party as „nationalist‟ went on well into the 1980s, when the then party leader Dafydd Elis 
Thomas (1984-1991) made a declaration which probably sounded as scandalous to the 
„traditionalist‟ members of the party: “I will never let anyone get away with calling me a 
„nationalist‟ and I will never call myself that, if I ever did” (Elis Thomas, quoted in 
McAllister, 2001, p. 78). 
While Evans‟ long leadership (1945-1981) produced decisive change in terms of 
improving the party organization and focusing on electoral politics, the party elaboration 
of the centre-periphery dimension both in ideological and policy terms showed 
substantive continuity with the inter-war period. Like Lewis, Evans saw the nation as a 
living organic creature which evolves through history and needs to be kept alive by 
ensuring cultural continuity. Even though in the 1960s the „Welsh Wales‟ policy was 
formally dropped in favour of a „bilingual Wales‟, the centrality of the Welsh language in 
Evans‟ nationalist ideology implicitly entailed that it was only the Welsh speaking Welsh 
(not the English speaking Welsh) who contributed to keep the nation alive. That might 
explain why his reform of the party machine and his focus on winning elections led Plaid 
Cymru to considerably strengthen its electoral support in the Welsh speaking areas but it 
proved unable to make significant gains in South and East Wales. Even from the 
constitutional perspective, the party continued with the same policy developed in 1931 
until well into the 1970s, with the only stylistic difference that it was now phrased „self-
                                                 
25
 Bebb had manifested some sympathies for conservative-authoritarian regimes, such as Italian Fascism 
and Spanish Falangism, though not for the „pagan‟ German Nazism. Lewis viewed the conflict not as one 
between democracy (UK and France) vs. authoritarianism (Germany) but as one between competing 
empires. Therefore, he professed that Welsh nationalists should not feel morally compelled to take sides 
and that neutrality was the best option (Davies, 1983).  
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government for Wales within the Commonwealth‟ (Plaid Cymru: 20 Questions&Answers, 
no date, between 1970 and 1972). Actually, as far as membership forms were concerned, 
the adopted formula was even more elusive, stating that the party‟s first aim was simply 
“Self-government for Wales” (Plaid Cymru, Membership Form, between 1970 and 1980, 
no date). 
However Evans‟ focus on electoral politics did produce some change in the sense 
that Plaid‟s nationalism and its policy proposals for constitutional change were now 
included in a wider party programme which outlined in much greater detail the proposals 
in all areas of government. In particular, more attention was devoted to socio-economic 
issues, not only to defend the cause of Welsh self-government from an economic 
perspective but also to propose solutions to immediate problems, independently of 
constitutional change. In addition, electoral strategy, more than party beliefs, seemed to 
dictate the priorities, at least in terms of communicating the party programme to the 
electorate. For instance, in the 39-page long manifesto for the 1970 general election, the 
national language
26
 issue came only at page 31 and the constitutional policy followed at 
page 33, whereas the first 30 pages were entirely devoted to socio-economic matters 
(Plaid Cyrmu, Action for Wales, 1970). 
The debate on the constitutional policy was revitalized both within and outside 
the party by the report of the Kilbrandon Commission, which had been set up in 1968. 
The majority report, presented in October 1973, recommended a directly elected Welsh 
Assembly with limited powers, so as to preserve “the political and economic unity of the 
United Kingdom” (quoted in McAllister, p. 131). For the first time, therefore, Plaid 
found itself in a position where discussions about constitutional change were not only 
based on wishful thinking or on the ideal preferences of party members but on a plan 
which had some realistic chance of being carried through. When the Wales Act was 
passed in 1978 with the provision that a referendum was needed to make it come into 
effect, the discussion with Plaid Cymru had to narrow down to whether the party 
intended to support a „yes‟ or a „no‟ vote. The need to operate such a „either or‟ choice 
proved extremely difficult for a party that had maintained internal unity through 
ambiguous formulations of its aims. Eventually the leadership decided to join the 
Labour-led „Yes‟ campaign but such a choice created an unprecedented level of dissent 
within the party (ibid., p. 132).  
                                                 
26
 It is telling that still in 1970, in spite of the formal „bilingual Wales‟ policy, the party still referred to 
Welsh as the „national language‟, implicitly meaning that English was not. 
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The results of the referendum represented a heavy blow for the party‟s aspirations 
of self-government. As Table 2.8 shows, support for the Assembly was just above 20% in 
the whole of Wales and remained below 35% even in the Welsh speaking areas, such as 
Gwynedd and Dyfed.  
 
Table 2.8 
1979 Referendum results by council areas 
 
Council Area Yes % No % 
 
Clwyd 
 
12.1 
 
87.9 
Dyfed 28.1 71.9 
Gwynedd 34.4 65.6 
Gwent 12.1 87.9 
Glamorgan (Mid) 20.2 79.8 
Glamorgan (North) 13.1 86.9 
Glamorgan (West) 18.7 81.3 
Powys 18.7 81.3 
 
Wales 
 
20.3 
 
79.7 
 
 
In the wake of such a debacle, Plaid set up an internal Commission of Inquiry which, in 
two years, produced a majority and a minority report on the ideological, strategic and 
organizational challenges that the party had to address if it was to recover its credibility. 
As far as the constitutional policy was concerned, the minority report, drafted by Phil 
Williams, urged the party to decide whether it wanted “to work to win a better deal for 
the Welsh people within the existing framework” or if it was “totally determined to end 
English rule” (quoted in McAllister, p. 136). In this respect, the majority report appeared 
to lean towards the second option, as it warned the party against the risk of jeopardising 
the achievement of radical constitutional changes by accepting compromises: “If, 
by…forcing concessions at parliamentary level, we get the present system to work more 
in harmony with the needs of Wales…, we are in effect strengthening the system of 
government that we seek to replace.” (ibid, p. 135). However, the report did not say how 
a party which had been unable to convince more than 12% of the Welsh voters to accept 
limited devolution would be able to push through a radical replacement of the UK‟s 
constitutional structure. In fact, the leaders of the 1980s, Dafydd Wigley (1981-1984) and 
Dafydd Elis Thomas (1984-1991), did not take the above considerations too seriously. 
The former, who ironically enough was a member of the Commission himself and signed 
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the majority report, argued that Plaid Cymru “had to fight not only for self-government 
for Wales but also for the best possible deal for the people of Wales” (Wigley, 1981, 
quoted in McAllister, 1983 p. 135). Yet, Plaid‟s 1983 general election manifesto was the 
most radical one of its pre-devolution history as, for the first time, the party asked 
explicitly for Wales to have her “own Welsh state” (Plaid Cymru, The Only Alternative, 
Manifesto 1983, p. 1).  
 It was with the election of Elis Thomas as President that the party really 
refocused its position on the constitutional dimension, both in terms of ideology, strategy 
and policy. In his vision, Plaid Cymru had to start from the socio-economic problems that 
the Welsh people were facing in the mid 1980s and had to propose credible solutions for 
them. This implied a different ideological profile, which left the nationalist dimension in 
the background. As stated above, he never referred to himself or to Plaid using the word 
„nationalist‟ and, according to the then vice-chair Phil Williams, Thomas‟ aim was to 
turn Plaid into an „anti-nationalist‟ party (Christiansen, 1998, p. 131). As a consequence, 
in Thomas‟ approach, the party‟s constitutional policy should have emerged from 
practical considerations regarding the powers Wales would need to in order to tackle the 
most immediate problems affecting the Welsh people, rather than from nationalist 
ideological stances. This approach led the party to adopt a de facto autonomist position in 
the 1987 election, when it asked for a Welsh “Senate firmly elected by the people of 
Wales and able to tackle the basic economic and social problems that we face” (Plaid 
Cyrmu, Winning for Wales, Manifesto 1987, p. 2). The electoral alliance with the 
Scottish nationalists also provided a concrete strategy to achieve the policy objective. 
The presence of third forces, such as Liberal Democrats, made hung parliaments a more 
realistic scenario during the 1980s. The manifesto went on to state that “In the event of 
this [SNP-PC] alliance holding the balance of power our primary aim will be to secure 
constitutional advance for our two countries” (ibid., p. 4).  
 
2.2.3 From the National Assembly for Wales to independence (1990s and 2000s) 
 Thomas‟ strategic repositioning did not work out immediately, either in terms of 
electoral progress or in terms of policy achievements. However, the second presidency of 
Dafydd Wigley (1991-2000) culminated with the greatest policy success of Plaid‟s 
history, the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales. 
 By 1992, attitudes within the Labour party towards devolving powers to the 
„Celtic peripheries‟ had changed considerably. Despite returning an overwhelming 
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majority of Labour MPs to Westminster, Wales (and Scotland) had been governed by the 
Conservatives in London and by a Conservative Secretary of State since 1979. As a 
consequence, some sort of self-government for Wales (and Scotland) was not seen 
anymore, from Labour‟s perspective, as a mere concession to nationalist claims. Rather, 
it was included in a larger plan of constitutional modernization of the UK and was 
perceived as a remedy for the „democratic deficit‟ suffered by the Celtic peripheries in 
the last thirteen years. The perpetuation of such „democratic deficit‟ for another five 
years after the 1992 election
27
 and the electoral growth of Plaid Cymru (and even more of 
the SNP in Scotland), represented a further decisive thrust for the Labour party to commit 
itself to devolution and to include such commitment into the 1997 election manifesto. 
 On Plaid‟s side, the wording used to address the party constitutional policy 
remained ambiguous and/or contradictory. Different formulas, such as self-government, a 
democratic Welsh state, decentralised socialism and full national status were used in the 
party statute, membership cards, manifestos and speeches. Wigley managed to re-unite 
the party under his leadership by conceding more voice to the hard-core nationalists, as 
the latter had been somewhat alienated during the Thomas years. However, the overall 
strategy remained very similar to Thomas‟: linking self-government to socio-economic 
and „new politics‟ issues, so as to foster an image of „progressive‟ nationalism, and 
setting out objectives pragmatically, on the basis of the evolving context (Christiansen, 
1998, p. 131).  
In 1997, the new Labour government pressed immediately for the implementation 
of its devolution program. The plan foresaw again a referendum to legitimise 
constitutional reform. Before the election, Plaid Cymru had campaigned to obtain a 
multi-option referendum, in which the voters would be able to express their preferences 
between the status quo, a devolved Assembly and full self-government (McAllister, p. 
138). On the one hand, the inclusion of the latter option would have allowed the party to 
distinguish itself not only from the Conservatives, who supported the status quo, but also 
from Labour and the Liberal-Democrats, who supported devolution. It would have also 
appeased the hard-core nationalist fringe, which ideologically rejected the devolutionist 
approach, on the grounds that it implicitly recognised the „imperial‟ Parliament in 
London as the legitimate source of power. On the other hand, splitting the pro-reform 
camp would have increased the chances of victory for the status quo side. In fact, the 
                                                 
27
 The Conservatives unexpectedly won the 1992 UK general election because of their strong majority in 
England. However, they obtained less than a sixth of the Welsh and Scottish seats. 
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inclusion of a third, more radical option was never a real issue, as Labour was determined 
to give the electorate only the first two options. However, it exemplifies how the 
dogmatic independentist drive of a significant minority of the party could have 
jeopardised the most important achievement in their history. Wisely, Plaid Cymru 
decided to join the pro-Assembly front and to co-operate with Labour and the Liberal-
Democrats in the referendum campaign.  
 
Table 2.9 
1997 Referendum results by unitary authorities 
 
Local Authority Yes % No % Turn out 
 
Blaenau Gwent 
 
56.1 
 
43.9 
 
49.3 
Bridgend 54.4 45.6 50.6 
Caerphilly 54.7 45.3 49.3 
Cardiff 44.4 55.6 46.9 
Carmarthenshire 65.3 34.7 56.4 
Ceredigion 59.2 40.8 56.8 
Conwy 40.9 59.1 51.5 
Denbighshire 40.8 59.2 49.7 
Flintshire 38.2 61.8 41 
Gwynedd 64.1 35.9 59.8 
Merthyr Tydfil 58.2 41.8 49.5 
Monmouthshire 32.1 67.9 50.5 
Neath and Port Talbot 66.5 33.5 51.9 
Newport 37.4 62.6 45.9 
Pembrokeshire 42.8 57.2 52.6 
Powys 42.7 57.3 56.2 
Rhondda Cynon Taffs 58.5 41.5 49.9 
Swansea 52 48 47.1 
Torfael 49.8 50.2 45.5 
Vale of Glamorgan 36.7 63.3 54.3 
Wrexham 45.3 54.7 42.4 
Ynys Môn 50.9 49.1 56.9 
 
Total Wales 
 
50.3 
 
49.7 
 
50.1 
 
Source: Jowell, R., Heath, A. and J. K. Curtice (1997) Scottish and Welsh Referendum Studies, 1997, 
UKDA Study Number: 3952 
http://www.dataarchive.ac.uk/doc/3952/mrdoc/UKDA/UKDA_Study_3952_Information.htm 
 
 
 The ballot boxes were opened on the 18th September, a week after the Scots had 
voted by an overwhelming majority in favour of the establishment of a Scottish 
Parliament. The drive of the Scottish vote was probably decisive as support for the 
National Assembly for Wales (NAW) was won by just 0.6% of votes (50.3 vs. 49.7). The 
results, as shown in Table 2.9, presented a highly divided nation, with Cardiff and East 
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Wales voting overwhelmingly against the Assembly, while Swansea and West Wales 
voted in favour. The closeness of the result was remarkable if one considers that, the 
parties supporting the „Yes vote‟ represented 77% of the Welsh votes and 100% of the 
Welsh MPs after the May 1997 general election, the Conservatives having failed to win a 
single seat. It testified to the reluctance of a vast section of the Welsh electorate to accept 
the idea of Wales being separated from England, even in the form of limited autonomy 
and even after the support of Labour‟s elite, the traditionally dominant party and now a 
very popular government.  
 However, the narrow victory gave Wales its own elected Assembly and, with it, a 
separate political arena. This constituted a crucial turning point for Plaid Cymru in terms 
of political opportunity structure. First, in the medium/long term the presence of the 
Assembly could represent an institutional drive for Welsh nationalism, helping to 
consolidate a Welsh identity and to win support for the idea of Welsh self-government. 
Secondly, a Wales-wide and Wales-only political/electoral venue represented the ideal 
arena in which Plaid could compete. It gave the party the opportunity presenting itself as 
the only one fully committed to protect Welsh interests and as the only truly Welsh one, 
without bosses in London from whom to take orders. This strategy proved particularly 
effective in the first NAW election in 1999 when Welsh Labour, the main opponent, was 
torn apart by internal divisions due to excessive interference from New Labour‟s 
leadership in London (Massetti, 2004). Plaid‟s manifesto insisted on the fact that “New 
Labour has rejected its Labour Party past, which Wales as a nation helped create” and, by 
adopting Tory policies, “it has chosen to become the party of „Middle England‟” (Plaid 
Cymru, 1999, Working for Wales, p. 2). Therefore, “Only the Party of Wales offers a real 
challenge to more Tory-type policies in Wales” (ibid, p. 3).  
Beyond attacking the Blairite Labour, Plaid paid greater attention to avoiding 
scaring off non Welsh-speaking voters. The „whole-Wales‟ character of the election 
compelled the party to emphasize its commitment to bilingualism and to dissipate its past 
image of a „Welsh Wales‟ party. For the first time it presented itself to the voters adding 
the English translation („The Party of Wales‟) to its Welsh name. In addition, having just 
secured some degree of self-government by the tiniest majority, the party avoided any 
reference to any ambitious constitutional objective and focused on how to make the 
Assembly work best by putting forward socio-economic policy proposals.  
The astonishingly positive election results, mainly obtained at the expense of 
Labour, were considered a „quiet earthquake‟ in Welsh politics (Scully et al., 2003). For 
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the first time, electoral support did not come only for the party‟s traditional „heartland‟ 
but also from the southern valleys where Plaid managed to win in single member 
constituencies that Labour had continuously held, for Westminster elections, for about 
eight decades (ibid.). As a result, Plaid became the formal opposition party to a Labour 
minority executive (1999-2000) and then to the Lab-Lib coalition executive (2000-2003).  
However, with the election of Rhodri Morgan as new Welsh Labour leader and 
First Minister in NAW in 2000, the wind started to change. Morgan represented both an 
opportunity and a challenge to Plaid. On the one hand, his ability to speak Welsh and his 
commitment to the protection of the language, his blatantly anti-Blairite approach in 
socio-economic matters and his moderate support for further self-government for Wales, 
enhanced Plaid‟s chances of seeing some its favourite policies being implemented. On 
the other hand, Morgan‟s „Welshness‟ neutralized almost completely the strategy adopted 
in 1999.  
In 2000, Plaid elected a new leader, Ieuan Wyn Jones, who was formally both 
President and leader of the NAW group. His leadership was characterized by overall 
continuity both in terms of ideology and strategy. The hard-core nationalists were kept 
under control and the party maintained an incrementalist approach on constitutional 
change, asking for the establishment of a Parliament with similar powers to the Scottish 
one and linking such requests to practical shortcomings of the current arrangement 
(Manifesto 2003, p. 28). However, controversies emerging from the growing influx of 
English, buying properties and settling in rural, poor and Welsh-speaking areas of Wales, 
allowed the Labour sympathising press to depict Plaid as an extremist and racist „anti-
English‟ party (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2003, p. 129-30). Arguably, these attacks 
damaged the party, especially in the English speaking southern valleys. More importantly, 
Labour had completed its re-branding as „Welsh Labour‟, also adopting a Welsh version 
of the name, and was now united under Morgan‟s leadership and ready to restore its grip 
on the Welsh electorate.                
 If Plaid‟s results at the 2003 NAW election were evaluated against any pre-
devolution election (or indeed against the 2001 general election), they would have been 
considered at least a very good performance. However, compared with the extraordinary 
results of the 1999 NAW election, they were perceived as a disastrous setback. All the 
four constituency seats in the south Wales were lost to Labour and the party‟s score in 
the regional vote decreased by more than a third, thus losing further seat. Labour was 
now able to form a single party majority government and Plaid retained its „opposition 
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party‟ status by only one seat lead on the Conservatives. The first consequence of the 
election was the resignation of Wyn Jones for the post of President (Wyn Jones and 
Scully, p. 128). The second consequence was a revival of nationalist pride within the 
party which led to the election of folk-music singer and local councillor Dafydd Iwan as 
new President and leader. In his speech at the opening of the Annual Conference held in 
September 2003 in Cardiff, Iwan said that “Plaid Cymru wants to see Wales emerge from 
England‟s shadow” and went on to ask the delegates to change the long term goal of the 
party from the vague expression „full national status‟ to the unequivocally secessionist 
„independence‟ (BBC Wales, 19/09/03, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/3121196.stm). 
Delegates approved the change of the party constitution unanimously two days later, 
arguably ending many decades of ambiguity on the party‟ long-term constitutional policy 
(BBC Wales, 21/09/03, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/3124418.stm).  
 To date, the new long-term aim of the party has never been brought openly into 
question, signalling that it enjoys an overall support within PC. Yet, as Table 10 shows, 
preference for independence within the Welsh electorate is still very much a minority 
view. In contrast, since devolution there seems to have been a gradually growing support 
for the establishment of a Scottish-like Parliament. This shift of preferences from the 
Assembly to a law-making Parliament in the Welsh electorate appears to correspond to  
(or indeed to follow) a similar shift in attitudes amongst most of the Welsh (NAW based) 
political elites. In particular, the appointment in 2002 of an independent Commission on 
the Powers and Electoral Arrangements for the NAW (so called Richard Commission) 
decided by the Lab-Lib executive showed, at the very least, an open-minded attitude 
towards discussing the best constitutional arrangement for Wales, if not a decided 
opinion in favour of  more powers being devolved. The Commission‟s report, delivered 
in 2004, represented de facto a strong and authoritative legitimation for more powers for 
the NAW. The report highlighted the awkwardness of the current arrangement and its 
actual functioning, pointing in particular to problems related to accountability and the 
capability to deliver on time (Report of the Commission, 2004, p. 85-125). It, therefore, 
concluded “we do not think that status quo is a sustainable basis for future development” 
and went on to recommend the establishment of “a legislative Assembly for Wales with 
primary law-making powers” (ibid. p. 255). 
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Table 2.10 
Public attitudes towards constitutional change in Wales (%) 
 
                 
       Voting intensions in referendum 2007-09 
 
 Constitutional preferences (1997-2008) 
 
 
Year 
More 
devolution 
(yes) 
More 
devolution 
(no) 
Don‟t 
know 
No 
devolution 
 
Assembly 
Law-
making 
Parliament 
 
Independence 
1997    36.9 25.1 18.3 13.2 
1999    24.3 32.9 28.3 9.6 
2001    23.1 24.5 36.8 11.8 
2003    20.3 25.3 35.9 13.4 
2006    20.4 23.9 40.2 11.0 
2007 47 44 9 15.7 26.1 41.5 11.5 
2008 49 46 5 15.0 30.7 38.8 10.0 
2009 52 39 9 19.0 21.0 44.0 13.0 
 
Source: National Assembly for Wales: Public Attitudes 2008, available at: 
(http://www.assemblywales.org/abthome/abt-commission/about_us-public_attitudes_2008/about_us-
public_attitudes_2008_attitudes_towards_the_assembly.htm), ICM polls/BBC Wales, June 2007 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/6235466.stm), ICM polls/BBC Wales, September 2008 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/wales_politics/7625621.stm), ICM polls /BBC Wales, February 2009, 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/7269460.stm) 
 
 
 
So, in spite of Plaid‟s electoral setback in 2003, the long wave effect of its 
extraordinary success in 1999 and the (at least partially consequent) assertiveness of 
NAW based Welsh Labour seem to have created a much more favourable environment 
for powers being devolved to Wales.  
 In this respect, the 2003 openly secessionist turn has left some influential 
members of the party rather sceptical about the convenience of such move: 
 
I don‟t think it is really helpful to aim too high. I would like the party to drop final 
aims and be more pragmatic…we should just focus on winning the next election and 
running things in the best interest of Wales. Our only constitutional objective should 
be the one we can get in the next few years and that is the same status as Scotland 
(Dafydd Elis Thomas, interview with the author, Cardiff, 12/12/06) 
 
 
Elis Thomas‟ position is not isolated within the party.28 Other prominent party members 
have confirmed that a firm belief in independence both as a strategic move and as a 
possible outcome is far from unanimous: 
                                                 
28
 He has never been loved by the traditionalist (nationalist) wing of the party and lost the support of 
many left-wing members in 1992, when he accepted the title of Baron and a seat in the House of Lords. 
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There is still some debate because we have now got this Assembly and there is a 
strong feeling that we have to work through this now…it makes much more sense. 
Anyway I don‟t see independence happening tomorrow or even in ten years. Unlike 
Ireland... and Scotland… we have a wide open border and a long one compared to the 
depth of the country. Therefore it is much more difficult for us to be separate from 
England, to become independent from England. And it‟s very easy for people who 
oppose independence, like the Labour party, to point to the problems that separation 
entails for Wales. That‟s why we don‟t talk about independence so much up-front. I 
think a large part of the party, not all of it, would prefer to progress gradually and 
overcome all the practical problems on the way (Janet Davies, interview with the 
author, Cardiff, 04/12/06). 
 
 
Persistent disagreement on the constitutional issue is not confined to the party elites. As 
table 2.11 shows, the party membership is also divided and, perhaps surprisingly, half of 
the members would prefer a law-making Parliament to all other options, with less than a 
third opting for independence as their first choice. In fact, the gradualist approach has 
never been fully abandoned and, with the return of Wyn Jones as party leader in 2006, it 
has regained prominence over the long-term independence objective. In addition, a new 
Government of Wales Act passed in 2006 has slightly increased the powers of the 
Assembly and has introduced a formal separation between the roles of the Welsh 
executive and the Assembly itself. Even more importantly, in terms of prospects for 
future development, the new Act gives the Assembly the opportunity to initiate, by a 
two-thirds vote, a referendum for the acquisition of law-making powers in the devolved 
areas.
29
 The realistic perspective to achieve more self-government working through the 
existing institutions has, therefore, deflected attention from debates over the ultimate goal 
of the party. In the 2007 NAW election the party campaigned primarily on environmental 
and socio-economic issues. As far as constitutional policy was concerned, it was left to 
the bottom of the manifesto and the ultimate aim of independence was preceded by the 
claim for the establishment of a law-making parliament on the model set out in the 
Government of Wales Act 2006 (Plaid Cyrmu, Make a Difference, Manifesto 2007, p. 
36). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Since the inception of the NAW he has acted as the Proceeding Officer and, arguably, this super partes 
role has contributed further to his isolation from the day to day running of the party. Nonetheless, he 
remains a very highly respected figure within the party.  
29
 The Assembly can only initiate the order for a referendum. However, then it is up to the Secretary of 
State to decide whether it is appropriate to bring the order before the Parliament in London. For the 
referendum to be called, it needs to get the approval of both the Commons and the Lords (Government of 
Wales Act, 2006, Part 4, 103, available at: 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060032_en_1). 
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Table 2.11 
Constitutional preference and party identification, 2008 (%) 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
PREFERENCE 
LABOUR CONS. LIBDEM PLAID NO PARTY 
ID 
Independence 6 3 7 27 12 
Parliament 44 30 50 50 38 
Assembly 37 34 32 18 28 
No Devolution 11 30 10 2 14 
Don‟t Know/Refused 3 3 1 3 9 
Source: National Assembly for Wales: Public Attitudes 2008, available at: 
(http://www.assemblywales.org/abthome/abt-commission/about_us-public_attitudes_2008/about_us-
public_attitudes_2008_attitudes_towards_the_assembly.htm) 
 
 
 In the aftermath of the 2007 NAW election, after alternative options were 
unsuccessfully explored,
30
 Plaid decided eventually to enter a coalition government with 
Welsh Labour. The party managed, in spite of some resistance from Labour, to include in 
the coalition agreement the holding of a referendum on further devolution of legislative 
powers to be called within the next Assembly term (One Wales, Agreement between 
Labour and Plaid Cymru, 2007, p. 6). The two parties have already started to work on the 
organization, by establishing an all-Wales Convention for extensive consultation with 
civil society. As table 10 above shows, latest opinion polls on voting intensions in a 
referendum are encouraging and the two parties have agreed to fully commit in 
campaigning for a „Yes‟ vote.  
However, working closely with Labour and having a realistic prospect of 
obtaining a Welsh parliament in the next two years, has not entailed leaving the 2003 
independentist turn completely in the background. The fact that the independence policy 
has not been reversed points to the achievement of a new strategic equilibrium, where a 
relatively undisputed independentist long-term project is coupled with an equally 
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undisputed strategy of working gradually, even engaging in cross-party ventures, and 
pick up the opportunities that are offered along the way. The pro-independence stance 
might cost the party some voters but, in perspective, it may help maintaining a certain 
distinctiveness and, in case a law-making Parliament was established as in Scotland in 
the next two years, to retain a further objective that still justifies the existence of the party.  
As we shall see in the section on European integration, the new policy also offers 
to link the ultimate objective of the party with the institutional structure of the EU in a 
more consistent way. In this respect, one could see an influence of EU‟s persisting 
intergovernmentalism on the party‟s turn on independence: “Europe is one of the reasons 
why we recently ended up calling for independence… being an independent member-
state is the only status that European Union recognizes. You cannot be a member of the 
EU unless you are an independent nation-state.” (Alun Fred Jones, interview with the 
author, Cardiff, 05/12/06). In addition, some within the party feel that “we have to put the 
argument out there in order to change public opinion towards more support for 
independence” (interview with Leonne Wood, Cardiff, 12/12/06). Indeed, in 2009 the 
party launched a new initiative to preach the benefits of independence, by setting up a 
website www.walescan.com where people can find articles by Welsh politicians and 
commentators and can have their say on the matter. However, PC has a long way to go to 
convince a majority of Welsh voters to support independence. A recent poll has found 
that only 13% of respondents would favour independence within or without the EU (ICM 
Poll for BBC Cymru Wales, 20-24 February 2009, available at:  
http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/media-centre-archive.php?month=February&year=2009) 
 
 
2.3 Party Ideology and Policy: The Left-Right Dimension 
2.3.1 The legacy of the inter-war period 
 The interwar period was one of extreme polarization, in which ideological debate 
on contrasting political/economic doctrines intertwined with significant political change 
both in the international scene and in Britain and Wales. At home, the rise of the Labour 
party and the decline of the Liberals entailed an increase in political and ideological 
polarization. The economic crises of the 1930s, which hit South Wales badly, sanctioned 
the end of the hegemony of the liberal, free-market ideology. The sympathies of some 
Labour‟s left-wingers for communist ideas and the activism of Mosley‟s fascist party in 
the 1930s added to the left-right radicalization of domestic politics. In Europe, the rise of 
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Lenin‟s Communism and Mussolini‟s Fascism in the late 1910s and early 1920s set the 
tone for the ideological debate in the following two decades. The seizure of power by 
Hitler‟s Nazi party in the early 1930s polarized the international picture further. The 
Spanish civil war represented dramatically the political and ideological struggle between 
Fascism and Communism.  
 In this context, the attempt by Plaid‟s elite to ignore the left-right ideological and 
social conflict and to push on the salience of the centre-periphery cleavage was a 
desperate move. Some members, such as John Roose Williams, had pointed out from 
1925 that, from a socio-economic and ideological perspective Wales was a left-leaning 
nation and, therefore, no success would have been possible if the party had not 
characterized itself as a socialist party, so as to win the support of the working class 
(Davies, 1983, p. 96). Yet, until the early 1930s, the party did not elaborate much beyond 
the issue of „Welsh Wales‟. This was mainly due to the need to focus on establishing an 
independent new organization, which was formed by people of different ideological 
orientations. Ignoring left-right politics allowed the party to persist in the critical first 
years, thus avoiding immediate disintegration.  
 Although Plaid did not develop formal ideological and/or policy stances directly 
linked to left-right politics, it ended up being associated with the personal ideas of its 
most authoritative and outspoken members, primarily Sanders Lewis and Ambrose Bebb. 
The former expressed on many occasions his Catholic, traditionalist and conservative 
views. His point of reference was Wales (and Europe) in the middle Ages, which he 
considered a morally superior civilization than „Anglicised‟ Wales. He also opposed the 
mainstream philosophical strands, such as Enlightenment, positivism and materialism, 
professing the superiority of spiritual over material values. Consistently, he rejected 
mainstream or rising political ideologies, such liberalism and socialism, criticising the 
individualism of the former and the materialist secularism of the latter (Davies, 1983, p. 
102). Moreover, he looked very negatively on major long-term socio economic processes 
(capitalist industrialization and urbanization) which had transformed Wales. In addition 
to the right-leaning orientations of Lewis, Bebb had spoken enthusiastically about 
Fascism in several occasion (Davies, 1983, p. 97), contributing to a public image of Plaid 
Cymru as a right-wing party.    
 In spite of Lewis‟s insistence on moral and cultural issues, after the disastrous 
electoral performance in 1929, the party started to reflect on the need to develop a socio-
economic policy as well. In addition, the dramatic effects of the economic crisis of the 
  
59 
 
early 1930s, the political debate on the limits of free-market capitalism and the rising tide 
of socialism convinced even Lewis himself of the need to devote more attention to 
economic matters. The main contribution, however, came from D.J. and Noëlle Davies, 
two former members of the Labour party who had deep knowledge of Scandinavian, and 
in particular Danish, social-democracy. In 1931, D.J. Davies published The Economics of 
Welsh Self-Government, the first party pamphlet that addressed economic issues in detail 
and that tried to justify Welsh self-government in economic terms.
31
 Davies envisaged a 
Welsh economy and society based on the principles of co-operative socialism.      
In 1934, Lewis summarised the new socio-economic plan of the party in his Ten 
Points of Policy, a document that remained very influential in the following decades. He 
embodied the co-operative ethos of D. J. Davies in his wider nationalist conservative 
ideology, forging the doctrine of „co-operative nationalism‟ (Lewis, Ten Points of Policy, 
1934). His position on the economy was deeply influenced by the Christian (Catholic) 
social doctrine, although it was expressed in more radical and visionary terms. He 
envisaged a return to the primacy of agriculture: “Agriculture should be the chief 
industry of Wales and the basis of its civilization…South Wales must be de-
industrialised” (ibid.). The main driving concepts of Lewis‟ socio-economic plan were 
co-operation, decentralization and diffusion of ownership. His anti-state ethos led him to 
oppose the nationalization of industries, thus rejecting socialist policies (Davies, 1983, p. 
102). Overall, Lewis remained always concerned with the party being identified with a 
specific ideology or socio-economic doctrine, in particular with socialism.  
 While Lewis‟s plan made some sense for the mainly agricultural North and West 
Wales, it offered no immediate solutions for the growing unemployment and extremely 
poor conditions of Southern Wales‟ working class. For these reasons, the party‟s 
leadership came under attack in the late 1930s. Dafydd Jenkins accused the leaders of 
being “far to ready to attack „socialism‟, usually meaning by that either the English 
Labour Party, or the philosophy of Karl Marx” and warned that “Wales cannot be won 
for Home Rule unless the socialists of Wales are won over” (quoted in Davies, 1983, p. 
105). The main challenge came at the 1938 Conference in Swansea where some 
delegates, linked to a group of young members of the University College in Bangor, 
strongly criticised the party‟s economic policy and proposed the nationalization of coal, 
steel and tinplate industries on the grounds that they were unsuitable for schemes of 
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cooperative control (Davies, 1983, p. 94). In general some members were deeply 
dissatisfied with the party being identified as right-wing because of its leaders‟ personal 
views. However, the overwhelming majority of the delegates backed Lewis‟ leadership 
and economic policy. In addition, during WWII the right-wing image of the party was 
even reinforced by Lewis‟s neutrality stance. 
From a strategic/electoral point of view, the ideological development of Plaid 
Cymru in the inter-war period appears as a missed opportunity, if not a disastrous 
mistake. Although the party aimed to represent a left-leaning nation, both in ideological, 
socio-economic and political terms, it developed an overall right-leaning ideology and 
policy platform. The electoral de-alignment away from Liberal domination of the 1920s 
was a tremendous opportunity which Plaid did not exploit for both organizational and 
ideological reasons. By the end of the 1930s, the Welsh electorate had re-aligned behind 
the socialist ideology of Labour, whereas Plaid had projected a conservative, if not a 
reactionary/Fascist image which will accompany the party for some decades. However, 
some strands of Lewis‟ ideological legacy, such as anti-militarism, anti-industrialism, 
environmental sustainability and decentralism, would represent an important source of 
inspiration in the post-industrial period, with the emergence of the so called „New 
Politics‟. 
 
2.3.2 From co-operative nationalism to decentralised socialism (1940s-1980s)    
The first decade after WWII saw the gradual de-polarization of British politics. 
The great reforms of late 1940s - primarily the establishment of the National Health 
Service by Welshman Labour minister Aneurin Bevan – met initial resistance by the 
Conservatives. However, from the mid-1950s a new settlement on welfare policies and 
Keynesian economics emerged, which arguably persisted for the following two decades. 
In this broad political context, Plaid Cymru managed to remain a „broad church‟, capable 
of attracting and retaining nationalists of all ideological persuasions. The party leadership, 
under Gynfor Evans, gradually developed a wider and more detailed socio-economic 
platform but always remaining within the borders of co-operative nationalism and 
opposing any attempt to add labels which would qualify the left-right party‟s stance. 
 Yet, this course looked inappropriate to many who wanted to place the party more 
to the left, so as to capture a greater share of the Welsh electorate. At the 1949 summer 
school, a group of republicans openly criticised Evans‟ leadership and put forward a 
motion calling for a republican basis to Plaid‟s ideology (McAllister, p. 161). The 
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rejection of the motion led many of them to leave the party and form an independent 
organization called the Welsh Republican Movement. More importantly, pressure from 
some of the branches to adopt a more trenchant socialist ideology and policy mounted 
during the 1960s. However, the image of a traditionalist leadership opposed the socialist 
grassroots would be misleading. Most party members remained faithful to the ideological 
legacy of the inter-war period, with the leadership trying to maintain the balance between 
them and those who urged for the adoption of a clear-cut leftist stance. In 1960 a motion 
from the Newport branch called for the party to remain a „broad church‟ and to avoid 
stressing its left-right ideological positions (McAllister, p. 164).  
 Internal debate continued, with leftist members asking to include references to 
socialism while at the same time suggesting qualification of what type of socialism the 
party wanted to adopt. In particular, it was widely acknowledged by most socialist 
members that, if the party was to be labelled as socialist, it needed to be distinguished 
from both the centralist ethos of the Labour party and from the oppressive bureaucratic 
drive of orthodox Marxism. At the 1963 conference, a motion from the Bridgend branch 
entitled „Socialism‟ urged the party to emphasise “the democratic socialist nature of our 
policy in our pamphlets and addresses and relocate the people as far as the real meaning 
of socialism is concerned” (quoted in McAllister, p. 164). The leadership intervened to 
amend the motion, which was passed only after the word „socialism‟ was substituted with 
„democracy‟.  
 The first electoral success at the 1966 by-election engendered some euphoria 
within the party, shifting the attention from the bad old news –the inability to win votes 
in South Wales – to the good new news – its ability to win votes and seats in the party 
heartland. However, the issue of expanding its social and electoral support amongst the 
Southern working class could not be ignored for long and, with it, the need to present the 
party with a more appealing ideological outlook and policy platform. In 1970 the 
Economic Plan for Wales was launched, containing interventionist policy proposals but 
devoid of explicit reference to socialism. That was not sufficient for many left-wingers in 
the party. As a convinced socialist member put it: 
 
There is no hope for Blaid [i.e. Plaid Cymru] to win self-government as long as it 
sticks to its current economic and social policies. Only a nationalist party with valid 
socialist policies can hope to win the support of the majority of the people of Wales 
(Gareth Miles, translated by Hywel Davies, 1973, p. 15)     
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What emerged from a study on the composition of Plaid‟s electorate in Cardiganshire in 
the early 1970s, as reported in Table 2.12, was that the party still attracted predominantly 
middle class voters. It also gained disproportionate support from the lower working class 
but was still largely underrepresented by the skilled working class. 
 
Table 2.12 
Social Class and Plaid’s Electorate in Cardiganshire in the 1970s  
 
 
Social Class 
All  
Cardiganshire 
Electorate (%) 
 
Plaid Cymru 
(%) 
  
Top Middle Class 
 
10 
 
15 
 Lower Middle Class 24 33 
Farming Class 20 8 
Top Working Class 29 15 
Lower Working Class 15 26 
    
          Source: original data in P. Magdwick (1973. p. 160), reported in T. D. Combes (1977, p. 309) 
 
However, it is difficult to say if the party‟s inability to win working class voters, mainly 
concentrated in South Wales, was due to its ideological position on the left-right or, 
rather, to its persisting characterization as a „Welsh Wales‟ party. As shown in Tables 
2.13 and 2.14, in the late 1960s and early 1970s Plaid‟s electoral support was still 
overwhelmingly from Welsh speaking voters. In the 1970s election the party obtained its 
best result ever (in terms of votes) but this came from gains in the Welsh speaking areas 
rather than from the more populous English speaking ones. In other words, many within 
Plaid, and certainly the leadership, felt that the party‟s ideology and policy position on 
the left-right dimension was already in tune with the preferences of the Welsh electorate 
– i.e. it was already leftist enough and did not need to be explicitly labelled as socialist - 
while the „language blockage‟ represented the most important impediment for expanding 
support in south Wales, and in particular amongst the English speaking working class. In 
the February 1974 election, 16 out of the 36 of Plaid‟s candidates were non Welsh-
speaking compared with just 9 in 1970. This was the result of a strategic choice to reduce 
the „language blockage‟ and increase electoral support in south Wales. In the 1974 
general elections, the party still won the overwhelming majority of its votes in north-west 
and west Wales but, in the 1976 local election, this strategy seemed to bear some fruit, 
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with Plaid electing several councillors in the southern valleys of West and Mid 
Glamorgan (Combes, 1977, p. 314).  
 
Table 2.13 
Voting intentions and ability to speak Welsh 
 
 
Which party do you 
intend to vote? 
 
Welsh-Speaking 
(%) 
 
Non Welsh-Speaking 
(%) 
 
Labour 
 
33 
 
37 
Conservative 17 35 
Liberal 12 9 
Plaid Cymru 24 9 
Don’t know 14 10 
 
Source: original data in Western Mail, 25/09/1968 (O.R.C. Survey), reported in T. D. Combes, 1977, p. 
310. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.14 
Welsh Speakers and Votes for Plaid in the 1970 general election 
 
  
Plaid Cymru Performance 
 
 
Able to speak 
Welsh in the area 
(%) 
 
Seats Contested 
 
Mean % of Vote 
 
Change on  
1966 election 
 
Over 70% 
 
6 
 
24.4 
 
+11.4 
25-60% 8 13.6 + 7.3 
10-25% 12 10.9 + 5.0 
Under 10% 10 6.0 - 0.1 
 
 Source: original data in M. Steed (1971, p. 402), reported in T. D. Combes (1977, p. 311). 
 
 
Although these electoral gains proved temporary, they confirmed that in the 
Southern Valleys there was a considerable share of voters who could be potentially won 
over from Labour (Balsom et al., 1983, p. 313).    
In the late 1970s, Plaid attention shifted to the Labour government‟s work on the 
bills that would lead to the first referendum on devolution in 1979. In that context, 
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debates on left-right positioning lost some of their salience. However, after the disastrous 
results of the referendum and the bad results of the 1979 election, in which Plaid‟s 
support retrenched again in the Welsh speaking areas, the debates on party ideology and 
policy reignited even more strongly, with the balance of power between traditionalists 
and left-wingers shifting in favour of the latter. Two major interrelated factors can be 
singled out to explain ideological change in the 1980s. First, the dramatic increase in 
social and political polarization in Welsh and British politics, determined by the 
rightward turn of Thatcher‟s conservatives and the leftward turn of Foot‟s Labour. The 
apex of social radicalization was reached during the dramatic miners‟ strike between 
1984 and 1985 but high polarization persisted throughout the 1980s. Secondly, new 
young members with „New Left‟ and radical left ideas had being joining the party during 
the 1970s and continued to do so in early 1980s, altering the ideological leaning of the 
party. 
           In 1980 Dafydd Elis Thomas and other members of the party set up a ginger group 
called the National Left, which was open also to non party members, with the explicit 
aim of bringing people of left-wing views into Plaid and the implicit aim of pushing Plaid 
more firmly to the left (McAllister, 2001, p. 174-5). From 1983, the ideas of the National 
Left were also propagated through a new quarterly magazine called Radical Wales, 
whose objective was to spark intellectual debate on the political context and on Plaid‟s 
role within it. The Commission of Inquiry, which was set up after the 1979 referendum 
and reported in 1981, strengthened the argument for a leftward ideological re-positioning. 
Under the heading „Political Philosophy‟ the Report argued that Plaid‟s ideology and 
policy “is socialist in nature” (Plaid Cymru, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1981, 
p. 14). However, Plaid‟s socialism needed to be qualified: “It is important for us not to 
allow our political stance to be misinterpreted” (ibid.). It went then on to explain the two-
dimensional dualisms, left-right and decentralism-centralism, with Labour occupying the 
left-centralist quadrant, the Tories the right-centralist one and the Liberals the right-
decentralist one. The Report concluded that Plaid was a left-decentralist party and its 
political philosophy “could be best described as Decentralist Socialism” (ibid.).  
 The new ideological stance was formally adopted in the party‟s statute and 
membership forms with a vote won at the 1981 Conference by a two thirds majority 
(McAllister, 2001, p. 167). Although the content of Plaid‟s „decentralist socialism‟ did 
not differ a great deal from D. J. Davies‟ „co-operative socialism‟ of the 1930s, for the 
first time the party officially recognised the it had to take a clear stance on the left-right 
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dimension and introduced an unequivocal, though qualified, reference to socialism. A 
further attempt to win the support of the working class was represented by the 
establishment in 1982 of a trade union affiliated to the party. Some party members tried 
to set up an organizational structure but, by March 1984, it had become clear that the 
project had failed (Plaid Cymru, NOPTU – Lost Momentum: A Critical Analysis, by 
Stuart Austin, 1984).   
The adoption of a leftist ideological position ended the „broad church‟ strategy 
which the party had been following until then and opened a phase of strong internal 
debate, with many traditionalist members now feeling uncomfortable within Plaid. At the 
1981 Conference, the leadership contest between Dafydd Wigley and Dafydd Elis 
Thomas was largely perceived both within and without the party as a left-right one, with 
the former representing a more traditionalist position and the latter representing the left-
wingers (McAllister, 2001, p. 72). The election of the former did not impede the 
formation of a ginger group called Hydro, whose primary aim was to “to re-establish 
self-government for Wales, unqualified by any dogma, as the main aim of Plaid Cymru” 
(Hydro Report on Plaid’s Electoral Performance, October 1983). However, Wigley‟s 
pragmatism contributed to soften the tone of the debate and to maintain party unity.
32
 He 
was a strong supporter of social-democratic policies but he preferred not to call himself a 
socialist, nor was he entirely comfortable with Plaid being called so. Under his leadership, 
rumours circulated that the party was conducting secret talks with the centrist Social 
Democratic Party to enhance cross-party co-operation (McAllister, 2001, p. 168).  
However, with the election of Elis Thomas in 1984 as party President and leader, 
the fragile internal truce was broken. Some traditionalist members left the party at the 
same conference in 1984, after a motion calling for the abandonment of the commitment 
to socialism was defeated (McAllister, 2001, p. 173). The confrontation between the 
National Left and Hydro became sour and, at times, nasty.  
The evolution of the socio-political context in Wales reinforced the National Left 
even more. In particular, the 1984-85 miners‟ strike and Labour‟ ambivalent position on 
it, gave Plaid the opportunity to try and mobilize support in the southern Valleys (Lynch, 
1995, p. 202). The party became involved with the National Union of Mineworkers and 
played an important role within the Congress in Support of Mining Communities, which 
organized the collection of money and food, even from abroad, to support the 
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 In fact, few hard left-wingers, such as marxist Garreth Miles, left the party during Wigley‟s first 
leadership (Radical Wales, first issue, Winter 1983).  
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communities during the strike (Janet Davies, interview with the author, Cardiff, 
04/12/06). The term socialist became more widely used in public speeches and pamphlets, 
such as Tim Richards‟ The case for a Socialist Wales (n.d.), and Plaid became a more 
familiar political actor in south Wales. After another attempt to reverse the commitment 
to socialism failed miserably at the 1986 Conference,
33
 the Hydro group was disbanded 
in order to preserve party unity in the run up to the 1987 general election (Western Mail, 
15/07/1986). 
Elis Thomas‟ constant concern was to broaden the base of Plaid, in order to turn 
what was a „nationalist‟ party, confined into Welsh speaking Wales, into a „nation-wide‟ 
party (McAllister, 2001, p. 77). Beside placing Plaid more firmly on the left in socio-
economic terms, his strategy included a stronger emphasis and commitment on „New 
Politics‟ issues, such as gender equality, environmentalism and anti-militarism. In order 
to establish the party as a recognised supporter of these instances, Elis Thomas sought 
co-operation with civil society‟s organizations and pressure groups, such as the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the Women‟s Movement and the Greens. 
Evaluated against immediate electoral performances, Plaid‟s strategy did not 
produce any appreciable result. Electoral gains in the 1987 local and 1989 European 
elections were extremely limited, whereas at the 1987 general election the party lost 
votes, particularly in south Wales. While some voters from the Valleys may have 
developed a certain sympathy for Plaid‟s stance, their only hope of getting rid of the Tory 
government was that Labour would win a majority of UK seats. Therefore, the recovery 
of Labour and the still high competition from the Alliance of the Liberals and Social 
Democratic Party nullified all the efforts to break out of the party‟s traditional heartland. 
On the other hand, adopting clear leftist and socially progressive rhetoric did not harm in 
rural Wales, where Plaid increased the number of elected MPs from 2 to 3. That 
represented a proof that this strategy could be pursued further, without incurring in 
electoral losses in the party‟s heartland. A senior party figure and former member of the 
National Left explained the fruits of the 1980s strategy as follows: 
 
In the place where I come from [South Wales], our image has completely changed. In 
the late 1970s we were still seen as some peculiar people who wanted to have a Welsh 
speaking Wales, where people who could not speak Welsh would be considered as 
second class citizens. We were also perceived as being on the side of the IRA, in spite 
of our anti-violence tradition. Whereas by the end of the 1980s people were saying 
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 Only 15 out of 215 delegates voted against a motion retaining socialism as a party‟s aim (Western 
Mail, 15/07/1986). 
  
67 
 
„we agree with you, we think you are great, the only problem you‟ve got is that you 
are too small…but we like you,  you are pulling the Labour party towards the way we 
want it to go‟. That‟s what our left-wing stance did, it made us acceptable and 
respectable in the south, which is where most people live. (Janet Davies, interview 
with the author, 04/12/06). 
 
 
2.3.3 Still a Socialist Party? Following and Challenging Labour (1990s-2000s) 
 In the early 1990s Plaid continued with the same strategy, consolidating its new 
image as a leftist and socially progressive party. The alliance with the Wales Green Party 
at the 1992 election represented a further move in that direction. The 1989 European 
election had shown that the two parties, in spite of their similar policy proposals, 
attracted voters from different socio-cultural and geographical constituencies. Plaid, as 
usual, had scored much better amongst the indigenous and Welsh-speaking voters, 
whereas the Greens had taken many votes from English-speaking voters who had 
recently moved to Wales because of its well preserved natural environment (Plaid Cymru, 
by Cynog Davies, 2005, p. 12). For Elis Thomas, the pursuit of the electoral alliance with 
the Greens represented a choice consistent with both the party‟s ideological orientations 
and the political strategy aimed at broadening its base (Lynch, 1995, p. 204-5). Dafydd 
Wigley, who was re-elected as party leader in 1991, supervised the final stages of the 
electoral alliance, though most of the activity, including the organization of the campaign, 
was carried out at the local level amongst the two parties‟ activists. The results were 
positive for Plaid which increased its Wales-wide vote share and, thanks to the electoral 
pact with the Greens, won one more seat in Ceredigion and North Pembrokeshire. 
However, the disastrous results of the Green candidates jeopardised the stability of the 
alliance in the medium term. Few joint candidates were presented at the 1995 local 
elections but, given the rebellion of many Green local activists, that represented the end 
point.  
 Dafydd Wigley‟s strategy during its second mandate as party President and leader 
was to target explicitly Labour voters across all Wales (McAllister, 2001, p. 83). The 
party he inherited from Elis Thomas was much fitter for the purpose, in terms of its 
ideological position. The leftist, inclusive and socially progressive outlook built during 
the 1980s had helped soften, to some extent, Plaid‟s public image as a cultural nationalist 
and exclusivist party. This was particularly important in respect of what was going on in 
former Yugoslavia, where nationalism was causing a brutal inter-ethnic war, and allowed 
the party to deflect possible accusations of professing a divisive and destructive ideology. 
  
68 
 
However, focusing more closely on winning working class voters implied a further, 
though slight, ideological repositioning. While the socio-economic leftist orientations 
were maintained, including the „socialist‟ word in the party constitution, „New Politics‟ 
issues were not supported indiscriminately anymore. Some ideas, which were part of the 
ideological legacy of the early years, such as opposition to war, militarism and armament, 
were kept highly visible in the party blueprint. Environmentalism, which was also seen as 
a legacy of the early years, was maintained within the party programme and was still 
talked up front but it was slightly diluted in the face of more pro-economic development 
proposals. Other issues, such as feminism, ethnic (immigrant) minority rights, not to 
mention gay rights, which were more extraneous to the party‟s ideological tradition, were 
left in the background. While this ideological shift also responded to the preferences of 
party members and activists (Van Morgan, 2006, p. 272), it arguably made the party 
more in tune with the preferences of the Valleys‟ working class, traditionally more 
sensitive to socio-economic than to „new politics‟ issues.  
 In the 1995 local elections, Plaid built on the success of the 1991 election, 
improving its score in South Wales, though most of the gains came again from the area of 
Gwynedd. By the mid-1990s, however, social and political polarization in the UK and in 
Wales had substantively diminished. New Labour had gradually repositioned itself 
towards the centre-ground, thus denying oxygen to centrist Liberal Democrats and re-
establishing itself as a UK-wide credible alternative to the Conservative party. In this 
context, debate within Plaid on left-right ideological positioning lost most of its salience. 
In addition, Labour‟s victory in the 1997 election and its pushing ahead with devolution 
shifted the attention again from left-right politics to self-government. This allowed the 
party to regain unity and to devote more attention to organisational and campaigning 
efficiency. Overall, it followed the right-wards ideological shift which characterised 
Britain and, arguably, the whole Western world and beyond: 
 
I think it is inevitable that we became less left-wing than we were in the 1980s. A lot 
of us were really idealists then, it was „left or nothing, no compromise‟. However, as 
we became more involved with running local councils from the early 1990s, we had 
to do the things that worked. (Janet Davies, interview with the author, Cardiff, 
04/12/06)  
 
 
However, Plaid remained clearly to the left of New Labour and, when the time of the first 
election to the newly established National Assembly for Wales came, the party was ready 
to fully exploit the opportunity which was presented to it. 
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 The strategy that Plaid followed more or less consistently from the early 1980s 
entailed a left-ward ideological repositioning that, by the late 1990s, had made it much 
more appealing to south Wales‟ working class voters. However, the overwhelming 
majority of them, including those who liked Plaid, kept voting for Labour for two main 
reasons. First, Plaid Cymru did not represent a credible player in UK general elections. 
Second, Labour in south Wales was seen as the true party of Wales, conveying a type of 
national identity which drew mostly on the socio-economic characteristics of the region 
(Roberts, 1995). In the 1999 NAW election these two obstacles to Plaid‟s electoral 
success either disappeared (in the case of the former) or lost strength (in the case of the 
latter). Tony Blair‟s interference in the leadership contest of Welsh Labour made the 
party look less Welsh and less left-wing, thus upsetting many voters who decided either 
to abstain or to vote for Plaid (Scully et al., 2003). That gave the party the electoral 
breakthrough it had sought for many years, which was also replicated at the local and 
European level.  
 Data from the Welsh Election Study, carried out in 2001, show how Plaid has 
become a credible political actor amongst the Welsh working class, even overcoming 
Labour (see Table 2.15). 
 
Table 2.15 
Working Class Interests and Party Image (%) 2001 
 
Looks after Working Class interests Welsh Labour Plaid Cymru 
 
Very closely 
 
9.7 
 
13.1 
Fairly closely 53.5 52.2 
Not very closely 24.9 18.8 
Not at all closely 3.0 3.3 
Don‟t know/not answered 8.8 12.7 
 
Source: Wyn Jones, Trystan and Heath, Welsh Election Study (2001), reported in Van Morgan (2006). 
 
 
However, turning working class voters‟ sympathy into actual votes remains a hard 
challenge for Plaid. Especially after Blairite leader Alun Michael was replaced in 2000 
by Rhodri Morgan at the head of Welsh Labour. The latter has not missed any occasion 
to stress the „clear red water‟ that separates Welsh Labour from English New Labour 
(Wyn Jones and Scully, 2004). As Table 2.16 shows, Plaid‟s electorate in the early 2000s 
was still very much cross-class, with most votes coming from the „petit bourgeoisie‟. 
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Table 2.16 
Social Class and Party Support in Wales (%), 2001 
 
Social group Cons Lab Plaid Lib Dem Others 
 
Salariat 
 
23.2 
 
36.0 
 
14.0 
 
22.0 
 
4.8 
Routine non-manual 17.3 51.8 12.9 12.2 5.8 
Petty Bourgeoisie 21.2 32.7 21.2 19.2 5.7 
Manual, foreman, technicians  14.5 61.8 14.5 7.3 1.9 
Working class 10.9 66.7 11.5 7.8 3.1 
 
Source: Wyn Jones, Trystan and Heath, Welsh Election Study (2001), reported in Van Morgan (2006). 
 
 
Ieuan Wyn Jones, elected as Plaid new President and leader in 2000, had to face 
the difficult challenge to maintain the 1999 level of electoral support in the face of a 
reinvigorated Welsh Labour party. His strategy was to follow the path traced by Wigley 
in the previous decade, although the new leader conveyed a less leftist image. Compared 
with the previous general elections the party‟s score in 2001 was a success, but still it lost 
50% of the vote share compared with the FPTP results of the 1999 NAW election. The 
confirmation that Plaid was losing ground came at the 2003 NAW election, when the 
party lost a quarter of the vote share in the FPTP constituencies and more than a third of 
the its vote share in the regional constituencies. That meant a total loss of five members 
of the Assembly, keeping just a one-member lead on the Conservatives. Some AMs 
explained such a strong setback by pointing to the party‟s stance against the Iraq war, 
which had seemingly just been concluded with a victory for Britain and the other allies 
(interview with Dai Lloyd, Cardiff, 29/11/06). However, controversial statements against 
English immigration in Wales by some Plaid‟s members also helped Welsh Labour 
reaffirm his grips on its traditional English-speaking constituencies (Wyn Jones and 
Scully, 2003). 
 The electoral defeat in 2003 triggered a leadership change in Plaid Cymru, with 
the election of Dafydd Iwan as party President and leader. Iwan, a local councillor in 
Gwynedd and Welsh folk-music singer, projected the classic image of the hard core 
nationalist, strongly concerned with the Welsh language. The independence turn at the 
2003 Conference, added to the picture. Although he did not force any left-right 
ideological repositioning which would signalled a discontinuity with the previous 
leaderships, he was definitely not the best front man to sell Plaid Cymru to southern and 
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eastern English-speaking voters. Following the negative trend of 2003, in the 2004 local 
elections the party lost 4% of its vote share, 28 councillors and the control of two 
councils in the south, Caerphilly and Rhondda Cynon Taf.   
 Arguably, the return of Wyn Jones as party leader in 2006 increased the chances 
for the party doing better in the 2007 NAW election, especially in the south.  However, 
the traditionalist soul of the party seems to have regained strength and primacy. It was 
Elis Thomas once again who shook the party with his famous interview: 
 
When I sit in my chair in our new debating chamber, I am ashamed when I look out 
and see before me a sea of white faces….Not having representatives from the BME 
(black, minority, ethnic) communities is just as bad as it would if there were no 
women AMs or no AMs who could speak Welsh (Western Mail, 29/03/06) 
 
 
Addressing the issue of ethnic minority representation in the Assembly was also a way to 
prompt debate on the party ideological positioning, a debate which was still going on in 
the run up to the 2007 NAW election (Elis Thomas, interview with the author, Cardiff, 
12/12/06). Ideological divisions within the party re-merged mainly as a consequence of 
coalition politics. Even before the election, some members of the „socialist‟ wing of the 
party were uncomfortable about talks going on with the Conservatives for possible post-
election coalitions (Leonne Wood, interview with the author, Cardiff, 12/12/06). After 
the election, as the Liberal Democrats ruled out entering a coalition with Labour, Plaid 
Cymru was left as the pivotal actor. The choice between forming a coalition with Labour, 
as junior partner, or with the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, as the leading partner, 
sparked debate amongst party members. The left of the party wanted a deal with Labour, 
even if this meant renouncing the claim to a Plaid‟ First Minister, whereas Wyn Jones 
and the traditionalists preferred to lead a government with the Conservatives and the 
Liberal Democrats. Eventually, it was the Liberal Democrats who decided to turn down 
the so called „rainbow coalition‟. Therefore Plaid was left to decide whether accept the 
Labour offer or renounce involvement in office. The Labour-Plaid government 
agreement was negotiated by the leadership and then approved by the National Council 
in July 2007 without any outspoken opposition to the deal. (BBC/Wales, 07/06/07, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/6278848.stm).  
 Since the party took office, ideological divisions have been left in the background, 
re-surfacing occasionally on specific policies. In particular, the Labour proposal on 
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increasing university fees has prompted some internal debate. However, discussions on 
the left-right ideological positioning are likely to go on, as the party has returned to being, 
if it ever ceased to be, a „broad church‟. 
 
  
2.4 Party Ideology and Policy: The European Integration Dimension 
2.4.1 The Eurosceptic turn: ‘Europe Yes – EEC No’ (1950s-1979) 
During the 1950s, when the process of European integration got started, Plaid 
Cymru‟s general vision of Europe was still deeply influenced by the ideological legacy of 
Sanders Lewis. He had not fully anticipated the multi-level system of governance that 
European integration would create in the 1990s but his admiration for Medieval Europe, 
united in the Christian faith and yet harmoniously respectful of local and national centers 
of power, as well as local and national cultural identities, oriented him towards a position 
strongly in favour of European co-operation. This was reflected in the supportive 
attitudes of the party towards the nascent integration process, irrespectively of well 
informed considerations on the institutional configuration and on the policies that the 
new entity was likely to adopt. Just few months before the signing of the Treaty of Rome, 
the party‟s journal reported that “the imminent reality of economic integration in Western 
Europe… must be welcomed by Plaid Cymru, which had always called for greater co-
operation with Europe in general” (Welsh Nation, January, 1957, p. 4). The indifference 
of the UK for European integration was highly criticized, especially for the exclusion of 
Wales from European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), as both industrial sectors were 
vital for the Welsh economy (Lynch, 1996, p. 59).  
On the other hand, already in 1957, the party expressed some concerns about the 
prospect of joining the ECSC at a later stage and without appropriate representation of 
Wales‟ interests at the negotiation table, a concern that would re-surface many times in 
Plaid‟s discourses about European integration and that contributed to change Plaid‟s 
position during the 1960s. A further source of dissonance between the party and 
European integration came from the strong grassroots ethos of the former and the 
technocratic, elitist, top-down nature of the latter. There was some overlapping between 
the two arguments, as the technocratic character of the process entailed scarce 
involvement of political parties and, as far as Plaid was concerned, a scarce possibility 
for the party to voice Wales‟ interests.  
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By the late 1960s, Plaid‟s position had substantively changed. In 1969, the party 
adopted a clear position against UK‟s accession into the European Economic Community 
(Lynch, 1996, p. 61). During the 1970 election, the party tried to push the issue of 
European integration at the centre of the public debate. This allowed it to distinguish 
itself from the British parties: “Plaid Cymru is the only party that has consistently 
opposed British application to join the European Common Market… The three British 
parties are deliberately trying to keep the question of the Common Market out of this 
election. And yet it is the most crucial issue which faces us at present (Plaid Cymru, 
Election Manifesto 1970, p. 23). Plaid‟s strategy was to exploit the issue electorally and, 
at the same time, to link it to Welsh self-government, strengthening the argument for the 
latter objective: “The prospect of E.E.C. entry makes the need for a Welsh Parliament 
even more urgent.” (ibid.). 
Beyond the generic preoccupation for Wales‟ non-representation in the 
negotiations, a more detailed analysis of the possible impact of ECC membership on the 
Welsh economy was undertaken. One of the major issues highlighted in the study Wales 
and the European Common Market, reported in 1971 by party member Gwynn Matthews, 
was the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on Welsh hill framers. There 
were concerns about the possibility that the CAP pricing system for cereals would 
penalize Welsh agriculture. There was also a concern that CAP‟s incentives on the 
creation of larger and fewer landholdings would threaten the survival of farming 
communities in the Welsh hills (Plaid Cymru, by G. Matthews, 1971, p. 12-13). The 
substantial overlap between agricultural and Welsh-speaking Wales made this issue very 
salient for Plaid, which obviously viewed the problem not only in economic but also in 
cultural, linguistic terms. A second concern, which was rather widespread in south Wales 
in the run up to UK accession (Rhys David, Western Mail, 23/06/1971), was about the 
impact of the Common Market on the Welsh steel industry. In particular the analysis 
pointed to the possibility that peripheral production plants, such as the Welsh ones, 
would be closed down and “new plants would probably be sited in those regions of 
Britain convenient for Europe” (Plaid Cymru, by G. Matthews, 1971, p. 15). There also 
were other, more general, economic concerns about the possible impact of membership 
on unemployment and the cost of living, which made the overall scenario of Wales in 
Europe appear rather gloomy. 
Beside the negative expectations about the economic impact of Wales joining 
Europe through the UK, other arguments were put forward against membership. First of 
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all the party commitment to Welsh self-government, which at that was still leaning, 
though not without ambiguities, towards a sovereigntist position („Commonwealth 
status‟), could be seen as being at odds with the membership of a supranational polity 
whose vocation was „ever closer union‟: “We took a negative position because there was 
the feeling that if we wanted to be in our own, then it was not very sensible to join 
another union” (Janet Davies, interview with author, Cardiff, 04/12/06). The EEC‟s 
structure, seen as overtly centralized and scarcely democratic, was perceived as a 
potential source of oppression and exploitation: “You can blame London for our position 
in the 1970s, because we have always been oppressed by London so we had the feelings 
that also the other Europeans would oppress us” (Dai Llyod, interview with author, 
Cardiff, 29/11/06).  
In order to avoid projecting a fully isolationist image, the party used an old 
proposal, which envisaged the creation of a Common Market of the British Islands, 
within which Wales would be a self-governing nation retaining close economic ties with 
England (Plaid Cymru, 20 Questions And Answers, between 1968 and 1972, n.d.). In 
addition, it proposed to strengthen co-operation within the European Free Trade Area, on 
the grounds that Wales had much more in common with EFTA countries than with EEC 
ones (Plaid Cymru, Election Manifesto 1970, p 23; 20 Questions And Answers, n.d., p. 
12). 
Some criticism of the EEC can also be linked to the left leaning ideology of Plaid 
Cymru. One of the reasons why Plaid felt that Wales had more in common with EFTA 
countries than with the EEC was that the former favoured social-democratic policies, 
whereas the latter was perceived as liberal, free-market organization favouring the 
interests of big business over those of workers and local communities. Moreover, EFTA 
countries had a much more neutral position within the context of the cold war, whereas 
the EEC ones were all NATO members and perceived to be aligned with US foreign 
policy. This was problem for the anti-war tradition of the party, especially in the context 
of the Vietnam War. Finally the party criticized EEC protectionism against third world 
countries (Plaid Cymru, by G. Matthews, 1971, p. 24). 
Given all these arguments, when the Labour government elected in October 1974 
held a referendum for the following year on continued UK membership of the EEC, Plaid 
sided with the „No‟ campaign. However, that was not a fully unitary decision and the 
slogan adopted for the campaign „Europe Yes – EEC No‟ reflected mixed views of party 
members. Indeed, likewise the other British parties, Plaid hosted very different positions 
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within its ranks. The majority of the party favoured a „no‟ position. This was an alliance 
of hard-core nationalists that did not want another „foreign‟ power, which would impose 
its technocratic decisions on Wales, and a more influential group of left-wingers, led by 
Dafydd Elis Thomas, which criticized the EEC for its (internal) free-market, anti-third 
world and pro-US positions. However, a minority of party members, led by Dafydd 
Wigley, saw no contradiction between joining the EEC and advancing Wales‟ self-
government. Quite the opposite, they insisted that the EEC umbrella could actually 
strengthen the argument of a self-governing Wales and that Europe centralized structure 
could be reformed in a decentralist direction. A senior party member recalls the divisions 
on the EEC referendum largely overlapping with the left-right divisions within the party:  
 
we took a position against EEC accession mainly because of the influence of 
Dafydd Elis-Thomas one of our two MPs at the time… there was a debate between 
the left and right within Plaid Cyrmu and at that time. Dafydd Wigley was seen as 
the one representing the right and David Ellis-Thomas was seen as the good guy 
representing the left. The trade unions at that time were against UK entry as the 
EEC was seen as a capitalist club… so it was the left led Plaid Cymru to campaign 
for a no vote in the referendum. (Alun Fred Jones, interview with the author, 
Cardiff, 05/12/06). 
 
 
However, the decision to campaign for a „No‟ vote was not based only on the ideological 
discrepancies between the left of the party and the EEC. Arguably, the reason why the 
left managed to impose its stance on the party was that, adopting a „No‟ position, Plaid 
Cymru could distinguish itself from all the other parties and, at the same time, exploit 
their much more evident divisions. Elis Thomas confirms that: 
 
in 1975 we chose to campaign for a no vote because we wanted to be part of the 
left alliance, we wanted to work together with the trade unions against UK entry. 
The Labour party was divided and we had an opportunity to win support from the 
workers. We were also the only party in Wales who developed an original position, 
„Europe yes – EEC no‟, which did not work very well for the referendum. (Elis 
Thomas, interview with the author, Cardiff, 12/12/06).   
 
 
Indeed, as Table 2.17 shows, the results were disappointing for Plaid. Wales voted 
clearly in favour of continued membership, especially in the rural counties, such as the 
party‟s heartland Gwynedd. Arguably, the Welsh farmers had had enough time to learn 
about and appreciate the benefits of the CAP (Keating and Jones, 1995, p. 95).  
 In the aftermath of the referendum the party had to come to terms with the 
preferences of the Welsh electorate and its traditional constituencies. The party discourse 
on Europe softened considerably, although the policy remained unaltered (Lynch, 1996, 
  
76 
 
p. 71). The prospect of having an elected European Parliament in few years time also 
neutralized, albeit partially, some of the previous criticism about the non-democratic 
character of the EEC. However, at that time, Plaid‟s attention shifted to the debate on the 
devolution, as the Labour‟s proposal was making its way through Westminster. A 
thorough re-examination of the party position on Europe was, therefore, postponed. 
 
Table 2.17 
The EEC Referendum in Wales, 1975 
 
County Turnout Yes No 
 
Clwyd 
 
65.8 
 
69.1 
 
30.9 
Dyfed 67.5 67.6 32.4 
Gwent 68.0 62.1 37.9 
Gwynedd 64.3 70.6 29.4 
Mid Glamorgan 66.6 56.9 43.1 
Powys 67.9 74.3 25.7 
South Glamorgan 66.7 69.9 30.7 
West Glamorgan 67.4 61.6 38.4 
 
Wales 
 
66.7 
 
64.8 
 
35.2 
United Kingdom 62.7 67.2 32.8 
 
Source: Original data in Danis Balsom, 1991, reported in Peter Lynch, 1996, p. 70. 
 
 
 
2.4.2 The Europhile (federalist) turn: ‘Europe of the Regions’ or ‘Full National 
Status in Europe’? (1980-2003) 
During the 1980s Plaid Cymru gradually reversed its stance on European 
integration. In this period the pro-EEC wing within the party grew stronger, as 
developments in domestic politics as well as at the EEC level reduced both the 
ideological distance between Plaid and Europe and the exploitability of a Eurosceptic 
position in terms of electoral party competition.  
The Report of the Plaid Cymru Commission of Inquiry (1981) was quite 
dismissive about the issue of European integration. It anticipated that, in its present form, 
the EEC would not survive the 1980s and that the party had therefore to decide whether 
to try and reform the EEC‟s structure or to promote its collapse (ibid., p. 9). As 
highlighted above, after the publication of the report, internal debate was almost 
completely absorbed by discussion on „socialism‟ and left-right positioning, leaving little 
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room for other issues, such as European integration to be taken into account. 
Reconsideration of Plaid‟s stance on Europe began in the period before the 1983 general 
election. However, it did not lead to a real change of policy, nor to a clear qualification of 
the party‟s stance: “Plaid Cymru views with concern the effects of UK membership of 
the European Economic Community on Wales, and the lack of an effective Welsh voice 
within the Common Market” (Plaid Cymru, 1983 Election Manifesto,  p. 11). The 
message the party wanted to convey was that both countries which had decided to remain 
out of the EEC, such as Norway, Sweden and Finland, and countries that joined as self-
governing nations, such as Ireland, were doing better than Wales economically. 
Therefore, membership of the EEC was to be considered a secondary issue, which could 
properly be addressed only after the achievement of self-government. 
However, the development of domestic politics which featured the strengthening 
right-wing and Eurosceptic connotations of Mrs. Thatcher‟s government led the left of 
Plaid to re-think its position on Europe. An article appeared on the first issue of the 
periodical Radical Left stated:  
 
[Plaid‟s] analysis has rarely penetrated beyond these simple formulae: Common 
Market equals free enterprise equals bad: or Common Market equals Brussels equal 
bureaucracy equals bad. The time has now come to rethink the issue much more 
carefully… anti-European sentiments are being increasingly voiced within the 
Thatcher government… In this political context… those who urge withdrawal from 
Europe… can all too easily contribute to conservative, centralist, statist goals… it is 
no use disentangling ourselves from Brussels and European multinationals if, in so 
doing, we end up tightening the stranglehold of South-East England (Radical Wales, 
“Withdrawal to what? Britain and the European Community, 1983, p. 17) 
  
 
The involvement of the party in the building up of a European party family for the 
regionalist and minority nationalist parties – the European Free Alliance (EFA) -led some 
of its members to realize that Plaid‟ positions were much closer to those of many 
European politicians and parties than to those of the British government. As a senior 
party member recalls: 
 
We had the feeling that the EU was actually defending us against the worst excesses 
of the Conservative government of that time. So, many people within the party 
changed their position towards Europe. You know during the miners‟ strike in 1984-
85 some of the sister parties in Europe, such as the Volksunie, sent us lots and lots of 
food for the miners in South Wales and they raised the whole issue in the European 
Parliament when nobody else had raised it. (Janet Davies, interview with the author, 
Cardiff, 04/12/06).         
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It should not come as surprise, therefore, that the party‟s left-wingers, which had pushed 
for a „No‟ position in 1975, gradually became the most strenuous supporter of a policy 
change: “We started realizing that there was more political benefit in being pro-
European… we started cooperating within the European Parliament elections with the 
other autonomist groups and parties” (Elis Thomas, interview with the author, Cardiff, 
12/12/06). The ideological proximity between Plaid and the EEC was also enhanced by 
EEC policies, such as the regional and structural funds, and by its emerging role in the 
international arena, which could be clearly distinguished by the US‟s for its stress of 
peace, human rights and environment as inspiring values.  
 During the 1984 European election, the party continued to use the issue of 
European integration mainly to strengthen the case for Wales‟ self-government: “The key 
issue is elf-government and nowhere is this more obvious than in the European Economic 
Community” (Plaid Cymru, 1984 Election Manifesto, p. 2). However, it became evident 
that the party‟s stance on UK‟s membership of the EEC had changed: “there is no answer 
in totally rejecting Europe and retreating to „fortress Britain‟” (ibid., p. 4).  
 Under Elis Thomas leadership, the party consolidated a Europhile stance. 
However, the linkage between Plaid‟s self-government objective and its policy on 
Europe became more ambiguous. Closer co-operation with the other parties of EFA, 
most of which were seeking some form of autonomy rather than full independence, 
together with the emphasis posed by the new leadership on short-term self-government 
objectives, such as devolution, led Plaid to develop a proposal which fell in between a 
sovereigntist and non-sovereigntist position. This ambiguity emerged in the 1987 election 
manifesto, where the party was calling for the establishment of a Welsh Senate: “The 
Senate will establish a Brussels office to represent Wales within the European 
community, as a first step towards ensuring Welsh ministerial representation in the 
Council of Ministers and a voice for Wales in all Community institutions (Plaid Cymru, 
1987 Election Manifesto, p. 26).    
De facto, during the 1980s, the party adopted the policy of the „Europe of the 
Regions‟, calling for a more decentralized structure of the EEC rather than one 
underpinned by intergovernmental politics (Lynch, 1996, p. 74). This new policy, 
however, was not fully reconcilable with previous self-government aims that, though 
avoiding the word independence (let alone secession), entailed a more „sovereigntist 
position, nor with party‟s claims shaped by those previous aims, such as Wales‟ veto 
power in the Council or same representation in the Parliament as existing small states.  
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 In 1989, when PC completed its policy reversal on European integration, the 
party policy was still oscillating between two different proposals: „full national status in 
the EEC‟ and the „Europe of the regions‟ (Plaid Cymru, Manifesto 1989). The former 
proposal was meant as a short-term objective, whereas the latter would follow from the 
regionalization of the EEC (Lynch, 1996, p. 76-77). While the 1989 European election 
marked the maturation of a fully Europhile, federalist position, the two-step policy was 
rather visionary, as both the first and the second step were not likely to materialized in 
the medium (and arguably long) term, and ambiguous.  
During the 1990s, Plaid remained a strong supporter of European integration: 
“We shall seek both the widening and the deepening of Europe” (Plaid Cymru, European 
Election Manifesto 1994, p. 9). However, its linkage between the self-government 
objective and the preferred structure of Europe remained ambiguous. The establishment, 
with the Treaty of Maastricht, of the Committee of the Regions and the principle of 
subsidiarity led the party to envisage the creation of a federal „Europe of the peoples‟, 
with powers shifting from the Council and the Commission to a bicameral Parliament 
where the regions would be represented (ibid. p. 11-12). The establishment of the Welsh 
Assembly, giving the party the possibility to have a more influential role within the 
European multi-level governance structure, reinforced the perspective of a regionalized 
Europe. In the 1999 European election, which coincided with the first NAW election, the 
party obtained its highest score ever, getting representation in the European Parliament 
for the first time. This represented an occasion for Plaid to take an even more active role 
within the EFA which, after the election, formed a new European parliamentary group 
with the Greens. Arguably, greater involvement in EU institutions helped consolidate the 
pro-European stance, though the party kept calling for reforms in a more democratic and 
more decentralist direction. The 2003 Welsh election manifesto states: “We firmly 
believe in the creation of a more democratic European Union with a written constitution 
and a Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Treaty.” (Plaid Cymru, 2003 Manifesto, p. 
27). However, actual prospects on constitutional reform of the EU‟s structure, as outlined 
in both the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and the Reform Treaty, did not 
go in the direction the party hoped for.  
 
2.4.4 The current phase: disillusioned Europhilia? (2004-2009) 
After the party‟s adoption of the policy of independence in Europe in September 
2003 and the final draft of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe agreed in 
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June 2004, Plaid‟s position on European integration turned much milder. The European 
Constitution, reaffirming the primacy of the member-states as the building blocs of the 
Union, appears to have dashed the expectations of the party. Some party members called 
for Plaid to commit to independence outside Europe but many of them left the party after 
they lost the argument (Janet Davies, interview with the author, Cardiff, 04/12/06). The 
perplexity over the lack of attention to regionalist concerns is outlined very clearly by the 
then party‟s chief executive: 
 
The constitution from our perspective had to guarantee the right of the regions being 
represented within the Council of Ministers…. The Constitution could specify that 
regions with regional governments must be included with regional delegations when 
something potentially relevant to them is being discussed. (Dafydd Trystan, 
interview with the author, Cardiff, 01/12/06). 
 
 
In the 2005 general election manifesto, the party advocated further integration in “foreign 
policy, conflict prevention and the use of military force for peace keeping purposes” 
because “the EU is potentially a very important counterweight in the world to the power 
of the US” (Plaid Cymru, Manifesto 2005). However, when it comes to the EU 
Constitution, the manifesto statements reflect the critical position outlined above. PC 
welcomes, “in principle”, both the proposed constitution and the promised referendum, 
without spelling out whether it would support a „yes‟ vote. In addition, the party 
maintains that, without UK government consulting the Welsh Assembly on new 
proposals coming from the Commission and allowing representation for Wales in the UK 
delegations in the Council, “the new constitution will not work at its best” (ibid). Such 
position is re-proposed in very similar terms in the 2007 Assembly election manifesto 
(Plaid Cymru, Manifesto 2007, p. 33-34).  However, no party documents speak openly 
about opposition to the Constitution or Reform treaties and the party does not appear to 
have a clear position on them. As one AM put it:  
 
We did not like it [i.e. the EU Constitution] because it seems to work against the 
regions within Europe. The constitution does not take the regions seriously…it 
does not consider them proper players within Europe…but I am not sure we would 
reject the whole constitution on those grounds. (interview with Alun Fred Jones, 
05/12/06)  
 
 
In fact, Plaid Cymru is keeping a very low profile on Europe. The party appears divided 
and probably confused. On the one hand, the Welsh nationalists still appreciates 
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important EU policies, such as the structural funds, environmental policies and the EU 
role in the international scene. As one member of the Assembly put it: 
 
We like very much the EU legislation…we have very few sensible laws made in 
England, the most sensible laws recently have been European ones. For instance, in 
terms of environmental legislation we would not have it if the UK wasn‟t in Europe. 
So we don‟t have problems with Europe making laws, provided that we have our 
full say in Wales (Dai Lloyd, interview with the author, Cardiff, 29/11/06). 
 
 
On the other hand, the constitutional process has disappointed some of Party‟s 
expectations. While in the 1980s and 1990s the process of European integration was 
perceived as an alley in the party‟s struggle for self-government, the current trajectory of 
the EU‟s constitutional reform seem to offer very little to regional authorities. Therefore, 
the party has now lost hope that empowerment of Wales within the EU multi-level 
governance may come from the EU level. In other words, as far as enhancement of 
Wales‟ self-government is concerned, the EU is now perceived as a neutral actor, which 
leaves decisions on the empowerment of the regions to the member-states. In this respect, 
it is the „non-sovereigntist‟ (autonomist) soul of the party which has been let down by the 
current trajectory of the EU constitutional structure: “I think the constitution could not 
satisfy our autonomous ambitions. I think it should go much further in recognizing the 
role of the regions” (Dafydd Elis Thomas, interview with author, Cardiff, 12/12/06). The 
independence turn, arguably, represents an attempt to come to terms with the reality of 
the situation. However, with independence being out of reach in the medium term, the 
party frustration with its lack of representation in the EU policy making, as well as 
debate within the party, is likely to continue:  
 
Plaid Cymru supports an honest and open debate on the future of Europe, which is 
why we supported a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty… As an interim measure, we 
will propose that the [Welsh] First Minister has the right to attend Council of 
Ministers meetings as an Observer with speaking rights… Things must change: the 
EU must stand up for you, for your community and for the future of Wales. (Plaid 
Cymru, Manifesto, 2009, p. 11-12).    
 
 
Conclusion 
During its long history PC has changed ideological/policy positions several times 
on all three dimensions. As far as self-government (i.e. the centre-periphery dimension) 
is concerned, the ideological position of the party was affected for a very long time by 
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the anti-independentist stance of its leader and founder. The strong resilience of this 
ideological legacy, which translated into a certain ambiguity in setting the party‟s final 
goal, also owed much to the need to reconcile the largely pro-independence attitude of 
party membership with the overwhelmingly anti-independence stance of the Welsh 
electorate. Since the 1970s, the party‟s position has changed several times in response to 
the emerging possibility of achieving limited autonomy. Finally, in 2003, PC abandoned 
any ambiguity, stating that independence for Wales represents its final objective. 
However, the opportunities opened up by multi-party government formation in the NAW, 
which resulted in PC becoming a junior coalition partner to Welsh Labour in 2007, have 
determined the adoption of a pragmatic, gradualist strategy aimed at achieving a Scottish-
style Parliament in the short to medium term. 
 The ideological legacy of the inter-war period had a long-lasting effect on the 
left-right dimension too. A certain conservatism and even sympathy for Fascism gave the 
party a right-wing public image which proved difficult to get rid of. In the wake of WWII 
the party tried to establish a centrist (no right, no left) image, which would allow 
members of all ideological orientations to feel comfortable. While this strategy made 
some sense in agricultural North and West Wales, it was completely „unfit‟ for Wales-
wide electoral expansion. Ideological repositioning towards the left started in the 1970s 
and accelerated in the early 1980s, under the thrust of increased polarization. In addition, 
in the second half of the 1980s and 1990s the party also developed a New Left ideology, 
emphasising its anti-militarist, environmentalist and pro gender equality stances. In the 
age of New Labour, PC could moderate its leftist stance and ease internal tensions on 
left-right ideological positioning. That said, it seems to have established itself as the most 
leftist party in the Welsh party system, in spite of Welsh Labour‟s attempts to distance 
themselves from the centrist strategy of London‟s New Labour. 
 As far as European integration is concerned, the main change of position, from 
anti- to pro-integration, occurred during the 1980s. In spite of the pro-European legacy of 
the inter-war period, PC had developed a Eurosceptic position during the 1950s and 
1960s. In 1975 it campaign for a „No vote‟ in the referendum confirming the UK‟s 
membership of the EEC, acquiring political visibility given the pro-membership positions 
of all the other parties. The slow change of position during the 1980s owed much to the 
contemporary leftward movement of both the party and the EEC‟s policies. In addition it 
was reinforced during the 1990s by the regionalist emphasis of the EU. Indeed, in that 
period the party subscribed to a Eurofederalist position. During the latest, constitutional, 
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phase of the EU (2002-2009), the party has maintained a rather ambiguous position. 
Many prominent members did not like Lisbon‟s re-emphasis on the centrality of 
member-states. PC asked for a referendum on the Treaty, omitting to spell out, however, 
its precise stance should such a referendum be held. 
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Chapter 3 
The Scottish National Party 
 
The Scottish National Party was born in the inter-war period but it made an 
impact in the electoral arena only in the late 1960s. From the very beginning it has been 
the party of self-government for Scotland, drawing on the region‟s history as an 
independent state and on the institutional legacy of that independence within the UK. 
Ethnic distinctiveness vis a vis England has never had a high profile in party‟s discourse 
and has declined over time; given the affinities between the Church of England and the 
Church of Scotland and the use of the same language north and south of the border, the 
resources for ethnic mobilization were scarce if not absent. 
 With Scotland making up less than ten percent of the UK‟s population, the SNP 
has rarely been a relevant party in Westminster. As with many other regionalist parties, 
its core level of action is the regional one. That is why the establishment of a regional 
parliament in 1999 completely changed the party‟s opportunity structure and eventually 
saw it take office in 2007. Like PC, the SNP consistently does better at regional than at 
general elections. However, in contrast with many other regionalist parties, the SNP has 
scored rather poorly at local elections until very recently.  
 
 
3.1. Party Profile: Origins and Political Achievements  
3.1.1 The historical origins of the centre/periphery cleavage in Scotland 
The origins of the centre/periphery cleavage in Scotland lie in the simple fact 
that Scotland and England were two independent and separate states for several 
centuries before the formation of the (United) Kingdom of Great Britain in 1707. From 
the late twelfth century, a unified kingdom, whose borders coincided to a large extent 
with contemporary Scotland, had emerged in northern Britain. Leaving aside a serious 
attempt by the English monarchy to embrace Scotland within the Kingdom of England 
between the late thirteenth and the early fourteenth centuries, the Scottish Kingdom has 
enjoyed institutional continuity for about five centuries. Even after the Act of Union of 
1707, Scotland maintained its own civil law, its civil service, its separate Church and its 
education system. These institutional elements contributed to maintain a sense of 
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Scottish identity in the face of cultural, and in particular linguistic, assimilation which 
was completed with the spread of mass education in the twentieth century.   
From a cultural perspective, medieval Scotland was not a particularly 
homogeneous polity, nor was it clearly separated from Anglo-Norman England. The 
Highlands and the north were predominantly Celtic in culture (in spite of strong 
Scandinavian influences in the north-east) and spoke Gaelic. In contrast, the Lowlands 
and the south were predominantly influenced by Anglo-Saxon culture and spoke 
English - or rather „Inglis‟ – (H. J. Hanham, 1969, p. 15). Anglo-Saxon knights had 
settled in the Lowlands from the sixth century and Norman lords had occupied lands in 
Southern Scotland from the eleventh century, thus providing cultural and political links 
with both England and the original motherland, France. The cultural distinctiveness of 
the „two Scotlands‟ was enhanced by the Reformation, with the overwhelming majority 
of Southern Scots becoming Protestants, whereas important Catholic enclaves survived 
in the Highlands (ibid, p. 20). 
It was mainly the Highlanders, and especially the Catholic ones, who took part 
in the two Jacobite revolts in the first half of the eighteenth century. The repression that 
followed obliged many of them to leave the Highland estates and to migrate either to the 
Lowland towns or outside Scotland. This created the basis for a rapprochement of the 
two Scottish cultures. For the first time, the inhabitants of Lowland towns saw the 
Highlanders not simply as bandits but as nationalist fighters who were paying the price 
for having stood up the English. From then onwards, the cult of the Highlands remained 
a stable feature in Scottish popular culture (ibid., p. 18). The subsequent waves of 
immigration from Ireland to Scotland in the nineteenth century were gradually absorbed 
into the pre-existing Presbyterian and, in greater numbers, Catholic Scottish structures. 
On the one hand, the Catholic Irish reinforced Scottish nationalism, as they were rather 
sympathetic to the Scottish Home Rule movement of the late nineteenth century, which 
took inspiration from the political developments in Ireland. On the other hand, the 
growth of the Catholic minority, which became ever more identified with „Irishness‟ 
(Maver, 1996, p. 272), led to increased sectarian hostility, thus contributing to internal 
divisions. 
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The middle of the nineteenth century, from the 1830s through the 1870s, was a 
period in which Scottish elites found themselves rather comfortable within the UK 
framework. Beyond important cultural similarities across the border, such as language 
and religion, the Scottish economy performed rather well, with Scotland taking the lead 
in expanding industrial sectors, such as shipbuilding, steel and coal, as well as in 
technological advancements. The expanding British Empire brought its dividends to 
Scotland too and, for the first time, average incomes were not significantly lower than 
those in England. In this context of general acceptance of the British state, Scotland 
came to be conceived as simply „North Britain‟ and the Scots‟ sense of being British 
became “stronger than any sense of particularism” (McCaffrey, 1998, p. 58).   
However, from the 1880s a gradual slow down in the Scottish economy together 
with social transformations which the massive industrialization of the previous decades 
had brought about led to a re-emergence of Scottish nationalism. Calls for Scottish 
Home Rule were made by the dominant Liberal party in the early 1890s, largely after 
the drive for Irish Home Rule. After 1910, Home Rule for Scotland was re-proposed by 
the radicals within the Liberal Party and by the emerging Labour Party, this time mainly 
on the grounds of Scottish socio-economic peculiarities (Finlay, 1996, p. 72). However, 
World War 1, the decline of the Liberal Party and the progressive Anglicization of the 
Labour party during the 1920s (which led the party to adopt an ever more centralist 
approach to socio-economic reform), as well as outright opposition to Scottish Home 
Rule in the House of Lords, nullified all attempts to reform the constitutional 
relationships between Scotland and the Union. In 1929 a convinced Scottish nationalist 
wrote “To my mind it would be better to wait for thirty years and die at the end of it 
with every dream unfulfilled than accept such a parody of a nation‟s life as was offered 
by the Liberals and Labour” (Compton Mackenzie, quoted in Hanham, 1969, p. 153-4). 
This frustration amongst nationalists led to the birth of several organizations, such as 
the Highland Land League (HLL), the Scots National League (SNL) and the Scottish 
National Movement (SNM), which flanked the already existing Scottish Home Rule 
Association (SHRA). In 1928 the National Party of Scotland (NPS) was founded from 
the merger of the Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist Association (GUSNA), the 
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SNL, the SNM and the SHRA, on the initiative of the GUSNA‟s leader John 
MacCormick.  
 
3.1.2 Party Birth, Electoral Expansion and Political Achievements 
 In 1932 another nationalist organization was established by a small group of 
Tory and Liberal notables, the Scottish Party (SP). This was a much smaller, less 
representative and less active organization than the NPS, which had already started to 
contest seats with encouraging results in the general elections of 1929 and 1931, as well 
as at some by-elections. However, John MacCormick was very keen on uniting forces 
with the SP and to take on board its seemingly influential members (Finlay, 1994, p. 
133). In order to achieve that, he forced the NPS to undergo some ideological and 
policy change which made it more compatible with the political aims set out by the SP. 
The content of such ideological/policy change will be analyzed in the following sections. 
Suffice to say here that such a move entailed the eviction of most of the 
literary/linguistic nationalist wing of the party (about a fifth of its membership), 
including the Gaelic militants of the Scots National League and prominent writers, such 
as Hugh MacDiarmid, Erskine of Marr and Edwin Muir (Hanham, 1969, p. 60).  In turn, 
this provoked the resignation of other prominent members, such as Tom Gibson and 
future leader of the Scottish National Party, Arthur Donaldson (Finlay, 1994, p. 134). 
Arguably, MacCormick‟s choices had negative repercussions in the life of the future 
party, both in terms of electoral performance and internal unity.   
 The National Party of Scotland and the Scottish Party merged formally in 1934, 
giving birth to the Scottish National Party (SNP). The SP, in spite of being the junior 
partner, obtained the most important positions (Hanham, 1969, p. 163). Alexander 
MacEwan became the party Chairman (i.e. the formal leader) and the Duke of Montrose, 
a Tory member of the House of Lords, became the first party President. On the NPS‟s 
side, Cunninghame Graham maintained the position of Honorary President and 
MacCormick that of Secretary. The new party represented a compromise between the 
two founding organizations not only in terms of ideology and aims but also in terms of 
strategy. The NPS had been established because a group of nationalists had come to the 
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conclusion that nothing could be expected by the British parties and that only the 
electoral success of an independent nationalist party could bring about Scotland‟s self-
government. From 1929 to 1933 the NPS had contested few seats in general elections 
and by-elections with considerable success, scoring well in some urban constituencies 
of the central belt, where the party concentrated its electoral activity, as well as in 
Inverness and in the Western Isles. In contrast, the SP was a loose organization and, 
although electoral activity was not excluded, had been conceived as mainly a pressure 
group.  
The SNP initially adopted the policy of the NPS which forbade party members 
joining other political parties. However, almost immediately MacCormick gave way to 
former SP‟s members who were demanding the right to retain their affiliations with 
other parties. Even the party President, Montrose, who could have been the only 
representative of the SNP in Parliament due to his seat in the Lords, left the Tory group 
not to sit as a Scottish Nationalist MP but to join the pro-Home Rule group of the 
Liberal Party (Lynch, 2002, p. 47). In fact, Montrose even suggested the whole party 
should follow him and merge with the Liberals.  
At the 1935 general election, the SNP did worse than the NPS had done in 
previous elections. That result determined the end of Montrose‟s presidency, but the 
party strategy kept moving towards pressure group activities, rather than the electoral 
route. However, the cross-party initiatives undertaken by MacCormick in the late 1930s 
did not lead to anything, mainly owing to the start of the war. If anything, they 
reinforced the image of the SNP as a cross-party pressure group, rather than a proper 
political party, and served to alienate some radical nationalists. The party scored well in 
war-time by-elections because the main parties did not present their candidates. It even 
managed to win a seat with Robert McIntyre in a by-election in April 1945. However, 
the SNP emerged from the war-time as a much weaker organization. In 1942, 
MacCormick had left the party because of continuing conflicts on the party aims and 
strategy. From 1945 to 1952 he initiated a series of cross-party activities (the Scottish 
National Assembly and the Covenant Association) which contributed to overshadow the 
SNP. In addition, the notoriousness of „nationalism‟ as a general ideology in the post-
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war context also contributed to keep voters and members away from the SNP. Lack of 
organizational and financial resources did the rest. As Table 3.1 shows, in the first post-
war general election the party only managed to retain the same share of vote it had got 
in 1935 and the following four elections of the 1950s were complete failures, both in 
terms of number of seats contested and votes obtained. 
 
Table 3.1 
Electoral results in Scotland for the Westminster elections 1935-2005 
 
 Conservatives Labour Liberals 
 Lib-Dem 
SNP 
Year Vote% seats Vote% seats Vote% seats Vote%  seats 
 
1935 
 
49.8 
 
43 
 
36.8 
 
20 
 
6.7 
 
3 
 
1.1 
 
0 
1945 41.1 27 49.4 40 5 0 1.2 0 
1950 44.8 32 46.2 32 6.6 2 0.4 0 
1951 48.6 35 47.9 35 2.7 1 0.3 0 
1955 50.1 36 46.7 34 1.9 1 0.5 0 
1959 47.2 31 46.7 38 4.1 1 0.5 0 
1964 40.6 24 48.7 43 7.6 4 2.4 0 
1966 37.7 20 49.9 46 6.8 5 5 0 
1970 38 23 44.5 44 5.5 3 11.4 1 
1974 Feb 32.9 21 36.6 41 8 3 21.9 7 
1974 Oct 24 16 36.3 41 8.3 3 30.4 11 
1979 31.4 22 41.5 44 9 3 17.3 2 
1983 28.4 21 35.1 41 24.5 8 11.7 2 
1987 24 10 42.4 50 19.2 9 14 3 
1992 25.7 11 39 49 13.1 9 21.5 3 
1997 17.5 0 45.6 56 13 10 22.1 6 
2001 15.6 1 43.3 55 16.4 10 20.1 5 
2005 15.8 1 38.9 40 22.6 11 17.7 6 
Source: Peter Lynch (2006, p. 232). 
 
The patient job of rebuilding party organization and credibility, which was 
carried out by McIntyre and James Halliday during the late 1940s and 1950s, started to 
pay off from an electoral point of view during the leadership of Arthur Donaldson in the 
1960s and, even more, under the leadership of Billy Wolfe during the 1970s. At the 
1964 general election the increase in the vote share was mainly due to the party‟s ability 
to contest fifteen seats, three times more than in 1959. However, at the following 
election in 1966, the party not only doubled its vote share but it also came second in 
three constituencies (Fry, 1987, p. 217).  
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Although the SNP had not built yet a stable basis of electoral support, by the late 
1960s socio-economic and political trends started to work at the advantage of the 
nationalists. First, industrial decline in Scotland had become manifest. Initially, this 
economic trend produced a voting re-alignment in favour of Labour and generated a 
slow but steady decline of the Conservatives. However, at subsequent junctures in 
which voters were dissatisfied with particular Labour Government‟s policies, many of 
them did not revert to the Conservatives but, rather, turned to the SNP and, to a lesser 
extent, the Liberals (ibid., p. 218).  
The victory of SNP candidate, Winifred Ewing, at the Hamilton by-election in 
November 1967 signalled the start of a dramatic electoral growth in the following 
decade. As a result of Ewing‟s election (and of Welsh nationalist Evans‟s election in 
1966), the Labour government set up the Kilbrandon Royal Commission for the 
Constitution. This gave even more impetus to the SNP. In 1970, the party won its first 
seat (Western Isles) in a general election and obtained more than ten percent of the vote 
across Scotland.  
In the early 1970s, two more factors contributed to the party‟s electoral 
breakthrough. First, it had become clear that oil resources under the North Sea were 
extensive. This strengthened the credibility of the party‟s independence policy from an 
economic point of view. Secondly, the issue of UK accession in the European Economic 
Community became very salient amongst some sectors of Scottish society. The SNP‟s 
position on the latter (which will be discussed in more detail in section 3.4.2) attracted 
the social groups who had more to lose from UK‟s EEC membership, such as workers 
in the fishing industry, providing a further electoral stimulus and, for the first time, 
winning over an identifiable social constituency with stable links to the party.  
As a consequence of the remarkable results of the two 1974 elections (see Table 
3.1), the newly (re-)elected Labour government pushed on with the devolution project. 
The Scotland Act 1978 proposed the establishment of a deliberative Assembly without 
tax-varying powers, subject to popular endorsement by a referendum in which at least 
40% of the total electorate would vote in favour. The good electoral results in the 1977 
local elections (see Table 3.2) seemed to confirm the positive trend. However, in spite 
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of a „Yes‟ victory and a relatively high turnout, the 1979 referendum was lost because 
the 40% threshold was not overcome.  
 
 
Table 3.2 
Scottish Local Election Results 
 
 Labour Conservatives SNP Lib/Lib-Dem Others 
 
Year 
 
vote% 
 
seats 
 
vote% 
 
seats 
 
vote% 
 
seats 
 
vote% 
 
seats 
 
vote% 
 
seats 
 
Regional 1974 
 
38.5 
 
172 
 
28.6 
 
112 
 
12.6 
 
18 
 
5.1 
 
11 
 
12.4 
 
114 
District 1974 38.4 428 26.8 241 12.4 62 5.0 17 14.1 345 
District 1977 31.6 299 27.2 277 24.2 170 4.0 31 9.8 318 
Regional 1978 39.6 177 30.3 136 20.9 18 2.3 6 4.9 89 
District 1980 45.4 494 24.1 229 15.5 54 6.2 40 6.7 289 
Regional 1982 37.6 186 25.1 119 13.4 23 18.1 25 5.1 87 
District 1984 45.7 545 21.4 189 11.7 59 12.8 78 6.8 267 
Regional 1986 43.9 223 16.9 65 18.2 36 15.1 40 4.8 79 
District 1988 42.6 553 19.4 162 21.3 113 8.4 84 6.4 231 
Regional 1990 42.7 233 19.6 52 21.8 42 8.7 40 4.5 73 
District 1992 34.1 468 23.2 204 24.3 150 9.5 94 7.4 228 
Regional 1994 41.8 220 13.7 31 26.8 73 12 60 4.2 65 
Unitary 1995 43.6 613 11.5 82 26.1 181 9.8 121 7.7 155 
Unitary 1999 36.6 545 13.7 108 28.9 201 13.6 148 11.8 135 
Unitary 2003 32.6 509 15.1 122 24.1 181 14.5 175 13.4 234 
Unitary 2007 n.d 348 n.d 143 n.d 363 n.d 166 n.d 202 
Source: Peter Lynch (2006, p. 233). 
 
The general election of 1979, which the SNP fought under the slogan “Scotland said 
„Yes‟” represented a considerable setback, compared to the October 1974 election, 
especially in terms of number of seats won.        
During the 1980s, under the leadership of Gordon Wilson, the party experienced 
a period of electoral decline and stagnation. Yet, it managed to hold onto its two seats in 
1983 and to capture a third one at the 1987 general election, when the SNP and PC 
formed an electoral alliance. In contrast, at the 1992 general election, the considerable 
growth in the party‟s vote share, achieved under the new leadership of Alex Salmond, 
did not gain it more seats. Yet, a nationalist party winning more than a fifth of the 
Scottish votes was a serious problem for a British Labour party that was desperate to re-
capture a majority at Westminster. In addition, lack of Scottish autonomy had also 
become an issue for the Labour Party in Scotland. Indeed, in spite of winning more than 
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two thirds of Scottish seats in 1987 and 1992, it had to suffer another Tory government. 
As a result, the Labour Party‟s commitment to devolution solidified and, after the party 
re-gained office in 1997, it pushed the reform through at Westminster. The SNP‟s good 
results at the 1994 European elections (see Table 3.3) and the 1997 general election also 
kept pressure on Labour to act quickly and to concede a substantial degree of self-
government.  
 
Table 3.3 
European Election Results in Scotland 
 
 Labour Conservatives Liberals/LibDem SNP 
Year Vote% seats Vote% seats Vote% seats Vote% seats 
1979 33 2 33.7 5 14 0 19.4 1 
1984 40.7 5 25.7 2 15.6 0 17.8 1 
1989 41.9 7 20.9 0 4.3 0 25.6 1 
1994 42.5 6 14.5 0 7.2 0 32.6 2 
1999 28.7 3 19.8 2 9.8 1 27.2 2 
2004 26.4 3 17.8 2 13.1 1 19.7 2 
2009 20.8 2 16.8 1 11.5 1 29.1 2 
 
 The Labour government proposed to establish a Scottish Parliament which, 
pending confirmation by the Scottish people in a referendum, would have primary 
legislative power on all matters not reserved to Westminster.
34
 If approved by 
referendum, the Scottish Parliament would also have tax-varying powers by up to 3%. 
In the 1997 referendum, the Scottish people approved the establishment of the 
Parliament by an overwhelming majority (see Table 3.4). The absence of the 40% 
clause, which in 1979 had determined the result, meant that the tax-varying powers 
were also devolved. 
The establishment of a Scottish Parliament represented not only the most 
important achievement of the SNP, but also a new point from which to increase its 
weight in Scottish and British politics. The Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) 
electoral system which was chosen for the new Parliament - about 57% of seats elected 
by single member plurality system (SMP) and about 43% elected by proportional 
                                                 
34
 These are: Constitution, protection of borders, defence and national security, Foreign policy and 
relations with Europe, civil service, electricity, coal, oil, gas, social security, employment, economic and 
monetary policy, abortion, broadcasting policy and drug policy.  
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representation (PR) in multi-member districts - was expected to favour the SNP and the 
other under-represented parties at the expense of Labour.  
 
Table 3.4 
Devolution Referendum Results in Scotland (1979 and 1997) 
 
 % of those who voted % of the electorate Turnout 
  
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
1979 
 
 
51.6 
 
48.4 
 
32.9 
 
30.8 
 
63.8 
 
1997a 
 
 
74.3 
 
25.7  
 
44.9 
 
15.5 
 
60.4 
 
1997b 
 
 
63.5 
 
36.5 
 
38.4 
 
22 
 
60.4 
 
a=First question: “I agree that there should be a Scottish Parliament” 
b=Second question: “I agree that the Scottish Parliament should have tax-varying powers” 
 
 
Table 3.5 
Scottish Parliament Election Results 
 
 Constituencies Regional lists Total 
1999 Vote% seats Vote% seats seats 
Conservatives 15.5 0 15.4 18 18 
Labour 38.8 53 33.6 3 56 
Liberal Democrats 14.2 12 12.4 5 17 
SNP 28.7 7 27.3 28 35 
Scottish Greens 0 0 3.6 1 1 
Scottish Socialists 1 0 2.4 1 1 
Others 1.7 1 5.3 0 1 
2003      
Conservatives 16.6 3 15.5 15 18 
Labour 34.6 46 29.3 4 50 
Liberal Democrats 15.3 13 11.8 4 17 
SNP 23.7 9 20.9 18 27 
Scottish Greens 0 0 6.9 7 7 
Scottish Socialists 6.2 0 6.7 6 6 
Others 3.4 3 8.9 1 4 
2007      
Conservatives 16.6 4 13.9 13 17 
Labour 32.1 37 29.2 9 46 
Liberal Democrats 16.2 11 11.3 5 16 
SNP 32.9 21 31 26 47 
Scottish Greens 0.1 0 4 2 2 
Others 2.1 1 10.6 0 1 
Source: Massetti (2009b) 
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As Table 3.5 shows, the first election of the Scottish Parliament confirmed these 
expectations, giving the SNP the second biggest parliamentary group and the role of 
formal opposition party. Labour failed to win a majority of seats and formed a 
government with the Liberal Democrats as junior partner. The great surprise of the 1999 
was the emergence of two new parties, the Scottish Greens (SG) and the Scottish 
Socialist Party (SSP), each electing one Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP). 
Being „only Scottish‟ and pro-independence parties, they constituted a significant threat 
to the SNP‟s aspirations to keep the nationalist and pro-independence front united under 
its banner. Indeed, the electoral growth of the Greens and Socialists in the 2003 election 
corresponded to a dramatic drop of the SNP, which lost nearly a quarter of its PR vote, 
and to a less dramatic drop of Labour, which could go on and form another Lib-Lab 
government. However, after two terms of Labour-led governments, the SNP was 
presented with a great opportunity at the 2007 election. The Conservative party had 
shown no sign of electoral progress and the Scottish Socialist Party had shot itself in the 
foot by splitting into two groups (the new group being called Solidarity) during the 
second term, with the leader of the splinter group being implicated in a scandal which 
developed into a court case and involved, as witnesses, other leading members of the 
SSP. At the 2007 election, the SNP emerged as the leading party in the Scottish 
Parliament by one MSP over Labour and, after several weeks of negotiations, managed 
to form a minority government committed to holding a referendum on Scottish 
independence by the end of term (Massetti, 2009b). 
 
3.1.3 Party organization 
 In the first fifteen/twenty years of its existence the SNP remained a political 
organization which fell somewhere between a political party and a pressure group. In 
this respect the NPS fusion with the SP represented a step back. Indeed, most members 
of the SP understood the new organization as a cross-party pressure group pursuing 
Home Rule for Scotland by means of winning the intellectual argument and bringing the 
other parties to commit to that policy. While the NPS had established that its members 
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could not join any other party, the SNP, under the pressure from former SP members to 
be permitted to retain their affiliations with the Conservative and Liberal parties, gave 
up on exclusive membership until 1948. The pressure group strategy, which was also 
endorsed by MacCormick of the former NPS, and the moderation policy on the 
constitutional objective (which will be discussed in section 3.2) damaged the new party 
electorally and in terms of membership. Table 3.6 shows how party membership has 
generally followed the same ups and downs as the party‟s electoral cycles, often 
anticipating them. It emerges quite clearly that, by 1960, the SNP was nowhere near 
having the same number of members that the NPS had attracted in the early 1930s.  
 
 
Table 3.6 
SNP’s Leaders*  
 
Alexander MacEwan 1934-36 
Andrew Dewar Gibb 1936-40 
William Power 1940-42 
Douglas Young 1942-45 
Bruce Watson 1945-47 
Robert McIntyre 1947-56 
James Halliday 1956-60 
Arthur Donaldson 1960-69 
Billy Wolfe 1969-79 
Gordon Wilson 1979-90 
Alex Salmond 1990-00 
John Swinney 2000-04 
Alex Salmond 2004- 
 
Source: Peter Lynch (2006, p. 242) 
 
*SNP‟s leaders were formally elected as party Chairmen and then as National Convenors    
 
 Membership fees being the main source of financial revenue for the party, low 
membership also meant very scarce funds to build up an organizational structure, to 
fund the party periodical Scots Independent, and to fight elections. For instance, from 
the mid-1940s to the early 1950s, the party could not afford to have a National 
Organizer constantly in post (Lynch, 2002, p. 74).  
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 Things started to change from the early 1960s under Arthur Donaldson‟s 
leadership (see Table 3.7). Two men played crucial roles in turning the SNP, in just a 
few years, from a tiny and amateurishly run party into a mass party with an effective 
organization.
35
  
 
 
Table 3.7 
NPS and SNP’s number of branches and membership 
 
Year Number of branches Membership 
            1930 (NPS) 
            1931 (NPS) 
1934 
1944 
1946 
1947 
1950 
1960 
1962 
1965 
1967 
1968 
1971 
1974 
1979 
1983 
1987 
1988 
1997 
2003 
2006 
2008 
 
 
  
 30** 
28 
38 
45 
23 
 
140 
333 
484 
 
460 
486*** 
 
 
               281 
 
4,000 
8,000 
14,500* 
 
1,228 
 
2460 
2,000 
20,000 
42,000 
 
125,000 
70,000 
85,000 
 
19,387 
12,115 
 
15,000 
9,450 
12,571 
15,097 
 
* 14,000 members came from the NPS and 500 from the SP. According to Finlay the figure claimed by the NPS was 
exaggerated (Finlay, 1994, p. 157). 
 
**Branches with more than 20 members, there were few more sub-branches with less than 20 members. 
 
***Only 186 of the 486 branches submitted membership list to the Head Quarter. 
Source: Levy, 1990; Newell, 1998; Lynch, 2002, The Scotsman, 01/01/09, available at: 
http://news.scotsman.com/latestnews/SNP39s-membership-surges-by-6037.4836805.jp 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 The information on the organizational reforms of the 1960s is taken from Lynch (2002, p. 99-101 and 
106-11) and from Gordon Wilson (interview with the author, Dundee, 06/11/06). 
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The first was Ian Macdonald, who became the party‟s National Organizer from 
1961. He was responsible for the growth and reorganisation of party membership in the 
succeeding years, spending a lot of time touring Scotland in order to recruit new 
members, establish new branches and dividing existing large branches into smaller ones. 
Crucially, he did all this on a self-funded basis, at no cost to the party. The second man 
was Gordon Wilson, the then National Secretary and future leader of the party in the 
1980s. From 1963, he undertook a re-organization of the party structure which lasted for 
forty years. The reform mainly concerned the top institutions in the party. Until then 
there had been only four top office-bearers – the President, the Chairman, the Secretary 
and the Treasurer – dealing with the executive and organizational functions. To these, 
three new were added: the Senior Vice-Chairman, acting as a Deputy Leader, and two 
Executive Vice-Chairmen which re-organized and supervised the work of the National 
Executive‟s Committees. The most important effect of the reform was to free the 
Chairman, the National Executive and the National Council from time-consuming 
administrative tasks, so as to enable them to dedicate more time to developing party 
policy and strategy. 
 Party finances were also improved considerably during the 1960s, thanks to the 
increased membership and to the „Alba Pools‟ scheme (Lynch, 2002, p. 110). By the 
late 1960s the party had turned from being in constant deficit to producing a surplus 
which was bigger than the total income of the early 1960s. This also allowed the SNP to 
expand its Headquarters (which at that time were still based in Glasgow), from three to 
eight employees, including a research officer hired in 1968. 
The re-organization, however, did not address all the problems of the party. In 
particular, issues concerning the relationship of branches with the National Executive 
and the Council were left aside. In the context of a dramatic increase of branches and 
members during the 1960s, that meant that co-ordination problems also increased, in 
spite of the fact that new Executive Vice-Chairmen were added in the late 1960s. The 
policy making process was also addressed in the late 1960s, when a new collective body, 
the National Assembly, was established (Gordon Wilson, interview with the author, 
Dundee, 06/11/06). This was a dual structure made up of specialist policy committees 
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and an overall plenary body which discussed and approved policy proposals. In addition, 
since the SNP at that time was a completely extra-parliamentary party, issues of co-
ordination between the MPs and the rest of the party were not addressed. As we shall 
see, this created several problems in the 1970s.  
Overall, the 1960s reforms did not alter substantially the distribution of power 
within the SNP. The branches remained the backbone of the party (much more so than 
the underdeveloped constituency organizations) and maintained a strong say in the 
supreme policymaking and elective body, the National Conference, as well as in 
National Council and National Assembly. The inclusive and democratic policy making 
process meant that members were able to get policy proposals passed in party 
Conferences, independently of their political weight within the party.  
 This party structure remained largely unaltered until the early 2000s. In the 
1980s, under Wilson‟s leadership, there was an attempt at reviewing party organization 
with the specific intention of strengthening the leadership but, at a 1985 special 
conference, the party rejected the proposed reform in all its aspects (Levy, 1990, p. 114). 
However, after the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and the consequent 
opportunity for the SNP to become a (regional) governing party, the time was right for 
re-organization of the party machine. Indeed, a general shift of power towards the 
parliamentary party had occurred independently of the reform, almost by default. The 
resources of the SNP‟s Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) far exceed those of 
the party as a whole both in terms of research and media output (Lynch, 2006, p. 244). 
Therefore, the Shadow (from 2007 actual) Ministers in the Parliament have become the 
spokespersons in their respective policy areas for the party. 
Reform was implemented by John Swinney, after he became leader in 2000. He 
streamlined the decision making process in the Conference and in the Council, and 
introduced a very tough disciplinary code aimed at containing the possibly disruptive 
„loose cannons‟ in the party. More importantly, he strengthened the position of the party 
leader, who was now elected by „one member one vote‟ system. He split more clearly 
the roles of the leader and the Chairman, the latter now being appointed directly by and 
accountable to the former. While the Chairman runs the party‟s finances and 
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organization, the leader is free to concentrate on political decisions. The rationale of the 
reform was to create “the best opportunity for the leader to pursue his political agenda 
without rival within the party” (John Swinney, interview with the author, 07/11/06).  
 Another part of the reform, “which was fiercely resisted within the party” (ibid.), 
was the centralization of party membership and collection of membership fees. The aim 
of this reform was to address the problem of the apparent inability of local branches to 
retain members and collect the annual fees: “we used to lose a thousand members a 
year” (ibid.). In conjunction with Plaid Cymru, which implemented the same reform at 
this time, the SNP created a centralized membership and a direct debit system for 
collecting fees. This reform not only made the revenue of the party more stable, it 
actually increased it considerably, as many members chose to devote a certain amount 
of their income (on the top of annual fees) to the party. The result was more money for 
the party‟s HQ and more money for the local branches. As far as party finance is 
concerned, it has to be noted that in recent years the SNP has also benefited from large 
donations from individuals, normally businessmen. In the run up to the 2007 Scottish 
election, for instance, the SNP received a £500,000 donation from Brian Souter, the 
Stagecoach tycoon who had already made other donations, though of a much lower 
amount, to the party in previous years (BBC/Scotland, 17/03/07, available at:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6462119.stm). 
 
 
3.2. Party Ideology and Policy: The Centre-Periphery Dimension 
3.2.1 The Initial Clash and the Home Rule period (1932-1945) 
 The SNP‟s birth, out of the merger between the NPS and the SP, was made 
possible only after the two groups had reached a compromise which involved not just 
the sharing of top positions within the new party but also, and most crucially, the party‟s 
primary objective. The first clash on the party‟s self-government policy, therefore, 
happened before the SNP was formed, in the period of mutual approach and negotiation 
between the two forerunners from 1932 and 1934. It is worth bearing in mind that the 
debate on constitutional aims was, at that juncture, still profoundly linked to the issue of 
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whether the new organization had to behave as a proper political party, as many within 
the NPS wanted, a cross-party pressure group, which was the preferred option within 
the SP, or a mix of the two, as MacCormick and others were inclined to conceive it. 
Indeed, while a moderate stance on constitutional policy would have kept the door open 
for cross-party activities, a pro-independence position would have set the new 
organization apart from other British parties. 
Although the NPS had been itself a „broad church‟, encompassing advocates of 
Home Rule, such Roland Muirhead (the former leader of the SHRA) and MacCormick 
himself, most members were in favour of full independence under the British Crown 
(Fry, 1987, p. 213). Amongst them, one of the most vocal groups was that of the literary 
men, some of whom advocated the creation of an independent state based on the revival 
of the Gaelic language, „Gaeldom‟ (Hanham, 1969, p. 151-57). The official policy of 
the NPS was to achieve „Self-government for Scotland with Independent National 
Status within the British Group of Nations‟ or, as the party periodical Scots Independent 
put it “to restore to the ancient Scots Nation and People their former Freedom to govern 
themselves” (ibid., p. 163). In contrast, the SP was clearly a Home Rule organization, 
whose members opposed political separation from England.  
The compromise between the two organizations was reached in the original 
programme of the SNP which called for equal partnership of Scotland and England in 
the British Empire and the establishment of a Parliament in Scotland dealing with 
Scottish matters (ibid. p. 164). De facto, this was an almost complete surrender to the 
Home Rule position of the PS, which became even more apparent after the 
disappointing results of the 1935 election. Indeed, rather than interpreting the results as 
a consequence of the softened self-government stance of the SNP
36
 and, therefore, 
reverting to a more radical stance, MacCormick used the results to argue that the 
electoral strategy was leading nowhere and pushed ahead with his preferred pressure 
group strategy, starting a prolonged negotiation with the Liberals and with the Labour 
party in order to create a consensus on Home Rule for Scotland. 
                                                 
36
 This was the interpretation given by the party periodical the Scots Independent (Hanham, 1969, p. 165). 
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The turn from the independence stance of the NPS to the Home Rule policy of 
the SNP was not a smooth one. On the contrary, it represented the first bitter internal 
row in the party‟s history. The abandonment of the independence policy was proposed 
by MacCormick at the 1933 Conference of the NPS as a prelude to merging with the SP. 
However, many within the party blatantly opposed the policy revision, especially the 
former members of the Scots National League. MacCormick managed to win the vote 
by 69 votes to 49, but he lost a vote which should have given the party leadership the 
„green light‟ to negotiate the merger with the SP (ibid., p. 160). The deadlock was 
broken by MacCormick‟s decision to expel most of those who opposed his line. The 
„purge‟ was carried out at a special Conference in July 1933, and targeted many of the 
„literary men‟, thus giving the SNP a reputation as an anti-intellectual party (Fry, 1987, 
p. 213).  
Having got rid of most dissenters within the party, MacCormick was now free to 
pursue his cross-party pressure group strategy based on moderate self-government. 
However, the long negotiations with the Liberal and Labour party produced the 
establishment of a Scottish National Convention only in 1939. With the start of the war, 
any hope of achieving Home Rule in the medium term vanished and the work of the 
previous years was entirely lost. In addition, internal dissent started to re-emerge around 
the issue of military conscription for Scotsmen and industrial conscription (often in 
England) for Scottish women. In particular the party had voted for a resolution in 1937 
which obliged all male members to refuse conscription. However, when the war started 
MacCormick encouraged people to enrol in the British army and many followed his 
advice. Those who remained in favour of the 1937 resolution gathered around Douglas 
Young, who had become popular for his imprisonment due to the refusal to join the 
army. At the 1942 Conference, the dissenters nominated Young as their candidate as 
Chairman (i.e. party leader) against MacCormick‟s candidate William Power. At the 
end of a tense confrontation Young won by 33 votes to 29, causing the walkout of 
MacCormick and his followers (Hanham, 1969, p. 168). 
The nationalist movement was now split. On one side MacCormick and the 
Home Rulers founded the Scottish Union, later renamed the Scottish Convention, and 
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kept trying to build a cross-party consensus. Although this activity led to nothing, it 
clearly overshadowed the SNP after the war and during the 1950s, hindering its 
electoral growth. On the other side, the SNP was now more similar to the NPS and 
many members who had left the party or had been expelled in 1933 started to re-join. 
However, the party‟s constitutional policy was not immediately reversed. After all, 
MacCormick had been beaten on the conscription issue and Young himself was a 
moderate nationalist. Yet, under his leadership, the pro-independence members quickly 
regained ground. In particular Dr. Robert McIntyre became the new leading figure, 
especially after he won a by-election in 1945 becoming the SNP‟s first MP, albeit for 
just few weeks.       
     
3.2.2 One objective, two strategies (1946-1997) 
 In 1946 the SNP adopted a new comprehensive policy statement which had been 
drafted by a small number of members led by McIntyre. In fact, more than a detailed 
policy plan, the document was rather a statement of intent, where the party‟s primary 
objectives and guiding values were outlined. The document put the SNP on a firm pro-
independence footing. The opening paragraph of the document, headed “Aim of the 
National Party”, states: “The People of Scotland….have…an inherent right to determine 
their own destiny. The aim of the Scottish National Party is therefore „Self-Government 
for Scotland‟. The restoration of Scottish National Sovereignty by the establishment of a 
democratic Scottish Government…” (Statement of Aim and Policy of the SNP, reported 
in Hanham, 1969, p. 213). The document also set out the strategy to achieve 
independence and a new Constitution for Scotland:  
 
On the election to the British Parliament of a majority of Scottish National 
members from Scotland, a Scottish Constituent Assembly shall be summoned 
either (a) in virtue of an Act of Parliament passed by agreement with the English 
members of (b) failing such agreement, by the Scottish National members acting 
in terms of the authority conferred upon them by the Scottish electorate. (ibid.) 
 
 
This strategic plan, which envisaged the achievement of independence, and nothing less 
than independence, in one stroke, would remain the „guiding light‟ of the so called 
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„fundamentalist‟ tendency within the party until at least the late 1990s. According to 
this school of thought (which was obviously affected by the past failures of cross-party 
co-operation on Home Rule grounds and was still suffering from competition with 
MacCormick‟s National Convention) self-government for Scotland could come only 
from SNP‟s success. Nothing should be expected from the British parties and, if any 
proposal was put forward by them, it should be considered a trap, designed to embroil 
the SNP and make it lose momentum. In addition, even if such proposals were genuine 
and serious, they should not be taken into consideration unless they were designed to 
grant the Scottish electorate the chance to choose independence, since the achievement 
of a milder form of self-government could jeopardise the final objective. 
 In the late 1940s and 1950s, this point of view was widely shared within the 
party and helped the SNP to focus on improving its electoral score as its primary 
activity. However, in the absence of electoral progress, the idea of winning a majority 
of Scottish seats and, on the basis of such an event, secure independence from the UK 
looked even more unlikely. In 1957 Roland Muirhead, who had remained a member of 
the SNP in spite of also engaging in consensus building with his Scottish National 
Congress, wrote: “the present policy of the party has proved a complete failure” (Harvie, 
1994, p. 170).      
 Ironically enough (or perhaps naturally enough) the electoral growth of the 
second half of the 1960s and 1970s also brought about the emergence of a „gradualist‟ 
tendency within the party. As the British parties, and in particular Labour, started to 
take the SNP‟s electoral challenge seriously, they became more prone to advance 
proposals for Scottish self-government, which lured many within the party (Levy, 1990, 
pp. 60-61). In the first half of the 1970s, the SNP obtained its electoral breakthrough, 
campaigning strongly in favour of full-blooded independence and using the issue of 
North Sea oil to strengthen its case. However, after Labour won the October 1974 
election with a manifesto that included a commitment to devolution, the SNP found 
itself engulfed in internal debates on the position to be adopted for the following five 
years.  
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 Divisions arose between the leadership and the grassroots and, because of lack 
of co-ordination, between the NEC (whose most prominent members were not MPs) 
and the parliamentary group at Westminster. Billy Wolfe, the party leader, struggled to 
find a balanced line between a largely fundamentalist membership and a devolution 
proposal which the SNP‟s parliamentary group had little or no chance to amend. 
Suspicion of the real commitment of Labour to devolution was widespread, as the first 
proposal was lost at Westminster in early 1977 and the second proposal was subject to 
approval by a referendum in which of at least 40 percent of the Scottish electorate 
would have to vote yes. The Labour government had itself to find a very delicate 
balance, between moderately pro-devolutionist Scottish MPs and largely anti-
devolutionist English and Welsh MPs. The SNP leadership, at least in the venues where 
the grassroots had considerable power, such as party conferences, could not avoid 
criticizing the limited powers that the Scottish Assembly envisaged would have. This 
put them in a weak position when they tried to uphold a pragmatic line in support of the 
government proposal. Debates between the gradualist and fundamentalist factions at the 
annual Conferences from 1975 to 1978 were often tough, with different positions being 
adopted each year (Levy, 1990, pp. 68-85; Lynch, 2002, pp. 148-56). Although the 
gradualists managed to formally commit the SNP to support for a „Yes‟ vote in the 
referendum, they never really won the argument fully within the party. In addition, the 
problems of co-ordinating a „Yes‟ campaign with the other parties, especially with a 
scarcely motivated Labour, contributed to the overall ambiguity of the party‟s stance. 
The opinion polls, showing a sharp decline in support of devolution from 65% in April 
1976 to only 49% in February 1979 (less than a month before the referendum), also did 
not help the gradualist faction to strengthen its position (Bochel and Denver, 1981a, p. 
32). In the party‟s public discourse, the benefits of devolution were never convincingly 
exposed (while many opponents, especially in local campaigns, indulged in listing the 
shortcomings of the government proposals) and party‟s support for the „Yes‟ vote was 
justified exclusively in terms of an incremental approach to independence (Levy, 1990, 
p. 86).   
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 The referendum result was very disappointing for the party. As Table 3.8 shows, 
only a very slim majority of voters supported devolution, with some Scottish regions, 
such as the Borders, Dumfries and Galloway, not to mention the „Scandinavian‟ Islands 
Orkney and Shetland, expressing a clear majority against. Crucially, the very narrow 
majority in favour of devolution meant that the 40% threshold was not reached. In spite 
of a relatively respectable turnout, the „Yes‟ votes remained below the threshold by 
more than 7%.  
 
Table 3.8 
1979 Referendum Results on Devolution in Scotland  
 
 Yes 
% of votes 
No 
% of votes 
Yes - % of the 
electorate 
Turnout 
Region      
 
Borders 
 
40.3 
 
59.7 
 
27.0 
 
67.3 
Central 54.7 45.3 36.4 66.7 
Dumfries and Galloway 40.3 59.7 26.1 64.9 
Fife 53.7 46.3 35.4 66.6 
Grampian 48.3 51.7 27.9 57.9 
Highland 51.0 49.0 33.3 65.4 
Lothian 50.1 49.9 33.4 66.6 
Strathclyde 54.0 46.0 34.1 63.2 
Tayside 49.5 50.5 31.5 63.8 
Orkney 27.9 72.1 15.3 54.8 
Shetland 27.1 72.9 13.7 51.0 
Western Islands 55.8 44.2 28.1 50.5 
 
Scotland 
 
51.6 
 
48.4 
 
32.9 
 
63.8 
 
Source: Bochel and Denver (1981b, p. 140-41), in Bochel, Denver and Macartney (eds) (1981) The 
Referendum Experience: Scotland 1979, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. 
 
 
The first reaction of the SNP was to push the Labour government to ignore the 
40% threshold and implement devolution, on the grounds that the „Yes‟ vote had won 
the referendum. With eleven MPs in Westminster and a Labour minority government 
which could not count anymore on the systematic support of the Liberals, the SNP 
decided to play the blackmail card. However, the choice turned out to be a failure as, 
confronted with a Labour‟s government playing for time, the parliamentary party ended 
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up supporting a motion of no confidence together with the Conservative Party, thus 
bringing the government down and opening the door to eighteen years of Tory 
government in Scotland. Such a move was severely punished by Scottish voters at the 
general election in May 1979, which the party fought on a gradualist position and 
focused primarily on the „broken promises‟ of the British parties, Labour being the 
primary target (Levy, 1990, pp. 95-96). In addition, the election of an anti-devolution 
Conservative government meant that the whole issue of Scottish self-government was 
now off the agenda.  
 The blow of the 1979 referendum and general election reignited factional 
confrontation with the party. The showdown between fundamentalists and gradualists 
led to the end of Billy Wolfe‟s leadership and the election of Gordon Wilson, the only 
MP amongst those elected in October 1974 who managed to get re-elected in 1979. It 
was Wilson himself who led the offensive on the party leadership for its divisive an 
ambiguous strategy: 
 
The poor result is a direct consequence of the indecisive collective direction of the 
party, which has wandered in only two years from full-blood independence to an 
obsession with devolution. The NEC must bear responsibility for the dismantling of 
the oil campaign with its phase-out as a priority issue…Any party which does not 
know where it is going and is disunited on strategy, stands little chance of obtaining 
support from the public. (Gordon Wilson, May 1979, quoted in Lynch, 2002, p. 156).    
 
Wilson himself, after being elected party leader, had to cope with increasing 
factionalism and, given his strong opinion on the deleterious consequences of internal 
divisions, did tackle the issue, even resorting to expulsions. However, as will be 
discussed in the following sections, the factionalism he had to deal with turned very 
quickly from being centred on a gradualist-traditionalist division to being centred on a 
left-right split. The opposition between fundamentalists and gradualists gradually lost 
salience. With the devolution issue off the agenda and electoral decline, both strategies 
were very unlikely to bring any concrete result in the short to medium term.       
 After the 1983 general election, in fact, the fundamentalist „counter-revolution‟ 
started to lose strength. The proposal for the establishment of an elected constitutional 
convention which would discuss a scheme for a Scottish Parliament was defeated at the 
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SNP‟s September 1983 Conference but approved the following year (Lynch, 2002, p. 
184). On that occasion, the SNP‟s proposal did not find a political context receptive 
enough and led to nothing. However, in the years that followed, and in particular after 
the 1987 general election, things were to change considerably. The growing 
unpopularity of the Thatcher government and the dramatic electoral decline of the 
Conservatives in Scotland created a „legitimacy question‟: the Scots continued to be 
governed by a party which they increasingly rejected at the ballot boxes (Levy, 1990, p. 
110; Mitchell and Bennie, 1996). This situation determined a sharp increase in public 
support for both devolution and independence (see Table 3.9). 
 
 
Table 3.9 Constitutional preferences (%) amongst  
the Scottish electorate (1979-1994) 
 
 1979 1981 1983 1984 1985 1987 1989 1990 1992 1994 
 
Independenc
e 
 
14 
 
22 
 
23 
 
 25 
 
33 
 
35 
 
35 
 
34 
 
37 
 
38 
Devolution 42 47 48 45 47 42 42 44 34 44 
No Change 35 26 26 27 14 20 20 19 25 16 
Don‟t know 9 5 2 3 6 3 3 3 3 2 
 
Source: Kellas, 1989, p. 150 and Newell, 1998, p. 113. 
 
 
 As will be discussed in section 3.4, in the late 1980s the SNP managed to 
reformulate its independence proposal in a more attractive way by linking it to the 
process of European integration. In the context of growing Scottish nationalism, this 
move contributed to rebuilding the party‟s credibility and to regaining electoral 
momentum. Even more importantly, the rise of the „legitimacy question‟ had pushed 
the Scottish Labour party and Scottish Trade Union Congress (STUC) towards strongly 
pro-devolutionist positions. In 1988, Scottish Labour Action (SLA) was formed, an 
internal pressure group which proved effective in pushing the issue of a Scottish 
Parliament in the following years. Under increasing electoral pressure from the SNP, 
which won the traditionally Labour seat of Glasgow Govan in a by-election in 1988, the 
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Labour party re-took the initiative for a cross-party Constitutional Convention which 
was set up in February 1989 (Mitchell, 1998). 
 While the establishment of the cross-party Constitutional Convention and its 
foundational Claim of Right, with its emphasis on the right of the Scottish people to 
self-determination, represented an important intellectual victory for the SNP,
37
 it also 
re-ignited internal debate over party strategy. Initially, the fundamentalists seemed to 
prevail again, as the SNP dropped out of the Constitutional Convention even before this 
was established. The memories of the disastrous experience of the 1970s added to the 
fear of being marginalized by the Labour Party within the convention, both numerically 
and, as discussion was going to be centred on devolution and not on independence, 
politically (Lynch, 2002, p. 184). However, with the election of Alex Salmond as party 
leader in 1990 the gradualists started to strengthen their position within the party. In 
fact, the fundamentalists retained considerable influence until the 1992 general election, 
when the SNP ran de facto two campaigns: one supported by the gradualists and 
centred on Salmond‟s idea of a multi-option referendum which included both 
devolution and independence; and one supported by the fundamentalists, such as Jim 
Sillars and Alex Neil, who campaigned on the unlikely slogan „free by 1993‟ (ibid., p. 
196-198).  
 After the 1992 election, Salmond and the gradualists strengthened their authority 
within the party further. In spite of a resilient internal opposition by the fundamentalists, 
in 1995 Salmond managed to push through a dual approach to independence which 
added a „plan B‟ to the traditional „one stroke‟ strategy. This plan B consisted of 
winning a majority of seats in a future Scottish Parliament rather than at Westminster‟s 
elections. De facto it was an endorsement of devolution as a stepping stone to 
independence. Such a move created the conditions for a commitment to support a „yes 
vote‟ in the 1997 referendum on devolution which found little internal opposition. 
                                                 
37
 Roger Levy argues that the „legitimacy question‟ could have been addressed by Labour (and the 
Conservatives) by considering and implementing other reforms than devolution, such as proportional 
representation. The latter would have made both Labour-majorities north of the border and Conservative-
majorities south of the border less overwhelming. The choice by Labour and the Liberal Democrats to 
convert to Scottish nationalism, and especially the formulation of the Claim of Right, represented a 
„political gift‟ to the SNP (Levy, 1990, p. 138).   
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Compared with 1979, conditions were now much more favourable for a gradualist 
stance. First, the 1997 proposal envisaged the establishment of a Scottish Parliament 
with more powers than the Scottish Assembly proposed in the 1970s. Secondly, the 
Labour Party, both in Scotland and in London, was very much behind the devolution 
project from its grassroots to the leadership. This was a better guarantee for success and 
opinion polls kept confirming a stable and solid majority in favour of devolution 
(McCrone, 1998). Thirdly, because of these reasons, there were no major divisions 
between the SNP‟s leadership and the grassroots or the wider electorate. The 
fundamentalists were marginalized and a majority of party voters would have liked the 
SNP to commit to a „yes‟ vote even before the 1997 election (ibid, p. 215). Eventually, 
the party backed a „yes, yes‟ vote only after having checked they were satisfied with the 
content of the White Paper Scotland’s Parliament. The formal decision was taken at a 
National Council in August 1997, about a month before the referendum date. As 
recalled by a prominent gradualist, the decision was uncontroversial: “I think that was a 
pragmatic, sensible response by the party to the prospect of having a devolved Scottish 
Parliament. It would have been unimaginable for the SNP to argue anything than that 
case in the referendum… it would have ridiculed the SNP.” (John Swinney, interview 
with the author, Edinburgh, 07/11/06).  
 
3.2.3 The new strategic dilemmas after devolution: between an independence 
referendum and ‘accelerationism’ (1997-2009) 
 The victory of the „yes, yes‟ vote in the September 1997 referendum opened the 
way to the establishment of a Scottish Parliament with limited tax-raising powers, 
whose first election was scheduled for the spring of 1999. Alex Salmond, who had had 
the opportunity to increase his popularity (and the SNP‟s) during the debates of the 
referendum campaign, adopted a gradualist approach for the first Scottish election, 
focusing mainly on devolution. Although the Labour party, which ran a largely negative 
campaign focusing on the „dark side of nationalism‟ and the negative effects of 
independence, emerged as the major party, the SNP achieved its third best electoral 
result ever in terms of vote-share (just behind the results of the 1994 European election 
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and the October 1974 general election). More importantly, it established itself as the 
second party and the formal opposition in Holyrood. 
 The new political/institutional context modified substantially the range of 
strategic options available for achieving independence. In particular, since devolution a 
pattern of „dual voting‟ appears to have emerged in Scotland, which fosters the 
nationalists‟ performances in the Scottish Parliament elections and hinders them in 
general elections (Hough and Jeffery, 2006). Although the number of seats won at 
general elections has barely changed, the SNP lost nearly 10% of its 1997 vote share in 
2001 and a further 12% of its 2001 vote share in 2005. If the idea of winning a majority 
of Scottish seats in Westminster (with the intention of using it as a mandate for 
negotiating Scottish independence) had been over-optimistic before devolution, it has 
become even more unrealistic in the current situation.  
To be sure, there is still a very marginal group of „old style‟ fundamentalists 
within the party  “who think that there should not be a Scottish Parliament, that that‟s a 
bit of a sell-out and that we should just fight the case for independence and nothing 
less” (Linda Fabiani, interview with the author, Edinburgh, 07/11/06). However, the 
„new‟ fundamentalist strategy is now framed in slightly less disruptive terms and looks 
at Holyrood, rather than Westminster, as the crucial electoral arena that can lead to the 
goal. This path to independence was expressed in the 1999 Scottish election manifesto 
with the simple formula: “In Government, an SNP administration will hold a 
referendum on independence in the first four years of the Parliament” (SNP, Manifesto 
1999, p. 10). In contrast to the „old‟ fundamentalist path, therefore, the voters would 
have two opportunities to choose or reject independence: one at election time, when 
they could decide whether to vote for the SNP or not, and a second one at the 
referendum. Such change of strategy has a twofold positive effect which consists in 
presenting the independence process as a less „all at once‟ option and allowing Scottish 
voters to vote for the nationalists without their vote being automatically interpreted as a 
mandate for immediate negotiations for secession. However, this strategy also entails 
legal issues and political risks which will be discussed below. 
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While the new fundamentalist strategy is slightly more moderate that the old one, 
the post-devolution gradualist strategy has become more assertive for the simple reason 
that it does not have to call for the establishment of a Scottish Parliament (or Assembly) 
but can build on the existing one, both in terms of a political institution which already 
has extensive powers and as a political venue where a consensus on further devolution 
of powers can be formed. This new gradualist position, which has been referred to as 
„accelerationism‟, aims to improve on the devolution settlement incrementally until a 
condition of quasi-independence is de facto achieved and will make the passage to „full‟ 
independence less traumatic: “we would like to have more and more powers being 
devolved to the Scottish Parliament, so as to get to a point where achieving 
independence would be more a matter of form than a matter of substance ” (George 
Reid, interview with the author, Edinburgh, 03/11/06). In particular, the issue of 
taxation and public spending seems to be the most likely starting point to re-open 
negotiations on the current settlement and to achieve more powers (Lynch, 2002, p. 
253-55; Mitchell, 2006).  
The distance between the „new‟ fundamentalist and gradualist options seems, 
therefore, much less dramatic than the one between the pre-devolution respective 
positions. More importantly, they can be viewed as complementary and/or 
interchangeable, depending on the political conditions. Indeed, the old divisions appear 
to have shaded away. As a senior SNP member put it:  
 
“One of the former fundamentalists in the SNP [i.e. Alex Neil] said: „We‟re all 
gradualists now‟. I think that means that anyone accepts the SNP‟s core 
argument within the party that we‟ll take whatever additional powers that we 
can. We are not going to be resistant to that. However, our raison d’etre 
remains independence and our objective is to hold a referendum on 
independence within the first four years of an SNP term.” (Bruce Crowford, 
interview with the author, Edinburgh, 31/10/06).  
 
  Yet, relationships between the fundamentalists and gradualists have not always 
been harmonious since devolution. In 1999, having led the party into the first Scottish 
elections, Alex Salmond decided unexpectedly to resign as party leader. The 2000 
leadership election contest between John Swinney and Alex Neil was described as a 
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competition between gradualists and fundamentalists. Although Swinney won with a 
large margin, his entire leadership was characterized by fundamentalists‟ attacks on him. 
A widespread perception of him as a more moderate leader than Salmond (Webb, 2001, 
p. 311), and disappointing electoral results left him open to accusation of being too soft 
on independence. According to Swinney, however, the contrasts within the party were 
not really related to a substantive division between fundamentalists and gradualists:  
 
“During my leadership, these labels [gradualist/fundamentalist] were used as a 
cover for an internal power struggle by people that did not much fancy the way 
I was leading the SNP but the crucial thing is that, despite the fact that I am no 
more the leader of the SNP, the strategy of the party today is absolutely the 
same as the one I pursued when I was the leader.” (John Swinney, interview 
with the author, Edinburgh, 07/11/06) 
 
After the resignation of Swinney in 2004 and the re-election of Salmond as party 
leader, the SNP seems to have left these divisions behind. The prospects of becoming 
the first party in the Scottish Parliament allowed the new leader to emphasise the 
referendum on independence strategy in the run up to the 2007 election. The SNP‟s 
victory and the formation of an SNP minority government led to the almost immediate 
publication of a referendum bill in draft form which, in the intentions of the nationalists, 
should translate in the referendum being held in 2010.  
The SNP appears very united behind this strategy. Since the establishment of the 
SNP government, opinion polls have suggested that the executive enjoys high levels of 
support and that a very large majority of Scottish voters want to have a referendum on 
the constitution. This represents a strong weapon that, in the view of the minority status 
of the SNP‟s executive, can be used against those parties who would oppose this project. 
In terms of public support for independence opinion poll data are rather contradictory 
and the results vary a lot depending on how the question is framed. However, until the 
first half of 2008 support for independence appeared to be overall on the rise and, in a 
three option question (yes, no, don‟t know)  a plurality view, though far from being the 
„settled will‟ (Sunday Herald, reporting TNS System Three polls, 12/04/08). In addition, 
a later poll which found lower support for independence (35% in favour vs. 50% against) 
suggested that a victory of the Conservatives in the 2010 general election would be 
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likely to push up to 24% of those who were then against independence (or would have 
not voted in a referendum) to vote „yes‟, thus producing a victory for independence 
(Sunday Times, reporting a YouGov poll 07/09/08).  
However, as has happened before, the closer the SNP gets to its objective the 
more other parties‟ counter-moves are likely to create dilemmas which may trigger 
internal divisions over party strategy. Indeed, few factors may lead some SNP members 
to seriously consider other options than a „yes or no‟ referendum on independence. First, 
this strategy presents a legal question mark. The constitution of the United Kingdom is a 
matter reserved to Westminster so, in strict legal terms, the Scottish Parliament does not 
have the authority to call a referendum on it. Even if Westminster, under strong political 
pressure, agreed to let the Scottish Parliament hold a referendum, it could demand to 
have the final say on the terms of the question being asked (Lynch, 2002, p. 250-52). 
However, the legal aspect is neither the only problem, nor the most compelling one.  
The second factor which might trigger a new internal debate between new 
gradualists and new fundamentalists is genuinely political. Pursuing the strategy of a 
„yes or no‟ referendum on independence is definitely isolating the SNP, and isolation is 
not something that a party leading a minority executive can afford, given its need for 
support from the other parties to progress its governing programme. The first sign of co-
operation between opposition parties against the SNP and its new fundamentalist 
strategy was the decision, taken in December 2007, to establish a commission to review 
the current devolution settlement. The proposal was opposed by the SNP but was 
carried through with the votes of the Scottish Liberal Democrats, Labour and 
Conservatives (BBC/News, 06/12/07). The Commission, led by Sir Kenneth Calman, 
was lunched in March 2008 and produced an interim report in late 2008. Although, it 
ruled out any possibility of recommending full fiscal powers for Scotland within the UK, 
the report did not baulk at increasing fiscal powers and more devolution in other policy 
areas, such as broadcasting and energy policy (BBC/News, 02/12/08). The interim 
report was welcomed by the unionist parties both in Edinburgh and in London, included 
PM Gordon Brown, signalling that a consensus was likely to emerge on further, though 
limited, devolution of powers. In addition, the idea of devolving more powers to 
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Scotland and creating an English Parliament at Westminster - sending out Scottish, Irish 
and Welsh MPs when „only English‟ matters are discussed or voted – is appealing for 
David Cameron, the most likely next PM (Nelson, in Spectator, 16/08/08). A gradualist 
SNP‟s strategy, therefore, could bring about further devolution even without resorting to 
a referendum, by direct negotiations between the SNP executive in Edinburgh and the 
Westminster government, be it Labour or Conservative.  
Yet, the SNP has preferred to downplay cross-party consensus building and to 
keep emphasising its new fundamentalist strategy. Salmond dismissed the interim report 
of the Calman Commission as a „constitutional mouse‟ (BBC/News, 02/12/08) and has 
kept pushing on the independence referendum. The appointment of a Minister for 
Constitutional affairs in February 2009 was understood primarily as a means to prepare 
for that event, trying to enhance the chances of victory for independence, although the 
Minister was also given a mandate to oversee a joint submission by the SNP and the 
Liberal Democrats to the Calman Commission on Holyrood being accorded borrowing 
powers (Telegraph.co.uk, 10/02/09).  
In the face of the global financial crisis which exploded in 2008 and the 
consequent economic downturn, this insistence on holding a referendum on 
independence appears to have backfired on the SNP. In March 2009, the Scottish 
Liberal Democrats presented an amendment calling on the SNP to ditch its referendum 
plan and to concentrate on the economy. The three opposition parties won this crucial 
vote by a 25-vote majority, leaving the nationalists‟ proposal „dead in the water‟ 
(Guardian.co.uk, 05/03/09). The SNP has already stated that, in spite of this vote, it will 
still present its bill for a referendum in early 2010 before the Parliament. The party has 
also tried to exploit the vote against the referendum plan accusing the three unionist 
parties of ignoring the fact that the Scottish people wants to have a say on the 
constitution (ibid.). However, in the current economic climate this strategy is becoming 
more and more risky. Opinion polls have started to register a considerable decline in 
support for independence and, for the first time in many years, only a minority of Scots 
(only 32%) are in favour of an independence referendum being held in 2010, whereas 
53% are against (Sunday Times, reporting YouGov poll, 15/03/09).    
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The current strategy is set on a medium-term perspective which aims at winning 
the next Scottish election in 2011, also using the argument that the unionist parties have 
conspired to deny the Scottish people their right to express their constitutional 
preference. It is possible that in the next parliamentary term both the economic phase 
and the political conditions (such as a Tory government in London) will be more 
favourable for passing and winning an independence referendum (Preston, 2008). 
However, it is also possible that the SNP‟s insistence on a „yes or no‟ referendum on 
independence during this term has isolated the party, with probable negative 
consequences for the executive‟s achievements in the last two years of the term and, 
therefore, on its prospects of winning the next election.     
A third way, between independence referendum and accelerationism, could be 
represented by proposing a multi-option referendum which included a third choice such 
as more devolution short of independence. Nearly all opinion polls carried out in the 
2000s have shown that such an option would be the most popular. Such a choice might 
avoid the SNP‟s political isolation and enhance the chances of winning a constitutional 
referendum. However, such a choice would probably mean giving up on independence 
for at least the next decade, a prospect that the fundamentalists would be unlikely to 
welcome. 
 
 
3.3 Party ideology and policy: the left-right dimension 
3.3.1 The SNP as a ‘broad Church’ and a centre party (1930s-1960s) 
  The merger of the National Party of Scotland and the Scottish Party which 
created the SNP in 1934 not only resulted in a compromise between the two 
organizations on the self-government issue but also on the left-right ideological 
spectrum. The NPS was a rather heterogeneous party, but some of its most influential 
members came from the Labour party. Under the influence of Tom Gibson it developed 
a clearly left-of-centre ideological outlook and a set of socio-economic policies aimed at 
national reconstruction (Lynch, 2002, p. 35). This ideological positioning was linked to 
the socio-economic transformation that Scotland was undergoing in the late 1920s and 
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early 1930s. In particular, in the context of the Great Depression and growing political 
polarization both at national and international level, the NPS aimed to provide solutions 
to practical concerns. Indeed, the party‟s independentist stance on the self-government 
dimension was primarily justified in terms of the ability of Scotland to carry out leftist 
socio-economic reforms. In contrast, the SP was a clearly right-leaning political 
organization, whose most prominent members came from the Conservative party (the 
Duke of Montrose and Dewar Gibb) or from the Liberal party (like Alexander 
MacEwan). While the leadership of Montrose and MacEwan made the SP a mainstream 
centre-right political organization, some members, such as Dewar Gibb and George 
Malcom Thomson, advocated a “racially oriented nationalism which was politically to 
the far right and had quasi-fascist tendencies” (Finlay, 1994, p. 130). An issue which 
clearly reveals the ideological differences between the two groups both in left-right and 
self-government terms is their different evaluation of the British Empire. While the 
formal policy of the NPS was Dominion status for Scotland within the Commonwealth, 
many within the party had sympathy for republican ideas and for the IRA struggle 
against London. Most importantly, for NPS‟s members political separation from 
England was a means to reform Scotland in a social-democratic direction. In contrast, 
one of the reasons why SP‟s members opposed the Dominion status policy was that it 
would render the Scots, who had built the Empire together with the English, to the level 
of other colonized races (ibid., p. 133). 
 The formation of the SNP was made possible only through the expulsion of the 
most radical wing of the NPS and at the cost of abandoning its previous socio-economic 
plan. The new party was, therefore, constituted as a „broad Church‟ which encompassed 
individuals and groups of different shades of ideological opinion and could not agree on 
any policy, except a common desire to bring about Scotland‟s self-government. The 
first victim of the merger was the „Reconstruction Committee‟, which had been 
established jointly by both parties in the final phase of the merger process. Because of 
the contrasting ideological views of the individual members it could not make any 
significant progress (ibid, p. 156). The SNP was therefore left to face its first general 
election in 1935 without a single policy that could address any real issue of the day.  
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 After the disappointing results of the 1935 general election, however, the party 
adopted a programme consisting of six main points: 1) national control of credit by 
means of a state bank; 2) national control of transport; 3) national control of power; 4) 
decentralization and ruralisation of industry; 5) land ownership for land workers; 6) 
development of Scottish fisheries (Hanham, 1969, p. 174). The drafting of this 
programme, which represented a compromise between the mildly socialist position of 
Douglas Young (who was also a member of the Labour Party) and more centrist 
positions inspired by the ideology of Clifford Hugh Douglas‟ „social credit‟, represented 
an attempt to connect the party with the main issues affecting 1930s‟ Scotland. 
However, the start of the war in 1939 meant that the SNP was not able to test its 
proposals in a general election until 1945.     
 After the war, under the influence and leadership of McIntyre, the SNP 
repositioned itself clearly as a centre party, strongly resistant to recognising the 
importance of class and social conflicts: “To the Scottish realist the issue is not between 
the materialist creeds of state socialism and private enterprise… The Scottish National 
Party policy shows that the Scottish radicals have transcended that now sterile and 
empty conflict… The worldwide struggle of the age we are now entering is for the 
human rights of man” (McIntyre, 1947, quoted in Hanham, 1969, p. 174). However, the 
policy McIntyre was talking about was little more than a list of utopian statements 
based on notions drawn from „social credit‟, rural (and protestant) populism, political 
radicalism, Christian socialism and anti-state anarchism. The basic idea underpinning 
the new statement of policy adopted in December 1946 was to reduce the risk of 
oppression by diffusing political and economic power. From here derived the emphasis 
on the „little man‟, on small town democracy, on diffuse and small-scale private 
ownership and, by corollary, opposition to big corporations (especially if lacking 
financial roots in the territory) and massive state ownership. In terms of ideological 
outlook, as well as party organization, the SNP came to resemble very closely the 
„social credit‟ movements of Canada and New Zealand and the populism of Scandinavia 
and American Midwest (Hanham, 1969, p. 175).  
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What was clearly missing from the policy programme was a realistic recognition 
of the modern state and of the major social forces acting within and upon it, such as 
industrial, commercial, and trade union bureaucracies. In addition, the SNP‟s 
ideological stance was not only detached from socialism and free market liberalism but 
also from the emerging Keynesian consensus. As a consequence the party was unable to 
develop any detailed policy which made particular sense in 1940s and 1950s Scotland. 
As pointed out by Lynch, having no detailed solutions to propose to voters remained a 
characteristic of the SNP up to the late 1960s, so that the other parties could ridicule the 
nationalists saying that their stance was „Still No Policies‟ (Lynch, 2002, p. 7). Almost 
incredibly, at the end of the 1960s, the SNP policy programme was, to all interests and 
purposes, still the one drafted by McIntyre in 1946.  
 Analyses of the SNP‟s electorate appear to lead to the conclusion that the 
electoral growth of the 1960s was mainly due to protest voting and that electoral 
support for the nationalists had little or no distinctive sectional or demographic basis 
(Budge and Urwin, 1966; McLean, 1970). These findings are very much compatible 
with the ideological outlook of the party and with its inability to attract voters on the 
basis of sensible policies. However, the 1960s was not a decade of immobilism in terms 
of party ideology and policies. The relative success in attracting protest votes was also 
due to the party‟s position on some specific issues, such as its anti-nuclear weapon 
stance, which exploited internal divisions within Labour (Lynch, 2002, p. 96). In 
addition, due to the influx of new members and emerging figures, such as William 
(Billy) Wolfe, the SNP started to timidly reposition itself to the left. 
 
3.3.2 The move to the left and the rise and fall of left-right factionalism (1970s-
1990s)  
The SNP‟s ideological repositioning as a centre-left party gained momentum 
after Billy Wolfe was elected party leader in 1969. By then, Scottish industrial decline 
had become evident and the two major British parties had entered a phase of growing 
pressure to find concrete remedies to high unemployment and deteriorating living 
conditions. According to Wolfe, the SNP did not need to stress nationalism, since the 
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overwhelming majority of Scots were already well aware of their national identity. 
Instead, the electoral future of the party depended on its capacity to develop coherent 
policies, responding to socio-economic concerns of ordinary Scots and to link self-
government to a project of economic growth and social justice (Lynch, 2002, p. 103-4). 
Overall, the development of a clearly social-democratic policy platform was the result 
of several factors: the need to penetrate Labour‟s electoral heartland (West Scotland); 
changing socio-economic conditions which called for more leftist (redistributive) 
policies; a changed membership (many new leftist members had joined the party during 
the 1960s); a new leadership; and a reformed organizational structure (the establishment 
of the National Assembly and of its policy committees in 1968) able to study and 
develop coherent policies.  
In order to reposition the party to the centre-left, several initiatives were taken at 
different levels. At a policy level, the SNP started to develop a set of policies aimed at 
reducing unemployment and poverty. At a symbolic/rhetorical level, the party 
announced the establishment of a Standing Commission on Poverty and stressed the 
social-democratic ideological basis of its policies (SNP, 1974 Manifesto). At the 1975 
annual conference there was even an attempt to formally recognize the SNP as a social-
democratic party and to change its name to „Scottish National Party (Social Democrats)‟ 
(Lynch, 2002, p. 133). However, the strong opposition of the traditionalists within the 
party prevented the motion from being discussed. Finally, at an organizational level, the 
party tried very hard to mobilize within the trade unions. While the overall operation 
was largely unsuccessful, party members‟ involvement in industrial campaigns, 
especially in the shipbuilding and oil sectors, brought publicity and gained the trust of 
some trade unionists to the extent that they seemed ready to contact the SNP on issues 
of redundancies or other industrial disputes (Brand, 1978, p. 287).  
Although studies of the SNP‟s electoral support in the 1970s have tended to 
stress the importance of the party‟s „oil campaign‟, its commitment to constitutional 
change, its emergence as the party of „Scottish interests‟ and its attractiveness for 
protest voters (Brand, 1978; Brand et al., 1983, Miller, 1981), it is arguable that the 
move to the centre-left had an indirect effect on the SNP‟s electoral growth during first 
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half of the 1970s. Indeed, constitutional change and a focus on „Scottish interests‟ can 
be understood as an increasingly „selfish‟ response to Scotland‟s economic problems. In 
other words, the poor performance of the Scottish economy created the conditions for a 
breakdown (albeit a partial one) of working class solidarity across the border. As other 
electoral studies have pointed out, most of the new SNP‟s votes in the 1970 and 1974 
general elections came from those who normally voted Labour (Bochel and Denver, 
1972; Hanby, 1976). However, this may not have occurred if the SNP had not 
developed a leftist ideological outlook which made the party sufficiently attractive for 
Labour defectors and for first-time leftist voters who would have otherwise voted for 
Labour. 
Unfortunately for the SNP, the nature of the electoral swings that allowed them 
to elect eleven MPs to Westminster in October 1974 and to gain over 30% of the vote 
was not entirely understood. The confusion owed much to the fact that most of the new 
seats won in 1974 were previously held by Conservative MPs, whereas the nationalists 
did not win seats in the Labour strongholds. This (mis)led the party, or at least most of 
the new MPs, into believing that they had been elected thanks to Conservative defectors 
and, during the 1974-79 term, this created a series of tensions and clashes between the 
party‟s non-elected leadership in Edinburgh and the parliamentary group in London. As 
discussed above, most of the tensions between the two groups concerned the strategy to 
be adopted on devolution. However, they also concerned MPs‟ voting on socio-
economic matters. While the SNP‟s leadership in Edinburgh was keen in strengthening 
the centre-left profile of the party, the MPs voted more with the Conservatives than with 
Labour MPs, especially in the period 1974-1977 (Lynch, 2002, p. 138). This left the 
party vulnerable to accusations by Scottish Labour that the SNP was working for the 
Conservatives and that the nationalists were nothing other than „Tartan Tories‟. Such 
accusations, which were very damaging for the party‟s image, became even more 
credible when, after the failure of the 1979 referendum on devolution, the eleven SNP 
MPs contributed to vote down the Labour government and opened the way for Margaret 
Thatcher‟s victory.        
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The outcome of the referendum on devolution and of the 1979 election threw the 
party into a period of open confrontation between internal factions of different 
ideological orientations. In the summer of 1979 the social-democratic and gradualist 
„soul‟, led by party leader Billy Wolfe, was overwhelmed by the fundamentalist tide led 
by Gordon Wilson, who became the new leader. The primary concern of the 
fundamentalists was to re-establish independence as the only objective of the party and 
to end once and for all any flirtation with the idea of devolution. However, with 
devolution off the agenda and the prospect of independence getting more unlikely, the 
internal debate soon came to focus on other issues which enhanced the salience of the 
division between left-wingers and traditionalists, eclipsing of the 
gradualist/fundamentalist divide.  
It is worth recalling that in those years (1979-83) British party politics was 
developing fast. The Thatcher government started to implement its neo-liberal policies 
aimed at bringing inflation under control (with all the implications they carried for 
levels of wages and unemployment), while the Labour party was drifting far to the left. 
Polarization between the two major British parties allowed a new centrist political force, 
formed by an alliance between Labour social-democratic splinter and the Liberals, to 
emerge. In this political context, the different ideological orientations within the SNP 
came to prominence.  
In 1979, when the social-democratic wing realized they were becoming a 
minority within the party, they established a formal internal faction called ‟79 group‟ 
and were warned by the new party leadership that such a move could constitute a breach 
of party rules (Levy, 1990, p. 98). The ‟79 group‟ was formed by few young members, 
including future leader Alex Salmond, and more experienced figures, such as Margo 
McDonald, with the intention of moving the party further to left. The rationale for this 
strategic objective was provided by Margo McDonald‟s analysis of the referendum on 
devolution: the working class had voted in favour of devolution while the middle class 
had voted against, therefore the SNP should see the working class as its electoral 
„hunting field‟ (Torrance, 2009). While the group included individuals with different 
views, from republican hard liners sympathetic towards the Provisional Sinn Fein to 
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gradualist social-democrats who just wanted to continue on Billy Wolfe‟s early 1970s 
direction, the faction was united in supporting socialist ideology and policies, industrial 
campaign and civil disobedience.   
 The response of the new traditionalist leadership was to neutralise the industrial 
campaign by launching a centrist „new oil campaign‟ in 1980. The oil campaign was 
part of a political/electoral strategy which found its rationale in a different interpretation 
of the political context and on the idea that the party had to remain open to nationalists 
of all ideological orientations. According to Wilson, the SNP did not have to follow the 
Labour in its drift to the left (nor in its factional politics). Rather, he saw the SNP as a 
natural competitor of the Social Democrats and the Liberals for the expanding centrist 
niche (Levy, 1990, p. 100-01).  
The ‟79 group‟ contested this analysis on the grounds that it was based on 
British, rather than Scottish, electoral trends. Using data from election studies and 
surveys, the theorist of the group, Stephen Maxell, argued that the centrist niche in 
Scotland would be smaller than in England and that SNP voters were much closer on 
socio-economic issues to Labour voters than to Conservatives‟. Therefore, he 
concluded, „the evidence suggests that the SNP should challenge for the Labour vote by 
presenting itself, inter alia, as a party better equipped than Labour to achieve the goals 
of full employment and social welfare‟ (Maxwell, SNP 79 Group, Paper n. 6, 1981, p. 
17). 
The failure of the traditionalist leadership to revive the „oil campaign‟ allowed 
the left to the regain ground within the party in 1981. However, the following year 
Gordon Wilson managed to end the „civil war‟ by dissolving all internal factions and 
expelling seven members of the „79 group‟, amongst them were Alex Salmond and 
Stephen Maxell. The presence of a right-wing (folkloristic) group „Siol nan Gaidhael‟ 
(in English „Seed of the Gaels‟) had already been used, unsuccessfully, by the 
leadership to convince conference delegates to support a motion for disbanding all 
internal groups in 1980 (Levy, 1990, p. 101). In 1982, however, the ‟79 group‟ position 
within the party had weakened because of the bad publicity some direct actions, such as 
the occupation of Edinburgh‟s Old Royal High School led by Jim Sillars, had given to 
  
123 
 
the party. The formation of a traditionalist faction by Winnie Ewing, called „Campaign 
for Nationalism in Scotland‟, strengthen Wilson‟s argument that factionalism was 
ruining the party and convinced party members to back the dissolution of all groups. 
When it became known that some ‟79 group members were trying to establish a 
Scottish Socialist Society, they were expelled from the party (Torrance, 2009). 
 Looking at the development of party ideology and strategy, however, it can be 
argued that the traditionalist wing won the struggle for party control but it lost, to a 
great extent, the „battle of ideas‟. The centrist strategy adopted for the 1983 general 
election held the two seats won in 1979 but did not prevent heavy electoral losses 
(about a third of the 1979‟s votes). In the following years, social polarization kept 
increasing, creating the conditions for a revived industrial strategy, which the party 
leadership could not resist. The left-wingers of the SNP started to regain positions 
within the party organization and in 1985 managed to halt a proposed reform which 
aimed to strengthen the party leadership at the expense of branches. In the same year it 
launched its new periodical „Nationalist Left Review‟. The review avoided carefully the 
divisive language and attitudes of the „civil war‟ years. The editorial of the first issue 
stated: “…we hope to stimulate a serious debate regarding the SNP‟s strategy for 
obtaining independence. And a serious debate it will be. Sectarianism and personal mud 
slinging will have no place in Nationalist Left Review” (NLR, issue 1, autumn 1985, p. 
1). However, the core arguments of the review were the same as those put forward by 
the ‟79 group: targeting Labour voters, adopting socialistic (if not socialist) policies, 
engaging in industrial campaigns and direct actions. Although the leadership managed 
to avoid the party formally adopting an ideological connotation beyond nationalism, 
Wilson‟s pragmatism and the emergence of left-wingers, such as Jim Sillars, within the 
party organization allowed the SNP to reposition itself.  
After the 1987 election, the SNP‟s move to the left was almost inevitable. The 
Conservative government persisted in its neo-liberal drift to the right and started to 
manifest openly its disregard for Scotland, treating the Scots as guinea pigs for 
experimenting new taxes (McCreadie, 1991, p. 46). At the other end of the spectrum, 
the Labour party had clearly stopped its shift to the left and was now closing in on the 
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centre, thus squeezing the Liberal-Social Democratic Alliance. In this context, it would 
have been political suicide for the SNP to keep ruling out direct action and keep 
competing for moderate votes. In spite of Wilson‟s supplications to the party not to try 
to compete with Labour „on the far left of the political spectrum‟ (Wilson, cited in Levy, 
1990, p. 119), at the 1988 conference the delegates not only supported the continuation 
of industrial campaigns but also accepted SNP‟s participation in a campaign of civil 
disobedience for the non-payment of the poll-tax and the party‟s opposition to nuclear 
weapons and NATO membership. In addition, the rising figure of the gradualist left, 
Alex Salmond, was elected as deputy leader. The campaign against the poll tax was 
particularly important as it became the major issue in Scottish politics for the next few 
years. The SNP was the only party which stood for civil disobedience, while Scottish 
Labour split on the issue due to its duty to comply with the law as the party which 
controlled most Scottish local councils (Levy, 1990, p. 119). This allowed the SNP to 
win over a lot of sympathy among traditional Labour voters and from the grassroots of 
the Scottish Trade Unions, thus affirming itself as a competitor for the leftist voters. 
The election in 1990 of Alex Salmond as party leader and of Jim Sillars, former Labour 
member and winner of the 1988 by-election in Labour heartland Glasgow Govan, as his 
deputy reinforced the image of the SNP as a party of the left.  
Survey data and election studies clearly confirm the increased appeal of the 
nationalists amongst social sectors traditionally associated with the left. Table 3.10 
shows how the support from manual workers in the late 1980s and early 1990s reached 
the same levels of 1974, after a sharp decline in 1979 and in the early 1980s. Table 3.11 
shows that in the period 1985-1993, support for the SNP from income classes A, B and 
C1 increased by one third, whereas support form D and E classes nearly doubled.  
 The 1992 general election‟s result strengthened the leftist strategy. The SNP 
won 50% more votes than in 1987, reaching the same levels as in February 1974, while 
the Liberal Democrats continued to fall and Labour declined considerably. Although 
both Labour and the Liberal Democrats did much better than the SNP in terms of seats 
won, the party established itself as the main competitor to Labour in the anti-Tory 
electorate. More importantly, the election of another Conservative government with 
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English votes contributed to solidify a new Scottish identity which, beyond the 
nationalist element (Scottishness), featured anti-Tory and left-wing orientations (Brown 
et al., 1999).  
 
 
Table 3.10  
Party support by social class, 1974-1992 
 
Party Class* 1974 1979 1984 1989 1992 
 
Conservative 
 
non-manual 
 
31 
 
46 
 
45 
 
34 
 
34 
 manual 20 28 19 15 18 
 
Labour 
 
non-manual 
 
26 
 
24 
 
22 
 
32 
 
29 
 manual 44 47 61 54 46 
 
SNP 
 
non-manual 
 
29 
 
18 
 
9 
 
22 
 
21 
 manual 26 14 10 24 26 
 
Liberal Democrats** 
 
non-manual 
 
9 
 
11 
 
23 
 
9 
 
14 
 manual 7 8 9 5 8 
 
Source: Brown, A. et al. (1996, p. 151). 
*Class is reduced to the distinction between manual and non-manual workers. 
**Liberals, Alliance (Lib+SDP) and Liberal Democrats 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.11 
SNP support by social class and housing tenure, 1985-1993 
 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
 
Social class: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABC1 12 9 12 16 20 16 17 17 18 
C2 15 14 14 22 23 18 20 23 23 
DE 12 16 14 20 24 16 20 24 22 
 
Housing tenure: 
         
owner-occupier - - 12 17 21 16 18 19 20 
Council tenant - - 14 20 23 17 19 23 23 
 
Source: Newell, J. (1998, p. 115). 
 
 
Labour, the traditional party of the left and recently converted to devolution, 
was becoming the major beneficiary of the solidified anti-Tory sentiments of the Scots. 
However, during the Conservatives‟ years, the SNP had moved closer and closer to 
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Labour, even outflanking it on some issues, and was therefore well positioned to attract 
growing shares of the Scottish electorate. The perceptions of voters about the proximity 
of the SNP to Labour and to the Conservative party spells out very clearly the trajectory 
of the nationalist party: in 1979, 22% of voters thought the SNP was closer to the Tories 
and 47% thought it was closer to Labour; in 1997, only 10% thought it was closer to the 
Tories and 62% thought it was closer to Labour (Dodds and Seawright, 2004, p. 98)
 . 
 
3.3.3. Ideology and policy repositioning after Devolution (1999-2009) 
 As discussed above, during the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s the SNP 
managed to overcome factional divisions and to position itself on the left. Under the 
leadership of Alex Salmond, the party re-discovered unity and electoral success by re-
styling itself as a party of the left but avoiding the socialist radicalism of the ‟79 group 
in the early 1980s. The moderation strategy was greatly helped, or indeed dictated, by 
the emerging post-Thatcher consensus which saw New Labour accepting some of the 
basics of neo-liberism as a means of fostering economic growth. As New Labour‟s 
principles were injected, though not without some resistance, into the Scottish Labour 
party, it became easier for the SNP to maintain a leftist profile without flirting with 
socialist ideas. Nonetheless, Salmond led the party into the campaign for the first 
Scottish Parliament election in 1999 with a radical social-democratic manifesto which 
clearly outflanked Labour to the left in several respects (Dodds and Seawright, 2004, p. 
98). The underlying strategy was to show how New Labour had absorbed Thatcherite 
ideas and was producing neo-liberal policies, while the SNP remained faithful to social-
democratic principles and policies. The flagship of such social-democratic agenda was 
the „Penny for Scotland‟, i.e. the proposal to use Parliament tax powers to increase 
taxation by 1% so as to fund education, health and housing (SNP, 1999 Manifesto, p. 2). 
Analysts and commentators considered the „Penny for Scotland‟ policy as not 
particularly rewarding and perhaps damaging (Jones, 1999, cited in McEwen, 2002, p. 
52). The proposal was adopted only two months before the election as a response to 
Gordon Brown‟s proposal to cut the basic rate of income tax by 1% and left the party 
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exposed to criticism of economic dilettantism. Beyond the tax rise policy, the manifesto 
proposed abolition of tuition fees and harshly criticized the privatization of public 
transport, health and education. 
 The resignation of Alex Salmond and the election of John Swinney as party 
leader in 2000 marked a clear departure from the socio-economic approach of 1999.  
Already in the 2001 general election, commentators had noticed a shift towards the 
centre (The Herald, 19/05/01, cited in McEwen, 2002, p. 56). Not only did the party 
drop the „Penny for Scotland‟ (which also remained out of the 2003 manifesto for the 
Scottish Parliament) but it also abandoned the commitment to increase National 
Insurance contributions and to restore benefits for 16-17 year olds. For Swinney the 
priority was to establish the SNP as a party competent to run the Scottish economy in 
the modern globalised context, a party that the people could trust as the next office-
holder in Holyrood. The focus on economic growth entailed the acceptance of the 
mainstream, New Labour approach on socio-economic matters. Now, New Labour 
policies were not criticized for their continuity with Thatcherite policies but for being 
tailored to English rather than Scottish concerns. Under Swinney‟s leadership, therefore, 
the SNP moved much closer to New Labour, absorbing the basics of the post-Thatcher 
neo-liberal consensus. As one MSP put it: 
 
Thatcherism has had a profound impact in Scotland and the rest of the UK. What 
people expect from governments today is different from what they expected back in 
the 1970s, and the SNP has not been immune from this ideological change (Shona 
Robinson, 31/10/06). 
 
 
Swinney saw this shift as the completion of a trajectory which brought the SNP back to 
its decentralists and anti-bureaucratic roots of the 1960s and 1970s: 
 
Up to the 1960s and during the 1970s, in my view, the SNP was still a strongly 
decentralist and anti-bureaucratic party. That ideological perspective entailed a 
rather limited role for the state and for state ownership. This prevented the party 
moving too much to the left. However, as a result of Thatcherism and as a 
consequence of the 79 group‟s influence, the SNP adopted a much more leftist 
ideology. The state was seen as a solution to everything. In my opinion, in doing so, 
the party moved away from its decentralist ethos. But from the 1990s we started a 
process of stepping back from the view that the state should run everything. That 
brought us back to our roots of a party which is radical, decentralist and moderate 
  
128 
 
left of the centre, not hard left of the centre. That process… was a very important 
ideological jump for us. (John Swinney, Edinburgh, 07/11/06). 
 
 
However, the adoption of New Labour‟s ideas was not confined to the economic 
policy sphere. The SNP also started to address social problems from an „individual 
responsibility‟ perspective. This was particularly evident in the case of youth anti-social 
behaviour, for which the party started to propose repressive policies rather similar to 
those of Labour and the Conservative party (McEwen, 2002, p. 57). The adoption of a 
new approach to socio-economic matters, nonetheless, did not represent a rejection of 
social-democracy. On the contrary, it represented the maturation of a party which had 
been prone, because of its permanent position at the fringes of the political system, to 
make sometimes unrealistic promises. It was time now to come to terms with fact that 
“you‟ve got to have a vibrant economy and high levels of economic growth if you want 
to spend money on social services that can improve peoples‟ lives and can create a 
decent society.” (John Swinney, Edinburgh, 07/11/06). 
As discussed below, the synthesis of pro-business, pro-economic growth 
policies with social-democratic ideals elaborated under Swinney‟s leadership has 
remained the guiding principle of the party to the present day. However, in the short run 
it did not pay off electorally. At the 2003 Scottish elections the SNP had to face three 
main problems. First, it was extremely difficult to push through an agenda of more 
constitutional reform as the devolution settlement was still too fresh. The party was 
therefore compelled to tie its economic policies to the actual powers of the Scottish 
Parliament, thus limiting the breadth of its proposals. Secondly, the SNP‟s anti-Iraq war 
stance was probably damaging as the UK government was able to announce „victory‟ in 
the run-up to the election. Last, but definitely not least, the shift to the centre happened 
when new political competitors on the left were emerging, which resulted in a loss of 
votes. According to respondents of the Scottish Election Study 2003, the SNP lost 3.9% 
of the 1999 party list vote to the Scottish Socialist Party and another 3.9% to the 
Scottish Greens (Scottish Election Study 2003). 
Since having been re-elected leader of the SNP, Alex Salmond has mainly built 
on the job done by Swinney and the party‟s economic experts, such as Jim Mather, to 
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make an economic case for Scotland‟s independence and to keep pressure on the Lib-
Lab executive for delivering economic growth. One of the papers produced to develop 
new economic policies states: “it is time for us to stop talking about social democracy 
in Scotland and start earning it” (SNP, Let Scotland Flourish 2007, 2006, p. 4), a 
sentence which is definitely in tune with Swinney‟s approach. However, the SNP has 
also paid more attention to the way in which the party intends to use the benefits of a 
better economy. It now appears more united and comfortable with its centre-left 
positioning. As a senior member of the party and MSP revealed: “At the last meeting of 
the parliamentary group Alex Salmond said „we are a social-democratic party‟ and 
everyone said „yes‟” (Andrew Welsh, interview with the author, 08/11/06) 
In the manifesto for the 2007 Scottish election, economic growth (cutting 
business taxes) and the anti-social behaviour proposal (getting tougher on those who 
sell alcohol to teenagers) were „sandwiched‟ between more spending on health services 
(to keep health centres closer to citizens) and a commitment to scrap the council tax and 
replace it with a local income tax (SNP, 2007 Manifesto, p. 6). The determination 
shown by the SNP executive to fulfil its pledge on the abolition of the council tax has 
caused the party, especially in the context of the economic downturn linked to the 
consequences of the global financial crisis, to clash with the CBI, the Institute of 
Directors and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland (Telegraph, 03/09/08). 
Opposition to the plan from the Labour and Conservative parties means that the policy 
has little chance of being approved. However, the Executive has already frozen council 
tax until 2011, with the Scottish Parliament compensating local councils for their 
consequent loss of revenue (ibid.). In February 2009, when the Liberal Democrats 
withdrew their support for the plan too, the executive had to come to terms with reality 
and decided to give up on their policy until the end of the term (The Times, 12/02/09). 
Although this climb-down has been exploited by the competitors, which painted the 
executive as a liability for Scottish economy, it can be argued that the SNP has prepared 
a favourable battleground for the next (2011) election. As the now super-minister of the 
economy John Swinney stated: “Make no mistake, this government will fight the [2011] 
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election to win a parliamentary majority that backs the abolition of the unfair council 
tax” (quoted in The Times, 12/02/09).            
  
Table 3.12 
SNP (and Labour*) support by self-assigned class, 1997-2007 
 
 1997 % 1999 % 2001 % 2003 % 2007 % 
 
Middle class 
 
13 (28) 
 
18 (20) 
 
20 (26) 
 
11 (9) 
 
30 (19) 
 
Working Class 
 
16 (46) 
 
21 (34) 
 
21 (64) 
 
16 (18) 
 
43 (29) 
 
Source: Scottish Election Studies 1997-2007 
*Figures in brackets refer to Labour 
 All data refer to constituency votes 
 
 
Table 3.13 
Best party for working class people  
and best party for people running a business, 2007 
 
 Lab SNP LibDem Con d.k. 
 
Best party for working class 
 
32 
 
22.8 
 
10 
 
8.1 
 
27.1 
 
Best party for business 
 
12.3 
 
8.9 
 
3.4 
 
49.2 
 
26.2 
 
Source: Scottish Election Study 2007 
 
 
 In spite of the move to the centre and the attempt to create a more constructive 
relationship with the Scottish business community, the SNP remains a party positioned 
clearly to the left of the centre and, as far as party competition is concerned, to the left 
of Labour. This is confirmed both by recent studies based on MSP surveys (Massetti, 
2009b) and on mass surveys, as reported in table 3.11 and 3.12. Actually, what 
surprises is that, after seven years of moderation and attention to business concerns, the 
SNP is considered the best party for business by less than 9% of voters, less than 
Labour and five times less than the Conservatives (table 3.12). Further evidence of the 
leftist stance of the SNP is provided by the analysis of the flow of vote between the 
2003 and the 2007 elections, in particular, the collapse of the radical-left Scottish 
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Socialist Party (which during the term broke up due to the formation of the splinter 
group Solidarity). Of the 2003 SSP‟s (party list) vote, only 7.5% went to Labour in 
2007; 33.9% went to either the SSP (11.33%) or Solidarity (22.6%); 20.8% went to the 
Greens and 30.2, the biggest share, went to the SNP (Scottish Election Study 2007).  
 
 
3.4 Party Ideology and Policy: the European Integration Dimension 
3.4.1 The Eurosceptic turn: ‘No voice – No entry’ (1950s-1970s) 
In the inter-war period, the SNP and the wider Scottish nationalist movement had 
played little attention to discourses about European integration. However, from the 
1940s, under the leadership of the Young and McIntyre, the party started to consider 
projects of European integration as functionally positive for the advancement of 
Scottish independence. The European entity that the party envisaged had to be 
substantively intergovernmental and with Scotland participating on equal basis with the 
other states: 
 
The SNP welcomes steps towards the Federation of Europe but emphatically declares 
that the only just basis for such a federation is the equal co-operation of self-governing 
democratic countries. Domination exercised by such as the British government over 
Scotland can have no place in a free Europe. Scotland is entitled to direct 
representation in any European Federation which may consider matters of customs, 
trade and military co-operation (Minutes of the 1948 National Conference, quoted in 
Lynch, 1996, p. 28). 
 
 
 Such pro-European attitudes were maintained during the 1950s, when the European 
project started to develop concretely through the establishment of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC). The SNP demanded direct representation for Scotland 
because of the centrality of the Steel and Coal sectors in Scottish economy and harshly 
criticized the decision of the UK government not to join the Community.  However, 
until the early 1960s the party did not devote much of its attention to European 
integration. In Aims and Policy of the Scottish National Party, a 15-page pamphlet 
published by the party in 1962, „European co-operation‟ was barely mentioned. The 
SNP interest in Europe increased when the UK government started to apply for EEC 
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membership. The party had two main interrelated concerns about EEC membership. 
The first was the feeling that the Common Market could have negative effects on the 
Scottish economy, in particular on the fishing, agricultural and steel industries. The 
second was that Scotland would be dragged into the EC not as a member-state but as 
region and that the accession negotiations would be dealt with by London on the basis 
of English, not Scottish, concerns. The second concern, in fact, reinforced the first one 
(Lynch, 1996, p. 31).  These negative attitudes turned toward an explicit rejectionist 
position in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the negotiations for UK accession 
proved some of the SNP‟s concerns to be well founded, especially regarding fisheries.  
 The party leader, Billy Wolfe, was very critical of the bureaucratic nature and 
structure of the EC. In 1970 after a visit to Brussels he declared “The Common 
Marketers of today are as doctrinaire centralists as their opposite numbers in the 
Kremlin in Moscow” (Billy Wolfe, 1973, p. 139). In 1971 the party committed itself to 
campaign against UK membership of the EEC and proposed an alternative membership 
of a free trade agreement similar to those negotiated by Sweden, Norway and Austria. 
The SNP defended its position on several grounds. First, it was argued that Scotland 
had more affinities with the other Northern European countries of the EFTA rather than 
with the six member-founders (SNP Manifesto, February 1974). Second, in keeping 
with a longstanding British critique of European integration, the party perceived the 
EEC as an overtly bureaucratic organization (Ibid). From a „domestic politics‟ 
perspective, the SNP could freely exploit the „European issue‟, since it was not 
constrained by any governmental responsibility. The party focused on the sacrifices that 
the Scottish economy, in particular the fishing industry, was going to suffer from 
membership of the common market. In this way it tried to highlight the „disgrace‟ of 
depending on London for the negotiations with Brussels, thus strengthening the 
argument for independence. In addition, given that all the major British parties were in 
favour of EEC membership, it attracted many voters amongst the „losers of accession‟ - 
at the expense of both the Tories (who bore the responsibility for the negotiations) and 
Labour which, having returned to office in 1974, had renegotiated the membership 
terms. In particular, the SNP was able to capitalise in electoral terms in the costal 
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communities depending on the fishing industry. The SNP candidate for the North 
Angus constituency in 1974, recalls a telling episode: “I remember that the Tory MP 
had to escape from a meeting with the fishermen. He was photographed running away 
through fish boxes followed by the crowd” (interview with Andrew Welsh, Edinburgh, 
08/11/06).  
The extremely positive results of the two 1974 general elections, therefore, can 
be also explained by the increased visibility that the SNP acquired on the issue of EEC 
membership. Such visibility increased even further during the referendum on UK‟s 
continued membership of the EEC which was held by the Labour government in 1975. 
A UK-wide referendum represented a unique opportunity for the nationalists since, if 
different majorities had emerged across the border (in particular an English „Yes‟ vs. a 
Scottish „No‟), the issue of Scottish sovereignty would have been pushed to the fore of 
public. The SNP, in spite of some internal divisions (interview with George Reid, 
Edinburgh, 03/11/06), was the only party in Scotland which campaigned against 
membership, using the slogan „No voice – No entry‟ (Lynch, 1996, p. 35). This allowed 
the nationalists not only to reinforce their electoral grip on the costal areas where the 
fishing industry was concentrated but also led to its taking up of some of the concerns 
of the Scottish Trade Unions, while the party also benefited from the evident divisions 
within the Scottish (and British) Labour party.  
Opposition to the EEC, indeed, was also linked to the ascendancy of the 
nationalist left, represented at the highest level by the leader Wolfe, which saw the EEC 
as a free-market, capitalistic club caring only about big business rather than about 
people and communities (Interviews with Alasdair Morgan and Bruce Crowford, 
Edinburgh, 01/11/06 and 31/10/06 respectively). In addition the emergence of the EEC 
as a military (nuclear) bloc aligned with NATO, also clashed with the SNP‟s anti-
nuclear weapon proliferation stance (SNP, Scotland’s Future, August 1974, Manifesto 
for the October 1974 election, p. 11). Therefore, the rejectionist position was not only 
based on cost-benefit calculus regarding both Scotland and the party but also 
ideological distance. However, principled distance from the EEC was not restricted to 
the left of the party. European integration was, to a great extent, a cross-cutting issue 
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with many members of all ideological orientations opposing membership and few 
people being in favour. As a fundamentalist and traditionalist SNP MP declared during 
the referendum campaign, the EU “represents everything that our party has fought 
against: centralisation, undemocratic procedures, power politics and a fetish for 
abolishing cultural differences” (quoted in Lynch, 1996, p. 35). 
 The results of the referendum were rather disappointing for the SNP, as the 
„Yes‟ won by 58.4 against 41.6. Although the „No‟ votes were more than 10% higher in 
Scotland than in England, that was not enough to build up a political case. However, the 
party had succeeded in maintaining strong visibility and attracted the sympathy of a 
strong minority of the electorate. In the following years, the SNP focused on the 
devolution issue and there was little re-consideration of European integration. Actually 
the party leadership remained very convinced that the position adopted in 1975 was the 
right one and that it was the Scottish electorate that got it wrong in supporting the „Yes‟ 
vote. As the deputy leader Gordon Wilson declared in 1978: “A massive re-think by 
Scots about the ECC may be needed soon. Evidence is growing that the EEC is proving 
hostile to Scotland‟s national interest” (quoted in Dardanelli, 2003, p. 275).  
 
3.4.2 From Rejectionism to Pragmatic integrationism (1980s-2002) 
The re-thinking on European integration started after the failure of the 1979 referendum 
on devolution but was slow and highly controversial even within the leadership. 
According to John Swinney, “the seeds of a change in the SNP‟s position happened at 
the 1981 conference in Aberdeen” where the resolution to re-affirm opposition to 
membership of the EC was put aside for re-consideration. He recalls that “at the grand 
age of seventeen, I spoke against the resolution and, unexpectedly, I was supported by 
Winnie Ewing, who was then our only MEP and a deeply respected figure in the party” 
(interview with John Swinney, Edinburgh, 07/11/06). As confirmed by the then party 
leader Gordon Wilson, the election of Winnie Ewing as MEP for the Highlands Islands 
did much to change party members perceptions of and attitudes towards the European 
Community: “In the early 1980s the SNP softened its views, partially because of our 
MEP who was very active in establishing good relationships with MEPs of different 
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countries and different parts of the political spectrum.” (interview with Gordon Wilson, 
Dundee, 06/11/06).  
In the 1983 general election manifesto, a first timid change was introduced. The 
party remained very negative about EEC membership: “we would not wish to join, 
since the EEC has been extremely damaging to many of Scotland‟s interests and its 
centralist thinking from Brussels is as ill-suited for Scotland as that from London” (SNP, 
1983 Manifesto, p. 11). Yet, the SNP would propose a further referendum where the 
Scottish people would decide again whether to remain or to leave the Community. The 
manifesto makes clear that the party would recommend a vote against membership 
(ibid.). However, a more substantive change of position was decided at the 1983 
conference. At the peak of the fundamentalist counter-revolution, the party leader 
Gordon Wilson was keen to elaborate a new and more appealing policy of independence. 
Although the party did not endorse a fully pro-EEC position, the new stance was that, in 
a hypothetical independence scenario, if re-negotiation with the EEC was satisfactory, 
the party would recommend a vote for continued membership in the (hypothetical) 
referendum (Lynch, 1996, p. 38). The primary reasons for this change of position were 
very pragmatic. Beyond the need to develop a more credible and appealing 
independence policy there was the simple consideration that, like it or not, Scotland was 
in the EEC and there was no credible prospect of leaving. In addition: “I think there was 
also a feeling that the party was campaigning on too many negative things: we didn‟t 
want to be in the UK, we didn‟t want to be in the NATO, we didn‟t want to be in the 
European Union” (interview with Alasdair Morgan, Edinburgh, 01/11/06). The overtly 
radical image projected by opposing all these status quo situations was felt to be 
damaging at the electoral level.  
In the following years, a Europhile consensus started to emerge within the party 
leadership. As the factional divisions of the early 1980s were left behind the new unity 
was achieved in the context of growing opposition to the strongly Eurosceptic Tory 
government. The whole party, therefore, tended to converge towards leftist and pro-
EEC positions. Indeed, the two architects of the SNP‟s turn were Wilson, considered a 
traditionalist and a fundamentalist (though, as discussed in previous sections, he showed 
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a good dose of pragmatism on self-government), and Jim Sillars, a former member of 
the Labour party and the prominent figure of the SNP‟s gradualist left in the 1980s. It 
has to be considered that in the 1980s the EEC changed substantially and this made the 
emergence of a leftist and pro-European orientation much more compatible. Beyond the 
desire to distinguish itself from the Euroscepticism of Mrs Thatcher, the SNP‟s left 
appreciated the social democratic turn of the EEC, especially the distribution of 
European social and structural funds. As one MSP recalls: “it was also because Europe 
became more socialist, in terms of social policy and therefore we recognized there was 
an opportunity on being part of the game” (Bruce Crowford, Edinburgh, 31/10/06). 
By the late 1980s the consensus on a pro-European turn had that the few anti-
EEC members who remained were given the nickname „Albanians‟, as a mockery for 
their isolationism (Lynch, 1996, p. 41). In the 1987 general election manifesto, all 
negative references to membership of the EEC had disappeared and the 
recommendation in favour of Scotland remaining in were made explicit, although the 
party opposed “moves for further centralization in the EEC to create a European super 
state” (SNP, 1987 Manifesto, p. 9). The pro-European turn was completed during the 
1988 Conference, when the party approved the proposal “Independence in Europe”, 
which was inserted into the manifesto of 1989 European election (SNP, European 
Election Manifesto 1989). The new policy became immediately popular, as 
independence within the European umbrella allowed the party to overcome old 
objections about Scotland‟s ability to stand on its own in the international scene, 
especially in terms of separation from the English markets. Opinion polls showed that 
support for independence within Europe was at least double that for independence 
without Europe (Lynch, 1996, p. 43; Newell, 1998, p. 113). 
However, the SNP has not become a federalist party and has never given much 
credit to the idea of a “Europe of the Regions” (not even in the “Europe of Peoples” 
version), seeing the Committee of the Regions as a weak institution with no future (SNP, 
Scotland’s Memo to Maastricht, 1991). According to Gordon Wilson there was an 
attempt by Sillars to move the SNP towards Eurofederalist positions but the party did 
not follow him (interview with Gordon Wilson, Dundee, 06/11/06). Instead, the party 
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supported the creation of a “Confederal Europe of the Nations”, where an independent 
Scotland would sit at the table of the European Council to cooperate with other 
member-states and, at the same time, to protect its own interests. The SNP realized that 
its final goal - secession from the UK and the creation of a Scottish state - fitted 
comfortably with European integration, as long as the EU remained a confederal, loose 
organization. Important objections, such as the negative consequences of separating 
Scotland from the English market, were thus overcome.  
 
2.4.3 From Europhile pragmatism to Eurosceptic revisionism? (2003-2009) 
The SNP kept supporting EU integration throughout the 1990s and early 2000s 
(SNP, Manifesto 1994; 1999; 2003). However, the constitutional process appears to 
have determined a new change of position. While the party was in favour of the 2004 
enlargement, it seems rather hostile to deeper integration: “We prefer the widening 
rather than the deepening of the integration process” (interview with Brian Adam MSP, 
Edinburgh, 24/10/06). All the interviews conducted for this study with the SNP MSPs 
confirmed, as stated in the 2005 general election and the 2007 Scottish election 
manifestos, that the crucial issue for which the party opposed the new EU constitution 
was again the Common Fisheries Policy, still regarded as a vital national interest (SNP, 
Manifesto 2005 and 2007). A further pragmatic issue concerns energy policy, which the 
treaties aim to bring under the control of the EU: 
 
There were also problems with the Constitution on energy: we are an extremely energy 
rich country. Currently we have oil, gas and coal but, looking at the future, we are also 
extremely rich in terms of renewables. So there‟s no way we want to see Europe taking 
control over our energy (Interview with Stewart Maxwell MSP, Edinburgh, 01/11/06). 
 
 However, beyond specific issues concerning national economic interests and their 
electoral implications, more general Eurosceptic themes have re-emerged:  
 
Our opposition to the European Constitution was driven by the fishing issue. That‟s a very 
sensitive issue for us in electoral terms. But I think it also reflects the unease that, not only 
people in Scotland or in the UK but also in other countries… some are feeling that 
perhaps the European project has gone too far too quickly. They think that we need to 
stop and make sure that what we‟ve got is working before we embark on yet more 
  
138 
 
constitutional change at European level. (interview with Alasdair Morgan, Edinburgh, 
01/11/06) 
 
In addition, arguments related to the party‟s secessionist goal appear to play a crucial 
role too. Many in the party are very uneasy about the creation of a new, more integrated 
Union before the achievement of Scotland‟s independence. As one MSP put it: 
 
Fundamentally the problem with the constitution, as far as I am concerned, was that it 
made it more difficult for us to become independent: the closer the ties of the current 
members of the European Union, the more difficult is to extract Scotland from the UK 
and re-negotiate. (interview with Stewart Maxwell, Edinburgh, 01/11/06). 
 
It is rather clear that what preoccupies the party is the pull of sovereignty from member-
states to the EU level, which in a future scenario may turn against the interests of an 
independent Scotland or may make independence more difficult to achieve. As outlined 
in the 2005 (general election) and the 2007 (Scottish election) manifestos the official 
party position is to call a referendum on the European Constitution in which the party 
would campaign for a „no‟ vote (SNP, Manifesto 2005, p. 37; Manifesto, 2007, p. 73). 
In this respect, the party‟s manifesto for the 2009 European elections could be 
interpreted as a slight move towards a more ambiguous position, as the party kept 
calling for a referendum but did not re-state explicitly which side it would campaign for 
(SNP, Manifesto 2009, p. 5). However, after at least five years of explicit rejection of 
the European treaties, the omission appears to owe more to the need to avoid 
Euroscpetic themes in a European election than a substantive change of position.  
 
Conclusion 
After a period of strong internal disagreement on the self-government objective 
during the 1930s and early 1940s, the SNP settled unambiguously on an independentist 
line. Contrasts between gradualists and fundamentalists have, however, resurfaced 
whenever an opportunity has arisen to obtain self-government concessions short of 
independence, turning into bitter fights after the failure of the 1979 referendum, when 
the adoption of a gradualist strategy was perceived (by fundamentalists) as a negation of 
the independentist line that had ultimately achieved nothing. The endorsement of 
devolution in 1997 was much less problematic and divisive, as the party made very 
clear that it represented just a stepping stone towards independence. The strong 
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commitment to independence is witnessed by the plan of the SNP executive to hold a 
referendum on it by 2011. 
 The interwar period also saw strong divisions on left-right positioning. After 
WWII the party settled on a centrist position based on (protestant) populism: i.e. a 
rejection of both big-company capitalism and state socialism, a defence of diffuse 
ownership, a grassroots ethos, an emphasis on tailoring politics, economy and finance 
(i.e. credit) to the needs of small communities and small producers. However, the social 
consequence of Scottish industrial decline led the SNP to move moderately to the left 
during the 1970s and even more to the left during the 1980s, in spite of a strong 
resistance from the traditionalist leadership. With the emergence of the „New Labour‟ 
consensus in the late 1990s, the party gradually returned to a more moderate but still left 
of centre position. 
 As far as European integration is concerned, the SNP adopted an anti-integration 
stance in the 1960s and campaigned for a „No vote‟ in the 1975 referendum for 
continued UK membership of the EEC. It slowly changed it position during the early 
1980s, due to an appreciation of „social and regional Europe‟ and a realization that, if 
anything, the European framework made the independence objective more, not less, 
viable. In accordance with this objective, the party never went beyond its support for an  
inter-governmental Europe. One of the areas of integration which the party has always 
contested is the Common Fisheries Policy. This issue was the main (and, according to 
some interviewees, the only) reason why the party opposed both the Constitutional and 
Lisbon Treaty. However, some in the party are concerned about the concretization of 
further European integration before Scotland achieves full independence from London.   
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Chapter 4  
 
The South Tyrolese People’s Party (Südtiroler Volkspartei) 
 
 
The SVP was born in 1945 as the party of the German-speaking minority in 
South Tyrol. It represents, therefore, a classic example of an ethnic party. Yet, its long 
struggle with the Italian state has concerned primarily the attribution of self-government 
to a precise territorial unit, South Tyrol (or Bozen province). Although the SVP, given 
its hegemonic electoral position in South Tyrol, has always managed to send MPs to the 
Italian national parliament, its core level of action is definitely the regional (i.e. 
provincial). The party has always dominated the provincial assembly and executive, as 
well as nearly the totality of local councils. Since the 1980s, the SVP has also been the 
biggest party in the assembly of Trentino-South Tyrol, the special status region made up 
of the two provinces of Trent and Bozen. 
 Having represented the overwhelming majority (indeed, virtually the totality) of 
German-speaking (and Ladin-speaking) voters until the early 1990s, the party did not 
need to undertake dramatic repositioning on the basis of electoral politics. In contrast to 
the other cases, its centre-periphery position has been deeply influenced by international 
relations, primarily between Rome and Vienna. Given the scarce weight of the party in 
the Italian parliament, even its main policy success, i.e. the achievement of extensive 
autonomy, owed more to international pressure and violent means adopted by terrorist 
organizations than to the SVP‟s electoral success. Since the early 1990s, increased 
electoral competition at regional (provincial) level and the chaotic development of 
Italian politics have, however, triggered some electorally-driven repositioning. 
  
4.1. Party Profile: Origins and Political Achievements 
 
4.1.1 The historical origins of the centre-periphery cleavage in South Tyrol 
The territory which is now called South Tyrol and which, within the 
regionalized Italian Republic, corresponds to the Bozen/Bolzano province has been part 
of a larger territorial/political unit, Tyrol, for about seven centuries. In order to recall the 
roots of the South Tyrolean question, therefore, an outline of the political and ethno-
linguistic/demographic history of Tyrol is necessary. 
The year 1248 is officially considered to be the one in which Tyrol was born. In 
1342 a constitution of Tyrol was drafted, which acknowledged the powers of the 
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Landschaft, the local parliament, in which different social classes were represented (and 
in which the Bishops of Brixen and Trent also participated through their emissaries), 
upon taxation, law making and governing the country (Peterlini, 1997, p. 41). The old 
liberties of Tyrol, as a whole, and of its local communities were upheld below the 
Habsburgs. In 1511 the Austrian Emperor conceded an additional liberty to the Tyrolese 
people: military self-defence of their country. They were allowed to form and keep a 
militia, the Schutzen (which as a cultural heritage, though not as an army, survives to 
this day), with the duty to defend their land from foreign attacks. In return, Tyrolese 
men were exempted from military service outside Tyrol. By that time the Italic 
archdiocese of Trent had been strictly bound to the Dukedom and the Austrian Empire, 
as the attempts of the Bishops to break away in the 15
th
 century had failed. Tyrol, 
therefore, kept developing as a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual entity, with a 
predominantly Germanic area in the north (corresponding approximately to the current 
Austrian land of Tyrol and the Italian province of South Tyrol), a predominantly Italic 
area (corresponding to the current Italian province of Trent or Trentino) and a residual 
area in the Dolomite valleys (which today is split between South Tyrol, Trentino and 
Veneto regions) where the oldest ethno-linguistic group, the Ladins (whose language is 
a mix of old Reatian and Latin), was concentrated. 
Before the rise of nationalism in the 19
th
 century, the coexistence of different 
ethno-linguistic groups within Tyrol was never a major issue. The people of Tyrol were 
united in their devotion to the Catholic faith and in their attachment to the ancient 
liberties and right to self-government. The attempts of the Bishops of Trent to break 
away in the 15
th
 century had nothing to do with ethno-linguistic divisions. The Bishops 
were Germanic and Polish, whereas the people of Trent (who were mainly Italic) rose 
against the Bishops with the help of the (Germanic) Dukes of Austria-Tyrol (ibid. p. 41-
42). During the so-called First War of Succession, in the early years of the 18
th
 century, 
Tyrolese of all ethno-linguistic groups fought together against the French and Bavarian 
invaders. In the second half of the 18
th
 century, all Tyrolese rose together against the 
Austrian Emperors and their centralizing projects which limited the ancient rights of 
self-government. However, the most memorable cross-ethnic Tyrolese rebellion 
occurred in 1809, under the leadership of cattle dealer Andreas Hofer, against the 
Napoleonic troops and their Bavarian allies (Girardi, quoted in Peterlini, 1997, p. 57).  
With the spread of nationalism across 19
th
 century Europe, however, the political 
situation in Tyrol, now a crown land within the Austro-Hungarian Empire with its own 
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Landtag (regional parliament), became more and more problematic. From the mid 19
th
 
century, the acceleration of the process of nation-state building in Germany and Italy 
(i.e. north and south of the Tyrolese borders) fermented a certain radicalization between 
the German and Italian groups within the region. The fact that the two main ethno-
linguistic groups were not particularly intermingled gave rise to territorial claims.
38
 In 
particular, Italian nationalism had clearly developed in anti-Austrian direction, given 
that the Austro-Hungarian Empire controlled most of Northern Italy.
39
 After the 
risorgimento, Giuseppe Mazzini made clear that the Italian speaking areas should not 
have been left to Austria and, in 1877 Matteo Renato Imbriani founded the „Association 
for unredeemed (irredenta) Italy‟ (ibid, p. 67).  
However, it has to be stressed that, first, many Italians of Welschtirol and, even 
more, the Italian minority within the rest of Tyrol, were not particularly touched by 
Italian nationalism, the exception being the urban liberal elites and then the socialists 
and a small part of the Catholics. A clear demonstration of the affection of the 
Welschtiroler for Tyrol and for Austria is that most of them fought WW1 on the side of 
the Empire against Italy.
40
 Secondly, only in the late 19
th
 century and early 20
th
 century 
did the claims of the Welschtiroler elites turn towards separatist irredentism. From the 
mid-19
th
 century the Italians of Tyrol had asked for the autonomy of Trentino. However, 
both the Imperial Parliament in Vienna and the Tyrolese Landtag in Innsbruck voted 
down such proposals in 1848, in 1877 and in 1884 (ibid. p.65-67). When in 1890, an 
agreement on the Autonomy of Trent was reached, it was too late. The growth of both 
Italian and German nationalism had produced a radicalization of positions which could 
not be accommodated. 
Eventually, it was not internal Tyrolese or Austrian politics which determined 
the fate of Tyrol. It was instead the international scene and, in particular, the First World 
War. In a secret pact agreed in London in 1915, the Entente promised to the Kingdom 
of Italy the Brenner frontier on the Alpine crest as a reward for the Italian involvement 
                                                 
38
 According to the 1910 census, in what was then called Welschtirol (Italian Tyrol) and is now called 
Trentino (Trent province) the Italians and Ladins made up nearly 94% of the population, whereas the 
Germans constituted less than 3%. On the other hand, in what is today called South Tyrol or 
Bozen/Bolzano province (which was then the middle part of the whole Tyrol) the Germans were 89%, the 
Ladins less than 4% and the Italians less than 3% (Petrelini, 1996, p. 58-61).   
39
 Beyond Welschtirol which was part of the Austrian heartland, the Austro-Hungarian Empire controlled 
directly Lombardy (until 1859), Veneto (until 1866) and Friuli Venezia-Giulia (until 1919), and 
indirectly, Tuscany and part of Emilia (until 1859).     
40
 However, during the war, Vienna treated the Welschtiroler (especially the civil population in the battle 
zones) with little sensitivity, to say the least, thus losing some of their respect and affection (Stocker, 
2007, p. 13-14).   
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in the war on their side. The war on the alpine frontier between Italy and the Austro-
Germans contributed even more to the growth and radicalization of the respective 
nationalisms. Just a few months before the end of the war there was a meeting of the 
Union of Tyrolese People which issued a manifesto strongly influenced by Austro-
German nationalism. In this document the following requests were put forward: a 
reasonable peace treaty, unity and indivisibility of Tyrol (including Welschtirol) within 
Austria, the creation of a monolingual (German) state, no-autonomy for Welschtirol, the 
strengthening of Germanism in Welschtirol through compulsory teaching of German in 
schools, the expulsion of all (Italian) irredentists, the substitution of the Italian Bishop 
of Trent with a German one, and the re-education of priests in the Diocese of Trent in 
pro-Tyrolese and Germanophile terms (Dughera, 1990, p. 6). However, at the end of the 
war, under the Treaty of St. Germain, Italy obtained the frontier it had negotiated with 
the Entente before joining the war, thus determining a break up of the old Land Tyrol. 
In spite of the opposition of US President Wilson and even of many Italian politicians 
(though almost exclusively from the socialist party),
41
 not only Welschtirol but the part 
of the land up the Alpine crest, including the mainly German speaking area from 
Salurn/Salorno in the south to the Brenner Pass in the north (i.e. what is currently called 
South Tyrol or Bozen/Bolzano Province), was given to Italy. Between 1919 and 1920, 
there were numerous discussions on autonomy between the representatives of the three 
main parties in South Tyrol – the Tiroler Volkspartei (TVP - a Catholic people‟s party), 
the Deutschfreiheitliche Voklspartei (DFVP - liberals of the right) and the tiny 
Sozialdemokratische Partei (SP - social-democrats) – and the Italian government. The 
German regarded St. Germain as an open injustice, and the still growing Italian 
nationalism was a source of uncertainty and anxiety. A first consequence of this 
situation was the merger of the TVP and the DFVP into a new party aiming to represent 
and protect the interests of the whole German population of South Tyrol, the Deutscher 
Verband (DV- Federation of the Germans), whose symbol was the typical flower of the 
Alps, Edelweiss.
42
 As a rally party (Sammelpartei) for the German population of South 
Tyrol, the DV can well be considered the forerunner of the Sudtiroler Volkspartei 
                                                 
41
 As Ballardini reports, “Filippo Turati [then leader of the socialists] exhorted the House of 
Representatives, on the 14
th
 of July 1919, „to vote against the Annexation of over a quarter of a million 
Germans, whose pride in their heritage, their homeland and their freedom would represent an eternal seed 
of dissatisfaction and rebellion‟. And on December 28, 1918, Minister Bissolati resigned from Orlando‟s 
cabinet, to testify, in a sensational manner, to his unbending opposition to the Annexation” (Ballardini, 
quoted in Peterlini, 1996, p. 70-72). 
42
 The few South-Tyrolese social-democrats (SP) refused to merge and, until the rise of Fascism in 1922, 
maintained a much more open attitude towards the Italian institutions. 
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(SVP). In the 1921 general election, the DV obtained about 90% of the votes in South 
Tyrol, while the SP obtained about 10% (Stocker, 2007, p. 18). The results were similar 
in the following year‟s local elections. For instance, in Bozen/Bolzano the DV obtained 
27 councillors and SP obtained 6, with no Italian party represented (Dughera, 1990, p 6). 
However, the electoral hegemony of the German parties, in particular the DV, 
and the political under-representation of the Italians in local councils, even in bi-lingual 
areas, did not help increasing the sensitivity of the Italian government towards the 
minorities of South Tyrol, nor the cause of autonomy. The Ladin language was 
considered by Rome as just another Italian dialect. In fact, the Italianization of the 
Ladins began even before the rise of Fascism. The same happened for the Italians 
(mostly from Welschtirol) who lived in the multi-lingual area of South Tyrol (Unterland 
or Bassa Atesina) and who had undergone, more or less voluntarily, a process of 
Germanization in the previous decades. 
With the rise to power of Fascism in 1922, the Italian ultra-nationalists, such as 
Senator Ettore Tolomei, were given the green light for their project of mass 
Italianization.
43
 In 1923, senator Tolomei presented in Bozen/Bolzano his 32-point 
programme for the Italianization of South Tyrol. The most important points were: the 
appointment of Italian Municipal Secretaries; the introduction of Italian as the only 
official language; the establishment of Italian kindergarten and schools;
44
 the dismissal 
of German-speaking civil servants and teachers, or their posting to Southern Italian 
provinces, and their replacement by Italians; the strengthening of the Italian police and 
military troops; a complete stop on German immigration in South Tyrol; Italian as the 
juridical language; the closure of German banks; the Italianization of the names of 
places (towns, roads, rivers, mountains, etc.) and the abolition of the name Südtirol; the 
Italianization of the Germanized family names; and the disbandment of the Deutscher 
Verband
45
 (Peterlini, 1996, p. 73; Dughera, 1990, p. 7). In addition to the 32 points, the 
Italian government promoted, especially during the 1930s, the settlement of new 
industries from Lombardy and Piedmont and labour migration of Italians from other, 
primarily North-Eastern, provinces (Stocker, 2007, p. 27). The immigration of Italians 
was encouraged and helped through the building of thousands of new houses, especially 
                                                 
43
 Tolomei gained himself the nickname of „grave digger‟ amongst the South Tyrolese, as he went as far 
as to prohibit the use of German in cemeteries and to order deleting German words from the grave stones. 
44
 In the following twenty years, the teaching of German language survived in secret schools, the so called 
Katakombenschulen (Catacomb Schools).  
45
 Anyway, in 1926 all parties, except the Fascist one, will be disbanded in Italy. 
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in Bozen/Bolzano. In contrast, the planned substitution of the German clergy with 
Italians failed because of the opposition from the Vatican.  
 With the rise of the Nazi party in Germany, many people in South Tyrol hoped 
that their land could be brought within a German speaking state. In 1933 a movement of 
youngsters and intellectuals inspired by Nazi ideas was created, the Völkischer 
Kampfring Sudtirols (VKS, National Fighting Front). The hopes increased after 
Germany‟s annexation of Austria and after the invasion of German speaking areas in 
Czechoslovakia. However, the alliance between Hitler and Mussolini was sanctioned 
with the re-endorsement of the Brenner frontier. The two dictators had a different plan 
for solving the South Tyrolean question: those who wanted to be German could „opt‟ 
for moving within the territory of the Reich, implicitly affirming that those who wanted 
to remain in South Tyrol had to accept Italianization. The population was given a 
deadline, 31 December 1939, to express their option. Given the Nazi propaganda of the 
VKS, which promised relocation in towns and villages very similar to the ones in South 
Tyrol, the threatening rumours spread by the Nazies and Fascists,
46
 and the genuine 
desire of the people to live in a German speaking polity, 86% opted for the German 
Reich (these were called the „optants‟). Those who chose to stay (in German, 
Dableiber), strongly supported by the Andreas Hofer Bund (a Catholic political 
organization formed by former members of the DV) and by the low clergy, were 
targeted by the Nazi propaganda and called „traitors‟ or Walschen, i.e. strangers or 
Italians (Stocker, 2007, p. 34-37). This created a fracture between the Germans of South 
Tyrol, which would take some time after the end of WW2 to heal. However, because of 
the difficulties created by the war, only around 75 thousand people left, mainly the 
proletariat or people without properties. Of these, only around a third came back after 
war. As a consequence, the German community of South Tyrol lost nearly a fifth of its 
population. 
 In 1943 the German people of South Tyrol were „freed‟ from Italian oppression 
by the German army that invaded Italy and helped Mussolini to hold onto power in the 
northern part of the country, while the Anglo-American troops occupied the south. 
Under German occupation of South Tyrol, those who had not chosen to move within the 
Reich in 1939, the clergy and the members of the Andreas Hofer Bund were persecuted 
but most people saluted the fact that the German language and schools could be re-
                                                 
46
 In particular the „Sicilian legend‟ went that even those who chose to stay would be moved to Sicily or 
Abyssinia or, anyway, South of the river Po (Stocker, 2007, p. 35). 
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established. However, any remaining hopes on the part of the South Tyrolese that they 
might re-join the Fatherland were shattered by Germany‟s defeat in 1945. 
 
4.1.2 Party birth, electoral success and political achievements 
 At the end of April 1945, the administration of South Tyrol was handed over 
from the German SS to the Italian resistance militias of the CNL (Committee for 
National Liberation), excluding the South Tyrolese anti-Nazi movement „Andreas Hofer 
Bund‟. Just few days later, American troops occupied South Tyrol and took over the 
administration. It was in this context that a group of nineteen South Tyrolese men, led 
by Bozen businessman Erich Amonn, founded the South Tyrolese People‟s Party (SVP) 
with the explicit mission “to protect, by all legal means, the interests of the South 
Tyrolese people”47 (i.e. the German and Ladin speaking people of South Tyrol). From 
the very beginning, therefore, the SVP was both an ethnic party and a regionalist party, 
as the link between the German (and Ladin) population and the territory of South Tyrol 
was considered indissoluble.  
The formal approval for the foundation of the new party by the Allies‟ military 
government, however, could not be taken for granted. Italian propaganda aimed to 
portray the South Tyrolese people as Nazis to the American governor, recalling the 
overwhelming numbers who had opted to join the Third Reich in 1939. In addition, the 
programme of the new-born SVP included the „right to self-determination‟, a thorny 
issue for the American governor, who did not know whether the allied powers would 
have backed or opposed such a claim at the peace table.  
 The approval of the military government was conceded, to the discontent of the 
local representatives of the (Italian) CNL, on the grounds that the overwhelming 
majority of the founding members were Dableiber (people who had not opted to move 
into the Third Reich in 1939) and many had been involved in the anti-Nazi organization 
„Andreas Hofer Bund‟. In addition, the party leader Amonn re-assured the American 
governor that the South Tyrolese people would never resort to violent means in order to 
achieve self-determination.  
 The most important political struggle that the party undertook in the following 
decades was the pursuit of autonomy for South Tyrol, as envisaged in the 1946 Paris 
Agreement between Italy and Austria. In 1948 the Italian Constitution created an 
                                                 
47
 Article 1 of the SVP‟s internal statute. 
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autonomous region which included both South Tyrol (i.e. Bozen/Bolzano province) and 
Trent province (the old Welschtirol). In this way, the German and Ladin minorities 
remained as such not only within the Italian state but also within the autonomous region. 
 The dominant electoral position that the SVP managed to establish in South 
Tyrol from the first election in 1948 and that continued in the following decades was, 
therefore, of limited use. As Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show, the hegemonic position within 
South Tyrol became a minority one within the Trentino-Alto Adige region. This was 
also due to the fact that, like in the other regions of North-Eastern Italy, the Italian 
electorate was relatively united in its support for the Christian Democratic party (DC). 
Nor was the SVPs‟ dominant electoral position of much use at the central government 
level, with the party sending only three MPs to the Lower House of the Italian 
Parliament (Table 4.3).
48
   
 In time, the power relations at the regional level changed because of faster 
population growth in South Tyrol than in Trent and because of the electoral decline of 
the DC and the consequent fragmentation of the Italian-speaking electorate. As Table 
4.2 shows, from 1983 the SVP became the plurality party at regional level, in spite of 
the Germans (and Ladins) remaining a minority within the region. However, at that time, 
the institutional arrangement of the region and of the two provinces had already 
changed substantially. 
 The reform of the autonomy was not driven by the exceptional success of the 
SVP at the polls. The Italian state remained largely insensitive to the grievances of the 
ethnic minorities of South Tyrol as far as these were simply expressed by the virtually 
unanimous vote for the SVP. It was primarily the violent struggle of few South Tyrolese 
terrorists/freedom fighters, from the late 1950s through the 1960s, and the pressure put 
by Austria on the Italian government that convinced the latter to negotiate a new deal on 
autonomy for South Tyrol.   
 In the second half of the 1950s the illegal organization Befreiungsausschuss 
Südtirol (BAS, Executive for South Tyrol‟s Liberation), led by Sepp Kerschbaumer, 
became more active. Initially, the activities went no further than organizing civil 
disobedience and submitting memorandums. However, from 1956/57 there was an ever 
growing number of dynamite bombings which culminated in the Feuernacht (the night 
of fires), between 11 and 12 June 1961, when about forty power pylons were blown up.  
                                                 
48
 Beyond the three MPs of the Lower House the SVP constantly elected two Senators from 1948 to 1987, 
bringing the total number of MPs to five. 
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Table 4.1. Provincial election results in South Tyrol  
(% of votes and number of seats), 1948-2008 
 
Year 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 
Total number of seats 20 22 22 22 25 25 34 34 35 35 35 35 35 35 
SVP 
 
67.6 
13 
64.8 
15 
64.4 
15 
63.9 
15 
61.3 
16 
60.7 
16 
56.4 
20 
61.3 
21 
59.4 
22 
60.4 
22 
52.0 
19 
56.6 
21 
55.6 
21 
48.1 
18 
Die Freiheitlichen (dF)           6.1 
2 
2.5 
1 
5.0 
2 
14.3 
5 
Sud-Tiroler Freiheit (S-TF)*              4.9 
2 
Union  fur Sudtirol – UfS  (WdH/SHB)**         2.5 
1 
2.3 
1 
4.8 
2 
5.5 
2 
6.8 
2 
2.3 
1 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Sudtirols (SPS)       5.1 
2 
2.2 
1 
      
Other only-German parties***     2.4 
1 
 1.7 
1 
1.3 
1 
2.4 
1 
1.3 
1 
    
Ladins            2.0 
1 
3.6 
1 
  
Grune/Verdi/Verc (cross-ethnic party)        3.6 
1 
4.5 
2 
6.7 
2 
6.9 
2 
6.5 
2 
7.9 
3 
5.8 
2 
Italian centre parties**** 10.8 
2 
13.7 
3 
14.3 
3 
14.6 
3 
13.5 
3 
14.4 
4 
14.1 
5 
10.8 
4 
9.5 
3 
9.1 
3 
6.1 
3 
4.5 
2 
3.7 
1 
 
Italian right parties***** 2.9 
1 
4.8 
1 
6.0 
1 
7.1 
1 
8.7 
2 
6.4 
2 
4.0 
1 
2.9 
1 
5.9 
2 
10.3 
4 
14.6 
5 
15.2 
5 
13.3 
5 
10.2 
5 
Italian left parties****** 12.0 
3 
12.2 
3 
11.8 
3 
12.6 
3 
12.9 
3 
13.2 
3 
14.7 
5 
12.6 
5 
11.6 
4 
7.0 
2 
2.9 
1 
3.5 
1 
3.8 
1 
6.0 
2 
 
Source: Holzer and Schwegler (1998, p. 159), Pallaver (2006, p. 170-71),  Bozen/Bolzano Province,  Election 2008 (available at: http://elezioni.provincia.bz.it/home_li_vg.htm). 
 
* A splinter party from Union fur Sudtirol (UfS). The new party is led by Eva Klotz, former leader of UfS and daughter of the irredentist fighter/terrorist Georg Klotz. 
** In 1983 Wahlverband des Heimatbundes, in 1988 Sudtiroler Hemiatbund. From 1993 Union fur Sudtirol (UfS). 
*** In 1964 the Tiroler Hemiatpartei won one seat. In 1973 the Soziale Fortschtittspartei won one seat. In 1978 and in 1983 the Partei der Unabhangigen (PDU) won one seat. In 1988 the 
Freiheitliche Partei Sudtirols, a continuation of the PDU, won one seat. 
**** From 1948 to 1988, data refer only to the Christian Democratic party (DC). In 1993, data refer to Partito Popolare Alto Adige (2 seats) and Unione Centro Alto Adige (1 seat). In 1998, data 
refer to Popolari-Alto Adige Domani and Centro-Unione democratica dell’Alto Adige (1 seat each). In 2003, data refer to Unione Autonomista, an alliance of Margherita (Ma), Italy of Values 
(IdV) and Union of the Centre (UDC). 
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***** From 1948 to 1960 and from 1973 to 1988, data refer only to the Italian Social Movement (MSI). In 1964 and 1968, data refer to the MSI and the Italian Liberal Party PLI (1 seat each). In 
1993, data refer to the MSI (4 seats) and the LN (1 seat). In 1998 and 2003, data refer to National Alliance (AN) that won 3 seats in each election, Unitalia  (1 seat each election) and Forward 
Italy (FI) that won 1 seat in each election. In 2008, data refer to Unitalia  (1 seat),  the People of Freedom (PDL), a merger of AN and FI, which won 3 seats and Lega Nord (LN) that won 1 seat. 
****** In 1948, data refer to the Socialist party (PSI), the Communist party (PCI) and the Socialist Labour party (PSLI). Each won 1 seat. From 1952 to 1978, data refer to PSI, PCI and the 
Social-Democratic party (PSDI). Each party won 1 seat in each election, except in 1973 (when the PSI and PCI won 2 seats each) and 1978 (when the PCI won 3 seats). In 1983, data refer to 
PCI, PSI and the Republican party (PRI), with 2 seats won by PCI and 1 seat each won by PSI and PRI. In 1988, data refer to PCI and PSI, each winning 1 seat. In 1993, data refer to the 
Democratic party of the Left (PDS, then DS). In 1998, data refer to Progetto Centrosinistra, an alliance of DS, PRI and socialists (SI). In 2003, data refer to Pace e Diritti/Fieden und 
Gerechtigkeit (Peace and Rights), an alliance centred on the DS which tried to appeal to both the Italian and German groups. In 2008, data refer to the just born Democratic Party (PD). 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Election results for the Regional Council (Trentino-Alto Adige)  
 
 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 
DC/PPI/ Mar 36.7 41.1 42.8 41.0 36.6 37.1 35.6 30.4 27.0 27.0 14.3 10.7 12.4 - 
SVP 30.2 29.4 30.1 30.0 29.3 29.1 27.0 29.8 33.7 30.4 26.0 29.2 29.7 25.4 
PPTT/PATT* 9.3 3.4 2.3 2.0 3.0 4.2 4.7 7.1 - 4.9 10.1 6.0 4.3 4.0 
PCI/PDS/DS 4.7 4.5 3.1 4.4 4.5 3.4 7.5 8.9 8.3 5.7 4.6 6.5 6.5        - 
PD (DS+Mar) - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13.4 
PSI/SDI 6.3 7.2 2.6 9.5 8.2 11.4 8.4 6.3 6.7 8.3 0.6 - 0.9 - 
PSDI 4.6 5.7 1.9 5.4 6.0 - 4.7 2.7 2.3 1.0 0.9 - - - 
PRI 0.5 2.1 -     0.5 0.3 1.8 2.7 2.3 4.5 2.5 0.5 - - - 
PLI 0.7 - 2.2 1.9 3.9 3.6 1.7 1.5 1.5 0.9 - - - - 
MSI/AN 1.3 4.0 3.9 4.7 4.0 3.2 3.1 2.3 4.4 6.5 7.3 2.9 6.4 - 
FI/PDL - - - - - - - - - - - 5.7 8.2 10.2 
Greens - - - - - - - - 1.5 7.1 3.5 3.3 5.9 4.4 
LN - - - - - - - - - - 9.6 4.7 3.2 7.8 
IdV - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.7 2.2 
SPS - - - - - - - 1.1 0.7 - - - - - 
dF - - - - - - - - - - - 1.3 2.7 7.5 
UfS - - - - - - - - - - - 2.8 3.6 1.2 
S-TF - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2.6 
 
Source: Istituto Cattaneo (available at: http://www.cattaneo.org/index.asp?l1=archivi&l2=adele&l3=regionali) 
 
*Tyrolese Trentino People‟s Party, later Tyrolese Trentino Autonomist Party. A multi-lingual party (Italian, Ladin and German) based in Trent Province, which claims the belonging of Trentino 
to Tyrol.  In the Regional Council, the PATT‟s elected members join with the SVP‟s members in a common group. 
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Table 4.3. General election results (Lower House, % of votes and number of seats) in South Tyrol, 1948-2008 
 
 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 
SVP 62.7 
3 
60.1 
3 
60.1 
3 
56.6 
3 
58.5 
3 
59.0 
3 
59.6 
3 
62.9 
3 
59.6 
3 
58.3 
3 
57.3 
3 
60.1 
3 
28.0a 
3 
60.5 
4 
53.4 
4 
44.3 
2 
DC 21.8 
1 
17.6 
1 
16.9 
1 
16.1 
1 
14.4 16.4 
1 
13.2 11.9 11.5 
1 
8.4 7.4 2.5     
PSI  5.8 6.3 8.3 8.8 5.2 5.5 4.3 4.3 6.0 4.4      
PSDI  3.2 3.4 4.5  3.5 1.6 1.8 1.3 0.5 0.6      
PCI/DS 
Ulivo/PD 
 4.1 4.1 5.1 5.3 5.7 6.8 8.4 8.0 4.6  3.4 5.2 3.0 10.8 
 
16.2 
1 
Ma              6.5   
MSI/AN  4.6 5.5 4.6 4.1 4.6 2.7 2.5 3.4 10.2 
1 
6.7 11.0 
1 
13.8 
1 
10.3 6.9  
FI/PDL            8.6 9.1 
1 
7.5 9.7 14.0 
1 
dF               5.4 9.4 
UfS             19.3   4.2 
Greens          6.8 
1 
 5.1 5.4 5.5 5.4 
 
3.3 
LN            2.4 4.3 0.6 0.9 2.0 
IdV              2.2 1.1 1.8 
UDC             1.6 0.4 1.7 1.8 
 
Source: Holzer and Schwegler (1998); Pallaver (2006); Historical Archive of the Interior Minister (http://elezionistorico.interno.it/). 
 
a: in 1996 the SVP presented itself together with PPI (Italian People‟s Party) for the proportional vote.   
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The SVP reacted by distancing firmly itself from the bombings but it was widely 
recognised that some members of the party had links with the BAS. The Italian Interior 
Minister threatened to disband the party and launched an offensive against the BAS. In 
July 1961 two members of BAS were shot dead by the police. Between late 1961 and 
early 1962 two others died in jail, allegedly because of torture – a crime apparently 
suffered by nearly all BAS members who had been imprisoned. Some of their letters 
were read at the provincial and regional council, provoking outrage against the Italian 
state and growing support for the BAS amongst the German and Ladin population. The 
most important trials started in 1963. Some were against the Carabinieri (one of the 
Italian police forces), who were accused of torture and abuses against the prisoners, 
others against the terrorists/freedom fighters. Most Carabinieri, however, were set free, 
while a few were sentenced only very lightly. For 91 BAS members a huge trial in 
Milan was held. It ended with 22 of them set free, 37 sentenced to less than four years 
of prison and 22 sentenced to up to 16 years.
49
 Others who had escaped, some of them 
Austrian citizens, were sentenced to up to 26 years. Violent actions, however, continued 
throughout the 1960s, also with the involvement of external groups (mainly Austrian 
and German extreme-right organizations) that tried to exploit the ethnic conflict in 
South Tyrol to broaden their bases (Frasnelli and Gallmetzer, 1990, p. 45). In contrast to 
the terrorist activities of the 1950s and early 1960s (including the „night of fires‟), some 
of the subsequent actions were conducted with the intention of killing. In total, political 
violence in South Tyrol claimed twenty-three lives.
50
   
 On the diplomatic front, things started to move in 1955 when Austria re-gained 
its full sovereignty. In 1959 the Austrian government brought the „South Tyrol 
question‟ to the attention of the UN. Two resolutions were approved and ratified in 
1960 and in 1961, compelling the two states to re-start negotiations and find a solution 
which would follow the principles of the 1946 Paris Agreement. 
 The double shock of violent actions and diplomatic initiatives broke the gridlock. 
In 1961 the Italian government established the so called „Commission of the nineteen‟ 
(including a minority of SVP members) to analyse possible solutions for the South 
Tyrolean question. From 1963, with the inauguration of the so called „centre-left 
                                                 
49
 The lawyer who defended the BAS members at the Milan trial, Sandro Canestrini, was a member of the 
regional council for the Italian Communist Party (PCI). His party did not approve his choice and he was 
not selected as a candidate for the following election (Stocker, 2007, p. 66). 
50
 Fifteen policemen, seven terrorists/freedom fighters (three were shot by the police forces or secret 
agents, while four died for the premature explosion of the bombs they were placing) and two civilians. 
There were also several tens of wounded people.   
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formula‟ in Rome - i.e. the government coalition, still led by the DC, was now formed 
without the Liberals (PLI), but included the Socialists (PSI) instead -  the negotiations 
between the Italian government, the SVP and the Austrian government proceeded much 
more constructively. The social-democratic and socialist Foreign Ministers (Saragat and 
Nenni) conducted fruitful negotiations with their Austrian counterpart Kreisky, while 
the DC politician Aldo Moro was the key figure in negotiating the new autonomy with 
the new SVP‟s leader Silvius Magnago.  
By 1969, the three negotiating partners (Italy, Austria and the SVP) had reached 
an agreement on the new autonomy statute that would pass most powers and 
competences from the Trentino-Alto Adige region to South Tyrol (i.e. to the 
Bozen/Bolzano province). That required a change of the Italian Constitution, which was 
completed in 1972. That process, in which the Communists (PCI) voted with the 
governing parties, secured the constitutional reform without the need for a national (i.e. 
Italy-wide) referendum. The full implementation of the autonomy statute took twenty 
years. In 1992, the autonomy statute was recognized by all sides as fulfilled, with 
Austria releasing a formal statement on the complete solution of the South Tyrol 
question at the UN.
51
    
 The approval of the so called „second autonomy statute‟ in 1972 and its 
implementation in the following years has represented the most important achievement 
of the SVP. Through it, the SVP was able to create the conditions for the survival and 
thriving of the two minority groups, fostering education in the German and Ladin 
language and implementing a system of ethnic quotas (etnischer Proporz) for the 
proportional distribution of public benefits, primarily jobs in the public sector and 
public housing, amongst the three ethno-linguistic groups. As Table 4.4 shows, since 
the 1970s the proportion of German- and Ladin-speaking people in South Tyrol has 
significantly grown, whereas the Italian-speaking population has declined. This was 
also a consequence of the „job opportunities differential‟ determined by the re-balancing 
of the distribution of public employees amongst ethno-linguistic groups. Although, as 
Table 4.5 shows, the rebalancing has been pursued rather gradually, job opportunities in 
                                                 
51
 The South Tyrolese who opposed the solution of the international controversy argued that Austria acted 
under Italian blackmail. Indeed, Austria was negotiating EU membership and Italy would have definitely 
vetoed the accession of a country with which it had on-going international controversies. However, as a 
matter of fact, the Austrian government waited to have „green light‟ from the SVP before releasing the 
document at the UN. 
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the public sector have greatly expanded for the two minority groups and have 
dramatically shrunk for the Italian group.      
  
 
Table 4.4  
Population development in South Tyrol 1900-2001  
according to linguistic groups (%) 
 
Year German Italian Ladin Others 
1900 88.8 4.0 4.0 3.2 
1910 89.0 2.9 3.8 4.3 
1921 75.9 10.6 3.9 9.6 
1953 62.7 33.6 3.7 n.d. 
1961 62.2 34.3 3.4 0.1 
1971 62.9 33.3 3.7 0.1 
1981 64.9 28.7 4.1 2.2 
1991 68.0 27.6 4.4 4.0 
2001 69.1 26.5 4.4 2.2 
 
Source: ASTAT. The figures for 1953 come from A. Leidlmair, Bevolkerung und Wirtschaft in Sudtirol 
(Insbruck: Wagner, 1958), reported in F. Pristinger (1980, p. 167).  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5 
Public employees in South Tyrol according to linguistic groups 
 
Year German and Ladin Italian 
1972 15.2 84.8 
1975 13.9 86.1 
1979 27.0 73.0 
1991 47.0 53.0 
2006 58.5 41.5 
 
     Source: Stocker (2007, p. 83). 
 
 
The achievement of the second autonomy statute has had contradictory effects 
for the SVP‟s electoral success. On the one hand, with the passing of many 
competences from the region to the Bozen/Bolzano province and the consequent growth 
of the provincial budget, the SVP has been able to display its administrative capacities 
and to exercise patronage. Together with the maintenance of the ethnic divide, this 
contributed substantially to the enduring electoral success of the party, especially in the 
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1970s and 1980s. Arguably, good administrative skills and patronage capability are the 
main reasons why the SVP has started to attract an increasing number of votes from 
Italian speaking people, though it is still an almost negligible portion of the party‟s total 
votes.
52
 On the other hand, the approval and implementation of the second autonomy 
statute represented the fulfilment of the party‟s „mission‟. Some of those (Germans and 
Ladins) who feel now secure about the survival of the minorities have moved away 
from the ethnic „rally party‟ and have shifted their allegiance to inter-ethnic parties, i.e. 
the Greens. Many more, however, did not feel accommodated by the „second autonomy 
statute‟. In particular, the party‟s approval of the end of the international controversy at 
the UN was interpreted by many as the abandonment of any aspiration to self-
determination and, therefore, to return to Austria. This resulted in a slight but steady 
electoral decline which culminated with the 2008 provincial election, when the SVP 
achieved, for the first time since its birth, below 50% of votes, though still gaining a 
majority of seats in the provincial assembly. The gradual defection from the SVP by 
German-speaking politicians and voters can be measured primarily by looking at the 
electoral score of the „German‟ parties that stand for reunification with Austria, such as 
Partei der Unabhangigen (PDU, the Party of Independents), Die Freiheitlichen (dF, the 
Libertarians), Union  fur Sudtirol (UfS, Union for South Tyrol) and Sud-Tiroler Freiheit  
(S-TF, South-Tyrol Free). The sum of their shares of vote has risen from 4.9% in 1983 
to 10.9 in 1993, to 21.5% in 2008 (see table 4.1). In addition, during the 1990s there has 
also been a relatively successful (but it now seems evanescent) attempt by the Ladins to 
create their own political party, separate from the SVP.  
 Since the 1990s the party has tried to re-create a new „mission‟ for itself by 
setting out new objectives which fall short of secession from Italy but, at the same time, 
aim to re-connect South Tyrol with North Tyrol. After the Austrian accession into the 
EU and the signing of the Schengen agreement, the creation of a Euro-region Tyrol has 
become a reality. However, this does not seem to have stopped the electoral decline of 
the party.     
 
4.1.3 Party organization 
 The most exceptional characteristic of the SVP‟s organization is definitely its 
extremely large membership relative to the number of voters. Although official 
                                                 
52
 However, in the last provincial election in 2008 the „Italian votes‟ were crucial in allowing the party to 
maintain a majority of seats in the assembly. 
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membership figures have usually been considered exaggerated (Pallaver, 2006, p. 186), 
the ratio between the number of members and number of voters has always been 
exceptionally high (see Table 4.6). This has prevented the party suffering from lack of 
funding, even before the Italian laws on party funding started to become extremely 
generous.   
 
Table 4.6 
Party Membership 1945-2005 
 
 
Year 
 
 
1945 
 
1964 
 
1973 
 
1983 
 
1993 
 
1998 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2005 
 
2009 
N. of 
members 
(thousands) 
 
50 
 
35 
 
51 
 
71 
 
78 
 
71 
 
69 
 
72 
 
69 
 
60 
 
55 
Ratio  
Members/ 
Voters 
 
- 
 
26.3% 
 
32.0% 
 
43.5% 
 
48.8% 
 
41.5% 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
41.2% 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Source: for 1945, Frasanelli and Gallmetzer (1990, p. 44). For 1964-2005 data elaborated by author on 
the basis of Pallaver (2006, p. 181); for 2009, SVP‟s official website 
(http://www.svpartei.org/de/partei/ortsgruppen/). 
 
 
Such a large membership, which was desperately sought by the party founders in 1945 
as means to legitimize the new party in the eyes of the American governor, testifies to 
the close links between the SVP and the South Tyrolese civil society. Since its birth, the 
party has had extremely close ties with the economic organizations representing 
business and agricultural interests as well as with the local clergy, which has always 
exhorted the South Tyrolese people to support the SVP (rather than the Italian DC) at 
the polls.  
However, enduring large membership did not mean the absence of considerable 
fluctuations. As Table 4.6 shows, after gathering an incredible number of members in 
its foundation‟s year, the figures went down in the following fifteen years. Since 1964, 
when a comprehensive organizational reform was implemented, the number of members 
started to grow again until the early 1990s, approaching 80,000 people. The figures for 
the second half of the 1990s and the 2000s show a slow but steady decline which, unlike 
membership fluctuations of the past, appear to mirror the party‟s electoral trend. 
Territorially, the party‟s structure is organized in local, district and central (i.e. 
provincial) bodies. Each level has a chairman and a committee, while at district and 
central level there is also an executive body. The central executive board consists of the 
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party leader (i.e. the party chairman), two deputy leaders (one German and one Ladin), 
the provincial first minister, the leader of the party‟s group in the provincial and 
regional assemblies, the MPs, the MEP, the district chairmen and the deputy Mayor of 
Bozen/Bolzano, the capital city of South Tyrol that, having an Italian majority, elects 
normally an Italian Mayor (Holzer and Schwegler, 1998, p. 172). Beside the executive 
board, there is also a smaller body called Presiding Committee (Praesidium) which 
meets only when top level decisions have to be discussed. The Presiding Committee is 
restricted to the leader, the deputy leaders, the provincial first minister and the speaker 
of the district chairmen (Pallaver, 2006, p. 179). 
The decision making process is strictly formalized and hierarchical: the political 
decisions rest with the central executive board, whereas the administrative tasks are 
decentralised and left to the local and district organs (Holzer and Schwegler, 1998, p. 
172). The party Conference, which is held annually, is the supreme organ and represents 
the link between the central executive body and the different territorial levels and 
vertical sections (such as the women and youth organizations) of the party. The main 
functions of the Conference are the election of the central governing bodies of the party, 
amendments to the party statute and the ratification/rejection of exceptionally important 
political decisions taken by the executive board. 
The most important organizational reform occurred in 1964, after a process of 
intense internal debate that had started with the election of Silvius Magnago as party 
leader in 1957 (see Table 4.7).  
 
Table 4.7  
SVP’s leaders (1945-2009) 
 
Erich Amonn 1945-48 
Josef Menz-Popp 1948-51 
Toni Ebner 1951-52 
Otto von Guggenberg 1952-54 
Karl Tinzl 1954-56 
Toni Ebner 1956-57 
Silvius Magnago 1957-91 
Roland Riz 1991-92 
Siegfrid Brugger 1992-04 
Elmar Pichler-Rolle 2004-09 
Richard Theiner 2009- 
 
The reform transformed the SVP from a party of notables (the group of founders 
who had led the party from 1945 to 1957) to a highly bureaucratised and centralized 
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mass party. In Panebianco‟s terms (1988), the 1964 reform represented the 
institutionalization of the party in the sense that it became more autonomous from the 
socio-economic organizations, primarily the Südtiroler Bauerbund (South Tyrolean 
Farmers‟ Association) and the Südtiroler Wirtschaftsring (South Tyrolean Economy and 
Trade Association), which had generated it. Until 1964, indeed, representatives of these 
two organizations had guaranteed seats in the SVP‟s executive board and could directly 
influence political decisions. With the reform, the link between the party and the main 
socio-economic organizations of the South Tyrolese society were made more indirect, 
as the latter lost their seats in the party executive. Instead, the new statute created two 
sectional units, de facto two highly formalized factions, which referred to the two (now) 
external organizations. 
 In 1964 the party also encouraged the formation of an ethnic (i.e. German) South 
Tyrolese trade union, separate from the Italy-wide union confederations. The birth of 
the Union of South Tyrolean Independent Trade Unions (ASGB) represented the first 
explicit recognition for the interests of a social class, the workers, which had always 
been a minority in South Tyrol, especially amongst the German and Ladin group. In 
1975 a new sectional unit was formed within the party, the Arbeitnehmer (Labour), 
which flanked the already existing Wirtschaft (Economy) and Landwirtschaft 
(Agriculture), thus (re)creating the organizational conditions for a true Sammelpartei 
(i.e. rally party) (Stocker, 2007, p. 62). 
 In order to avoid destabilizing conflicts between the factions, the party also 
established formal venues, such as the social and economic committee and the 
agriculture and social board, for discussing and harmonizing socio-economic policies 
(Pallaver, 2006, p. 182). It worth remembering that, given the hegemonic position of the 
SVP at provincial level, the formation of policies within the party is taken very 
seriously as they become official policies of the provincial government almost 
automatically. The organization of the SVP, therefore, reflects the function that the 
party fulfills in producing a synthesis which can accommodate the whole German (and 
Ladin) society of South Tyrol.    
 Beyond the formalization of sectional factions, the reform of the 1960s 
introduced organizational tools for women and the young. According to Holzer and 
Schwegler (1998, p. 167), these two internal units have not generally had much political 
weight. The women‟s movement is oriented towards a traditional and conservative 
image of women in society, while the „Young Generation‟ is an organizational unit 
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which serves to recruit and form new political personnel for the party. However, at the 
2009 Annual Conference it was primarily the youth and women‟s organizations that, in 
the hope of regenerating the political class of South Tyrol, pushed through a highly 
controversial policy which prohibits party members staying in office, as council mayors 
or provincial councillors, for more than fifteen years (L’Espresso, 30/03/09).  
 
 
4.2. Party Ideology and Policy: The Centre-Periphery Dimension 
4.2.1 From self-determination to moderate autonomism (1945-1956) 
 At the end of WW2 the establishment of a table for peace negotiations, which 
would have inevitably dealt with issues of border re-definition amongst states, fostered 
the hopes of many South Tyrolese that they might rejoin their fatherland, Austria. After 
two years of „cultural-linguistic freedom‟, under the occupation of Nazi-Germany‟s 
troops, the prospect of a re-imposition of control by an „alien‟ state was extremely 
unappealing.  
The most important point of the SVP programme in 1945 was to pursue the right 
of self-determination. Together with the Austrian government, whose Foreign Minister 
was a North Tyrolese, the SVP tried to lobby the four victorious Allies for the 
concession of a referendum through which the people of South Tyrol could decide 
whether to remain within the Italian state or re-join Austria. However, the conditions for 
such a diplomatic achievement were not good. First of all, three of the four winning 
powers (USA, UK and France) were the same ones that had decided on South Tyrol‟s 
annexation to Italy in 1919. What was being asked of them was, therefore, to overturn 
their own previous decisions. On the other hand, during the negotiations it became clear 
that the American and French governments had developed a pro-referendum stance and 
the British government was under pressure from public opinion to do the same. The real 
obstacles to re-unification with Austria came from the larger diplomatic capacity of 
Italy vis a vis Austria, the British fear that Austria would fall within Soviet influence 
(which made London resistant to concessions to the Austrian government) and, most 
importantly, the USSR‟s fierce opposition. Moscow was acting as the protector of 
Yugoslav interests, which aimed to annex various Italian territories. These annexations 
in favour of Belgrade would be easier to achieve if Italy limited territorial losses 
elsewhere.  
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In order to show that there were no doubts about the preferences of the South 
Tyrolese as to which alternative they preferred, in early 1946 the SVP organized a huge 
demonstration in Sigmundskron/Castelfirmiano and gathered about 155,000 signatures 
(i.e. much more than 50% of the adult German and Ladin population) which were 
submitted to the Austrian Chancellor in April (Stocker, 2007, p. 41).  However, later in 
the same month the four powers formally rejected the request of a referendum for the 
self-determination of South Tyrol. The Tyrolese people, both north and south of the 
Austro-Italian border, responded with numerous demonstrations. Although these rallies 
could not change the decision, they had some impact especially on British public 
opinion and, therefore, indirectly on the British government (Voggler, 1985, p. 16). 
After coming to terms with the idea that the foreseeable future of South Tyrol 
was within Italy, the SVP (and the Austrian government) tried to use the on-going peace 
negotiations to at least anchor the „South Tyrolean question‟ to international jurisdiction. 
At that stage, the British government had joined its American and French counterparts 
in backing an internationally recognised agreement between Italy and Austria, in spite 
of the continued Soviet opposition. The Paris Agreement was signed in September 1946 
and included in Italy‟s peace treaty in December of the same year. The main points of 
the Agreement were: equal status for the Italian and German
53
 languages in South Tyrol, 
autonomy for South Tyrol (autonomous legislative and executive powers) to be drafted 
taking into consideration the requests of the local representatives (i.e. the SVP), 
reconsideration of citizenship for those South Tyrolese who had opted to become 
German citizens in 1939 (Voggler, 1985, p. 19-20). The importance of the Paris 
Agreement lay in the fact that the concession of autonomy was not only a simple 
internal Italian matter but a commitment that Italy had taken with the international 
community, with Austria as the recognized guarantor of the rights of German-speaking 
ethnic minority.      
The shift from self-determination to autonomy by the SVP was, therefore, not 
driven by electoral strategies. Indeed, the most crucial elections, both at provincial and 
national level, would come only in 1948. The party acted under the rigid constraints of 
realpolitik which had denied it the path to self-determination, in spite of the fact that 
that was the preferred choice of the people the party wanted to represent. In fact, self-
                                                 
53
 The Paris Agreement does not mention the Ladin group and the Ladin language, which the then Italian 
PM Alcide De Gasperi, a man from Trent who had lived under the Austrian Empire before 1919, 
considered just another Italian dialect (Stocker, 2007, p. 45).   
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determination never disappeared from party discourses and documents. However, at the 
Conference in February 1947, the party programme was changed and the central 
objective of the SVP became the achievement of autonomy, as envisaged by the Paris 
Agreement (Voggler, 1985, p. 21). 
 However, in mid 1947, it became clear that the Italian Constituent Assembly, 
elected in 1946 for drafting the new Constitution, had no intention of complying with 
the Paris Agreement. Rather than conceding extensive autonomy to South Tyrol, where 
the German ethnic group would be the majority (about two thirds), it created an 
autonomous region of Trentino-Alto Adige which included South Tyrol (i.e. 
Bozen/Bolzano province) and Trent province (the old Welschtirol). The SVP protested 
and tried to negotiate a better deal but, being blackmailed on the issue of Italian 
citizenship for the „optants‟, it had to accept the proposal of the Constituent Assembly. 
Although the so called „first autonomy statute‟ did not satisfy the SVP, since the new 
autonomous region would be controlled by the Italian parties (primarily the Christian 
Democrats), the party leader Amonn sent a letter to the Italian government expressing 
his thanks, thus legitimizing the choice of the Italian Constituent Assembly. Many party 
members did not appreciate that move. After having withdrawn from self-determination, 
the SVP‟s leadership seemed to be now withdrawing even from the Paris Agreement.  
Amonn‟s choice can be explained in two ways, neither mutually exclusive. On 
the one hand, he was effectively blackmailed by the Italian government, as the issue of 
citizenship for the optants had not been fully solved yet. Indeed, in 1964, Amonn 
revealed he had sent that letter because he had been put under massive pressure (Stocker, 
2007, p. 46). On the other hand, the leader and the other notables that constituted the 
dominant group were both inclined to compromise with the Italian state and still 
optimistic about the possibility of implementing a satisfactory autonomy agreement 
through co-operation with the Christian-Democrats of Trent. This inclination of the 
SVP‟ leadership towards compromise and moderation had several origins. First of all, 
South Tyrol did not only need autonomy. Like most other regions of Italy and Europe, it 
needed to be rebuilt economically and in terms of infrastructure. The SVP‟s leadership 
of the 1940s and 1950s was very sensitive to economic issues, not least because most of 
the founding members were (mainly urban) businessmen who had interests in re-
building a market economy. Such interests (and their Christian democratic ideology) 
meant they were close to the Italian DC both in Rome and in Trent, thus pushing them 
towards compromise and co-operation rather than open confrontation.     
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However, the strategy did not seem to pay off. The DC, both in Rome and in 
Trent, started to lean more and more towards Italian nationalism, not so much in terms 
of discourse but in terms of concrete policies. This situation left the German- and Ladi-
speaking feeling insecure. For instance, by 1952 citizens could deal with state‟s public 
offices exclusively in the Italian language (Stocker, 2007, p. 49). This also entailed that 
Italian-speaking people were absurdly over-represented in public jobs. In addition, the 
public housing policy of the Italian government, helped by the regional government of 
Trentino-Alto Adige, strongly discriminated against the German minority and 
encouraged Southern Italians to move into South Tyrol. From 1946 to 1952, the number 
of Italians grew by about 50,000 (ibid, p. 49). In 1953 a very influential local 
churchman, Michael Gamper, spoke about a „march towards extinction‟ of the South 
Tyrolese people. By the mid 1950s, discontent with the „first autonomy statute‟ amongst 
the German and Ladin speaking groups had grown stronger and the party needed to 
respond.    
 
 
4.2.2 From ‘Los von Trient’ to the ‘Package’ (1957-1969) 
 The turn to a more radical stance in 1957 was neither anticipated nor motivated 
by any electoral shocks. In the 1952 and 1956 provincial elections, as well as in the 
1953 general election, the SVP continued to secure virtually 100 percent of the German 
and Ladin votes in South Tyrol. However, it had become evident that unanimous 
electoral support for the ethnic rally party did not coincide with consensus on the 
leadership‟s strategy. The most evident signs of this discontent were, on the one hand, 
increasing activities outside the limits of electoral (democratic) politics culminating in 
the establishment of the BAS (the illegal organization for South Tyrol‟s Liberation). On 
the other hand, the extremely close links between South Tyrolese civil society and the 
SVP allowed the pressure for change to be channelled within the internal organization 
of the party. 
 Internal debate became intense, with the traditional leadership increasingly 
pushed on the defensive because of the lack of progress on autonomy. Uneasiness with 
the direction of the party between 1948 and 1956 was witnessed by very high leadership 
turn-over: five leaders in eight years (see table 4.7). However, all leaders belonged to 
the group of notables that was created around the founding members.  
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Although disagreement on the party‟s stance and strategy cannot be 
simplistically reduced to precise pre-existing factions or groups, the two most important 
lines of divisions were age (i.e. an opposition between the older and the younger 
generation of SVP politicians) and socio-economic sector (i.e. an opposition between 
the urban businessmen and the mountain-farmers). The young and the farmers 
represented the groups in favour of a more radical stance. Until 1956, Josef Menz-Popp 
had remained the leader of the Bauerbund (the Farmers‟ Association). He belonged to 
the group of notables and had also been leader of the party between 1948 and 1951. 
However, the election of Hans Dietl, an advocate of strategy change, as new leader of 
the Bauerbund in 1956 represented the first important change in the balance of power 
within the SVP leadership (Stocker, 2007, p. 51). 
The 1957 Conference, which sanctioned the so called „Palace revolution‟, started 
in a tense atmosphere. The Italian government had shown resistance and irritation 
towards Austria‟s renewed diplomatic activism. Even more importantly, in 1956 the 
BAS‟ first dynamite bombings had begun. In that context, eleven members of the old 
leadership who had been proposed for re-election were rejected by the conference‟s 
delegates (Voggler, 1985, p. 26). The new elected leader, Silvius Magnago, found 
himself at the head of a new leadership group that had a more intransigent orientation. 
The same conference approved a resolution which called for the establishment of a 
separate autonomous region for South Tyrol and for the protection of Germans‟ and 
Ladins‟ minority rights by Austria in all international venues.  
The first move by the new leader was the calling of a mass rally of the South 
Tyrolese people to protest against the announcement of a new plan for public housing in 
South Tyrol. As much as 95 percent of the public housing built from 1955 had been 
allotted to Italian-speaking people (Stocker, 2007, p. 50). The new plan, announced in 
1957, sounded very much like the continuation of the Fascist policy of Italianization. As 
a consequence, the mass rally had, on the one hand, a very high attendance (about 
35,000 people out of about 240,000 Germans and Ladins) but, on the other hand, it 
represented a highly risky move. Indeed, the most radical elements, and members of the 
BAS, wanted to turn the rally into a „march on Bozen‟, which would have ended up 
with violent confrontation with the Italian police (Voggler, 1985, p. 27). Magnago, 
however, managed to keep the demonstration peaceful and announced the change of 
party strategy with the slogan „Los von Trient‟ („Break from Trent‟).  
  
163 
 
From now on, the alliance of the SVP with the DC in Bozen, in Trent and in 
Rome could not be taken for granted anymore. Political co-operation at all levels would 
now be subject to the DC‟s willingness to concede a new autonomy statute to South 
Tyrol. When it became clear that the DC in Rome refused to consider a draft-law for 
more autonomy, presented by SVP‟s MPs in February 1958, and that the Italian 
government, with the complicity of the Trentino-Alto Adige regional government, was 
interpreting in a very restrictive way the already limited competences of the 
Bozen/Bolzano province, the SVP took the decision (in 1959) to withdraw its regional 
assembly group. 
To be sure the abandonment of the moderate stance in 1957 engendered some 
ambiguities about (and divisions over) the new policy. While Magnago pursued 
consistently the objective of increased autonomy within the Italian state, others 
interpreted (or wanted to portray) the policy turn as return to a position in favour of self-
determination. The terrorist activities of the BAS obviously strengthened this 
perspective both internally and, even more, externally. 
By 1961, the new dynamism of Austrian diplomacy and the terrorist attacks 
convinced the Italian government to start negotiations with the SVP (and with Vienna). 
At that juncture, as Magnago convincingly engaged in the negotiations, the divisions 
within the SVP became more evident. The party leader was now caught between a 
radical faction (whose most prominent members were Hans Dietl, Peter Brugger and 
Alfons Benedikter) oriented towards self-determination, and a moderate faction called 
Aufbau (Reconstruction) which in 1961 re-organized itself around some figures of the 
old leadership (such as Roland Riz, Toni Ebner and Josef Raffeiner) (Stocker, 2007, p. 
59-60). The latter faction, who had the support of many SVP mayors, criticized the new 
leadership on several grounds. First, it urged the party to abandon its overtly nationalist 
rhetoric, its confrontational strategy and to return to co-operation with the DC in the 
regional assembly and executive. Secondly, it blamed the leadership for letting former 
Nazi collaborators reach influential positions within the party. Thirdly, although the 
Aufbau never went public in denouncing individual SVP‟s members for collaborating 
with the BAS, it condemned the terrorist activities of the BAS much more strongly than 
the party was doing and, more or less explicitly, accused the leadership of providing 
ideological fuel for the terrorists. This also led the BAS to threaten members of the 
Aufbau, thus increasing enormously the internal tensions (Stocker, 2007 p. 62). Finally, 
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it criticized the new leadership‟s obsession with nationalism for leading it to overlook 
the South Tyrolese economy.         
It was from this faction that the first real electoral challenge to the SVP‟s 
monopoly of the German vote arrived. In 1963 Josef Raffeiner decided to leave the 
party and stand as an independent at the general election. Then he went on to create a 
new party, the Tiroler Heimatpartei (THP, Tyrolean Homeland Party), which contested 
the 1964 provincial election obtaining 2.4 percent of votes and gaining one seat (see 
table 4.1).  
The THP disappeared at the 1968 elections. By that time, most members of the 
Aufbau who had remained in the SVP had been reabsorbed within Magnago‟s 
leadership. However, that did not happened by default. On the one hand, the progress in 
the negotiation process after 1963 legitimized Magnago‟s strategy, especially in the 
eyes of more moderate members. On the other hand, internal factionalism and the first 
serious electoral challenge by the THP were the main reasons why the party undertook a 
deep organizational reform which transformed it not only into a mass party, but also 
into a real Sammelpartei, where all different sections of and orientations within the 
South Tyrolese society could make their voice heard. In spite of its small and brief 
electoral success, the THP had a great symbolic impact on the SVP, as it was the first 
time that the Germans‟ monolithic vote was broken and the rally party lost, 
momentarily, the exclusive role of representative of the minorities.   
Having reabsorbed most of the moderate faction, Magnago was now heading 
towards a showdown with the hard-liners who had criticized or rejected the negotiations 
with the Italian government. By early 1969 an agreement on a new autonomy, called the 
„package‟, had been reached. In May, Italy and Austria also agreed on the timing for the 
implementation of all the measures included in the agreement. It was now time for the 
SVP‟s supreme bodies to express themselves on the „package‟. The executive board 
took six days to examine in detail all the documents concerning the agreement. 
Eventually, 41 members voted in favour of recommending the Conference to approve 
the „package‟, 23 members voted against and 2 abstained (Voggler, 1985, p. 36). The 
division within the executive announced an epic battle at the Conference that was held 
in November 1969. Many meetings were organized to inform the population throughout 
South Tyrol about the pros and cons of the agreement. The battle between Magnago and 
the radical faction led by Brugger was fought in each local branch and at each level of 
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the party organization. Eventually the Conference approved the package by 583 to 492 
(ibid. p. 37). 
 
 
4.2.3 From the ‘package’ to the end of the full implementation of the ‘second 
autonomy’ 
Although Magnago and Brugger committed to work together to maintain party 
unity following the autonomist path, the approval of the „package‟ by the SVP provoked 
other splits. Already in 1966 a new hard-line party, the Soziale Fortschrittpartei 
Sudtirols (SFP, Social Progressive Party of South Tyrol), had been formed under the 
leadership of Egmont Jenny. This party enjoyed the support of the Austrian Social 
Democratic party, which was more intransigent than the Austrian People‟s Party in the 
negotiations with Rome. In 1969 the SFP was the only German party that opposed the 
„package‟ but was not able to capitalise much at the next provincial elections in 1973. It 
gained only one seat and 1.7 percent of total votes. By then, two more „anti-package‟ 
parties had formed around Hans Dietl, a prominent figure who had been an SVP 
member of the provincial assembly since 1952, a member of the party‟s executive since 
1957 and MP in Rome from 1963 to 1972. In 1971 Dietl was expelled by the SVP 
because, as an MP, he voted against the Constitutional Law which introduced the 
„second autonomy statute‟. Before the 1972 general election a group of independents 
was formed to support Dietl‟s election in the Senate. After the general election, in which 
Dietl scored well but was not elected, he formed a new party, the Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Sudtirols (SPS). Some of those who had been in the group of independents that 
had supported Dietl in 1972 did not follow him into the SPS but formed another party, 
the Partei der Unabhangigen (PDU, Party of Independents). 
By the first post-package provincial election in 1973 there were, therefore, 
already three parties competing with the SVP for the German votes from a more radical 
position. During the second half of the 1970s the hard-line parties of the left, the SFP 
and SPS, were eclipsed but new hard-line competitors were to emerge to the right of the 
SVP. As well as the PDU, which managed to win one seat in the provincial elections of 
1978, 1983 and (under the new label Freiheitliche Partei Sudtirols FPS) in 1988, the 
1980s saw the birth of a new radical nationalist party under the leadership of Eva Klotz, 
daughter of former BAS‟ member Georg Klotz. The new party, called Wahlverband des 
Heimatbundes (WdH) in 1983 and Sudtiroler Hemiatbund (SHB) in 1988, was the first 
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one that challenged the SVP specifically, almost exclusively, on the self-government 
dimension. All other splinter parties (THP, SFP, PDU and SPS) had criticized the SVP 
not simply on the issue of self-government. However, the WdH-SHB was a different 
matter. The core policy of Klotz‟s party was to go back to the objective of self-
determination as professed by the SVP‟s original political programme of 1945. This 
made it the most attractive alternative to the SVP for all those who opposed the 
„package‟ during the 1980s. 
Did the emergence of all these harder-line parties affect the self-government 
policy position of the SVP during the 1970s and 1980s? It would appear not. The new 
SVP‟s programme adopted in 1972, which set the implementation of the „second 
autonomy statute‟ as its main goal, remained unchanged until 1993. The constitutional 
change that established the new autonomy statute in 1972 represented only the first step. 
Between 1972 and 1992 the SVP, as the party in office at provincial level, had to co-
operate with the national government in passing the necessary legislation to fully 
implement the „package‟. In this context, Magnago was very keen on avoiding any 
rhetorical, let alone policy, shift towards self-determination. In addition, opposition to 
the SVP‟s policy stance did not come exclusively from the hard-liners.  
The hegemonic party also had to deal with the emergence of inter-ethnic parties, 
such as the Neue Linke/Nuova Sinistra (New Left) and the Grune/Verdi/Verc (Greens), 
who criticized the ethno-nationalism of the SVP. These parties opposed all kinds of 
separatism in South Tyrol: not only the secessionist stances of the WdH-SHB but also 
the politics of „ethnic apartheid‟ pursued by the SVP through the logic of census and the 
„ethnic quotas‟ (Langer, 1990, p. 59). The obligation on all residents to register as 
belonging to one ethno-linguistic group and the subsequent allocation of public benefits 
(public jobs, houses, subsidies, studentship bursaries, etc.) according to ethnic 
proportionality had started in 1976 – a move which immediately re-ignited tensions 
between the Italian and the German groups (Pallaver, 2007, p. 585). In particular the 
Italian group started to feel threatened in its economic interests and increasingly 
developed a sense of „minority syndrome‟ within the province. Initially some Italian 
speaking voters, mostly former supporters of left Italian parties, supported cross-ethnic 
lists in the hope of easing ethnic tensions and overcoming the system of „ethnic quotas‟. 
However, as table 4.1 shows, by the late 1980s the Italian-speaking people of South 
Tyrol had shifted to the right, with the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) 
becoming the biggest Italian party in the provincial assembly. The growth of the cross-
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ethnic lists in the late 1980s and early 1990s was now due to increased support from 
German voters who, feeling less and less threatened in their cultural/linguistic survival, 
abandoned in slightly greater numbers the SVP and its insistence on the politics of 
„ethnic cages‟ (Langer, 1990, p. 60). The latter was denounced as an obstacle to real 
bottom-up democracy, as the system created and perpetuated by the SVP of an 
ethnically segmented society could work only by negotiations between the elites of the 
ethnic groups.
54
  
Therefore, the policy position of the SVP in the 1970s and, even more, in the 
1980s was more or less a middle-way between hard-liners and secessionists 
(concentrated primarily in the mono-ethnic rural villages), on the one side, and 
supporters of political integration amongst the ethnic groups within the autonomy 
(concentrated in Bozen/Bolzano and in the other few urban centres), on the other side. 
Electoral results seem overall to have rewarded this policy. After having scored its 
worst result ever in the post-package election of 1973 (56.4%), the SVP recovered in 
the late 1970s and stabilized at around 60% by the 1980s.    
      
 
4.2.4 From ‘dynamic autonomy’ to a new (folklore) nationalist politics (1992-2009) 
 With the full implementation of the package in 1992 and the consequent end of 
the international controversy a completely new phase began for the SVP. De facto, the 
party had fulfilled its historical „mission‟, as it had been set out in the political 
programme of 1947 and restated in the subsequent programmes, including the last one 
in 1972. The adoption of a new party programme in 1993, witnessed the awareness of 
an urgent need to re-position itself so as to find a new raison d’etre and communicate it 
to the electorate. That was not an easy task. Having underscored the party‟s courage and 
sense of responsibility for implementing the „second autonomy statute‟ and posing an 
end to the international dispute, the first point of the 1993 programme lays out the new 
objectives: further expansion of the autonomy and the creation of a „European region‟ 
called Tyrol (Grundsatzprogramm, Das neue Programm der Südtiroler Volkspartei, 
Beschlossen von der Landesversammlung am 8. Mai 1993 - The New Basic Programme 
of the SVP, May 1993).    
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 On the traditional politics of South Tyrol as an example of consociational democracy governed by 
agreements amongst elites and on the difficulties of maintaining such political system in recent years, see 
Pallaver, G. (2008). 
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To be sure, the document also mentioned the right of the South Tyrolese to self-
determination. However, in contrast to the original programme of 1945 (and likewise all 
the subsequent ones), the right to self-determination was referred to as an hypothetical 
option that could be invoked only if the Italian state failed to respect the rights of the 
minority as envisaged by the Paris Agreement. In other words, as argued by Alfons 
Benedikter in his indictment The Facts about the Betrayal of the Homeland, with the 
endorsement of the Dispute Settlement Declaration the SVP renounced both the right to 
self-determination and the possibility of raising the „South Tyrolean question‟ again at 
the UN (Benedikter, quoted in Peterlini, 1997, p. 104). Such a decision created a 
fracture between the majority faction, led by Magnago‟s successors,55 and the most 
intransigent elements. The walk out of the latter, either joining forces with the already 
existing hard-line parties or creating new ones, has considerably enlarged the (German) 
political opposition and increased the scope for competition for the German votes. 
Already in 1989, some members led by Benedikter had left the SVP, joining 
forces with Klotz‟s SHB and the FPS to form the nationalist-irredentist party Union fur 
Sudtirol (UfS). In addition to that, other members left the party in 1992 following the so 
called „gang of four‟ (four right-wing irredentist members who had led the youth 
organization of the SVP) to form another secessionist party, Die Freiheitlichen (dF – 
the Libertarians). At the 1993 provincial election these two parties managed to win 
nearly 11 percent of votes and four seats, causing the SVP to score its worst electoral 
result ever: only 52% of the votes.     
 The 1993 new programme represented the response to the new situation 
characterized by a re-invigorated challenge. This strategy has been rather rewarding in 
policy and electoral terms between the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s 
(see Table 4.1). The SVP-led provincial government obtained further concessions 
during the centre-left government in Rome (1996-2001) and the outstanding economic 
performance of the province favoured a certain relaxation in the cross-ethnic tensions. 
In 2003, the cross-ethnic party Grune/Verdi/Verc achieved its best result ever and the 
SVP started accepting (bi-lingual) Italians in its ranks, even as candidates.  
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 For more than three decades Silvius Magnago provided a complete leadership, acting as both party 
leader and provincial first minister. After his resignation the two positions were made incompatible. 
Several party leaders alternated from 1991 to the present day (see table 4.7). However, the new „strong 
man‟ of the SVP has been Luis Durnwalder, the provincial first minister since 1993, and prominent 
member of the farmers‟ section of the party. 
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In electoral terms, it is not entirely clear whether the recovery of the SVP was 
due to its own merits or to the damage that challenger parties inflicted on themselves. 
This was particularly the case for the Libertarians (dF),
56
 a party linked to the Austrian 
radical-right Freedom Party (FPÖ). After the electoral breakthrough in the 1993 
provincial election, the party was torn apart by personalistic factionalism and, most 
crucially, by the murder in 1997 of former leader Waldner by another party member 
(Pallaver, 2007, p. 585). This episode impacted negatively on the party‟s performance 
in 1998 provincial election. Only in 2003 did dF recover the same number of elected 
members to the provincial assembly and nearly the same share of votes that it had 
gained in 1993. Since then, however, the tide seems to have turned again in favour of 
the nationalist-secessionist forces in South Tyrol. Ethnic tensions have re-emerged, too, 
as a consequence of the campaign initiated in 2004 by the Schutzen for the 
rehabilitation and celebration of the terrorists/freedom fighters of the 1960s. However, 
at the heart of these tensions there are very different constitutional preferences between 
the two ethnic groups. As table 4.8 shows, a majority of Germans prefers to secede 
from the Italian Republic whereas the overwhelming majority of the Italians want to 
remain within Italy, and probably would like more central government control over the 
province. 
 
Table 4.8 
Constitutional preferences of the German (2005) and  
Italian (2008) speaking population of South Tyrol. 
 
 Remaining within 
Italy 
Secession 
  Independence Re-joining Austria 
 
German speakers 
(2005) 
 
45.3% 
 
 
33.4% 
 
21.3% 
 
Italian speakers 
(2008) 
 
78% 
 
20% 
 
2% 
Source: Soffi-Institute, Innsbruck, 2005 (available at: Wissenschaftliche Meinungsumfrage des 
Heimatbundes und Cossiga-Vorschlag); Institute of Social Research and Opinion Polling in 
Bozen/Bolzano, 2008 (available at: Meinungsumfrage zur Selbstbestimmung: Nur 55% der Italiener 
würden definitiv für Italien wählen). 
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 The UfS was also shaken by internal factionalism after the 1993 election but managed to re-discover 
unity behind Eva Klotz well before the 1998 election, increasing its share of votes both in 1998 and in 
2003 (Pallaver, 2007 , p. 583-84). 
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It is extremely interesting to note that, according to these figures, most German 
secessionists are not irredentists, as one might expect, but independentists. However, 
both independentists and irredentists are dissatisfied with the current settlement. This 
leaves the SVP confronting a dilemma: should it follow the secessionist majority or 
respect the pacts made with the Italian government? 
The 2006 general election represented an extraordinary opportunity for the SVP 
to expand autonomy. The pre-election alliance with the centre-left, led by Romano 
Prodi, was built on an agreement which foresaw further concessions from Rome. The 
very narrow victory of Prodi made the SVP a relevant party for the government‟s 
survival in Parliament, thus putting pressure on the PM to fulfil his promises. Indeed, 
just few months after the formation of the new government, Prodi had a meeting in 
Bozen with a delegation of the SVP and with the first ministers of the Bozen and Trento 
Provinces to discuss the development of autonomy (Alto Adige, 02/02/07). The most 
important point was the introduction of a specific clause that would prevent unilateral 
change of the autonomy statute by Rome. In addition, the negotiations also included 
more concessions for the province, especially in the energy, post and broadcasting 
sectors (J. G. Widmann, SVP‟s MP 1992-2008, interview with the author, 
Meran/Merano, 16/11/07; Elmar Pichler-Rolle, party leader 2004-2009, speech at the 
2007 Conference in Meran/Merano, 17/11/07). However, with the premature fall of the 
centre-left government in 2008 both the strong negotiating position and the envisaged 
reforms were lost. 
 With the election of a centre-right government in 2008, which includes the 
Northern League, the projects under discussion for the reform of the relationships 
between regional and central governments has changed considerably. For the time 
being, the agenda of the Northern League, has given priority to financial rather than 
political decentralization: so called „fiscal federalism‟. Since South Tyrol, as a 
consequence of its fiscal privileges granted by the special autonomy statute, already 
keeps 90% of the taxes collected in the province, this path of reform has little to offer to 
the SVP. If anything, given the extremely rich status of South Tyrol vis a vis the Italian 
average, the reform that the League‟s Minister Calderoli is negotiating with the SVP‟s 
South Tyrolese first minister Durnwalder will entail some financial sacrifices for Bozen 
(Alto Adige, 11/03/09). All in all, the reform of the Italian constitution and of the 
financial relationship between Rome and the regions driven by the Northern League 
represents more of a source of concern than an opportunity. On the one hand, it does 
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not seem to move autonomy far enough so as to counter the nationalist/separatist 
grievances politicized by the radical parties. At the last provincial election, the 
Libertarians, UfS and Sud-Tirol Freiheit (S-TF – South Tyrol Freedom), the latter being 
a new splinter party from UfS, gained 21.5 percent of the vote (a little less than a third 
of the German votes) and 8 members of the assembly. On the other hand, the project of 
the Northern League may disturb the extensive autonomy which South Tyrol already 
enjoys both politically and financially.               
At provincial level, the further growth of the radical nationalist parties in the last 
years has not significantly changed the SVP‟s ideology and policy position on the self-
government dimension. The first headline of the 2007 Conference resolution goes 
“Autonomy – the right way” (SVP, Resolution of the 54th ordinary Conference, 2007). 
The party has overall maintained a pragmatic and moderate line. As a prominent SVP 
member put it:  
 
Pacta sunt servanda [Pacts must be respected]. We can not, on the one hand, 
demand self-determination and, on the other hand, negotiate about more 
responsibilities in the „dynamic autonomy‟. We have not given up on self-
determination, but it would be the ultima ratio [last resort], in case of a one-sided 
violation of the Parisian agreement. (Elmar Pichler Rolle, SVP leader between 2004 
and April 2009, email interview with the author, 12/03/09). 
 
 
However, the SVP now seems persuaded that, in order to counter the emergence of the 
radical secessionist parties, they need to push more on ethnic-nationalism, at least at a 
rhetorical level. As stated by two prominent members of the party, the SVP needs to 
engage more on „folklore‟ policy issues (Seppl Lamprecht, deputy leader of the SVP 
2000-2004, email interview with the author, 30/03/09; Elamr Pichler Rolle, email 
interview with the author, 12/03/09). This has taken the shape of a full and official 
endorsement of the recognition of the BAS members as „freedom fighters‟, the deletion 
of the headline „Alto Adige‟ (i.e. the denomination of the province in the Italian 
language) from the documents and stamps in local councils populated exclusively by 
German speaking people (on the grounds that such headline has a Fascist connotation), 
requests to the central government for the removal of monuments that the German 
South Tyrolese consider offensive, the removal of signs in Italian (though that is against 
the autonomy statute), and even inflammatory statements by SVP‟s politicians 
occupying institutional roles. In particular, in the run-up to the celebration of the 
Liberation Feast in 2009 (25 April 1945 is taken as the date of the liberation of Italy 
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from Nazi-Fascism) the SVP‟s Deputy Major of Bozen declared “it‟s not our feast, we 
South Tyrolese were freed in 1943 by the Wehrmacht.” (Alto Adige, 07/05/09). Even 
the powerful provincial first minister, Luis Durnwalder, appears concerned and 
desperate for some kind of (folklore) achievement that he might boast in front of the 
most radical elements: “I am worried…The confrontation between the two ethnic 
groups is ever more radical. We moderates of the SVP are chased by the [German] 
right… Italy has to give a non-hostile sign, removing the Fascist symbols from Bozen” 
(ibid.). It is not at all clear whether this current „appeasement‟ strategy towards the 
nationalists/secessionists will prove beneficial for the SVP in the medium term or will 
actually legitimize and further strengthen the radical parties.  
 
4.3. Party Ideology and Policy: The Left-Right dimension 
4.3.1 Finding the balance between the economic right and the nationalist right 
(1945-1968). 
In 1921, at the last democratic elections before the advent of the Fascist regime the 
Deutscher Verband (DV), the forerunner of the SVP, obtained about 90% of the 
German votes while 10% went to the Sozialdemokratische Partei (SDP). In contrast, in 
the first six provincial elections, from 1948 to 1968, the SVP gained virtually 100% of 
the German (and Ladin) votes. No party of the left was able to emerge in this period. 
The Sozialdemokratische Partei Sudtirols, formed in 1945, dissolved immediately after 
its disastrous performance in 1948 (Pallaver, 2007, p. 560).  
 The failure of the (German) left in South Tyrol can be easily explained. From a 
psychological point of view, the „minority syndrome‟ and the experience of Fascism has 
certainly pushed the German (and Ladin) speaking South Tyrolese towards a sort of 
„fetishism of unity‟ (Pallaver, 2005, p. 196), thus avoiding divisions on socio-economic 
lines.  From a sociological point of view, South Tyrol has always been a rather 
homogeneous territory. The electoral figures of 1921 already demonstrate that left 
voters have always been a small minority. The South Tyrolese society has traditionally 
been characterized by the prominence of agriculture over industry, by the prominence of 
ruralism over urbanization and by the prominence of a religious, conservative culture 
over a secular and progressive one (Pallaver, 2005. p. 199-202). Industrialization came 
with Fascism, also as a means of Italianization of the province. Most workers in the big 
industries were, therefore, Italians. Likewise, most public employees (teachers, doctors, 
police officers, civil servants, etc.) were also Italians. The German population was made 
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up of three main socio-economic groups: the mountain farmers (by far the most 
populous one); the urban business middle class (small but influential); and the 
proletariat (small and divided between those working in urban industries and those 
working on rural farms). 
 The policy of „options‟ and the consequent emigration into the German Reich 
between 1939 and 1943 affected primarily the urban proletariat.
57
 As a consequence, the 
already small South Tyrolese working class shrank even more. As Table 4.9 shows, in 
the first fifteen years after WWII, the industry and the tertiary sectors expanded, while 
employment in agriculture diminished. However, by 1961 the percentage of people 
employed in the primary sector was still higher than in any other economic sector. 
 
Table 4.9 
Occupational Structure of the Germans  
and Ladins in South Tyrol (%) 
 
 1951 1961 
 
Agriculture 
 
67 
 
45 
Industry 13 21 
Public Administr. 5 4 
Other sectors 15 30 
 
       Source: compiled by author on the basis of Pristinger (1980, p. 168-172) 
 
 
Given such homogeneity and the presence of only two influential socio-economic 
groups – the farmers and the urban businessmen represented within and without the 
party respectively by the Südtiroler Bauerbund (South Tyrolean Farmers‟ Association) 
and the Südtiroler Wirtschaftsring (South Tyrolean Economy and Trade Association)– 
the SVP was able to unite the entire German (and Ladin) electorate without renouncing 
to maintain a rather consistent Christian-democratic, conservative ideology, largely 
inherited by the Deutscher Verband (Holzer and Schwegler, 1998, p. 164; Pallaver, 
2006, p. 167).  
The two main social constituencies were ideologically keen in several respects. 
Beyond the common ethno-linguistic identity, which both emphasized, they were 
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 Divided by profession the „optants‟ who actually emigrated represented 67% of industrial workers, 
40% of workers in tourism, 83% of workers in transportation, but only 9% of workers in agriculture 
(Pristinger, 1980, p. 157).  
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deeply religious (Catholic), opposed to cross-class conflict, and socially conservative 
(Holzer and Schwegler, 1998, p. 168). In the emerging contest of the cold-war order, the 
SVP adopted a clearly anti-communist position. To be sure, all the tendencies within the 
SVP were fierce opponents of Fascism too. However, while many opposed Fascism 
because it was an extreme-right ideology (i.e. because of its general ideological content), 
others opposed it only because it had been an „Italian‟ political movement and because 
it represented „Italian‟ nationalism. The latter did not dismiss extreme-right ideologies, 
provided they were moulded to the German nationalist perspective.   
Beside these ideological similarities, the two groups also showed some 
ideological differences. The urban businessmen were more in favour of free market 
policies and more moderate in their ethnic nationalism, whereas the farmers had a more 
centrist/populist approach to economic policy (protectionism, access to fair credit and 
some social provisions) and were more radical on ethnic nationalism.  
From 1945 to 1957, the party was led by a group of notables who mostly 
represented the interests of urban (mainly Bozen) middle class. The left-right 
positioning of the SVP was therefore extremely close to that of the Austrian People‟s 
Party (ÖVP) and to that of Italian Christian Democratic party (DC) (Lill, 1991, cited in 
Pallaver, 2006, p. 167). In terms of alliance politics, the DC represented the best 
possible (if not the ideal) partner for the SVP. Indeed, in the tri-polar Italian party 
system, the Christian-democrats represented the pivot of the anti-communist and (to a 
lesser extent) anti-fascist political forces. The alliance with the DC was strongly 
pursued by the SVP leadership until 1957. In that period, not only did the SVP form an 
alliance with the DC at regional and provincial level, it also supported the DC-led 
governments in Rome. In spite of differences on the issue of South Tyrol‟s autonomy, 
the SVP never voted against the government in a confidence vote: indeed, it voted five 
times in favour, abstaining only twice (Tempestini, 1994, p. 11). 
However, from 1957 the new leadership of the SVP decided to adopt a much 
more confrontational approach to the Italian DC. While co-operation at provincial level 
continued, the SVP withdrew from the regional assembly (and government) until 1970. 
The attitudes towards the DC-led national governments in Rome also changed. Out of 
the fifteen confidence votes in the period 1957-1971, the SVP never voted in favour; it 
voted three times against and abstained on twelve occasions. This change in the politics 
of alliances reflected a turn to the nationalist right. Paradoxically, the two parties 
remained similar ideologically: the DC embedded more and more former fascists within 
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its ranks (especially in Bozen), while the SVP did the same with former Nazis (Pallaver, 
2007, p. 561). In the mid 1950s, there had even been an attempt by a local challenger 
party, the Weisser Turm in Brixen/Bressanone to politicize/criticize the infiltration of 
the SVP by former Nazis, though with very little success (Pallaver, 2007, p. 571). 
As discussed above, the move from a socio-economic right to an ethno-
nationalist right corresponded to the increased weight of the farmers within the SVP. 
Since the early 1950s, the agricultural sector of South Tyrol had been experiencing a 
period of deep crisis, due also to the wider process of rationalization of agriculture 
occurring throughout Western Europe, which had a particularly negative impact on 
marginal areas of low productivity, such as mountain areas (Pristinger, 1980, p. 169). In 
addition, the combination of a growing rural population with the primogeniture 
inheritance system of the South Tyrolese farming families - i.e. the whole land went to 
the first male-son, while all the others had to look for alternative sources of income -  
created a wave of unemployment and discontent in the South Tyrolese countryside. The 
turn to ethnic nationalism by the SVP and the start of violent actions in the last 1950s 
can be explained by this diffuse dissatisfaction (Stocker, 2007, p. 56-7). While in other 
circumstances, the frustration of the unemployed would be channelled towards social 
class struggle and lead to the call for leftist policies, in the contest of diffuse nationalist 
feelings and of the ethnic division of labour that existed in South Tyrol, it was 
channelled towards an ethnic-nationalist struggle. 
In the first three years of the new leadership, 1957-1960, the turn to the 
nationalist right was radical and met almost no opposition. However, after 1961 the 
tendencies within the party that were inspired by Christian-democratic moderatism and 
by economic liberalism started to re-organize around some of the figures of the old 
leadership. The internal faction Aufbau (reconstruction), was meant to bring back the 
party towards more moderate positions, also re-starting co-operation with the DC in 
Trent and Rome (following the advice of the Church), and to pay more attention to 
socio-economic issues (especially, though not exclusively, the interests of the 
businessmen), which had been overshadowed by the ethnic-nationalist struggle. The 
concerns voiced by the Aufbau internal faction soon became a political platform for 
external political actors who engaged in electoral competition with the SVP. In 1963, 
Josef Raffeiner a prominent figure of the Aufbau, left the party to create a liberal-
conservative alternative to the nationalist swing of the SVP. In the 1963 general election 
he presented himself as an independent candidate, diverting 4% of the votes from the 
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SVP (Pallaver, 2007, p. 571). The following year he formed a new party, called Tiroler 
Haimatpartei (THP), which got 2.4 percent of the votes at the provincial election.  
The combination of the internal action of the Aufbau and the external 
competition of Raffeiner‟s THP, the first to break the electoral unity of the German 
group since 1948, led party leader Magnago to accept some of the specific concerns of 
the business organization and, more generally, to re-organize the party in a way which 
would allow diverse opinions and positions to be heard. Ideologically, the compromise 
reached in 1964 also led to the inclusion of an explicit reference to Christian-democratic 
values, definitely a way to moderate the shift to radical nationalism. This was not only 
included in the party political programme (the 1947 programme already contained such 
a reference) but it was anchored in the party statue (Pallaver, 2006, p. 167). By the 1968 
provincial election, the aufbau faction had been re-absorbed within Magnago‟s 
leadership and the THP disappeared.         
 
 
4.3.2 Reacting to the challenges from the economic left and of the ‘new’ left (1968-
1992). 
The reform of the party organization in the 1960s aimed to transform the SVP 
from a party of notables into a true Sammelpartei, a rally party for the German (and 
Ladin) speaking people of all socio-economic classes and of all ideological leanings. 
However, the reform was incomplete. Following the 1940‟s and 1950s, the party created 
internal sections only for the two major socio-economic groups: the farmers and the 
employers. However, given the social transformation of South Tyrol and the changes in 
Italian politics, this was insufficient if the unity of the rally party was to be maintained. 
 From a social perspective, the share of workers employed in industry in South 
Tyrol increased from 23.3% in 1951 to 30.6% in 1971. Even more importantly, while 
only a minority of industry workers were German speaking in 1951, 54.7% of them 
were in 1971 (Pristinger, 1980, p. 168-70). In the same period the share of workforce 
employed in agriculture (almost exclusively German and Ladin speakers) halved (ibid.). 
The SVP had tried to address this issue in 1964, by encouraging the birth of a German 
trade union (ASGB). This union had the political task of parting the workers on ethnic 
lines and, following the tradition of the Katholischer Verein der Werktatigen (KVW)
58
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 The KVW had never received the endorsement of the SVP because it was affiliated with the Italian 
sister organization ACLI (Pristinger, 1980, p. 177). 
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formed in 1948, directing the German workers towards a representation of their interests 
inspired by Christian-social values, rather than class-struggle ideas (Dapunt, 2000, cited 
in Pallaver, 2006, p. 182). The activity of the ASGB was characterized by diffuse anti-
strike propaganda, allegedly entrenched in the Christian doctrine, hostile opposition to 
Italian workers and trade unions and “distortion in ethnic terms of the supposed Italian 
opposition to the demands of the workers of South Tyrol, a tactic designed to foment 
competition for jobs among the workers of the different ethnic groups” (Pristinger, 1980, 
p. 178). While the ASGB was initially quite successful, increased industrialization and 
the above-mentioned transformations in the occupational structure of the workforce led, 
during the 1970s, many German workers to join Italy-wide labour unions (ibid.). 
 Changes in the socio-economic dynamics of South Tyrol also reflected a 
dramatic increase in social polarization in Italy. The eruption of such social 
mobilization of the working-class in the so called „hot autumn‟ of 1969 was just the 
beginning of a period in which polarization at the socio-economic level soon translated 
into increased polarization at the political level. The vote share of the Italian Communist 
Party (PCI) „jumped‟ from 26.9 in 1968 to 34.4  in 1976, reducing the distance from the 
DC by a third  (from a gap of about 12% to just about 4%).
59
 While part of the political 
elites tried to face the new situation by pursuing an unlikely strategy of gradual power 
sharing between the DC and the PCI, political and social radicalization erupted in 
terrorist activities by extra-electoral organizations of the extreme-left and extreme-right.   
In this polarized context, it became more and more difficult for the SVP to side 
with one of the blocs  - the bourgeois and anti-communist one - and at the same time to 
keep representing the whole German (and Ladin) speaking society of South Tyrol, 
especially given the limits of the organizational reform of 1964. The attempt to create a 
Sammelpartei which would mirror the entire (German) society of South Tyrol was, 
indeed, incomplete. When in 1965 Egmont Jenny, a member of the provincial assembly 
who had close relationships with the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), tried to 
form a social-democratic wing within the SVP, he was expelled from the party. With 
the support of the SPÖ, he created a new party, the Soziale Fortschrittpartei Sudtirols 
(SFP – Party of Social Progress) that declared itself in favour of democratic socialism 
(Pallaver, 2007, p. 572). The party voiced the needs of a wide range of emerging strata, 
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 It is worth stressing that in the rather sclerotic Italian electoral market, characterized by the presence of 
stable „sub-cultures‟, such changes represented a shock. Data refer to the share of vote in the Lower 
House (Istituto Cattaneo, available at: http://www.cattaneo.org/index.asp?l1=archivi&l2=adele). 
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such as the workers, clerks, technicians and young college graduates, but was unable to 
create links with the labour unions and received scant support from the workers 
(Pristinger, 1980, p. 182). At the 1968 provincial election, it got 2.3% of votes but failed 
to win a seat, whereas at the 1973 provincial election it won a seat with just 1.7% of the 
votes
60
 (Pallaver, 2007, p. 572). 
By the 1973 provincial election, another new party had also appeared to the left 
of the SVP, the Sozialdemokratische Partei Südtirols (SPS). Ideologically, the SPS 
remained rather ambiguous until the walk out of its founder, Hans Dietel. He was 
social-Christian who had been expelled from the SVP because he had rejected the 
agreement with the Italian state on the „package‟. When he founded the new party, he 
attracted a rather heterogeneous group of people around him. In the first years, the 
SPS‟s ideological outlook resembled that of national-populist party which paid 
particular attention to the discontent lower strata (Pristinger, 1980, p. 183). Only in 
1978, did the SPS explicitly declare itself a „member of European social-democracy‟ 
and „sister party‟ of the Austrian SPÖ and the German SPD (Pallaver, 2007, p. 573).  In 
contrast to the SFP, the SPS immediately formed links with the ethnic(German) labour 
union ASGB, creating strong tensions within the union between the social-democrats 
and the members of the SVP (Pallaver, ibid.). In 1973, the SPS obtained 5.1% of votes 
and two seats in the provincial assembly. Although it did not score particularly well 
amongst the urban working class, it attracted many voters from rural workers employed 
in the agricultural sector, from the lower middle class and, in general, from those who 
opposed the „package‟ (Pallaver, ibid.). 
The reaction of the SVP to this challenge from the socio-economic left resulted 
in the completion of the organizational reform started in 1964. The words of a former 
SVP member, who contributed to the creation of the labour wing of the party, leaves 
little doubt about the causal relationships between the appearance and relative success 
of the challengers of the left and the decision of the SVP to concede more room  and 
visibility to the interests of the workers: 
 
At the 1973 election the SVP included in its party list Rosa Franzelin and Erich 
Achmuller, as candidates of the workers which, in my opinion, would not have 
happened if there had not been the presence of the two opposition social-democratic 
parties. In 1974 we started to create, within the SVP, the labour wing, whose 
                                                 
60
 In between the two elections the number of provincial councilors had increased from 25 to 34, making 
it easier to win a seat. 
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establishment occurred in November 1975 (Hubert Frasnelli, reported in Frasnelli 
and Gallmetzer, 1990, p. 48). 
 
 
 
In addition, following (albeit with ten years delay) developments in Italian politics, the 
SVP started in 1973 to include the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) in the provincial 
governments, which until then had been formed almost exclusively by the SVP and DC 
(Pallaver, 2008). The SVP‟s moves were very successful, due also to the inability of the 
two (German) leftist parties to unite forces or even to co-operate (Pristinger, 1980, p. 
183). At the 1978 provincial election, the SFP remained without a seat and disappeared. 
The SPS dropped to 2.2% of votes and one seat, disappearing after further electoral 
failure in 1983 (Pallaver, 2007, p. 573). By the early 1980s, therefore, the SVP had 
reabsorbed the votes of the (German) working class, while the voters who opposed the 
„package‟ had realigned themselves with opposition parties of the right, leaving the SFP 
and SPS without an electorate.  
 However, another challenge from the socio-cultural, „new‟ left started to appear 
in the late 1970s. The political conditions for the emergence of the new left have to be 
found in the ideological stability of the SVP that, in spite of the creation of the internal 
labour wing, remained primarily a party of order, ethnic separation and conservation, 
emphasising its anti-communism but also its opposition to libertarian values (Pristinger, 
1980, p. 184). On the eve of the SVP Conference in 1978, eighty-three authoritative 
figures of the cultural (but also political and economic) world of the German speaking 
population launched an appeal - the so called „letter of the 83‟ (Pallaver, 2007, p. 574) - 
“for the liberty of opinions in South Tyrol”, stating that “the monopoly on information 
and cultural activities which exists in South Tyrol has promoted and promotes 
intolerance” and deploring the climate of cold war that crushes “whoever does not let 
himself be tied by the train of anticommunism” (quotations from Pristinger, 1980, p. 
184). 
Beyond these political motivations, and likewise the emergence of the SFP and 
SPS, the challenge from the „new‟ left also stemmed from transformations in the South 
Tyrolese society and in the ethnic division of labour in South Tyrol. The 
implementation of the „package‟ started in 1972 and, in particular, the application of the 
„ethnic quotas‟ policy in the distribution of public jobs (see table 4.5) starting from the 
mid 1970s has created a new (German) social class of public employees. This new 
social constituency, together with the young educated the urban, mobile middle class 
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represented for the following decades a potential electorate for the parties of the new 
left (Holzer and Schwegler, 1998, p. 166). 
Italian left parties, primarily the PCI and PSI, tried attracting voters from this 
constituency by presenting themselves as cross-ethnic parties. They presented 
themselves with the Italian and the German language and included German speaking 
candidates in their lists (Pallaver, 2007, p. 577). However, their electorate remained 
overwhelmingly Italian-speaking and they never attracted a significant share of the 
German progressive electorate. In contrast, the parties of the new left managed to build 
a true cross-ethnic political force that, though always remaining of modest electoral size, 
has established itself in the party system of South Tyrol. 
The first new left list was presented in at the 1978 provincial election with the 
name Neue Linke/Nuova Sinistra (New Left), obtaining 3.6% of votes and one seat. 
Although in this first election its votes were attributed mostly to the Italian speaking 
voters, it managed to increase its cross-ethnic character, as well its vote share in the 
following elections. In 1983, the new list‟s name was Alternative Liste furs andere 
Sudtirol/Lista Alternative per l’altro Sudtirolo (Alterntive List for the other South Tyrol) 
and obtained 4.5% of votes and two seats. In 1988 the name changed again, in Grüne 
Alternative Liste/Lista verde Alternativi (Green Alternative List), signalling a shift 
towards a new centrality of environmental issues, and the list gained 6.7% of the vote, 
missing the third seat by very few votes. In 1993 this political movement, which was 
now called Grune/Verdi/Verc (Greens in the three languages), increased slightly its vote 
share. In terms of ideology, the new left movement tended to stress more issues of 
democracy, freedom and inter-ethnic peaceful relationships during the late 1970s and 
1980s, when the Italian speaking community was over-represented. From the 1990s, 
when its electorate started to substantially mirror the ethnic proportion of the population, 
the party became more narrowly concerned with environmental issues (Pallaver, 2007, p. 
593).              
Overall, the SVP did not show any evident reaction to the emergence of the new 
left (Green party), beyond devoting more rhetorical space to environmental issues. It has 
maintained its traditionalist, conservative and ethnic-nationalist ideology. However, this 
apparently non-reactive choice might be considered a strategic response in itself. On the 
one hand, the limited opening up of cross-ethnic electoral competition allowed the SVP 
to attract part (though a very small one) of the Italian electorate with traditionalist 
orientations (Pristinger, 1980, p. 184). On the other hand, the strict pursuit of the „ethnic 
  
181 
 
quotas‟ policy, which also allowed the SVP to exercise ethnic patronage (Holzer and 
Schwegler, 1998, p. 167), created new tensions between the ethnic groups and meant 
that cross-ethnic voting remained a minority sport, thus taking away oxygen from the 
new left and ensuring the survival of the ethnic rally party.      
In terms of coalition politics at national (Italian) level, the SVP re-started its co-
operation with the DC as soon as the agreement on the package was reached in 1969. It 
supported all governments from 1969 to 1978, although it abstained when it came to the 
government of the „historical compromise‟ in 1978, which foresaw co-operation with 
the PCI. There followed a period, between 1979 and 1987, in which the SVP oscillated 
between support, abstention and opposition, due to contrasts in the implementation of 
the „package‟. From 1987 to 1992, the party voted the confidence in all governments.             
   
 
4.3.3 The SVP in the bipolar ‘Second Republic’: the ‘heart’ to the right and the 
‘head’ to the left? (1993-2009). 
The dramatic transformations of the Italian party system and the developments of the 
South Tyrolese one since 1992 have definitely increased the strategic dilemmas of the 
SVP. At national (Italian) level, the 1980s had seen the establishment of a new 
governing formula, still based on the pre-existing tri-polar structure. The centre alliance 
of five parties – DC, PSI, PRI, PSDI and PLI – of which the DC had remained the 
bigger if not always the leading party, guaranteed the formation of governments and the 
permanent exclusion of the most extreme part of the old left (PCI), the new left 
(Proletarian Democracy, the Greens and the Radical Party) and the old extreme-right 
(the neo-fascist MSI). In 1992 a regionalist, „new right‟ party emerged, the Northern 
League (LN), which was also excluded from government in what was to be known as 
the last Parliament of the „First Republic‟. In this political context, the SVP found it 
convenient to keep an open dialogue with the parties of the centre coalition and, on the 
basis of the government‟s commitment towards the implementation of the „package‟, 
decide whether to offer its support. The presence of a centre bloc afforded the SVP the 
possibility of avoiding having to choose between left and right. Ideological divisions 
within the party were, therefore, kept dormant more easily, while the internal dialogue 
between the different wings of the SVP focused on compromising over diverging 
interests, in a corporatist fashion, rather than arguing over conflicting ideas and 
principles.      
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However, the collapse of the government parties, the transformation of the PCI 
and MSI in post-communist and post-fascist parties (Democratic Party of the Left [PDS, 
then DS] and National Alliance [AN] respectively), the birth of new parties, particularly 
Berlusconi‟s Forward Italy (FI), and the change of the voting system from PR to a 
predominantly single member plurality system transformed the old party system into a 
new and dramatically different one.
61
 In just a few years, the new party system was re-
built around a binary coalitional logic, left vs. right (or centre-left vs. centre-right), 
where the two coalitions included not just moderate parties, such as the heirs of the DC 
(the PPI went with the left while the CCD-CDU, then UDC went with the right), but 
also the post-communists and the post-fascists. In addition to the bi-polar coalitional 
structure, the party system of the Second Republic has also been characterized by strong 
ideological polarization, which the most important politician, Silvio Berlusconi, has 
largely maintained, if not increased (Massetti, 2009a). In this context the SVP was 
pushed, especially after the new reform of the voting system in 2005,
62
 to accept pre-
electoral agreements with one of the two blocs, thus having to choose between left and 
right.  
Between 1996 and 2006, the party preferred to negotiate agreements/alliances 
with the centre-left (or with individual parties within that coalition, such as that with the 
PPI in 1996), which allowed it to maintain or even increase its parliamentary 
representation and to incrementally expand the autonomy. According to prominent party 
members, the only reason for accepting agreements/coalitions was the constraints of the 
voting system and the possibility of extracting further competences (Elmar Pichler Rolle, 
speech at the 2007 Conference, Meran/Merano, 17/11/07). As all interviewees 
confirmed, the only criterion for deciding between centre-left and centre-right was not 
proximity on the left-right spectrum but, rather, on the self-government dimension, i.e. 
the different attitudes of the two coalitions towards South Tyrol‟s‟ autonomy. As the 
then party leader put it in 2007: “We chose Prodi because of autonomy…  To choose 
Berlusconi and centralism would have been wrong… The Italian right has always been 
against autonomy” (Elmar Pichler Rolle, speech at the 2007 Conference, Meran/Merano, 
17/11/07). 
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 On these changes see and Katz R. (1996), Newell and Bull (1997). 
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 For the Lower House, the new voting system introduced one multi-member national constituency with 
a majority bonus for the plurality party or coalition. For the Senate, there multi-member constituencies 
and the bonuses were on regional basis. For details on the 2005 electoral reform and its consequences on 
the party system see Massetti E. (2006). 
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Coalition politics has created a lot of internal debate and tensions between the 
various „souls‟ of the SVP, which cast a shadow on the future survival of the party. First 
of all, the more the SVP obtained for autonomy the more further minor achievements 
lost importance compared to governmental decisions on economic policy. Increasingly, 
certain social constituencies would not tolerate SVP support for unwelcome economic 
policies in Rome in exchange for minor extensions of the autonomy. The experience of 
the party‟s support for the Prodi government between 2006 and 2008 was particularly 
divisive, as the latter abandoned the extremely permissive fiscal policy of the previous 
Berlusconi‟s governments (2001-2006), which the business and farmers‟ sections of the 
SVP‟s had appreciated, and started to enforce taxation using „intrusive‟ methods. This 
created enormous dissatisfaction amongst the SVP‟s most important sections (business 
and farmers), as well as internal tensions with the labour wing. Secondly, the 
polarization of Italian politics has fostered internal debate not only in terms of interests 
but also in terms of ideology. At the 2007 Conference, the words of the then party 
leader strongly criticized this tendency towards „excessive‟ internal debate over left and 
right, and looked forward to the return of the centre in Italian politics:  
 
The SVP is neither a left nor a right party, it is a centre party. As an alliance of social-
democrats and Christian-democrats we have anticipated the end of the left-right divide. 
The „grand-coalition‟ in Germany between CDU and SPD and the birth of the 
Democratic Party in Italy confirm that our way is the right one…We don‟t have to let 
ourselves get involved in the polemics between the two blocs of Italian politics… We 
would like an electoral law that would allow us not to choose… We remain very 
interested in developments in Italian politics that would see the emergence of the centre 
(Elmar Pichler Rolle, speech at the 2007 Conference, Meran/Merano, 17/11/07). 
 
 
 
At the April 2008 general election, the SVP decided to run alone. This resulted in a 
very negative score, losing nine percentage points in vote share and two of its four seats 
in the Lower House. The SVP‟s provincial first minister, Durnwalder, put the blame on 
the decision to support the Prodi government (Alto Adige, 13/04/08). Indeed, the 
increased support given to the (German) populist right can be seen as a vote of protest 
against the SVP‟s coalition politics. However, other interpretations, such as the then 
party leader‟s Pichler-Rolle, point to the management of the province. 
 The development of the South Tyrolese party system has also presented 
strategic dilemmas and created internal tensions, at least as much as national Italian 
politics. Within the German electoral arena, at the 1993 provincial election (the first 
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after the full implementation of the „second autonomy‟) minor parties, such as the UfS 
and the cross-ethnic Greens, increased their votes, while a new party the Libertarians 
(dF), broke through. The latter (and to some extent the UfS) represented a radical-right 
challenge with strong links with the Austrian FPÖ. Their electoral appeal was based on 
an anti-establishment and anti-immigration rhetoric, as well as on radical nationalism 
(Pallaver, 2007, p. 584). Because of internal problems, which have been briefly 
discussed in section 4.2.4, the dF experienced an electoral setback in 1998. However, 
with an aggressive and xenophobic campaign, they managed to recover in 2003, 
gaining two seats in the provincial assembly (Pallaver, 2007, p. 585). At the 2008 
provincial election, they increased their vote share by nearly three times and got five 
seats, becoming the second party (including the Italian ones) in the assembly and the 
most feared challenger to the SVP‟s hegemony.  
In addition to the „German diaspora‟, the discontent of many Ladins with the 
way the SVP represented their interests and identity led to the formation of a rally party 
for this ethnic group, which gained representation in the provincial assembly both in 
1993 and 1998. Ideologically, the Ladins‟ party was very close to the conservative, 
Christian democratic section of the SVP, as well as to the old Italian DC. This allowed 
the SVP to re-absorb a great portion of their votes at the 2003 election (Pallaver, 2007, 
p. 588). 
 The Italian parties developed under the influence of the dynamics of the national 
party system. With the demise of the DC, its main heir – Italian People‟s Party (PPI) -  
was the most appealing partner for the SVP (Pallaver, 2007, p. 588). However, because 
of the developments of Italian politics in Rome, the government alliance in Bozen was 
extended to the PDS-DS. To the left, only the Greens remained out of the provincial 
governments. The Italian right remained dominated by the main heir of the MSI, 
National Alliance (AN). This party represented the nationalist feelings within the Italian 
speaking community of South Tyrol. It won three seats in 1998 and in 2003, before 
merging with FI in the People of Freedom (PDL), which got three seats in 2008. The 
other heir of the MSI, the neo-fascist and radical nationalist Unitalia, managed to win 
one seat at each election from 1998 to 2008. The Northern League gained a seat in 1993 
but then disappeared from the provincial assembly until the last election in 2008, when 
it won again a seat. Berlusconi‟s FI, which participated in the provincial elections for 
the first time in 1998, tried to establish itself in South Tyrol by engaging in a strong 
competition with AN. Initially, it adopted a pro-autonomist stance hoping to occupy the 
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place of the old DC and to become the SVP‟s partner in the provincial government 
(Pallaver, 2007, p. 591). In terms of ideological orientations on socio-economic policies, 
FI is very close to the dominant sections of the SVP and many members of the rally 
party would not see such partnership as unviable. However, FI‟s strategy did not work 
out and the party found itself on the opposition benches with AN. At that stage FI 
changed its strategy and started to try and outbid AN on (Italian) nationalism. This 
move proved no more beneficial, jeopardising any possibility of co-operation with the 
SVP without leading to significant electoral gains. Before the 2008 provincial election, 
AN and FI merged into one party, the PDL, with disappointing results. Nevertheless, 
the PDL emerged as the main Italian party in the assembly and is now pursuing a 
strategy of courting the right-wing of the SVP, by slightly softening its nationalist and 
anti-autonomist position. 
 The main strategic difficulties for the SVP in the last sixteen years have come 
from three inter-related factors: the increased competences and responsibility of the 
provincial government, the transformation of the South Tyrolean society, and the 
transformation of the provincial party system just described. The attribution of many 
competences to the provincial government, including the management of relatively very 
large budget, has produced two negative effects. First, instances of disagreement 
between the internal wings of the SVP have increased. Overall, the business and 
farmers‟ section of the party have had the upper hand in taking policy decisions. This 
led the labour wing to the edge of splitting the party in 1998. Eventually, the party only 
lost two members of the provincial assembly, while the bulk of the workers‟ section 
remained within the SVP (Pallaver, 2007, p. 580). In the 2003 election, the labour 
section (and the women‟s section) was rather successful in electing candidates in the 
assembly, thus increasing their political weight (Pallaver, 2007, p. 582). The second 
negative effect concerns the fact that people started to blame Bozen rather than Rome if 
they were  unhappy about the administration. Given the hegemonic position of the rally 
party, criticism towards the provincial government translated automatically in criticism 
towards the SVP. According to a prominent member of the party, the success of dF has 
not only been due to immigration and irredentist feelings but also to the protest vote of 
people discontented with the provincial administration (J. G. Widmann, interview with 
the author, Meran/Merano 16/11/07). This was especially the case with the success of 
dF in the last provincial election. The Libertarians were, indeed, very able to exploit 
discontent over the way the provincial government had implemented construction 
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projects (such as the expansion of the airport) against the wishes of wide sectors of the 
population, and giving the impression it was just serving the interests of the business 
wing (Elmar Pichler Rolle, second email interview with the author, 18/06/09). The anti-
establishment rhetoric of dF is also very effective in criticising the SVP as a party 
permanently in power which, although providing a high standard of administration 
compared to many other Italian regions, has not been completely immune from public 
scandals (Alto Adige, 13/04/08). 
 The transformation of the South Tyrolese society in recent decades has also 
been a source of difficulties for the SVP in some respects. In particular the loosening of 
the ethnic division of labour, especially in the urban centres, the diffusion of higher 
education, the growth of cross-ethnic marriages and of multi-lingual people who grow 
up in such families has put into question the system of strict separation amongst ethnic 
groups. The trend towards transcending the ethnic divide has been particularly evident 
in the 1990s and early 2000s, coinciding with the electoral growth of the cross-ethnic 
party of the Greens and its peak at the 2003 provincial election and 2004 European 
election. In this period the SVP has tried to react to the increased electoral weight of the 
Greens by devoting more attention to environmental issues and by slightly softening its 
character as strict ethnic party. In the 1998 election manifesto the SVP spoke of “eco-
social market economy” (Pallaver, 2006, p. 168). However, whenever environmental 
protection conflicted with economic growth, the latter took priority in the party‟s 
decisions (ibid.). In terms of inter-ethnic relationship, the SVP showed a moderate 
opening towards the Italian speaking group from the late 1990s. In 1998 it ran, for the 
first time, an electoral campaign in Italian as well, which was appreciated by the 
majority of the Italian group and supported by an overwhelming majority of the 
German group (Pallaver, 2006, p. 184). This moderate opening has been opposed by the 
internal nationalist wing and has not led to a full transition from a ethnic-regionalist 
party to a simply regionalist one. This notwithstanding, some concessions to the access 
of Italian speaking people were maintained: not only they could become members of 
the party, provided that they accepted its statute and agenda, but could also be put on 
party lists as candidates at local council level, if the local branch gave its approval. 
 However, after the electoral setback of the Greens and the breakthrough of the 
radical-right dF at the 2008 general and provincial election, the SVP has inverted its 
policy. Caught in between the multi-cultural leaning of the (small) urban population and 
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the ethnic-nationalism of the rural one, the party has not taken long to realize where the 
most serious challenge is coming from: 
 
Many people in South Tyrol live multi-culturally but only in the cities. The Greens have 
even lost one mandate during the state parliament election 2008. It should be much 
easier to build a moderate, liberal and open wing within the SVP than to cover the 
deficits on the folkloristic political right-wing. (Elmar Pichler Rolle, email interview, 
12/03/09). 
 
 
The SVP was built as a minority party and still sees herself as one today. She will remain 
the party of the German and Ladin minorities in South Tyrol… During the last election 
the Greens lost a mandate. The electors want a clear and direct position in times of crisis. 
It seems they want no multi-ethnical party in times of crisis but a clear direction/line… 
In times of crisis it is nothing new to see even employees vote increasingly right. They 
[Die Freiheitlichen] have made their election campaign a downright hate campaign 
against foreigners with very clear concept of the enemy. (Seppl Lamprecht, deputy 
leader of the SVP 2000-2004, email interview with the author, 30/03/09).  
 
 
At the 2009 Conference, the SVP decided to change its statute to prevent Italian 
speaking people from being placed on the party lists as candidates at any level, thus re-
stating its nature as an ethnic party (Alto Adige, 07/05/09). 
  The basic question for the SVP remains, however, how to reconcile the desire to 
maintain an ethnic divide and a consociational regime with the lack of a suitable Italian 
party which could act as a permanent government partner. Figure 4.1 represents the 
current (post 2008 election) party system in South Tyrol. As the figure shows, the SVP 
has managed to maintain a pivotal and dominant position. However, the distribution of 
votes and seats amongst the Italian parties, as well as their positioning constitute a 
dilemma for the SVP, especially in the context of ever more evident divisions between 
its internal factions. The PD represents an acceptable partner as far as the autonomy is 
concerned, although it would prefer a looser application of the principle of ethnic quotas. 
It represents an almost ideal choice for the minority faction of the SVP, the labour wing, 
which shares ideological proximity with it. It is also the party whose national leadership 
has proved more generous with the South Tyrolese autonomy. For this reasons, after the 
2008 provincial election, the SVP‟s leadership has decided to continue its co-operation 
with it. However, the PD (and its originating parties) has represented less than a quarter 
of the Italian community, casting doubts on the legitimacy of a consociational regime in 
which one of the groups is barely represented. In addition, in terms of left-right 
positioning the PD has been rather distant from the majoritarian factions of the SVP, 
which share more ideological affinity and, even more, convergence of interests with the 
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biggest Italian party, the PDL. The latter party has been challenging the SVP for its 
rejection of co-operation with the Italian right and the consequent illegitimacy of a 
governance system that decides matters over the heads of the majority of the Italians. 
 
Figure 4.1 
      Current Party System in South Tyrol 
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However, it has also softened its position on the autonomy issue and courted the 
business section of the SVP. This strategy seems to have started producing some effects, 
as a prominent member of the business section of the SVP has urged the party to open 
to the Italian centre-right (Alto Adige, 25/06/09). Debate within the SVP on policy re-
positioning and alliance politics is still going on, and the situation appears rather fluid. 
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However, it is very unlikely that the leadership would be able bring the whole party into 
an alliance with the PDL. The words of a prominent member of the labour wing of the 
party suggest that the issue has been thoroughly discussed amongst the social-democrats 
of the SVP and sound more like a threat than a simple prediction: “There is a 
component of the party [the business section] that does not like our alliance with the 
centre-left… But they know very well that if the party moves to the right the risk of a 
split becomes inevitable” (J. G. Widmann, interview with the author, Meran/Merano, 
16/11/07). 
 
 
4.4 Party ideology and policy: The European integration dimension 
4.4.1 A Europhile party throughout the integration process 
 For a long time, the worst „nightmare‟ of the SVP has been to be isolated in its 
struggle with the Italian state. In this respect, help and support was sought not only 
from the motherland (Austria) but, also, from the international community.  The 
involvement of the UN in the South Tyrolese question has been the key to the success 
of the SVP in securing an extensive autonomy. For this reason, the party has developed 
from the beginning a positive attitude towards international and supra-national co-
operation, including European integration. This basic inclination has been reinforced by 
several factors. First, the party‟s ideology has played an important role. As a 
predominantly Christian-democratic party, the SVP had close relationships with the 
main political forces (especially the German CDU-CSU and the Italian DC) which 
started the integration process back in the 1950s and shared their philosophy of „social 
market economy‟. As an anti-communist party, it also appreciated the development of 
the European Community as a political/economic/military bloc which counterbalanced 
(with the support of the US) the power of the Eastern bloc in Europe. Secondly, 
European policies also developed in a direction which suited in most respects the needs 
and grievances of South Tyrol. European regional policy with its structural founds, as 
well as projects for interregional co-operation, were particularly helpful to South Tyrol 
for the building of modern economic infra-structures. It was partly thanks to these funds 
that South Tyrol has become one of the richest regions in Europe (Pallaver, 2004, p. 
207). The embracing of minority rights by the European Community was also 
welcomed by the SVP, which for long time saw the EEC (then the EU) as protective 
entity vis a vis the Italian state. Finally, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has 
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been very important for a largely rural region such as South Tyrol. The CAP and the 
Common Market have been major drivers in the restructuring of South Tyrolese 
agriculture in the 1960s (Pristinger, 1980, p. 169). Although the SVP has always 
complained that the CAP, having been designed for the farming businesses of the 
French and German lowlands, does not take enough into account the specific needs of 
the mountain farmers, European agricultural funds have represented an important 
resource for the South Tyrolese economy. 
The political driver of European integration, however, has always remained the 
most interesting one for the SVP. The 1972 party programme stated: “The SVP 
approves the political union of European states in the protection of peoples‟ 
peculiarities… [the SVP] sees in this process as the precondition for the overcoming of 
nationalisms” (SVP, 1972 Programme, quoted in Frasnelli and Gallmetzer, 1990, p. 48).  
 As Table 4.10 shows, the SVP has always been able to send a representative to 
the European Parliament, being in this respect one of the few exceptions amongst 
regionalist parties (Lynch, 1998; De Winter and Gomez-Reino, 2002).  
 
Table 4.10 
European election results and seats in South Tyrol 1979-2009 
 
Party 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 
SVP 63 (1) 63.1 (1) 53 (1) 56.8 (1) 56 (1) 46.7 (1) 52.1 (1) 
PCI/DS/PD 7.4 (1)      7.2 
Grune/Verdi   7.2 (1) 9 (1) 6.7 (1) 13.1 (1) 10.9 
MSI/AN/PDL   7.1 (1)    12.8 
 
Source: Pallaver (2006). 
 
 
Interestingly, the SVP‟s MEPs have always joined the European People‟s Party (EPP) 
group and never took into consideration the idea to join the EFA group. This choice 
owed much, in addition to ideological proximity with the parties of the EPP, to its wish 
to belong to a large and influential group:  
 
In the EU parliament only big parliamentary groups can change something. Our 
delegates have been able to establish a connection between the Italian and Austrian as 
well as the German “People‟s Parties” and often mediated between them and from that 
we have also benefited. (Elmar Pichler Rolle, email interview, 12/03/09).   
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 Since the 1980s, the SVP has enthusiastically joined the discussion on the 
creation of a „Europe of the Regions‟ and welcomed the Treaty of Maastricht and the 
„subsidiarity‟ principle. The party‟s understanding of the „Europe of the regions‟ project 
is the creation of a federal Europe in which the regions will eventually substitute the 
nation-states as the building blocs. As the new 1993 party programme states: “The SVP 
does not want a Europe of states, levelling out and central bureaucracy, but a Europe of 
the regions as manageable units in which the principle of subsidiarity is put in practice” 
(Grundsatzprogramm, Das neue Programm der Südtiroler Volkspartei, Beschlossen von 
der Landesversammlung am 8. Mai 1993 - The New Basic Programme of the SVP, May 
1993). 
 Beyond strengthening the status of South Tyrol as an autonomous region within 
Italy, the „Europe of the Regions‟ framework has also served another important 
objective of the SVP: re-connecting South Tyrol with the Austrian Tyrol as much as 
possible. This project, which has been discussed since the 1980s, acquired centrality in 
the SVP‟s programme in the early 1990s, when Austria‟s imminent accession into the 
EU made the project more feasible and the party was desperate to find a new mission to 
substitute the already accomplished autonomy. Beside „dynamic autonomy‟, the 
creation of a Tyrol Euro-region with an influential role within the European multi-level 
system became the new long term goal of the SVP. The 1993 programme states:  
 
It is the duty of the responsible policy in South Tyrol to restore this unit [Tyrol] at all 
levels and with legal and political means. A major goal is the creation of a multi-lingual, 
federalist Tyrol Euro-region within the framework of the European federalist system 
(Grundsatzprogramm, Das neue Programm der Südtiroler Volkspartei, Beschlossen von 
der Landesversammlung am 8. Mai 1993 - The New Basic Programme of the SVP, May 
1993). 
 
 
In the 1980s the idea of a Euro-region referred to an ethnic (German) Tyrol, rather than 
to historical Tyrol. The initial project included only South Tyrol, with its German 
majority, and Land Tirol in Austria. However, this project was fiercely opposed by the 
Italian minority of South Tyrol, and the ethnic connotation was not welcomed either by 
Rome or Brussels. Eventually, in order to make the project acceptable, the North and 
South Tyrolese had to include the old Welschtirol, that is Trent province, as well 
(Pallaver, 2005, p. 206). The name Tyrol Euro-region was officially used for the first 
time in 1995 for the joint representation of the three components to the EU Commission 
in Brussels, although the Euro-region was proclaimed only 1998 by the joint assembly 
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of the three territorial units (Markusse, 2004, p. 667). However, the project has not 
moved much further than pre-existing co-operation on areas of traffic, infrastructures 
and environment. Institutionally, it has not gone beyond the triennial meetings of the 
three regional assemblies, which by the way used to happen also before the 
proclamation the Euro-region. In the words of a SVP senior member: “For the time 
being, the Tyrol Euro-region is a cultural more than political project” (J. G. Widmann, 
interview with the author, Meran/Merano, 16/11/07). The 2007 Conference resolution 
also acknowledged the underdeveloped state of the project and urged the South 
Tyrolese society to do more, in the hope that deeper European integration created more 
favourable conditions: “We have to act for more European integration and give real life 
to the Tyrol Euro-region… it is in the people‟s heads that frontiers must be abolished 
and transformed into a positive policy. A shared Tyrol must be built from below” (SVP, 
Resolution of the 54
th
 Conference, 2007, p. 2).    
 The conviction that the best way ahead for South Tyrol‟s future lies in a united 
and federal Europe has maintained the SVP in a Europhile position, in spite of concerns 
that have recently emerged about the EU‟s dominant ideology and its possible 
repercussions on the EU‟s policies. The liberal approach of the EU to social problems, 
which tends to give priority to individual rights, might sooner or later clash with the 
pillar of South Tyrol‟s autonomy: the system of ethnic quotas (Pallaver, 2005, p. 207). 
The SVP is very aware of this potential source of tensions:  
 
We must be watchful in order to avoid substantial aspects of our autonomy being 
unjustly limited. Defending our autonomy, also in respect to Europe, remains a primary 
objective of ours. Such an objective remains unchanged, independently of whether 
decisions are taken in Rome or in Brussels (Luis Durnwalder, South Tyrol‟s First 
Minister 1992-today, Programmatic declarations, 28/01/99, quoted in Di Sotto, 2004).      
 
 In addition to the risks for the system of ethnic quotas, the SVP is also very wary of the 
EU‟s immigration policy. The source of the disagreement is the same. While the SVP 
ideology is primarily shaped by ethnic regionalism – what Michael Keating calls „old 
regionalism‟ (Keating, 1998) – the EU‟s is mainly guided by individualistic 
cosmopolitanism. The latter stream of thought does not assign particular importance to 
the link between individuals (let alone ethnic communities) and the territory. However, 
this ideological divergence between the SVP and the EU, with the possible 
disagreements that may descend from it in the future, has remained dormant so far. As 
former party leader put it: “We see Europe very positively. I think that European 
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integration will proceed. The states will sooner or later assign more powers to the EU 
(defence, security, immigration policy and foreign affairs). This means regions will 
become stronger, especially those with a long common history” (Elmar Pichler Rolle, 
email interview, 12/03/09). The SVP has supported all European treaties, including the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
Conclusion 
 As a hegemonic party attracting virtually all the votes of the ethnic electorate, 
the SVP has been for long time relatively immune to the challenges posed by electoral 
competitors. Although many tried to compete with the party for German-speaking votes, 
their challenge proved too evanescent to exert much influence on the SVP. Things have 
substantively changed, though, since the 1990s. 
On the centre-periphery dimension, the constraints of international relations (i.e. 
peace treaties), prevented the party from adopting a stable secessionist position, in spite 
of the overwhelming irredentist aspirations of the German-speaking people and 
therefore of the majority of the electorate. Challengers proposing a more radical 
position were largely unsuccessful until 1992, when the SVP acknowledged the 
implementation of the Paris agreement. Since then, when its historic mission could be 
said to have been accomplished, the party has tried to escape electoral decline by 
proposing the pursuit of „dynamic autonomy‟.  However secessionist challengers have 
dramatically increased their electoral weight and are drawing the SVP towards more 
radical positions, at least as far as „folklore politics‟ is concerned. 
 Left-right politics in South Tyrol from 1945 to the end of the 1960s was 
essentially an internal matter within the SVP, as the party represented all the main 
interests of South Tyrolean society. The first serious electoral challenge came in the 
early 1970s from the left. However, it was re-absorbed again in the form of internal 
politics, by creating a „Labour section‟ within the party organization. Since then, the 
cohabitation of left and right within the party has not always been easy, with the labour 
section coming very close to splitting off in 1998. Important challenges have also come 
from the New Left, the inter-ethnic Greens, and the New (Radical) Right, especially the 
populist, anti-immigration and anti-Islam Libertarians. While the former propose an 
ideology which is at odds with the SVP‟s, the latter just take some of the party‟s 
ideological stances, such as ethnic-nationalism and nativism to more extreme positions. 
In addition, being relatively new and outsider competitors, they can deploy a populist 
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rhetoric which blames the governmental SVP for shortcomings that lie both within and 
without its responsibility. There is no doubt that, for these reasons, the challenge 
coming from the radical right is the most serious for the SVP and the one which is 
affecting its strategies the most. 
  As far as European integration is concerned, the SVP has not significantly 
changed its position on this issue. It strongly supported integration from the 1940s to 
the 1990s. Recently, it has been suspicious about the EU‟s emphasis on individual 
rights (since these might clash with the principle of ethnic quotas) about the EU‟s 
immigration policy, and about the omission of a reference to Europe‟s Christian roots in 
the EU Constitution and Lisbon Treaty. Nonetheless, it remains clearly a pro-European 
party, as further integration allows it to envisage new developments in South Tyrol‟s 
relations with Italy and Austria. 
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Chapter 5  
 
The Northern League (Lega Nord) 
 
 
The Northern League is a peculiar regionalist party. Like the other cases analysed in this 
work it represents a particular territory within the state. However, the construction of 
this territory has been a work-in-progress, which has led the party to focus on different 
territorial levels and to include different parts of Italian territory at different times. In 
addition, being a federation of different regionalist parties (the various regional leagues), 
it is primarily a national actor, in the sense that its size makes it a very relevant player in 
Italian politics at central level. In contrast to most regionalist parties, which try and 
exert pressure on central governments from the regional level, the League has mainly 
attempted to seize power at national level in order to carry out those reforms which 
would empower the regions it represents. 
The party has been in office in Rome three times (1994-95, 2001-05, and since 
2008). This national focus is also confirmed by the party‟s electoral performance, which 
tends to be better at national than regional level. Indeed, the League has never been the 
biggest party in regional assemblies and has never led a regional executive in the 
heartland regions of Lombardy, Veneto or Piedmont. On the other hand the League has 
always scored particularly well at local level (both provincial and council). In spite of 
its relatively recent appearance on the scene, the League has repositioned itself many 
times on all three ideology/policy dimensions analysed in this study. This was often 
driven by the rapid and chaotic developments in Italian politics over the last thirty years.  
 
 
5.1 Party Profile: Origins and Political Achievements 
5.1.1 The historical origins of the centre-periphery cleavage in Northern Italy 
 Northern Italy remained a politically fragmented territory until 1866, when 
Italian unity was completed - with the exception of Trent and Trieste (and Rome in 
central Italy). From the middle ages, the north-west part of Italy, of which Turin was the 
most important city, had been under the rule of the House of Savoy, who subsequently 
extended their control over Sardinia, thus acquiring a royal status, and over Genoa. The 
northern-central part of Italy belonged to the Dukes of Milan, though in the following 
centuries it often fell under foreign (i.e. non-Italian) rule, and roughly corresponded to 
contemporary western Lombardy. Contemporary eastern Lombardy (i.e. Bergamo and 
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Brescia provinces) belonged to the Republic of Venice, which controlled the north-
eastern part of the peninsula, plus other possessions external to contemporary Italy. 
South of the Po River, were the Duchy (later Grand-Duchy) of Tuscany, the small 
Duchies of Modena and Parma, and the Papal States which extended from Gaeta in the 
south up to Bologna and Ferrara in the north. Roughly, this was still the political 
situation of Italy after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, with the only important change 
concerning the unification of Lombardy and Veneto (the Kingdom of Lombardy-
Venetia) under the rule of the Austrian Empire.
63
 
 After unification, which was achieved by means of military conquest (though 
legitimized by popular referendums in the occupied territories), the new Kingdom of 
Italy was organized in a rigidly centralised way. The Napoleonic system of prefects 
(provincial governors appointed by the central government) was extended from the 
Kingdom of Sardinia to the new Kingdom of Italy. In spite of institutional centralization, 
strong economic and cultural differences between the various regions persisted, and 
national politics mainly consisted of a bargaining between territorial elites representing 
different socio-economic and socio-cultural constituencies. Large scale industrial 
development, starting from the late nineteenth century, remained circumscribed within 
the so called „industrial triangle‟ (Turin, Milan and Genoa). The remaining part of the 
north was left agricultural and economically depressed, while southern regions, as well 
as being economically backward, were also afflicted by widespread social banditry 
(Hobsbawm, 1959). The inability of Italian governments to develop the depressed areas 
produced an immense wave of emigration which reached its peak in 1913, when in a 
single year nearly 900,000 people left (Monticelli, 1967). The Fascist regime addressed 
the „southern question‟ more convincingly, expanding enormously public expenditure 
on health and social welfare (Pollard, 1998, p. 80). It tried to establish the state‟s 
„monopoly of violence‟ by repressing not only social banditry but also, though not 
without some contradictions, the mafia too (Duggan, 1989). In addition, the Fascist 
regime, following its nationalist ideology, made great efforts to strengthen the Italian 
national identity. However, in terms of economic development, it did not manage to 
decrease the gap between the north-west and the rest of the country, which remained 
almost exclusively agricultural. 
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 For a brief account of pre-unitary Italy and how previous territorial identities were embodied and, in 
many cases, reshaped within the unitary state, see Lyttelton (1996). 
  
197 
 
 In 1948 the new Constitution of the Italian Republic recognised fifteen ordinary 
regions with administrative competences and four special status regions - Sicily, 
Sardinia, Aosta Valley and Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol (to which Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia would be added in the 1960s, after the solution of the „Trieste question‟) – with 
legislative and tax-raising powers. However, fearing that the Italian Communist Party 
(PCI) could seize power in some of the regions, the governments led by the Christian 
Democratic party (DC) delayed implementation of the Constitution for ordinary regions 
until 1970. From the post-war electoral contests, in fact, it had emerged that the PCI - 
and the then allied socialists (PSI) - were the dominant force in Emilia-Romagna and 
central Italy (mainly Tuscany and Umbria). They were fairly competitive in the „north-
western industrial triangle‟ too, while the DC was dominant in the remaining parts of 
the north („deep north‟) and in the south.  
Public education, military service and the diffusion of mass media (especially 
TV) managed to spread the use of standard Italian language
64
 across the peninsula and 
to create, to a large extent, a national cultural identity. However, from an economic 
point of view, the governments of the new Italian Republic did not succeed in closing 
(or even decreasing) the gap between the North-western regions and the Southern ones. 
The only novelty in Italian economic geography was represented by the rapid and 
sustained growth experienced by the central and, even more, peripheral northern regions 
(i.e. those outside the industrial triangle) since the late 1960s. Sociologists started to 
speak of a „Third Italy‟ (Bagnasco, 1977), which through the diffusion of small 
enterprises, often organized in territorial networks (industrial districts), had started to 
resemble the „First Italy‟ (i.e. the area of the industrial triangle) in several respects: 
reduction of employment in agriculture, increase in manufacturing workers, growth in 
the resident population and an increased share of Italian industrial output.
65
 In contrast 
to „First Italy‟, the „Third Italy‟ was characterized by: first, lower levels of urbanization 
(the industrial districts grew outside the big cities) and a marked predominance of 
manufacturing over service businesses; second, a certain distance of the (small) 
entrepreneurs from the Italian financial and political elites (the former based in Turin 
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 For the diffusion of the Italian language amongst the Italian population since 1861 and for the 
persisting complex relationship between standard Italian and dialects, see Lepschy et al. (1996). 
65
 For instance, in Lombardy as a whole those employed in agriculture dropped from 28.9 in 1936 to 6% 
in 1981. In the same period the number of workers in industry rose from 57.9% to 68.9%. In the province 
of Como (in northern Lombardy), for instance, the number of self employed artisans grew from 33,262 in 
1951 to 59,469 in 1981 (Tambini, 2001, p. 27). 
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and Milan, the latter based in Rome); and third, a much less marked distinction between 
owners and workers‟ social and political identities than in the industrial triangle 
(Bagnasco and Triglia, 1984). Owners and workers of „Third Italy‟ had, in most cases, 
the same socio-cultural background. Until the late 1950s most of them (or their families) 
had been peasants (Cento Bull and Corner, 1993). In addition, many new enterprises 
were family businesses, where the members of the family both owned and worked for 
firm. Moreover, the small dimensions of economic units, the network system, the 
extremely rapid pace of the economic development and the good prospects for further 
expansion meant that many entrepreneurs had started their career as workers and many 
workers aimed to set up a new business on their own in the future. Therefore, a working 
class identity remained largely absent, in spite of extremely high levels of employment 
in industry. Instead, affiliation to the Catholic Church remained very strong until at least 
the 1970s (Dal Ferro, 1989). This explains why the DC, rather than the PCI (or the PSI) 
was the dominant party in the northern part of „Third Italy‟ until the late 1980s 
(Diamanti, 1993). 
Paradoxically, the emergence of a „Third Italy‟, whose conceptualization was 
meant to overcome the traditional and simplistic North-South dichotomy, created the 
conditions to reinforce such dichotomy. The north as a whole became, in spite of the 
different socio-economic fabric between the large scale industrial triangle and the 
periphery, more homogeneous in terms of level of private wealth. In contrast, the 
southern regions, with few territorially concentrated exceptions, were left far behind. 
The creation of the European Common Market in the 1950s, in fact, created a further 
structural advantage for the North, which enjoyed geographical proximity with other 
well developed regions north of the Alps.
66
 
 This north-south economic divide had several consequences, amongst which 
three are particularly relevant here. First, from the 1950s to the early 1980s there was a 
continuous flow of internal migration from south to north (initially to the north-west but 
from the 1970s onwards to the north-east too). Although the southern immigrants were 
integrated relatively well, this massive flow of migrants led to some cultural clashes. In 
addition, from the 1980s Italy started to receive significant flows of foreign immigrants 
(the so called „extra-comunitari‟). Given the north-south economic gap, most of them 
settled (and still tend to settle) in northern regions. Second, a certain division of labour 
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 By 1991 the GDP of Northern and Central Italy was 122 percent the European Community average, 
while the GDP of the South was 68.9 percent (Levy, 1996, p. 3). 
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between northern and southern Italians started to emerge, with people in the north 
working primarily in the private economy and southerners taking up most of the jobs in 
the army, the police, the civil service, in the judiciary and, increasingly, in education. 
This trend also added to cultural clashes and, in times of economic slow-down, 
represented a cause for „northern grievances‟ towards the central state. Third, in order to 
promote economic development in the south, the state transferred financial resources 
from the regions of the north to the south.
67
 In 1950 the Cassa del Mezzogiorno was 
created. It has been reported that the Cassa has transferred an average of 3.2 billion 
euros per year from the state to the southern regions for over forty years (Stella, 1998, p. 
84). While in the 1950s and 1960s, the money was primarily spent on building basic and 
useful infrastructures, from the 1970s it has been mainly used as a generator of political 
consensus in the degenerated form of clientelism.  
The centre-periphery cleavage that the Northern League has politicized has, 
therefore, had a predominantly economic emphasis. In addition, it has had two different 
points of reference. One is internal to northern Italy, and concerns the divide between 
the centres of finance and big industry (mainly Turin and Milan) and the more 
peripheral or „deep‟ North. The latter area has been identified with the provinces which 
follow the foothills of the Alpine arch and is labelled „Pedemontania‟ (Diamanti, 1996). 
The second point of reference is the North-South divide. As it will be discussed in the 
following sections, from the League‟s point of view, the central state has become the 
means through which the assisted south kept milking the productive north. The Cassa 
del Mezzogiorno was the symbol of this reality, or perception of the reality. It was 
eventually closed down on the wave of the Northern League‟s electoral growth in the 
early 1990s. However, for the League that was just the beginning of a long struggle with 
the Italian state.  
 
 5.1.2 Party profile: origins, electoral expansion and major political achievements  
 During the 1980s several regionalist „leagues‟ were created in the ordinary 
regions of Northern Italy (Diamanti, 1993). Behind this political phenomenon lay the 
idea of Bruno Salvadori, a prominent figure in the ethno-regionalist party of Aosta 
Valley Union Valdôtaine, who professed co-operation between regionalist parties of 
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 In 1991 the south received 53 percent of the capital transfers from the state, while it paid 20 percent of 
the national direct tax revenues, 29 percent of all indirect revenues and 16 percent of the national social 
security. In spite of these financial transfers, unemployment in that year was over 15 percent in the south 
compared with just above 5 percent in the north (Levy, 1996, p. 3).  
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different regions in order push for a federal reform of the Italian state (Tarchi, 1998, p. 
143). In 1979, after having met Salvadori, Umberto Bossi founded the Unione Nord-
Occidentale Lombarda per l’Autonomia (Bossi, 1992, p. 41). In 1982 he set up a new 
movement, which in 1984 was officially founded as Lega Autonomista Lombarda and 
from 1986 was renamed simply Lega Lombarda (LL). In 1980 the Venetian League 
(LV) and the Piedmont‟s Rebirth (AP) were born too. In the same period, regional 
leagues were also founded in Liguria, Emilia Romagna and Tuscany. Therefore, by the 
early 1980s all the major ordinary regions of Northern and Central Italy had their own 
regionalist organizations, though they were still something in between movements and 
proper political parties. The LV - „the mother of all leagues‟, as the party leader Franco 
Rocchetta used to say (Diamanti, 1993, p. 43) - was the first to impose itself in the 
electoral arena by electing two MPs (one Deputy and one Senator) at the 1983 general 
election and two regional councillors at the 1985 regional election. However, both the 
LV and AP were torn by internal divisions, while Bossi‟s LL gained prominence 
electing two MPs (one Deputy and one Senator) at the 1987 general elections and 
projecting itself as the leading component of „leaguism‟. 
 
 
Table 5.1 Electoral Results of the Northern League  
at Regional elections in northern regions 
 
 1985** 1990 1995 2000 2005 
North      
Lombardy 0.5 18.9 18.7 15.5 15.8 
Veneto 3.7 5.9 17.5 12.0 14.7 
Piedmont 1.1 5.1 11.1 7.6 8.5 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia* - - 26.7 17.4 9.3 
Trentino-Alto Adige/Sudtirol* - 0.3 9.6 4.7 3.2 
Liguria 0.9 6.1 6.5 4.3 4.7 
Emilia Romagna 0.4 2.9 3.8 3.3 4.8 
Aosta Valley* - - 7.6 3.4 - 
 
Centre 
     
Toscana 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.6 1.3 
Marche  0.5 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.9 
Umbria 0.4 0.2 - 0.3 - 
 
Source: Istituto Cattaneo. Data available at: 
http://www.cattaneo.org/index.asp?l1=archivi&l2=adele&l3=regionali 
  
*Elections in the three special status regions were held two years earlier than in the other regions (1983, 
1988, 1993, 1998 and 2003). 
**Data on the 1985 election refer to the individual regional leagues. 
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The 1989 European election represented the occasion for co-operation amongst 
the leagues and for the creation, under the Lombard leadership, of a federated, unitary 
party. The Alleanza Nord list, presented at European election, became Lega Nord (LN) 
in December 1989 (Tarchi, 1998, p. 114). In 1991, after the positive results of the 1990 
regional elections (see Table 5.1), it celebrated its first Conference (Congresso 
Federale), at which Bossi was elected party leader and the individual leagues ceased to 
exist as independent parties. Beyond federating the existing leagues, the new party 
penetrated other regions – the three special status regions of the North (Aosta Valley, 
Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol and Friuli-Venezia Giulia) and two central regions 
(Marche and Umbria) – establishing regional branches. 
 With the creation of the LN, the new party became a political actor of national 
relevance and its main objective became the achievement of influence in the central 
institutions. The 1992 general election, in which the party obtained 8.7 percent of votes 
nationally and 17.3 percent in the North (Table 5.2), marked the entrance of the League 
into the Italian party system as a relevant party for government formation. The League‟s 
result, which came primarily at the expense of the DC (Diamanti, 1993), contributed 
decisively to weakening the party system that had emerged from the beginning of the 
Republic, thus opening the way for new developments. Between 1992 and 1993, the DC 
and its allies – the socialists (PSI), the social-democrats (PSDI), the republicans (PRI) 
and the liberals (PLI) – were swamped by judicial investigations which unveiled a 
widespread network of illegal party funding. With the collapse of the centre and centre-
right parties, the LN found itself in a very favourable position. In the local elections of 
1993 the LN „conquered‟ Milan, electing Marco Formentini as city mayor, giving a 
further demonstration of its electoral strength in the north. The adoption, forced by a 
popular referendum, of a mainly majoritarian electoral system opened up a scenario in 
which the LN would electorally dominate the North, the PDS (the main heir of the PCI) 
the central regions and the PPI (the main heir of the DC) the south. However, the entry 
into politics of media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi and his new party Forza Italia (FI), 
together with his rehabilitation of the neo-fascist party MSI - restyled as Alleanza 
Nazionale (AN) in 1995 – as a legitimate coalition partner (the so called sdoganamento), 
radically changed the political scenario (Morlino, 1996; Newell and Bull, 1997).  
On the one hand the League was negatively affected. These new competitors 
considerably restricted its electoral „hunting ground‟. This was particularly true of the 
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FI, a party ideologically very similar to the League,
68
 newer than the League
69
 and with 
a leader who represented the northern entrepreneurial class. On the other hand, 
Berlusconi‟s project of creating a centre-right bloc to prevent the PDS and its allies 
getting into office (these had formed the Progressisti alliance for the forthcoming 
election) did not stand a chance without the support of the LN (Tarchi, 1998, p. 145). 
 
 
Table 5.2 General elections (Lower House) in Italy,  
votes % and seats (1992-2008) 
 
 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 
De - - - - - 2.4 (0) 
LN 8.6 (55) 8.4 (117) 10.1 (59) 3.9 (30) 4.6e (26) 8.3 (60) 
FI - PDL - 21.0 (113) 20.6 (123) 29.4 (178) 23.7 (137) 37.4 (276) 
MSI - AN 5.4 (34) 13.5 (109) 15.7 (93) 12.0 (99) 12.3 (71) -f 
PLI 2.9 (17) - - - - - 
MpA - - - - - 1.3 (8) 
CCD-CDU-UDC -  (27)a 5.8 (30) 3.2 (40) 6.8 (39) 5.6 (36) 
DC–PPI/PS–PPI-Ma 29.7 (206) 11.1 (33) 6.8 (80) 14.5 (80) - - 
Radicals - RnP 1.2 (7) 3.5 (6) 1.9 (0) 2.3 (0) 2.6 (18) -g 
IdV  - - - 3.9 (0) 2.3 (16) 4.4 (29) 
PSDI 2.7 (16) - - - - - 
PRI 4.4 (27) - - - - - 
PSI-Sdi-Ps 13.6 (92) 2.2 (14) 0.4 (0) (9)c - 1.0 (0) 
PCI-PDS-DS-Ul-PD 16.1 (107) 20.4 (164)b 21.1 (167) 16.6 (137) 31.3 (220)d 33.2 (217) 
Verdi (Greens) 2.8 (16) 2.2 (0) 2.5 (14) 2.2 (8) 2.1 (15) - 
PdCI - - - 1.7 (10) 2.3 (16) - 
RC-SA 5.6 (35) 6.0 (39) 8.6 (35) 5.0 (11) 5.8 (41) 3.1 (0)h 
Others 7.0 (18) 6.6 (15) 6.5 (2) 5.3 (26) 6.2 (18) 3.3 (4) 
Total 100 (630) 100 (630) 100 (630) 100 (630) 100 (630) 100 (630) 
 
Source: Bardi (2007, p. 716-17); Massetti (2009a). 
 
a: the CCD did not present its own list for the PR vote in 1994. Its candidates were elected in FI‟s lists or 
in FPTP constituencies. 
b: includes elected representatives of the Greens and La Rete (The Net). 
c: SDI candidates were only present in FPTP constituencies. 
d: in 2006, DS and Ma formed a common list Olive Tree (Ul). The following year they merged into the 
Democratic Party (DP). 
e: LN+MpA. 
f: in 2008 AN presented a common list with FI called People of Freedom (PDL). The following year the 
PDL became a unified party. 
g: the radicals in 2008 were included in the PD‟s list.  
h: in 2008 RC, PdCI and the Greens formed a common list, the Rainbow Left (SA).  
 
 
                                                 
68
 Eugenio Scalfari (columnist of the newspaper La Repubblica) has recently reported that FI‟s co-
ordinator Denis Verdini declared that, before deciding to found FI, Silvio Berlusconi had flirted with the 
idea of joining Bossi at the leadership of the LN (La Repubblica, 23/08/09).      
69
 It is worth noting that, in the aftermath of the fall of the old party system, „newness‟ was a very 
precious resource to spend in the electoral market. 
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 The tough conditions imposed by Bossi to Berlusconi for the alliance – 80 
percent of all Lombard and 65-70 percent of all northern single member constituencies 
were reserved for candidates of the League – meant that, after the 1994 general election, 
the LN became the biggest parliamentary group. However, as Table 5.2 shows, the 
percentage of votes slightly decreased compared to the 1992 election, with Berlusconi 
becoming Prime Minister. The negative trend was confirmed in the 1994 European 
election (see Table 5.3), when the vote of the League went down to 6.6 percent 
nationally. 
 
 
  Table 5.3 Electoral results of the Northern League in European elections 
 
 1989* 1994 1999 2004 2009 
Lombardy 8.1 17.7 13.1 13.8 22.7 
Veneto 1.7 15.6 10.7 14.1 28.4 
Piedmont 2.1 11.5 7.8 8.2 15.7 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.5 11.2 10.1 8.6 17.5 
Liguria 1.4 8.0 3.7 4.1 9.9 
Trentino-Alto Adige/Sudtirol 1.0 4.5 2.4 3.5 9.9 
Aosta Valley 0.5 5.7 1.9 3.0 4.4 
Emilia Romagna 0.5 4.4 3.0 3.4 11.1 
Total North 0.8 12.7 9.0 10.0 19.3 
Tuscany - - - - 4.3 
Marche - - - - 5.5 
Umbria - - - - 3.6 
Total Italy 0.3 6.6 4.5 5.0 10.2 
No. of MEPs      2** 6 4 4 9 
 
Source: Istituto Cattaneo. Data re-worked by author. 
 
*The various regional leagues participated in the election as Northern Alliance. 
**Both MEPs were elected by the Lombard League (LL). 
 
 
 In 1995 Bossi decided it was time put and end to Berlusconi‟s government and 
broke the alliance. After supporting for a year a new government led by a technocrat 
from the Bank of Italy, Lamberto Dini, the League withdrew its confidence and new 
elections were held in 1996. This time the LN went it alone and achieved its best result 
ever in terms of number of votes (20.5% in the North, 10.1 nationally). As Table 5.4 
shows, in contrast to the electoral growth of 1992, which had reflected an expansion 
into regions such as Liguria, Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany, the result of 1996 was due 
to a new increase of votes in the party‟s heartland – Lombardy and Veneto (Diamanti, 
1996; 2003).  
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Table 5.4 Electoral Results of the Northern League  
at general elections (Lower House) in the northern and central regions 
 
 1983* 1987* 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 
Lombardy - 4.1 23.0 22.6 24.8 12.1 11.7 21.6 
Veneto 4.3 3.1 17.8 21.6 29.8 10.2 11.1 27.1 
Piedmont - 2.9 16.3 16.2 18.4 5.9 6.3 12.6 
Friuli-VG  - 0.8 15.3 16.9 23.2 8.2 7.2 13.0 
Trentino-AA - - 8.9 7.5 13.2 3.7 4.5 9.4 
Liguria - 1.3 14.3 11.4 10.2 3.9 3.7 6.8 
Emilia-Romagna  - 0.5 9.6 6.4 7.2 2.6 3.9 7.8 
Aosta Valley   - - - - - - 2.0 - 
Total North 0.7 3.6 17.3 17.0 20.5 8.2 8.5 17.2 
 
Toscana 
 
- 
 
0.3 
 
3.1 
 
2.2 
 
1.8 
 
0.6 
 
1.1 
 
2.0 
Marche  - 0.5 1.3 - 1.5 - 1.0 2.2 
Umbria - 0.4 1.1 - 1.0 - 0.7 1.7 
 
Total Italy 
 
0.3 
 
1.7 
 
8.7 
 
8.4 
 
10.1 
 
3.9 
 
4.1a 
 
8.3 
 
Source: Istituto Cattaneo. Data re-elaborated by author. Original data available at: 
http://www.cattaneo.org/index.asp?l1=archivi&l2=adele&l3=politiche 
  
*Data for the 1983 and 1987 elections refer to the individual regional leagues. 
a: In 2006 the LN presented a common list with Movement for Autonomy (MpA), a party which is active 
in Sicily and in southern regions. The figure reported in table, however, only refer to the votes taken by 
the LN in the centre-north. The total vote for the common list was 4.6.   
 
 
However, Bossi‟s hope that the League could become a pivotal party in a hung 
parliament did not materialize, as the centre-left alliance obtained a clear majority. This 
deprived the LN of the opportunity of getting into office again. After two years, a 
rapprochement with Berlusconi started, which led to the creation of a new centre-right 
alliance Casa delle Libertà (House of Freedoms) for the 2001 election. Before the end 
of the parliamentary term, the centre-left government approved a reform of the 
Constitution which enhanced the competences of the regions. This reform, emphatically 
labelled as „federalism‟ by the centre-left, was strongly opposed by the League on the 
grounds that it fell well short of its demands. Yet, to date, it represents the most 
important policy achievement of the party, albeit an indirect one. Although the reform 
did not introduce a federal structure, it transferred more powers to the regions and, 
crucially, allowed the possibility of implementing regional financial autonomy (or, as it 
is often referred to „fiscal federalism‟) by ordinary laws. 
The 2001 general election presented exactly the opposite outcome compared 
with the 1996‟s. The League scored its worst result in terms of votes but, due to the 
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victory of the coalition, it found itself in office once again. This time the party tried to 
make the most of its position. In 2002 the parliament approved a law, strongly desired 
by the League, on immigration (Repubblica, 12/07/02). By November 2005 the centre-
right had passed an extensive reform of the Constitution which, amongst other 
important provisions, aimed to establish a federal state. However, as the reform was not 
negotiated with the opposition, the latter called a referendum on it. In 2006, the League 
and the centre-right lost the general election, which was held under a new voting 
system,
70
 and the vote on the constitutional referendum. The federal reform was, 
therefore, rejected (Bull and Pasquino, 2007). After two years in opposition, in which 
the party multiplied its activities at local level, the LN came back to power in 2008, 
once again in coalition with Berlusconi. The party went back to similar levels of support 
as in 1992. In the first year of government the party has imposed a new law on 
immigration and a law which sets out the guidelines for the implementation of fiscal 
federalism. In the wake of these policy achievements, it scored extremely well at the 
2009 European elections (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2009).  
 
5.1.3 Party Organization 
 The Northern League is formally a federation of regionalist parties (i.e. the 
leagues). The party is active in eleven regions of Central and Northern Italy, divided 
into thirteen „nations‟. 71  Each individual league corresponds to one of the thirteen 
„nations‟ and, since the establishment of the federation in 1991, has de facto become a 
regional branch (sezione nazionale) of the central (federal) party. The sezione nazionale 
lombarda (i.e. the Lombard League) has always been the dominant component in the 
party and it shares the same headquarters, in Milan, with the federal organisation. The 
Liga Veneta‟s leadership has never been in a position to compete with the Lombard 
component for the federal leadership. However, considering the importance of Veneto 
                                                 
70
 The new voting system, as far as the Lower House is concerned, represents a sort of plurality system 
applied in one single multi-member constituency, where the plurality party (or coalition) gets at least 55 
percent of the seats (distributed proportionally amongst the parties of the coalition) and the opposition 
shares the remaining 45 percent proportionally. Parties running alone have to overcome a 4 percent 
threshold, while coalitions need to obtain at least 8 percent of votes. A strong incentive in forming two 
competing coalitions is therefore maintained (Massetti, 2006). 
71
 The eleven regions are: Lombrady, Veneto, Piedmont, Liguria, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trentino-South 
Tyrol, Aosta Valley, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Marche and Umbria. These translate into thirteen 
„nations‟ because Trentino and South Tyrol, as well as Emilia and Romagna, are considered as separate 
national entities (Lega Nord, Party Statute, 2002, p. 1). The definition of the territorial borders – i.e. the 
territorial definition of the „nations‟ as well as the inclusion/exclusion of them – is an exclusive 
competence of the executive committee Consiglio Federale (ibid, p. 2). 
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for the LN‟s electoral results (see Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.4), it could be argued that the 
level of marginalization of the Liga within the federal party has sometimes been 
humiliating.
72
 Umberto Bossi has been the undisputed leader of the federal party and, 
until 1993, he maintained the leadership of the Lombard section too. Beside Bossi, who 
is from Varese, the other three most prominent figures in the LN, Roberto Maroni, 
Roberto Calderoli and Roberto Castelli, are from Lombardy too (respectively from 
Varese, Bergamo and Lecco). 
 The League‟s staff has grown enormously since the party has become a 
nationally relevant party. The Lombard League employed five people in the late 1980s. 
After the 1992 general election, the number of staff grew to about thirty-five and in the 
late 1990s it reached about hundred staff members (Tambini, 2001, p. 90).    
Formally, the supreme body of the LN is the Congresso Federale, which elects 
the members of the other federal bodies, can change the party statute and takes 
decisions concerning the party‟s political and programmatic line. The Congresso is 
formed by the delegates of the regional branches,
73
 plus the members of the federal 
organs, the „founding fathers‟,74 the leaders of the regional and provincial branches 
(segretari nazionali and provinciali), the MPs, MEPs, the representatives elected in the 
regional assemblies, the provincial „prime ministers‟, and the mayors of the main cities.       
The party leader (Segretario Federale) is elected by the Congresso and is the 
only person entitled to speak on behalf of the party. So far, there has never been a 
challenge to the leadership of Bossi and, therefore, there has never been a proper 
election where votes needed to be counted. The election has been simply carried out in 
the form of „acclamation‟. The Presidente Federale has rather unclear functions. The 
position was created after the creation of the federation to find a federal „role‟ for the 
leader of the Liga Veneta Franco Rocchetta, who did not see eye to eye with Bossi‟s 
centralizing attitudes (Tambini, 2001, p. 94).  
The Consiglio Federale represents a kind of executive committee devoted to 
managing the party organization. In its duties the Consiglio is assisted by the Segreteria 
Amministrativa Federale. It consists of the party leader, the president, the chairman of 
                                                 
72
 For an account of the complexity and fragmentation of the autonomist/separatist movement in Veneto 
until the early 1990s, see Allum and Diamanti (1996). It is worth specifying that in the second half of the 
1990s and in the early 2000s the electoral strength of regionalist competitors in Veneto has grown further. 
73
 One delegate eavery 300,000 inhabitants plus two delegates every percent point in the late election, be 
it regional, general or European (Lega Nord, Party Statute, 2002, p. 3). 
74
 The „founding fathers‟ are those who signed the document establishing the Lega Nord on the 4th of 
December 1989 and those who swear to the independence of „Padania‟ (the territory encompassing the 
thirteen nations) on the 15
th
 of September 1996 (ibid, p. 2). 
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federal administration, the co-ordinator of the regional branches and their respective 
leaders, twelve members elected by the Congresso Federale (four from Lombardy and 
the remaining ones divided amongst the other „nations‟), the party presidents of the 
parliamentary groups in the House and in the Senate. 
The Segreteria Politica Federale represents a sort of executive committee 
primarily devoted to developing policies. Its members are appointed by the leader and 
are flanked by research teams divided by policy areas. Many of the League‟s legislative 
proposals come from the work of this organ.    
The organizational structure of the federal party is more or less identically 
replicated at the level of the regional branches, which are governed by the segeratrio 
nazionale, presidente nazionale, congresso nazionale, consiglio nazionale etc. 
Since the first electoral breakthrough in 1992, the party membership has 
remained relatively stable (see Table 5.5).  
 
 
Table 5.5 Membership of the Lega Nord, 1989-2008* 
1989 1993 1994 1996 1997 2000 2002 2004 2005 2008 
18,000 147,297 167,650 112,970 136,503 120,897 119,753 122,576 148,321 155,478 
 
Source: figures for 1989 are from Tambini (2001, p. 54). All other figures are from Albertazzi and 
McDonnell (2009). 
 
*The figures should be taken with a pinch of salt. For instance, according to Tambini the 1993 
membership was 43,308. Both works have taken their figures from documents provided by the party. 
 
 
 
Party members are divided into three hierarchical groups. At the top there are the 
founders of the LN and the founders of Padania, who have the right to life participation 
and voting in the Congresso. The ordinary members (Soci Ordinary- Militanti)
75
 have a 
duty to actively participate in the associational life of the party. Their access to different 
levels of the organization (local, provincial, regional and federal) depends on how long 
they have been ordinary members. This prevents the rise of people whose loyalty has 
not been proved within the party and guarantees continuity to the party organs. The 
bottom of the pyramid is constituted by the sympathisers (Soci Sostenitori), who do not 
                                                 
75
 Until 1998 there were four groups of members, as the ordinary members and the militants were distinct 
categories, the latter being lower ranking (Tarchi, 1998, p. 151). 
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have right to vote at any level of the party organization. They can apply for ordinary 
membership at least six months after having been enrolled as sympathisers (Lega Nord, 
Party Regulations, 2002, p. 2).   
 The LN also has a section for women and one for youngsters. In time the party 
has built a series of satellite institutions around itself: a daily paper (La Padania), a 
press agency (AgeLega), a technical consultancy to MPs (Timer), a labour union (SinPa, 
whose Lombard originators were Sal and Confedersal), many associations for 
entrepreneurs, artisans and farmers (Tarchi, 1998, p. 151). This organizational structure 
makes the party resemble very closely a mass party. Indeed, grassroots participation has 
always been a strong resource for the League. Especially after Bossi had a serious 
stroke in March 2004, the maturation of a „political class‟ formed at all levels of 
government; the territorial organization and the activism of militants have compensated 
for the loss of the leader‟s rhetorical skills during election campaigns. This hard test, in 
which the party has responded by holding together until the return of Bossi to active 
politics, may have triggered or sped up a process of institutionalization (La Repubblica, 
by I. Diamanti, 09/01/05). As Diamanti noticed since the early 1990s, the LN‟s 
organization and internal working falls in between several ideal types: “a little bit 
movement, a little bit mass-party, a little bit charismatic party” (Diamanti, 1993, p. 14).  
 In fact, the actual working of the party organization has appeared rather different 
from what the official structure would suggest. For instance, the informal summer 
gathering in Pontida (the locality where in the twelfth century the military alliance 
amongst northern Italian towns called Lega Lombarda was formed), in which Bossi 
speaks to party members and sympathisers about the latest and future developments of 
the League‟s political action, are extremely important moments in the life of the party. 
Pontida is where the „ancient oath‟ is renewed every year, strengthening members‟ 
identification with the party and with the leader.
76
  In fact, it has been argued that the 
formal structure was designed to project the image of an internally democratic party and 
deflect accusations of Bossi‟s authoritarianism, or even Stalinism (Tambini, 2001, p. 
93-95). Since the time of the Lombard League, Bossi had developed a certain „siege 
mentality‟. The central state was perceived as a ruthless entity which used its power to 
stop, in one way or another, the new and scarcely resourced movement. In this 
representation, enemies were everywhere, in the police, the civil service, in the judiciary, 
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in the national parties, in the press, in the academy, etc., and were ready to infiltrate and 
damage the party (Bossi, 1992, p. 81-109). Obviously, this vision of the reality had 
strong repercussions in (or was functional to) the way the internal organization was 
managed, that is with minimal or no tolerance for open internal dissent.  
 
If you don‟t have iron-fist and steel-will it is better to give up before starting the fight, or 
maybe to leapfrog into the enemy‟s ranks, which are more comfortable and better 
remunerated… if you want to face the centralist state with some probability of victory, 
you need to be very firm and not to tolerate betrayals (Bossi, 1992; p. 39). 
 
The fate of those who openly challenged Bossi on relevant political choices, people 
such as Castellazzi (former Presidente Nazionale of the Lombard League), Rocchetta 
(former leader of the Liga Veneta) and Miglio (considered to be the ideologue of the 
party in the early 1990s), has nearly always been the same: expulsion or voluntary 
departure from the party. This monarchical style of leadership has been, however, 
possible because Bossi has enjoyed an incredible level of support amongst the LN‟s 
followers, which has been due to his devotion to the cause, his capacity to make hard 
choices, his extraordinary rhetoric skills and his capacity to use the media. From the 
grassroots to the members of the executive, all members of the League have always 
recognized that Bossi is an absolute asset for the party (Francesco Miroballo, interview 
with author, Perugia, 10/04/07; Raffaele Volpi and Jonny Crosio, interviews with the 
author, Rome, 10/06/08).  
Therefore, a mix of widespread respect for his capabilities and a strong grip on 
the organization has allowed Bossi a considerable concentration of power. As will be 
discussed in the following sections, this decision-making autonomy of the leader is at 
the basis of the League‟s capacity to adapt almost instantaneously to the frequent 
changes of Italian politics, repositioning itself according to the circumstances. Some of 
the decisions taken by Bossi represented real U-turns which disorientated party 
members, including top members and MPs. However, he has managed to quickly 
impose his vision and enforce his decisions in most occasions, often using the „sacred‟ 
venue of Pontida to impress legitimacy to his ideology/policy shifts (Biorcio, 1997, p. 
198).     
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5.2 Party ideology and policy: the centre-periphery dimension 
5.2.1 From ethno-regional autonomy to the League of Federal Italy (1980-1993) 
 In order to understand the original project of the Northern League it is necessary 
to analyze the ideology and policy proposals of the major regional leagues which 
subsequently gave birth to the federated party. This section covers the period from the 
emergence of the various leagues to the end of the so called Italian „First Republic‟.77 
Although this period was characterized by several changes in the Italian party system, 
amongst which the emergence of the League is one of the most important (if not the 
most important), the reform of the national voting system and the dramatic changes in 
the party system which occurred between 1993 and 1994
78
 set the period in question 
apart from the subsequent ones in terms of institutional and political 
incentives/constraints.   
The first half of the 1980s, when the Liga Veneta was the dominant one, has 
been identified as the ethno-regionalist phase of the leagues (Diamanti, 1993, p. 17). In 
this period, the various leagues focused on the re-discovery of the historical, cultural 
and ethnic distinctiveness of their respective region vis a vis the Italian state. Great 
emphasis was posed on the re-interpretation of Italian history and, in particular, Italian 
unification, stressing the military aspect of the latter. In sum, the regional leagues 
engaged in a process of national identity building based at regional level: 
 
These Leagues are improperly defined as „regional‟. Actually they embody the desire for 
autonomy of several European nations which have reached a very high level of 
modernity and efficiency. Those which officially, in the administrative language, are 
called regions are, actually, nations; which means peoples, organic societies, with a 
cultural, linguistic, social, economic, administrative and institutional consistency. I want 
to be clear: for Veneto – as well as Lombardy, Tuscany or Sicily – is a nation at the same 
rate as Denmark, France, Poland, Greece and the Netherlands (Rocchetta, quoted in 
Diamanti, 1993, p. 52).    
 
 
The ethnic characterization of the „regions/nations‟ manifests itself in the use of the 
regional dialects and in some calls to prevent further immigration from the southern 
regions, for immediate cessation of the „soggiorno obligatorio‟ (the transfer of southern 
mobsters to northern regions for detention/rehabilitation), and for jobs in the regional 
and local administration to go to natives of the region (Diamanti, 1993, p. 53). These 
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claims were not only confined to Veneto. The first programme of the Lombard League, 
amongst other things, proposed: public sector employment on an ethno-regional basis; 
government houses reserved for Lombards; industrialization proportional to availability 
of local labour; a guarantee of work for Lombard workers, or returning Lombard 
emigrants before those coming from other regions; recuperation of the cultural and 
linguistic inheritance of Lombardy and its diffusion through the school system; and 
stopping the use of Lombardy as a site for the soggiorno obbligatorio (Manifesto of the 
Lega Lombarda, 1983, reported in Tambini, 2001, p. 42). In spite of the paltry electoral 
results which this ethnic mobilization managed to bring about, Bossi was convinced that, 
as a first stage, “you need to pass through the conquest of your own linguistic identity” 
(Bossi, quoted by Diamanti, 1993, p. 56). 
 Since the beginning, however, the recognition of regional ethnic distinctiveness 
represented just one side of the leagues‟ claims. The economic dimension of the 
leagues‟ grievances was also very evident. While the focus on historical legacy and 
ethnicity was the result of a genuine interest in the cultural revival of the regions, it also 
served to build the legitimacy of requests for constitutional reforms. The three northern 
special status regions – Aosta Valley, Trentino-Sudtirol and Friuli-Venezia Giulia – had 
obtained extensive autonomy from the state on the basis of ethnic distinctiveness. The 
„leghisti‟ in the ordinary regions had the opportunity to see how beneficial the special 
autonomy statutes had been for those regions in economic terms. Although Lombardy 
has always been the first region in terms of production, by 1970, the Aosta Valley 
boasted a GDP per head nearly 10 percent higher (Gold, 2003, p. 66). In 1980 
Trentiono-Sudtirol‟s GDP per head was more than 10 percent higher than Veneto‟s 
(ibid.). Salvadori‟s ideas found fertile terrain amongst the „leghisti‟ not only because of 
the prospects for ethno-cultural revival but also because of the economic consequences 
of autonomy. One of the first manifestos of the Lombard League stated: “The fruits of 
Lombards‟ work and taxes should be controlled and administrated by the Lombards 
through the arrangement of a financial system similar to that which is being 
implementing in Trent and South Tyrol” (Lega Lombarda, Manifesto 1983). It would 
not be an exaggeration, therefore, to argue that at the origins of the autonomist claims of 
the northern regional leagues there is a sort of „spill-over effect‟, driven primarily by the 
economic privileges conceded to the special status regions. 
As far as the policy proposals of the leagues are concerned, it is worth pointing 
out some differences between the two most important leagues in Veneto and Lombardy. 
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To be sure, the differences between Lombardy and Veneto as well as between different 
periods have to be taken with a pinch of salt, as both the discourses and the proposals 
were vaguely formulated. In addition, in the case of the League, rather than changes of 
policy positions, it is more appropriate to talk about emphasis put on different terms at 
different times. Yet, while the Liga Veneta has always leaned towards a more 
nationalist/independentist position (Diamanti, 1993, p. 52), the Lega Lombarda, though 
not renouncing to the idea of Lombardy as a nation, has boasted a preference for the 
autonomist/federalist solution. As mentioned above, Bossi was strongly influenced by 
Salvadori‟s ideas of integral federalism inspired by the Swiss model. In the original 
programme of the Lega Lombarda the first three objectives were: 1) “The 
transformation of Italian state into a confederation of autonomous regions”; 2) “Direct 
democracy with popular initiatives and referenda”; 3) “The decentralization of political 
power to the provinces (cantons) and to the local councils” (Lega Lombarda, Manifesto 
1983).  
With the coming to prominence of the Lega Lombarda from the 1987 general 
election the conceptualization of the regions and the policy proposals shift too. Given 
that Lombardy constituted a less favourable environment than Veneto for ethnic-
regionalism, Bossi reconceptualised the regions as a „community of interests‟, thus 
fusing together the ethno-cultural and economic dimension in an attempt to strengthen a 
territorial identity (Diamanti, 1993, p. 57). The fusion of the economic with the ethno-
cultural was based on a set of stereotypes, such as the hard-worker, genuine, transparent, 
honest, altruistic, trustworthy and trusting Lombard (later, for extension, northerner) vs. 
the lazy, false, intrigue-prone (furbo), dishonest, egoistic, unreliable and suspicious 
southerner (Gomez-Reino, 2002, p. 120-21). After all these stereotypes had, to a large 
extent, been confirmed and spread by authoritative academic studies conducted by 
American scholars on Italian politics and society (Banfield, 1958; Almond and Verba, 
1965; Putnam, 1993).
79
 The economic differences between north and south were, 
therefore, explained in terms of virtues of the former and vices of the latter, thus de-
legitimizing the state‟s policies for territorial re-distribution of resources. 
At the time of its formation in late 1989, therefore, the Northern League was 
positioned by the Lombard leadership towards a territorial-economic critique of the 
                                                 
79
 For a critical discussion on the consequences of these studies on Italians‟ self-perception and on 
territorial (and non-territorial) politics in Italy, see Mastropaolo (2009). For a similar critique of the 
mainstream interpretation of the „southern question‟, see Davies (1996).  
  
213 
 
state and an autonomist/federalist proposal for constitutional reform. At that stage, the 
electoral weight of the party at national level was still negligible (just two MPs). 
However, at the 1990 regional elections the LN confirmed its fast rising trend and the 
traditional parties started to take into consideration strategies for contrasting the 
emergence of the new party. As Bossi himself recalls in 1988 the DC very quickly 
approved a law to abolish the „soggiorno obbligatorio‟ in an attempt to stop the erosion 
of its electoral support by the League (Bossi, 1992, p. 113). However, it was the PSI 
which tried to pick up the core of the League‟s policy proposals by showing its 
willingness to discuss about devolution of more powers to the regions. This move was 
considered a threat by Bossi, an attempt to lure the League with vague promises and 
undermine its electoral support. However, he also recognized that the PSI helped 
legitimize the League‟s request. At that stage, in order to avoid being      accommodated, 
the LN re-launched a much more radical programme. With the federation of the regional 
leagues, the territorial focus of the party shifted from the individual regions to the entire 
North (Diamanti, 1993, p. 73). In 1991, having being proclaimed segretario federale at 
the first Congresso, Bossi founded at the annual gathering in Pontida the „Republic of 
the North‟ - an act without any real official value but highly symbolic and dovetailing 
with a plan for redefinition of the party‟s federal reform. This new plan, which was 
adopted after the suggestions of Prof. Gianfranco Miglio (the party ideologue) and 
which would be presented at the 1992 general election, envisaged the creation of a 
confederal state formed by three macro-regions:
80
 North, Centre and South (Lega Nord, 
Election Manifesto 1992). The federal state would maintain the competence of national 
defence, foreign policy, defence of individual rights and the emission of currency. The 
macro-regions would control economic policy – taxation, industrial development, 
commerce and agriculture. The regions (within the macro-regions) would control 
education, health and co-ordination of local authorities, plus secondary powers on 
economic matters (ibid.). 
With such a proposal the League again became a party which stood out for its 
radicalism on the territorial re-organization of the state, thus marking its electoral 
„hunting ground‟: 
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Craxi [the PSI‟s leader]… launched a series of regionalist proposals… hoping to 
outflank and then replace us in this battle. However, without knowing it, he built a 
bridge of boats which allowed us to reach the middle of the river. But we did not stop 
there, we jumped onto the other shore, where we were alone, without competitors. The 
other shore is, obviously, the proposal to divide Italy in three Republics: North, Centre 
and South... The [other] parties… will never digest an incisive reform that breaks once 
and for all the working of centralism (Bossi, 1992, p. 115-16).  
 
 The 1992 election sanctioned the entry of the League in the Italian party system 
as a relevant player. However, the political landscape was about to change dramatically. 
During 1993 the traditional parties that had governed Italy collapsed under allegations 
of illegal party funding and other political/judicial scandals. The vacuum created by the 
disappearance of these political actors created an enormous opportunity for the League, 
especially because they represented the political bloc, led by the DC, from which the 
party had harvested most of its votes. The League demonstrated it had become the 
biggest party in the North during the local elections, in which the party scored well even 
in metropolitan areas and captured Milan‟s Council. The temptation to replace the 
traditional parties in the whole Italian territory led Bossi to develop a strategy for 
territorial expansion of the League. This strategy, which faced strong opposition both 
amongst prominent figures, such as Miglio and Rocchetta, and from the grassroots, 
consisted of tempering the North/South opposition and transforming the League in to a 
state-wide federalist party (Bossi, 1995, p. 36). In late April 1993 Bossi announced his 
intention of presenting candidates at the next electoral contexts in southern regions too, 
using the label Lega Italia Federale (Diamanti, 1993, p. 95).         
 
5.2.2 From federalism to secession (1994-1999)  
 The idea of using the label Lega Italia Federale and the whole project of 
creating a national federalist party were aborted within months. According to Bossi: 
 
The League did not manage to penetrate, because of its organizational limitations, 
because of the economic and cultural backwardness of the South, and because of the 
press who accused us of racism and prevented the people of the South from 
understanding the Southern Question (Bossi, 1995, quoted in Tambini, 2001, p. 60) 
 
           
However, the anti-Southern image of the League was not an invention of the press, 
which had simply reported the more or less explicit anti-Southern content of the party‟s 
discourse (Pasquino, 1993, p. 8). After all, if Bossi had managed to overcome the 
regional borders of the individual leagues and create a „Party of the North‟, this was 
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mainly due to the emphasis placed on the strong opposition to the south, which 
functioned as a cover for the differences within the north. In spite of some opposition by 
the hard-core Lombards to the inclusion of central regions such as Tuscany, the 
operation of creating a Northern (economic) identity, which encompassed all the local 
and regional (ethno-cultural) identities, had been more successful than Bossi expected. 
Breaking away from the territorial north/south divide proved to be not possible. Many 
militants perceived such an attempt as a betrayal of the party ideology and staged a 
protest that obliged Bossi to reverse his plans. The project was also undermined by the 
internal dissidents in the leadership, such Miglio and Rocchetta, who retained a clear 
anti-Southern stance in public (Tambini, 2001, p. 59). This juncture represented one of 
the few episodes where Bossi did not succeed in getting his way. 
 However, had Bossi and the League had more time to prepare and carry out the 
penetration of the south, things could have gone differently. In fact, a new general 
election was called for the early spring of 1994, and by the end of 1993 the political 
scene had considerably changed, reducing the scope for both the League‟s electoral 
growth in the north and its penetration in the south. The collapse of the party system of 
the First Republic had revitalized, especially in the south, the electoral appeal of the 
Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), a post-fascist party which, due to its isolation during 
the First Republic, had been largely left untouched by the latest political scandals. In 
addition, in December 1993 Berlusconi founded Forza Italia (FI), aiming to harvest the 
voters who had become „orphans‟ of the moderate bloc of parties that collapsed in that 
year (Newell and Bull, 1997). Following the incentives posed by the new voting system, 
which attributed 75 percent of the seats according to single member plurality (FPTP) 
and only 25 percent to according to proportional representation (PR), he created a 
coalition with the MSI, which would re-style itself into Alleanza Nazionale (AN) in 
1995, with a tiny splinter party from the old DC called Centro Cristiano Democratico 
(CCD) and few liberal/conservative figures. Berlusconi, Fini and Casini – respectively 
the leaders of the three parties just mentioned – formed a right-wing alliance. The main 
heirs of the DC, the Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) and Patto Segni (PS) formed a 
centrist coalition, trying to retain as many voters as they could, while the left-wing 
parties – Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS), Rifondazione Comunista (RC), 
Verdi (the Greens) and other minor ones – formed the alliance called Progressisti. 
 None of these coalitions would have accepted the League‟s plan for 
transforming Italy into a confederation of three macro-regions. The party had therefore 
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to choose whether to compromise on policy and enter one of the coalitions, thus 
increasing its chances to get in office and implement a milder reform, or keep its policy 
unchanged and run alone, with the risk of remaining non-influential in the next 
parliamentary term. 
 In the event, Bossi opted for joining the right-wing coalition led by Berlusconi. 
The rationale of this choice will be better explained in the section devoted to the 
League‟s positioning on the left-right dimension. Indeed, from the point of view of the 
centre-periphery dimension, such a decision is rather difficult to explain. The MSI was a 
strong supporter of Italian nationalism and of the state‟s centralism. Bossi was very 
aware of this contradiction and, together with Berlusconi, worked out a façade operation 
which consisted of creating two territorially separated alliances: the Polo del Buon 
Governo – FI, MSI-AN and CCD – in the centre and south, and the Polo della Libertà – 
FI, LN and CCD – in the north. 
 This trick did not prevent the abandonment of the three macro-regions‟ project 
by the League, which had to go back to its previous proposal of implementing 
federalism on a regional basis (Lega Nord, 1994a, General Election Manifesto). The 
alliance, in addition, did not work well, in spite of the clear victory at the 1994 general 
election and the fact that the League became the biggest party in Parliament. Wide 
sections of the LN‟s membership and of the electorate were not reconciled to the 
alliance with the other parties. This emerged very clearly in Bossi‟s speech at the 
Pontida rally in June 1994, just a few months after the general election and a few days 
after the disappointing European elections. The bulk of the speech was devoted to 
justifying and explaining the rationale of the alliance, addressing explicitly the “ancient, 
independentist” soul of the party which “emerged at the dawn of our movement”, and 
promising that he would oppose with all his strength any attempt to absorb the League 
by Forza Italia (Bossi, speech at Pontida, 19/06/04, reported in Bossi, 1996, p. 67-74). 
 From an ex post perspective, one could detect from that speech that not only the 
League but its leader too was already torn between the choice of remaining in the 
alliance and the temptation to break away. After four months of further fights amongst 
the partners of the government coalition, the League withdrew its confidence and voted 
the government down, accusing Berlusconi and Fini of being uninterested in carrying 
forward the federalist reform (Bossi, speech at the House of Representatives, 
21/12/1994, reported in Bossi, 1996, p. 85-89). 
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 The break-up of the centre-right coalition was just the first part of a process that 
would lead to the adoption of a new position on the centre-periphery dimension: 
secession. After giving its support to the new government led by technocrat Lamberto 
Dini and backed by the centre and left-wing parties, the League retrenched into 
Northern nationalism. The first move was a symbolic one. In June 1995 Bossi gathered 
in Mantua his group of MPs and of representatives in the regional assemblies 
inaugurating the „Parliament of the North‟ (later also called the „Parliament of Padania), 
with the aim of generating “proposals, critiques and doctrines for the achievement of 
important political objectives, first of all the constitutional advent of federalism” (Bossi, 
speech at the first gathering of the Parliament of Padania, 07/06/1995, reported in Bossi, 
1996, p. 109). The term Padania which had already been used in the past by the League 
was the word now used for referring to a northern fatherland (Diamanti, 1996, p. 76). In 
December Bossi announced the support of his party for the budget, adding an explicit 
threat: “The basic choice, at this stage, is between a federal state and the secession of 
the north: now, immediately” (Bossi, speech in the House of Representatives, 
21/12/1995, reported in Bossi, 1996, p. 129). In this period Bossi started to add to the 
previous federalist discourse references to the „independence‟ of the North or of Padania. 
A poll conducted in January 1996 on northerners‟ attitudes towards the „independence 
of the North‟ reveals that the idea was not at all unpopular. As many as 29.2 percent of 
the respondents thought the idea was advantageous but unacceptable, while 23.2 percent 
thought it was advantageous and desirable (Poll conducted by Poster-Limes, reported in 
Diamanti, 1996, p. 77). However, the same poll revealed that the majority of those who 
desired it actually preferred the federalist solution to the break-up of Italy.              
 The invention of Padania served the purpose of creating a new nation and 
providing the legitimacy of an independentist project (Diamanti, 1996, p. 82). Bossi 
decided to fight the coming general election, called for the spring 1996, on an 
independentist position, which allowed the party to regain a clear distinctiveness from 
the other parties and from the two – centre-left and centre-right – coalitions. Before the 
election the so called „Parliament of the North‟ approved a document called 
„Constitution of the North‟ (Lega Nord, 1996, General Election Manifesto). At the 
general election the League obtained its best result ever in terms of votes. However, 
since the centre-left coalition (Ulivo) with the external support of the communists (RC) 
achieved a parliamentary majority, it found itself in an irrelevant position. In such 
circumstances, Bossi decided to push ahead with the separatist line. The league created 
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a Committee for the Liberation of Padania (Clp), a kind of militia called the „green 
shirts‟ (Camicie Verdi) and most importantly, from a symbolic point of view, it staged a 
week-long event which, starting at spring of the Po river in Piedmont, concluded in 
Venice with a solemn declaration of independence of the „padanian nation‟ (Biorcio, 
1997). The event attracted so much attention from the media that, not only did the 
League remain for weeks at the centre of the political debate, but the whole process, 
which per se was just about virtual (and illegal) politics, gathered some kind of 
legitimacy (Diamanti, 1996, p. 97-98). 
 The secessionist option was endorsed even in the party name, which at the 1997 
Congresso Federale was officially changed to Lega Nord per l’Indipendenza della 
Padania - Northern League for Independence of Padania – (Corriere della Sera, 
16/02/1997). De facto, the new stance was maintained until the 1999 European election, 
which confirmed the downward electoral trend. In that period, the League was not only 
cut off from the government but it had also excluded itself from the work of the 
parliamentary commission for the reform of the Constitution, in distrust of the 
commitment and possibility of the Commission of bringing about a genuine federalist 
reform. Instead, it kept indulging in „virtual politics‟ by staging the first election of the 
Parliament of the North (which was previously made of the League‟s representatives in 
the real institutions). The election was held in the autumn 1997, using gazebos as 
polling stations, and attracted between five and six million people according to the 
League (Repubblica, 27/10/97). As usual, the operation managed to attract a lot of 
attention from the media and to keep the League and its themes at the centre of the 
debate.       
 
5.2.3 From secession back to federalism (1999-2009) 
The secessionist stance coincided with political isolation. This mix provoked internal 
disagreement which eventually resulted in walk-outs by individual members and splits. 
In 1998 the Liga Veneta tried to break-away from the LN. The attempt failed but a new 
splinter party was created, the Liga Veneta Repubblica (LVR). In 1999 several 
prominent figures left the party: Fabrizio Comencini, who would become the leader of 
the splinter LVR, Marco Formentini, former mayor of Milan, Vito Gnutti and 
Domenico Comino. In a speech at the Congresso Federale held after the very poor 
result of the 1999 European election, Bossi tried to pull the party together and 
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denounced the splits and defections as operations orchestrated by Berlusconi (Bossi, 
speech at the Congresso Federale, 25/07/99). 
 However, it had become clear that the secessionism and political isolation were 
leading nowhere but electoral decline and policy irrelevance. In addition it was creating 
regionalist competitors in the northern regions, primarily in Veneto. The new strategic 
change consisted of forming a new a centre-right alliance with Berlusconi (Repubblica, 
09/12/99), the corollary being a moderation of the party‟s position on the centre-
periphery dimension. In 2000 the new alliance Casa delle Libertà (House of Freedoms) 
was created, including FI, AN, LN and CCD-CDU (later UDC). However, in contrast to 
1994, the new alliance was based on a „special relationship‟ between FI and the League. 
Such a special relationship, embodied by Giulio Tremonti (a member of FI who had 
publicly endorsed most ideas of the LN and who would become Italy‟s Economy 
Minister), was based on Berlusconi‟s guarantee of a federalist reform.  
 This strategic move immediately generated a policy success. Since the centre-
left government was heading towards the end of term with little chance of winning the 
coming general election, it quickly passed legislation to which it gave the emphatic 
label „federalism‟. In fact, the reform expanded the powers of the regions but fell well 
short of establishing a federal regime.
81
 Yet, as intended by the centre-left, it troubled 
the centre-right alliance, which voted united against the reform. From the perspective of 
the League it represented an attempt by the centre-left to steal its „flagship policy‟, or at 
the least its flagship pitch to the electorate. Hence, the party was resolute in denouncing 
the „deception‟ of the „fake federalism of the centre-left‟ (Repubblica, 07/03/01). For 
the League‟s partners in the House of Freedoms, especially those less enthusiastic about 
federalism – CCD-CDU and AN - it represented an even thornier issue. For them, the 
centre-left‟s reform had, so to speak, raised the bar they would, it seemed, have to jump 
over. Once in office with the League, they would have had to grant the latter a reform 
which went well beyond the centre-left‟s. 
 After the centre-right‟s victory at the 2001 general election, federalism (now 
called „devolution‟) became one of the four points of the government agreement. The 
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influence of AN and CCD-CDU on the drafting of the agreement can be observed in the 
following carefully-worded statement: 
 
The scheme of devolution, as a progressive transfer of powers, upwards, from the state 
to the European Union, and downwards, from the state to the regions, is not, as the left 
maintains, outside but inside the 1948 Constitution, which foresees that, to the initial 
regional competences, „others indicated by the constitutional laws‟ can be 
incrementally added. This is the scheme which we want to follow, with intelligence and 
prudence, exactly on the basis of the agreement reached on the 17
th
 of February of last 
year. (Agreement of the House of Freedoms, 13/05/01). 
 
 
In fact, the parliamentary work for the passing of the reform was a long and very 
difficult process. This was not only due to the complex procedures for Constitutional 
reform or to the fact that devolution was included within a much wider and ambitious 
plan for reforming the state. It also owed much to the internal contrasts and mutual 
suspicion between the government partners, with devolution often being at the centre of 
such tensions. Yet, between 2003 and 2006, the House of  Freedom managed to pass the 
whole reform. As far as devolution was concerned, the reform attributed exclusive 
powers to regions when it came to the organization of health services, schools and 
regional and local police. However, the state maintained the power to veto a regional 
law if this was perceived as damaging the national interest (Corriere della Sera, 
16/11/05). Leaving aside the technical criticism attracted by the reform, including the 
section on devolution (Vandelli, 2002), the problem was that the constitutional law had 
been approved only by a simple majority of MPs. That meant that the centre-left could 
call a referendum on it. 
 The referendum was held in the early summer of 2006, after the centre-left had 
regained power at the general election in the spring of the same year. The League, 
fearing a defeat, conducted a very temperamental campaign, which even involved 
accusations against its erstwhile allies, especially the UDC (formerly CCD-CDU) and 
AN, for their lukewarm commitment to the campaign for a „Yes vote‟. Less than two 
weeks before the vote, Bossi went as far as to declare that in case of a victory of the 
„No‟: “the country will not change democratically ever again. We will have to find other 
ways, because democratically it will never change. And this is a tragedy” (Repubblica, 
15/06/06). Arguably, this threatening tone did not help the cause, as it was stigmatized 
by the press and obliged the allies, with the exception of Berlusconi, to keep their 
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distance from the League and, indirectly, from the federalist reform (Repubblica, 
16/06/06).  
Eventually the „No' campaign won by a large majority in Italy as a whole but not 
in the League‟s core regions, Lombardy and Veneto. The first reaction of the League 
and its leaders appeared to prefigure another shift towards a secessionist position. The 
re-opening of the „Parliament of the North‟ (this time based in Vicenza) was announced 
in late 2006 and held in February 2007. In public speeches Bossi kept up his bellicose 
approach and did not exclude the Parliament of the North deciding on a return to 
secession (Corriere della Sera, 29/01/07). 
However, ultimately the party did not take that path. The centre-left government 
had a tiny majority in Parliament (in the Senate, to be precise) and in order to survive 
included in its programme issues which could lure the League, such as „fiscal 
federalism‟ and a reform of the voting system (Repubblica, 02/03/07). In particular the 
issue of fiscal federalism or, in the terms of the Constitution, „financial autonomy‟ of 
the regions had become rather urgent. The government was under pressure from the 
regional executives of Lombardy and Veneto, which were asking for the 
implementation of the 2001 constitutional reform, as well as from the Constitutional 
Court which, in the absence of due legislation, had already had to intervene with „law-
making sentences‟ and had demanded the Parliament to intervene for the 
implementation of the constitutional principles (Barbero, 2007). The LN, therefore, 
freed itself from the confrontational opposition led by Berlusconi and engaged 
constructively in parliamentary negotiations which eventually led to the passing of a 
„framework law‟82 for the implementation of fiscal federalism (Repubblica, 29/06/07). 
However, the sudden fall of the centre-left government and the calling of a new general 
election in 2008, quashed the process. 
Once back in office in coalition with the People of Freedom (PDL) – an alliance 
of FI and AN under Berlusconi‟s leadership – and the Movement for Autonomy (MpA) 
-  a kind of „southern league‟ that has its electoral stronghold in Sicily - the League 
decided to keep focusing on the achievement of „fiscal federalism‟, leaving „institutional 
federalism‟ to be carried out at a later stage in the parliamentary term. So far the League 
has managed to get a new „framework law‟ supported by the parliament in April 2009. 
However, the complex set of legislative decrees for the actual implementation of 
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 In the Italian legislation procedures, a „framework law‟ (or delegation law) is an act of the parliament 
which allows the government to produce legislative decrees in the matter specified in that act. 
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financial autonomy of the regions has yet to be produced, leaving intact all the contrasts 
between the League and the other government partners representing southern regions 
too. It seems extremely unlikely that the reform will ultimately allow the regions to 
retain 90 percent of their taxes, as in the League‟s 2008 election pledges (Albertazzi and 
McDonnell, 2009). 
In spite of the partial progress in the direction of fiscal federalism and the 
government agreement for the creation of a federal state, sudden and unforeseen 
changes of position cannot be excluded. In September 2009, at the end of the usual 
celebration which starts at the source of the Po river in Piedmont and ends in Venice 
few days later, Bossi stated the final goal of its party: 
 
is the freedom of Padania… It will be free by good means or by less good ones. 
Freedom is a right and therefore it is a right to achieve it by any means. We are here in 
Venice because we know that one day Padania will be a free, independent and 
sovereign state (Bossi, reported in Corriere della Sera, 13/09/09). 
 
 
It might well be that such a message has to be interpreted in the context of internal 
difficulties in the government of which the LN is part occurred by revelations concerning 
Berlusconi. It might well be that it is just a way to prepare a sort of „plan B‟ in case the 
Berlusconi government does not survive in the long term. In the perspective of a party 
system reshuffle the radicalization of the League‟s position on the centre-periphery 
cleavage might just serve the short term objective of maintaining its identity. However, it 
is also possible that Bossi has simply spoken the truth: the short-to-medium term tactic 
has been the moderation of the party objectives, while the long-term strategic objective 
remains the establishment of an independent state. After all, the party has not changed its 
full name since 1997: it is still the „Northern League for the Independence of Padania‟.      
 
5.2 Party ideology and policy: the left-right dimension 
5.2.1 From no position to the centre-right (1980-1993) 
 Detecting the ideological position of the LN along the left-right ideological 
dimension, especially in its early years, poses several problems. In fact, this is true for 
many regionalist parties which try and attract voters from both the left and right by 
avoiding declaring themselves as explicitly left-wing or right-wing. However, in the 
case of the LN the problem is made worse by three factors. First, the League has 
devoted a great deal of its political discourse to protest, resentment and anti-
  
223 
 
establishment politics which, per se, are not classifiable as either left or right. Second, 
the LN has boasted a tendency to instrumentally mix up clusters of ideas without 
worrying too much about internal consistency and coherence over time. As some 
scholars put it, the LN “is too politically opportunistic to be ideologically coherent, 
hence its relatively chaotic ideological references” (Fieschi et al., 1996, p. 241). Third, 
since the individual leagues and the LN have emerged as political outsiders, their 
politicians have often used a very colourful and/or extreme language, with the intention 
of attracting the attention of the media (Ruzza and Schmidtke, 1993). This strategy of 
getting visibility also entailed a negation or a partial revision of previous statements, 
once these were stigmatized by the media or by political opponents. For this reason 
some of the sources, public speeches, newspapers‟ interviews, etc., have to be taken 
with a pinch of salt.      
The combination of these characteristics, in addition to the extraordinary 
importance of the leader, has led several scholars to classify the League as a populist 
party (Biorcio, 1991; 1992; 1997; Kitschelt, 1995; Betz, 1998; McDonnell, 2006; 
Mudde, 2007; Tarchi 2008).
83
 Especially during the years of the First Republic, the 
leagues characterized themselves as protest movements that fiercely criticised 
partitocracy, corruption and clientelism. The positive proposals did not go much beyond 
the request for autonomist/federalist reforms. However, as noted by Taggart, populism 
is like “a chameleon, adopting the colours of its environment (Taggart, 2000, p. 2). 
Indeed, looking at the message of the leagues, as well as at the profile of its voters, it is 
possible to detect from the very beginning a positioning to the right of centre. In the 
original manifesto of the Lombard League, the only purely economic point refers to the 
“strengthening of the artisanship and agriculture, which have to enjoy an easier access 
to facilitated credit schemes” (Lega Lombarda, Manifesto 1983, in La Lega Nord 
attraverso i manifesti, 1996). The leagues (in Lombardy and Veneto) were very aware 
of the social fabric of their territories and of the (Catholic) political culture that 
characterized them. Analysis of the electoral geography in the late 1980s and early 
1990s show very clearly that the leagues stole most of their votes from the DC 
(Diamanti, 1993, p 37). The DC had been the hegemonic party in the provinces of „deep 
north‟ where the leagues developed. It made, therefore, perfect sense to target its 
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 Biorcio (1991, 1992, 1997) and McDonnell (2006) defined the Northern League precisely as a 
„regionalist populist‟ party. Kitschelt defined it as a populist anti-statist party (1995). Mudde (2007) 
defined it as an ethno-regionalist (or nationalist) populist party. He considers it as a border line case of the 
populist radical right family.   
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electorate for electoral expansion. In addition, the process of secularization, linked to 
two decades of rapid industrialization and economic growth, and the increasing 
identification of the DC with corrupted, clientelistic, pro-southern politics, made that 
party rather vulnerable to the leagues‟ challenge (Diamanti, 1993, p. 49; 1996, p. 38-9). 
In the 1980s the profile of the Liga Veneta‟s voter was: male, mature but not elder, with 
low education, belonging to the medium-lower socio-economic strata, such as artisans, 
shop keepers and workers of the small firms (Diamanti, 1993, p. 44). 
 During the late 1980s and early 1990s the centre-right, neo-liberal and anti-tax 
ideological orientations of the leagues and of the LN became more evident and 
consolidated. Obviously, the emphasis on excessive taxation fitted very well with the 
construction of the northern identity based on the north/south economic divide. A poster 
dated 1989 claimed: “The North pays for everyone. No more taxes to Rome! Taxes fair 
and paid to Lombardy!” (Lega Lombarda, 1989, in La Lega Nord attraverso i manifesti, 
1996). The neo-liberal discourse of the League emerged in a more articulated form in 
the document „Programme of work for the 1990s‟, which explicitly proposed neoliberal 
reforms – lower taxation on people and business, privatization, flexibilization of the 
labour market, reduction of the role of trade unions and reform of the welfare state 
(Lega Nord, by G. Bonetti, n.d.).  
 Besides proposing neo-liberal policies, the rightward leaning ideology of the 
League also owed much to messages which conveyed, often implicitly, anti-
immigration, xenophobic and cultural-racist messages. Yet, in this period, the League 
tried to counter accusations of racism and extreme-right ideology by proposing an 
ambiguous discourse which tended to put blame on those who favoured immigration 
(the actual racists) and those who wanted a centralist state (the actual fascists). For 
instance an electoral poster stated “Le Pen is fascist like the parties in Rome. A firm NO! 
therefore to the fascists who call us fascists and to the racists who call us racists” (Lega 
Lombarda, 1988, in La Lega Nord attraverso i manifesti, 1996). Other posters stated: 
“To bring the blacks here to our land is slavery” or “Mass industrial immigration is a 
crime against humanity” (Lega Lombarda, 1990, in La Lega Nord attraverso i manifesti, 
1996). In addition, the League took every possible opportunity to stigmatise the 
discrepancy between the soft law on immigration approved by the government parties in 
1990 and the sometimes brutal methods used on immigrants:  
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Let‟s take the case of the Albanians who arrived in tens of thousands on Apulia‟s coast 
in the summer of 1991. They had to be sent back, no doubt, but they had to be 
respected as human beings, they did not deserve the brutal treatment that the Italian 
government reserved for its overseas ex-subjects (Bossi, 1992, p. 149). 
 
This kind of ambiguous discourse allowed the League to plead innocent to charges of 
racism and to be perceived by large sections of the electorate as a presentable party. In 
addition, it allowed the party to appeal, to some extent, to the leftist electorate too. 
Indeed, since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the consequent loss of 
credibility/legitimacy of the post-communist PDS (the hegemonic party of the Italian 
left), Bossi had it in mind the goal of targeting the leftist electorate too (Bossi, 1992, p. 
119). Softening the xenophobic rhetoric, or simply making it more confused, was part 
of this strategy. The most important opening to the left was, however, the League‟s 
opposition to war in Kuwait in 1991, which in Italy was perceived as an anti-American, 
left-wing stance. In the context of the late First Republic, characterized by decreasing 
polarization, loss of legitimacy of the governing (centre and centre-right) parties and 
loss of credibility of the left parties, the strategy of the League aimed to present itself as 
a party neither of the right nor of the left, but simply in favour of federalism and against 
corrupted partitocracy. The plan worked very well as, at the 1992 general election, the 
LN not only increased its vote in the traditional heartland but it also expanded in the 
urban areas and even in the red regions of the centre-north – Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, 
Marche and Umbria (see Table 5.4). 
 However, the severity of the new government‟s fiscal policy, which aimed to 
avoid the bankruptcy of the Italian state, gave the League the opportunity to boast of 
both its protest-leaning style of politics and its anti-tax stance. In the autumn of 1992, 
the LN was the only party, together with the MSI, which openly sided with the 
demonstrations organized by traders, shopkeepers and self-employed against the 
government‟s tax policy (Corriere della Sera, 27/10/1992).  In addition, the events of 
1993 which brought about the collapse of the centre and centre-right parties, led the LN 
towards an explicit repositioning to the centre-right, in an attempt to replace them. A 
distinguished observer of Italian politics declared that the LN was “a centre-right 
movement, neo-Thatcherite, very centralist, strong and very organized with internal 
rules of iron” (G-P. Pansa, 1993, quoted in Allum and Diamanti, 1996, p. 161). 
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5.2.2 A centre-right party in coalition politics: from the right-wing to the centre 
pole (1994-1998) 
The 1992 general election, in which the LN established itself as a relevant actor in the 
national party system, presaged a destabilizing period which fostered further instability 
and change (Bull and Newell, 1993; Di Virgilio, 2006, p. 181). The new voting system 
adopted in 1993 and used for the first time in the 1994 general election changed 
considerably the incentives and constraints affecting party competition (Katz, 1996). 
The new system assigned 75 percent of seats to single member constituencies operating 
under plurality rule (FPTP) and 25 percent of seats through multimember constituencies 
elected via proportional representation (PR). The latter share of seats was to be divided 
amongst those parties achieving at least 4 percent of national votes. The predominant 
majoritarian (plurality) logic established strong incentives for parties to form coalitions 
capable of winning as many FPTP seats as possible. Yet, the system guaranteed the 
survival of the old proportional logic and, therefore, of a large (and increasing) number 
of parties. This was not due to the 25 percent PR seats, which would anyway preclude 
representation to all parties not reaching the 4 percent threshold. It was granted by the 
„proportionalization‟ of the FPTP seats, that is by the division of „safe seats‟ amongst 
parties of the same coalition in proportion to the their supposed electoral weight 
(Pappalardo, 2002, p. 230).
84
 This technique allowed the survival (and the emergence) 
of many tiny parties and, therefore, of an even more fragmented mutli-party system. So, 
while competition for the FPTP seats remained a matter between very few coalitions (2 
or 3) and competition for the PR votes remained a matter for 6 or 7 parties, the actual 
number of parties represented in Parliament was always much higher (Pappalardo, 2002; 
Di Virgilio, 2006; Massetti, 2009a). The Italian party system in which the LN had to 
compete after 1994 was therefore characterized by two different sorts of actors and by 
two different logics: the coalitions responding to the plurality logic and the parties 
within the coalitions responding to a proportional logic (Bartolini et al., 2004). 
In this new political environment, the positioning of the League also depended 
on crucial choices about coalition politics. The first choice was whether to run alone, 
thus exposing itself to the plurality logic of electoral competition, or to join one of the 
coalitions, thus accepting the „shelter‟ of the proportional logic. In the latter case, the 
LN had to choose between the three options on offer: the left coalition, formed by the 
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post-communist PDS and the communist RC, the centre coalition, formed by former 
Christian Democrats PPI and PS, and the right coalition, formed by Berlusconi‟s FI and 
the post fascist MSI-AN (Di Virgilio, 1994). The party‟s centre-right ideological 
orientation excluded any alliance with the left, thus limiting the actual options to the last 
two. As already recalled above, the LN reluctantly chose to form a coalition with FI in 
the north and accepted that FI and AN maintained a separate alliance in the south. This 
entry into the (two-fold) right-wing coalition represented, at least at the level of public 
perception, a shift towards the right, which also saw the party  suspended from the 
European Free Alliance (EFA) group (Lynch, 1998, p. 198; De Winter and Gomez-
Reino, 2002, p. 496-97). 
 The election saw a victory for the two (territorially separated) right-wing 
coalitions, with the result that the LN was practically obliged to join a government 
coalition not only including FI but AN too. The centre coalition was squeezed between 
the left and right, obtaining only 11 percent of votes and less than 6 percent of seats (see 
Table 5.2). This triggered a process of dissolution of the traditional centre which, during 
the parliamentary term (1994-96) split into two parts, one (PPI) joining the left and one 
(CDU) joining the right. At the same time, the League‟s cohabitation with FI and AN 
was particularly problematic. Not only were AN and parts of FI very resistant to the 
federalist ideas of the LN but they had become its most important electoral competitors. 
While AN competed with the LN on issues of immigration and law and order, the main 
challenge came from FI which, using the media power of its leader, had established 
itself as the main advocate of a neo-Thatcherite revolution. When the 1994 European 
election, held just few months after the general election, confirmed that the LN was 
losing many votes to FI, the fate of the government and of the coalition looked gloomy. 
Already in his Pontida speech in June 1994, Bossi was posing the rhetorical question of 
“whether the League, the creative factor, the catalyst of the new political age, which 
will be the age of federalism, should remain plebeian or let itself be absorbed by the 
Berlusconian aristocracy?” (Bossi, speech at Pontida, 19/06/94, reported in Bossi, 1996, 
p. 67). 
 The LN continued to sustain the government for few more months but, at the 
first opportunity, in autumn 1994, it announced the withdrawal of its support. The 
break-up of the right-wing alliance produced a split in the parliamentary group of the 
League and even Roberto Maroni, a prominent figure in the party from its infancy, came 
very close to leaving (Repubblica, 11/02/95). However, Bossi managed to hold the bulk 
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of the party together. In the speech at the House of Representatives before the no-
confidence vote, he tried to distinguish the League, the true party of the “liberal and 
federalist right”, of the “small and medium entrepreneurial bourgeoisie” and “of the 
self-employed”, from the former government partners, labelled as “the fascist fringe” 
and the “paternalist and monopolist right” (Bossi, 21/12/94, reported in Bossi, 1996, p. 
86-89). His strategy consisted of attempting to detach the small and medium 
bourgeoisie from FI and AN in order to form a liberal, right of centre pole under the 
League‟s leadership. This was very evident in his speech to the House of 
Representatives before the confidence vote for the Dini government, which with the 
support of League and of the left was going to replace Berlusconi‟s, and it was evident 
too that Bossi deemed crucial to limit Berlusconi‟s media power if this strategy had to 
be successful: 
 
The League has opposed this [i.e. Berlusconi‟s and Fini‟s] anti-democratic project, 
demanding reforms and the abolition of the monopoly on information, demanding  the 
birth of a liberal-democratic pole which, alternating with a social-democratic one and 
excluding the extreme wings, could ensure democracy and reformism against these 
sorcerer‟s apprentices of neo-fascism: as all over the world Mr. Fini and Mr. 
Berlusconi are defined as such… But there is a real danger, dear colleagues: many, too 
many, small entrepreneurs and artisans, self-employed and citizens believe this [i.e. 
Berlusconi‟s] propaganda. (Bossi, 24/01/95, reported in Bossi, 1996, p. 92-93). 
 
It emerges very clearly from Bossi‟s words that, at that stage, the LN‟s leader was most 
concerned about competition with FI over well defined socio-economic constituencies, 
rather than competition with AN over xenophobic voters. 
 At the same time as Bossi planned the secessionist turn, therefore, he also 
prepared the party to run alone at the next election as a centre pole in competition with 
both the left and right. The reconciliation of the party‟s centre-right (or liberal right) 
ideology with the positioning at the centre of the party system can be best understood by, 
again, looking at Bossi‟s speeches: 
 
The League, actually, is clearly entrenched in the bourgeois structure. Therefore, we 
have got the vote of those people who have always thought that they could best protect 
their interests with the right, if right means free-market… The League, a force of the 
centre, represents those modern moderate strata that now do not have a pole to refer to. 
They are dividing up between the right pole and the social-democratic pole because of 
the absence of a centre pole. This is a danger because the moderate strata vote much 
more for the right than for the left… We cannot pretend to ignore that a stable alliance 
of us with Fini and Berlusconi would be dangerous, because it would drag the middle 
class, which the League represents, to unite itself with monopolism, thus creating the 
conditions for a second fascism. (Bossi, 12/02/95, reported in Bossi, 1996, p. 105).   
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The strategy was, therefore, set: the secessionist turn and the occupation of the political 
centre ground went hand to hand. Repositioning towards the centre was not such a 
difficult task even if the party retained its clear right-of-centre socio-economic and 
socio-cultural stances. Indeed, the voting down of the Berlusconi government, the 
break-up of the right-wing coalition and the support for a new government with the left 
were enough to project the image of a leftward moving party. In fact, Bossi even had to 
reassure its party members that, in contrast to what Berlusconi‟s propaganda wanted 
them to believe, “[d]ear friends, the League does not go to the left” (ibid.). In addition 
the 1996 party manifesto was rather prudent on issues concerning immigration. 
Although the party continued to demand more control, it did not indulge in its usual 
xenophobic rhetoric and the short paragraph dedicated to the issue was titled 
“Immigration – The Northern League is not racist” (Lega Nord, Manifesto 1996, p. 6).  
 The campaign for the 1996 election was, therefore, fought from a secessionist 
and centre position against what Bossi called the two 'Roman', centralising poles – 
Roma-Polo and Roma-Ulivo. The gamble was only partially successful. The party 
obtained its best score ever in terms of votes but, since the centre-left coalition won a 
majority in parliament, it condemned itself to quasi-irrelevance as far as office and 
policies were concerned. 
 The new situation soon became unsustainable for the League for a series of 
reasons. First, it drew accusations from FI and AN that LN had not only caused the fall 
of their government back in 1994 but had also, by subtracting them crucial votes, 
favoured the victory of the centre-left. Second, these accusations became particularly 
painful as the centre-left government, in a desperate attempt to heal public finances and 
to be able to join the European Monetary Union (EMU), started to raise taxes and to 
tackle tax evasion, a source of strong discontentment among those socio-economic 
constituencies which the LN was trying to retain in the face of FI‟s competition. Third, 
the centre-left government set up a „bi-cameral‟ commission (i.e. with MPs from both 
the House and the Senate) to consider constitutional reform, including federalism. For 
the League, this was a threat to its „issue ownership‟. Fourth, the centre-left government 
adopted a new law for the regulation of immigration flows and the integration of 
foreigners which not only provided a general regularization and increased the possibility 
for legal entry but also called for a revision of the Constitution with the intent of 
enfranchising foreign long-term residents with the right to vote (and to stand as 
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candidates) in local and regional elections (Massetti, 1999). Finally, all these 
developments were occurring in a context of increased polarization between the left 
government and the right opposition, which made the centre positioning of the LN 
untenable. As a consequence, the party started to suffer electoral setbacks, such as the 
one it experienced at the 1997 local elections (Ruzza, 2006, p. 224). It also experienced 
growing internal dissent. Bossi‟s „iron fist‟ generated expulsions and voluntary walk-
outs, like the one by the pro-Berlusconi faction led by Comino (leader of the Piedmont‟s 
regional section). Opinion polls conducted in late 1997 showed that about a quarter of 
the LN‟s voters intended to vote FI at the next general election and a majority of them 
wanted the party to re-join forces with FI (Corriere della Sera, 15/12/97, cited in Chari 
et al., 2004, p. 445). It was time, once again, for the party leadership to work out an 
„exit strategy‟. 
            
5.2.3 From the centre to the radical right (1999-2009) 
 The assault of the LN on the centre-left‟s new immigration law in 1998 signalled 
the beginning of a new re-positioning. After the negative results of the 1999 European 
election, the League pursued a strategy of rapprochement with Berlusconi and his right-
wing coalition. At the end of the year, Bossi gave his consent to a new alliance 
(Repubblica, 09/12/99), which was tried out at the 2000 regional elections. Although the 
League continued to lose votes (see Table 5.1), the new centre-right alliance won 
control not only of Lombardy and Veneto but also Liguria and Piedmont. The following 
year the House of Freedoms - the name given to the new alliance – won the general 
election and, with Berlusconi as PM, formed a new government. The electoral 
performance of the League was extremely poor, just 3.9 percent nationally, which 
meant that the party gained representation in parliament only because of the agreement 
in FPTP constituencies with the other partners. Yet, the governing influence of the LN 
was not small: it obtained three important ministries - Justice (Castelli), Welfare 
(Maroni) and Constitutional Reforms and Devolution (Bossi and then Calderoli). More 
importantly, within the government coalition a privileged relationship between Bossi 
and Berlusconi was established, whereby Berlusconi committed himself to delivering 
devolution and to providing benevolent media coverage for Bossi‟s and other LN 
politicians‟ 'politically incorrect' (often xenophobic) public outbursts, while Bossi 
committed himself to backing any legislation (mainly concerning justice and media) 
directly related to the (conflict of) interests of the PM (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005, 
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p. 956). This bilateral pact was also based on the fact that the two parties shared the 
same socio-economic constituencies and, therefore, a very similar orientation on socio-
economic policies. The economy minister Giulio Tremonti, a member of FI very well 
connected amongst the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie of the north and a stanch advocate of 
fiscal federalism, was the embodiment of the Bossi-Berlusconi axis. He was the 
cheerleader for the revenge of „productive Italy‟ against the burden of taxes and for 
protectionism against „unfair competition‟ from China. 
 Having secured a favourable governmental approach on economic policies, the 
League could focus on its preferred policy areas. Beside devolution, immigration and 
criminality – which in the discourse of the LN are nearly the same issue – became once 
again the flagship policy themes of the party. This new strategy led the League to 
become a classic example of populist radical right party and, after the 2008 general 
election, the most right-wing party in the Italian parliament (Massetti, 2009a). For the 
League turning from a party of opposition to a party of government was far from simple. 
Addressing its new allies (AN‟s leaders in particular) at the 2002 Congress, Bossi 
declared “…it is difficult to transform from a political movement of warriors, of people 
who cannot even remember how many sentences they have received”. This difficulty 
was, however, overcome by launching their populist attacks on alternative targets to 
central government, such as immigrants, Islam, globalization and the European Union. 
The ability to maintain „one foot in and one foot out‟ of government (Albertazzi and 
McDonnell, 2005), which allowed the party to retain its populist rhetoric, was primarily 
based on a communication strategy aimed at drawing public attention towards highly 
symbolic and emotive political battles and to drag attention away from the distance 
between party‟s declared objectives and actual outcomes (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 
2009). This style has been labelled „simulative politics‟ (Cento Bull, 2009).      
 Before discussing the party‟s proposals and discourse, it is worth analysing the 
changes in the party‟s electorate through time. Table 5.6 shows the socio-economic 
profile of the League‟s voters. It is not easy to infer much about the party‟s left-right 
positioning from this data, especially in view of the fact that in the LN's electoral 
strongholds the correlation between workers and the political left does not hold and 
because the peculiar achievement of populist radical right parties is to attract workers to 
the right (Pelinka, 2005, p. 140). Yet, the growth in support  from employees and 
teachers in 1996, a social constituency usually associated with the left, would appear to 
confirm the more centrist positioning of the party in that period.  
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Table 5.6 Socio-economic profile of the LN’s electorate (1991-2008) 
Profession 1991 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 
 
Entrepr., Manag., Profes. 
 
14.0 
 
15.8 
 
12.4 
 
12.0 
 
4.4 
 
13.5 
Employees, Teachers 13.3 16.0 18.8 10.1 8.2 10.9 
Artisans, traders, farmers 24.0 26.5 23.9 7.6 16.8 21.7 
Workers 16.6 21.4 31.2 10.7 9.2 19.8 
Unemployed 11.2 14.2 17.3 5.9 8.1 15.5 
 
Total North 
 
14.1 
 
16.9 
 
19.8 
 
8.2 
 
8.5 
 
17.2 
   
Source: opinion polls by Eurisko, Cirm, Abacus and Doxa. Reported in Biorcio (2008, p. 65). 
 
 
The table also shows that artisans, traders and farmers have consistently represented the 
League‟s most important constituency except in 1996, when they were outnumbered by 
the workers, and in 2001 when most of them preferred to vote FI  and wanted to punish 
the LN for exposing them to five years of centre-left fiscal policies. 
 Table 5.7, however, provides much more helpful data concerning the self-
placement of the party‟s voters. The 1996 data clearly stand out for the balance in the 
left-right distribution of voters and for the fact that the single biggest group was 
constituted by those who placed themselves in centre. The voters placing themselves on 
the centre-right have always been a plurality except in 1996 and in 2009, when they 
were the second biggest after those placing themselves in no category. The 
disappearance of voters placing themselves to the left from 2001 and to the centre-left 
from 2006 clearly appears to confirm the party's ideological trajectory to the right.  
 
Table 5.7 Self-placement along the left-right dimension of the LN’s voters  
 1991 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 
Left 6.7 3.3 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
Centre-left 11.2 7.5 16.1 1.6 0.0 0.8 
Centre 14.1 13.8 28.7 6.9 6.0 11.8 
Centre-right 22.5 32.6 18.2 17.3 19.6 30.0 
Right 22.2 28.1 8.1 11.4 19.9 22.8 
No position 20.4 23.0 27.9 9.0 11.0 32.5 
 
Total North 
 
14.1 
 
16.9 
 
19.8 
 
8.2 
 
8.5 
 
17.2 
 
  Source: opinion polls by Eurisko, Cirm, Abacus and Doxa. Reported in Biorcio (2008, p. 66). 
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The rightward repositioning of the League started in the late 1990s. Already in 
1999 the LN had organized the gathering of signatures supporting a referendum against 
the centre-left immigration law. On that occasion the LN had co-operated with Forza 
Nuova (FN), an extra-parliamentary and extreme-right movement linked to the French 
Front National (Repubblica, 19/02/99). The change of tone and emphasis on 
immigration after the mid-1990s can be also detected by comparing the 2001 manifesto 
with the 1996 one. While in 1996 the chapter on immigration was short, prudent and 
titled “Immigration – The Northern League is not racist” (Lega Nord, 1996, General 
Election Manifesto, p. 6), the chapter on the 2001 manifesto
85
 was much longer, it 
denigrated not only irregular but also regular immigrants and was simply titled 
“Clandestines” (Lega Nord, 2001, Ragionamenti per la campagna elettorale, p. 2). 
Ownership over issues related to immigration and law and order remained 
contested between the LN and AN until 2002. In that year both leaders wanted to put 
their signature on the tough new immigration law which had been passed by the centre-
right coalition and which was, indeed, labelled the „Bossi-Fini law‟ (Geddes, 2008). 
However, with the launch of the proposal for the enfranchisement of regular immigrants 
for local and regional elections by Fini in 2003 (Repubblica, 08/10/03), the xenophobic 
and anti-immigrant ground was left entirely to the League which kept marking its 
thematic territory continuously. Beyond remaining the only openly xenophobic 
parliamentary party, the LN also established itself as the most important islamophobic 
actor in Italy. Two figures in the party played a major role in this respect, Roberto 
Calderoli and Mario Borghezio. The former, who was a minister at the time, revealed on 
a TV programme that he was wearing a t-shirt bearing the images of the so called „anti-
Islamic cartoons‟ which had been published by a Danish newspaper few months earlier. 
The move caused furious reactions in Islamic countries, especially in Libya where the 
Italian embassy was attacked (Corriere della Sera, 19/02/06). The following year he 
went on to declare that he would bring a pig to a site in Bologna which had been chosen 
for building a mosque “[e]xactly as I did in Lodi, where the mosque was not built 
anymore because the site was considered impure” (Repubblica, 14/09/07). In addition to 
Islamophobia, Calderoli was also one of the LN‟s politicians who talked most about law 
and order. For instance, he launched proposals for the re-introduction of death penalty, 
                                                 
85
 Strictly speaking, the official manifesto for 2001 was a different document drafted together with the 
other parties of the House of Freedoms. However, the LN also drafted an independent document called 
“Resolutions for the electoral campaign” and dated April 2001 (the month in which the election took 
place). That is the document to which I refer. 
  
234 
 
for the introduction of „head-money‟ on criminals and the introduction of chemical 
castration for rapists (Repubblica, 14/03/05; Repubblica, 22/06/05). 
 Borghezio could be defined as the party‟s man within the European extreme or 
radical right network. He has been an MEP since 2001, having been re-elected in 2004 
and 2009. Beside having been condemned for setting fire to the personal belongings of 
some illegal and homeless immigrants who had settled themselves under a bridge (La 
Stampa, 02/07/05), he has led several campaigns throughout central and northern Italy 
against the building of mosques. In 2007 he was arrested together with Franz van Hecke 
and Filip Dewinter of the Vlaams Belang (VB) by the Belgian police for staging an 
unauthorized anti-Islam demonstration near to the European Parliament (Corriere della 
Sera, 12/11/07). In 2008 he participated, together with representatives of the VB and of 
the FPÖ, in an anti-Islam rally organized by an extreme-right local movement in 
Cologne (The Local, 18/09/08). In 2009, he was caught on camera while advising a 
group of French neo-fascists that infiltrated the main centre-right party Union pour un 
Mouvement Populaire (UMP) (Repubblica, 28/03/09). In the recorded video Borghezio 
suggests his hosts refrain from the temptation to openly declare themselves as fascists, 
to emphasize regional identities or religious Catholic traditions instead, and to start by 
capturing local governments before getting “there where we want to arrive” (ibid.) – a 
strategy remarkably similar to the development of the philosophical work by the main 
European ideologue of the New Right, Alain De Benoist (Luverà, 1999; Spektorowski, 
2003). 
While these incidents and the behaviour of individual, though prominent, figures 
could be dismissed as not representing the actual and official position of the League,
86
 
the party‟s activities and proposals at all levels of government seem to confirm the 
characterization of the LN as an example of a populist radical right party. Indeed, the 
party proposals put forward in the run up to the 2008 general elections included: islamic 
religious celebration to be hold exclusively in Italian (presumably to facilitate 
monitoring by intelligence services), compulsory local referendums on giving the „green 
light‟ to build new mosques, a total ban on the construction of camps (even regular ones) 
for the Roma, and the granting to mayors of new powers to deport illegal immigrants 
(Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2009, p. 13). Although most of these proposals were not 
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 For instance, the participation of Borghezio in the anti-Islam rally in Cologne was criticized by Bossi: 
“You cannot accept all invitations. I am a liberal leader so I leave the party members the freedom to 
reason with their own heads, but I would not have gone there” (Repubblica, 21/09/08). 
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and could not be passed, given their evidently unconstitutional nature, in 2009 the 
League managed to push through a „security package‟ which, amongst other provisions, 
introduced the offence of „clandestine immigration‟ 87  and obliged medical staff to 
denounce to the authorities any illegal residents who received medical treatment in 
hospitals. Ironically enough, the new offence has created some panic amongst the many 
Italian families who (irregularly) employ illegal immigrants as domestic workers, which 
has provided an opportunity for the Catholic establishment and charities to advocate and 
push through a new regularization.
88
 In addition to the new offence, the League‟s 
Interior Minister Maroni has started since the early spring of 2009 to reject boats 
overcrowded with asylum seekers and send them back to other shores of the 
Mediterranean.  
These policies have created tensions with the EU, the UN and with the Italian 
Catholic establishment (Corriere della Sera, 07/07/09; Repubblica, 20/07/09; 
Repubblica, 15/07/09). In fact, the relationship between the LN and the Catholic Church 
has never been an easy one. The League's ethnic-regionalism, the secessionist turn in 
the mid-1990s and, even more, its xenophobic positions have never met with approval 
from the Church. On the other hand, for the same reasons, the League has often 
manifested anti-Christian sentiments and has stigmatised the hypocrisy of the Catholic 
establishment regarding certain issues (“illegal immigrants are not allowed in the 
Vatican state”). Yet, the League has found itself on the same side as the Catholic 
Church on several political disputes, such as public funding of private (Catholic) 
schools, opposition to same-sex marriages, opposition to civil unions, and inclusion of a 
reference to the „Christian roots‟ of Europe in the EU Constitution. More generally, the 
League uses religion (and therefore Roman Catholicism) instrumentally as a reference 
to tradition and as an „identity provider‟ often in opposition to other „alien‟ religious 
identities, primarily Islam. Not surprisingly the party, though defining itself as 
„traditionalist Catholic‟, enjoys very good and close relationships with the ultra-
traditionalist Brotherhood of Pius X founded by the schismatic bishop Marcel Lefebre 
(Repubblica, 10/09/07). 
                                                 
87
 Curiously enough the LN‟s 2001 manifesto stated: “[c]reating the offence of clandestine immigration 
means, therefore, making expulsion more complicated” (Lega Nord, Ragionamenti per la campagna 
elettorale, 2001, p. 25).  
88
 A very similar process occurred on the occasion of the first immigration law adopted by the centre-right 
coalition in 2002. After the introduction of tough measures a huge regularization was carried out 
(Repubblica, 05/07/02).  
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Given the maintenance of a populist rhetoric and the adoption of the above-
mentioned positions on issues of immigration and law and order, it is not surprising that 
in recent studies the LN has been included, more or less fully, in the populist radical 
right party family (Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005, Zaslove, 2008). This is in contrast to 
previous research conducted in the early/mid 1990s, which had concluded that party 
was an anti-statist populist but not a radical right one (Kitschelt, 1995). Indeed, the LN 
still maintains some peculiarities of the anti-statist parties. For instance, as far security 
is concerned most radical right parties rely on police (i.e. on the state), whereas the 
League has won a political battle to introduce the so called ronde, i.e. locally organized 
groups of vigilantes who, theoretically, co-operate with the police in patrolling the 
streets. Yet, leaving aside minor differences, in the last ten years the message of the 
party on identity, security, immigration and globalization has been very similar to those 
of the other radical right parties. Mudde argues, that the core concerns of these parties 
do not refer to the socio-economic domain but to the socio-cultural or spiritual one 
(Mudde, 2007, p. 119-37). In the case of the League, this has certainly not always been 
the case as far as actual concerns are considered: “Dear friends, Padania was born out of 
a real clash against Italy, and real means for the control over economy” (Bossi, speech 
at the Congresso Federale, 29/03/98). The right to cultural difference claimed by the 
party has often served the objective of maintaining economic growth and wealth of the 
north. Yet, at a rhetorical level, the party has always emphasised the spiritual dimension:  
 
man is not like a beefsteak… to live, he needs to actualize his own affectivity, and 
therefore he needs a whole set of things that do not stay in the economic domain, but in 
the domain of ethics, culture and religion. To tell the truth, some simplistic little men 
think that a global government can prevent any conflict… Without the re-conquest of 
cultural and religious diversity, which is at the basis of men and peoples, it will not be 
possible to reach peace. (Bossi, 04/05/96, reported in Bossi, 1996, p. 142).     
 
 
 
 
5.3 Party ideology and policy: The European integration dimension 
5.3.1 From conditioned support to Europhilia (1980s-1997) 
 The European dimension, as for many other regionalist parties, has been very 
important for the LN. The meeting between Bossi and Salvadori in 1979, which 
converted the future leader of the LN to the ideas of „integral federalism‟, occurred 
during a tour that Salvadori was undertaking in order to unite regionalist movements 
into a common list for the European election of that year (Stevenin, 2008, p. 65-67). 
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Ten years later, it was the 1989 European election which gave momentum to the project, 
now led by Bossi, to unite and then federate the diverse regional leagues (Tarchi, 1998, 
p. 143-44). 
 During the 1980s the various Leagues' references to Europe were frequent and 
overall leaned towards a positive (i.e. supportive) attitude. In the original programme of 
the Lombard League, the party was in favour of “the construction of a Europe founded 
on autonomy, federalism, respect and direct solidarity amongst the peoples of the 
continent and, therefore, between the Lombards and any other people” (Lega Lombarda, 
1983, in La Lega Nord attraverso I manifesti, 1996). Yet, as this spells out, support for 
European integration was conditioned on the construction of a particular kind of Europe. 
An electoral poster of the alliance between the Lombard and Venetian League for the 
1984 European election was even more explicit: “A united Europe was pursued by 
Napoleon and Hitler too. An autonomist Europe, which respects the peoples and their 
needs, is pursued by the democratic people” (Unione per L’Europa Federalista, 1984, 
in La Lega Nord attraverso I manifesti, 1996). Electoral posters, the most important 
medium of communication of the party before the 1992 electoral breakthrough, kept 
sending the same ambiguous message during the 1989 European election. On the one 
hand, Europe and „being European‟ was seen as a legitimation. One poster stated: 
“Lombardy has been European since the beginning of time” (Lega Lombarda, 1989, in 
La Lega Nord attraverso I manifesti, 1996). In addition, European integration was seen 
as a process that would weaken member-states and empower the regions. Moreover, it 
represented an alternative source of power and policies which better suited party‟s 
preferences (Piermattei, 2008). Another poster stated: “Further from Rome, closer to 
Europe” (Alleanza Nord, 1989 in La Lega Nord attraverso I manifesti, 1996). However, 
as in the previous European elections, the direction Europe should take was set out 
boldly, albeit ambiguously: “Europe of civilization. Not Europe of big business‟ lobbies, 
but Europe of small and medium enterprises and artisans. NO! to Europe of 
immigration, social disaggregation and drugs. YES! to Europe that moves capital and 
not workers” (Lega Lombarda – Alleanza Nord, 1989, in La Lega Nord attraverso I 
manifesti, 1996). 
 The turn to a more convinced pro-European integration stance occurred during 
the early 1990s, when the party tried to portray itself as a new centre-right party which 
would replace the old parties. In 1993 the LN voted for the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty and expressed its concerns that Italy should do its best to meet the criteria for 
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monetary union (Quaglia, 2003, p. 15). In the party‟s manifesto for the 1994 election, 
one can read that the League said “'yes‟ to the European union, both political and 
economic, which is being carried out following the Maastricht Treaty… This choice 
imposes on the country [Italy] a credible and consistent pro-European policy, inspired 
by liberalism and federalism and by the rigorous respect for European commitments” 
(Lega Nord, 1994a, General Election Manifesto, p. 19). The 1994 European election 
poster went as far as to state that “the League is the only party that wants Europe” (Lega 
Nord, 1994b, in La Lega Nord attraverso I manifesti, 1996). During the first 
participation in office, indeed, the League was the most pro-European party amongst the 
three major partners of the right-wing coalition and obtained the Ministry for EC Affairs 
(Quaglia, 2003, p. 15).  
 However, it was during the years of the secessionist turn that the League reached 
its pro-integration peak. In 1996 the LN even re-applied, though unsuccessfully, for 
membership of the European Free Alliance (EFA) group. In that period the League was 
strongly in favour of integration in agriculture, competition, trade, monetary policy and, 
more generally, the economy (Chari et al., 2004, p. 427-28). It even saw in the EU a 
protection against a possible authoritarian intervention of the Italian state against the 
secessionist party: “I don‟t believe they can think of using authoritarianism because 
Europe would not allow that” (Bossi, reported in Repubblica, 13/09/97). From an ex 
post perspective, this nearly unconditional support can be interpreted as mainly 
instrumental. The EU was used as a framework to make the secessionist project more 
feasible and, therefore, more credible: “the Northern League considers Europe as the 
primary framework of our political action. The unitary state, self-proclaimed as 
„national‟, constitutes an institution which belongs ever more to the past.” (Lega Nord, 
Manifesto 1996, p. 31). For the following 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC), 
the party proposed to revise the Treaty introducing, amongst other provisions, the right 
to self-determination of all peoples, within and outside the EU; the principle of local 
autonomy; protection and promotion of all linguistic and cultural identities, starting 
from the least diffuse and most threatened; a new formulation of the principle of 
subsidiarity which explicitly addressed the local and regional levels; more powers to the 
Committee of the Regions; and acknowledgement of the economic and social role of 
businesses employing less than 20 people, as these suffer from their inclusion in the 
much wider category „small and medium enterprises‟ (Lega Nord, 1996, General 
Election Manifesto, p. 31-32).  
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The League went even further than simply using the EU framework as a shell 
for its would-be new Padanian state; it tried to use the EMU process to justify the break-
up of Italy into two states: north and south. This attempt was based on the anticipation 
that Italy as a whole would not qualify for EMU, while Padania, freed from the burden 
of the centralist state, would. With two years to go until the launch of the monetary 
union (EMU), that was a bold gamble.  
This strategy was implicit in the 1996 manifesto. The paragraph entitled 
“Padania and Europe: the „paradox of Padania‟” goes:  
 
It is vital to avoid the exclusion of Padania from the institutionalization of a „solid 
nucleus‟ to which she is intimately linked, and within which she could lead in terms of 
GDP per capita… The so called „Europe of variable geometry‟ is in the nature and 
history of European integration, but it cannot be rigidly based on the member-states” 
(Lega Nord, Manifesto 1996,  p. 31). 
 
In September 1996, Bossi even wrote a letter to the European Commission enquiring 
whether it would be possible for Padania to join EMU (Quaglia, 2003, p. 16). As late as 
November 1997, the League was still very keen in having Padania within the EMU zone. 
Giancarlo Pagliarini, the party's then economic spokesman, said in an interview with 
The Economist that: “[s]plitting Italy into two countries would be good for the north and 
good for the south” (Economist, 06/11/97). He went on to claim: “Padania would 
comfortably qualify for membership of EMU, which is what its firms want. The rest of 
Italy – which can keep the name – could make itself more competitive by devaluing the 
lira” (ibid.). 
 
5.3.2 The U-turn: from pro-integration to Eurosceptism (1998-2009)  
 In spite of the pro-European and pro-EMU messages sent by prominent figures 
up the end of 1997, after March 1998 the party adopted a clear anti-European position: 
 
…this is a Europe that we like less and less. The idea born in the aftermath of the war - 
to prevent further wars amongst European states – is now generating a monster which 
will produce neither democracy, nor stability, nor economic advantages for everyone. 
Padania is not interested in a Europe which will be full of instability and which 
destroys our small and medium enterprises that, differently from other countries, 
constitute the backbone of our economy. Therefore, if Europe does not recognise 
Padania, Padania cannot recognise itself in Europe. (Bossi, speech to the Congresso 
Federale, 28/03/98) 
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The reasons behind this U-turn are various. Chari et al. have argued that the main driver 
was the intention to get closer to FI‟s cool stance towards Europe, in the hope  of re-
creating a new centre-right alliance for the forthcoming general election (Chari, et al., 
2004). Certainly, it is true that Berlusconi was very keen on denigrating EMU because it 
represented a success of the centre-left Italian government and of a centre-left led 
Europe (Quaglia, 2003, p. 20). In addition, he also had personal problems with 
integration in the field of justice and police investigations, in particular with the 
common arrest warrant: once back in office in 2001, the LN‟s Minister of Justice 
Roberto Castelli assumed the duty, rather costly in terms of popularity (Albertazzi and 
McDonnell, 2005), to protect the PM‟s (conflict of) interest on justice, which included 
strong opposition to the European common arrest warrant. Yet, the thesis proposed by 
Chari et al. leaves some questions unanswered, or unconvincingly answered. For 
instance, why did the League not limit itself to approaching FI‟s stance, rather than 
becoming more Eurosceptic than FI itself? The authors argue that, as a party inspired by 
the principle of „make or break‟, the League, once it abandoned the pro-European stance, 
easily slipped towards a radical Eurosceptic position (ibid, p. 448). While this is a 
reasonable interpretation, the point is that they appear to have missed the most evident, 
though not necessarily single, explanation.  
In early 1998 Italy qualified to join the EMU. This possible outcome had already 
been anticipated as a negative scenario for Padania by Bossi in 1996:  
 
… the Padanian manufacturing system, although it is the most productive in Western 
Europe, needs the continuous devaluation of the lira in order to sell its products, 
because of the Roman burden… if devaluation of the currency is no longer possible, 
which would be the case with the entry into EMU, the Padanian production system 
would undergo a devastating crisis, as the costs of the nanny state [assistenzialismo] 
would lead to the failure of northern firms in favour of southern ones (Bossi, speech in 
Pontida, 02/06/96).                       
 
 
At the basis of the U-turn there was, therefore, the failure of a gambling strategy which 
had led the party to bet everything on the exclusion of Italy from EMU. Amongst the 
three scenarios envisaged by the party – Padania included and south excluded; Italy as a 
whole excluded; Italy as a whole included – it was the latter, deemed by the party to be 
the worst one, that materialized. The economic arguments reported above, which had 
remained very much under the surface until the end of 1997, became the dominant ones 
after March 1998, with criticism towards the EU focusing predominantly on the 
negative consequences of EMU and its convergence criteria (Bossi, speech at the 
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Congresso Federale, 28/03/98). In this respect, criticism of EMU and European trade 
policies came to be increasingly linked to globalization, especially in terms of growing 
„unfair‟ competition by China and other emerging economies. 
 However, as Bossi admitted a few years later, the disappointment of the League 
with the fact the Italy managed to join the EMU also owed much to the realization that 
the project of extracting Padania from Italy became much more difficult (Bossi, speech 
at the Congresso Federale, 03/03/02). Already in 2000, the leader had spoken against a 
“Europe of subsidiarity”, as the latter concept was actually “a trick to maintain only one 
level of sovereignty: yesterday, the state; today, the state and Europe; tomorrow, only 
Europe” (Bossi, speech at Pontida, 04/06/00). 
 As noted by Albertazzi and McDonnell, the Eurosceptic turn also owed 
something to the populist nature of the League (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005). This 
was especially the case after the party returned to national office in 2001 and, as a result, 
it had to stop or limit its criticism of the „corrupted palaces‟ of Roman politics. To be 
sure, the party did not stop its attacks on its more centralist and southern-oriented 
government partners (UDC and AN) completely. However, the EU, with its arcane, 
distant and bureaucratic government, represented the ideal substitute to keep expressing 
anti-establishment discourses. Using his typically colourful language, Bossi kept 
attacking Europe by referring to “European technocrats and paedophiles” (Economist, 
12/05/01, cited in Quaglia, 2003, p. 17), and labelling the EU as “a Super-State without 
a face, the Soviet Union of the West” (Bossi, Speech at the Congresso Federale, 
03/03/02), or “a nest of freemasons and Communist bankers” (Financial Times, 07/0701, 
cited in Quaglia, 2003, p. 17). 
 The increasing Euroscepticism of the LN developed parallel to the party‟s move 
towards radical right positions. The LN‟s increasingly nativist, anti-immigrant and anti-
Islam ideological orientation clashed blatantly with the EU‟s emphasis on individual 
rights and liberal cosmopolitanism. Criticising the EU‟s policies on immigration gives 
the party the opportunity to attack both the EU and immigration:  
 
no power on immigration should be given to Europe because the keys of our house‟s 
door have to remain in our own hands. The only useful thing Prodi [the then President 
of the European Commission] can do is to contribute paying the costs for sending 
immigrants back, thus giving us back some of the money that Europe has taken away 
from us (Bossi, speech in Pontida, 04/05/03) 
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The League‟s opposition to European integration has taken, as has often happened with 
this party, the shape of „virtual‟ or „symbolic‟ politics. Having called for a referendum 
for the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, which was not required by the Italian 
Constitution, having voted „No‟ to Italian ratification both within the cabinet and in 
parliament (Corriere della Sera, 29/10/04), and in the wake of the failed ratifications of 
the European Constitution in France and Holland, the party launched the idea of an 
unlikely referendum on dropping the Euro and return to the Lira. 
 Given the traditional pro-European attitudes of Italian public opinion, the 
strategy of the party looks, at first sight, rather risky from an electoral point of view. 
However, as Table 5.8 shows, during the first years of the euro (1999-2004) the share of 
those who held negative views on Italian membership or thought that integration had 
gone too far doubled. 
 
Table 5.8 Opinions of Italian voters  
about EU membership (1999-2004) 
 
 1999 2004 
Italian membership of the EU is:   
Good 65.5 54.8 
Bad 4.2 8.1 
Neither good nor bad 17.2 27.4 
Don‟t know 13.1 9.7 
 
European integration: 
  
Has gone to far 10.2 22.1 
Should remain as it is 27.4 26.5 
Should go further 39.6 36.2 
Don‟t know 22.8 15.3 
 
No. of interviewees 
 
3,707 
 
1,553 
 
                             Source: Biorcio (2005, p. 11). 
 
 
In contrast, the share of those who thought that Italian membership was a good thing 
decreased considerably. Changes in attitude towards integration have followed an 
interesting development in relationship to voters‟ position on the left-right dimension. 
As Table 5.9 shows, while in 1999 left and centre-left voters were less supportive than 
right and centre-right ones, in 2004 the situation had completely reversed: centre-right 
voters had become as sceptical about further integration as their centrist counterparts 
(the most eurosceptic group); right-wing voters were less sceptical but it was the left 
and centre-left voters that had become the most supportive.  
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Table 5.9 Italian voters’ self-placement on the left-right scale  
and onions about European integration (1999-2004) 
 
 European integration should go further 
 1999 2004 
All 39.6 36.2 
Left 42.1 45.9 
Centre-left 50.3 49.1 
Centre 37.5 32.0 
Centre-right 55.7 33.6 
Right 60.9 39.7 
Don’t know 18.9 24.0 
 
         Source: Biorcio (2005, p. 15). 
 
As the League has harvested its votes almost exclusively from centre, centre-right and 
right-wing voters since 2001 (see Table, 5.7), the party has either followed the 
preferences of most of its voters or, more likely, has dragged many of them towards its 
anti-European stance. In any case the U-turn does not look like it has been harmful from 
an electoral point of view. On the contrary, it has established the LN as the only 
explicitly anti-European party in the Italian party system, thus providing another (beside 
anti-immigration and law and order) competition-free hunting ground. Table 5.10 
confirms this interpretation. The LN‟s voters are the least supportive of Italian 
membership of the EU, the least trustful of EU decisions and, by far, the least 
supportive of further integration. 
 
5.10 Voting intention and opinions on European integration, 2004 
 
party 
Italian membership of 
the EU is good 
European integration 
should go further 
EU decisions are in 
Italy‟s interest 
 
RC 
 
68.8 
 
39.8 
 
48.8 
Greens 62.0 50.5 49.5 
DS 73.2 53.2 67.2 
Mar 80.4 46.2 54.0 
IdV 73.6 31.6 37.6 
UDC 64.6 41.0 56.7 
LN 47.7 26.3 34.6 
FI 49.9 33.1 45.3 
AN 55.9 36.5 31.8 
 
All 
 
54.8 
 
36.2 
 
39.6 
  
  Source: Biorcio (2005, p. 17). 
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Surprisingly, the LN voted in favour of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. 
However, this episode does not indicate a new shift in the party‟s position. It should 
rather been interpreted as a case of 'Europragmatism' dictated by the requirements of 
governmental responsibility. Before returning to office in spring 2008 the party had 
been outspoken against the Treaty. Even after the election Calderoli kept calling for a 
referendum for the ratification of the Treaty (Corriere della Sera, 30/05/08). In addition, 
after the Irish „No‟ in their own referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, Calderoli and Bossi 
showed their happiness at this outcome, and the party organized a celebration in Milan 
with Guinness and Irish flags (Repubblica, 15/06/08). It took an explicit „order‟ by 
Bossi to make the LN MPs vote in favour of ratification just a few days later: “they vote 
as I tell them to vote; if I say vote yes, everyone votes yes!” (Corriere della Sera, 
19/06/08). As expected, the LN campaign in the European elections of 2009 confirmed 
that the party position had not changed. Criticism of Europe reflects the party‟s unease 
with the restricted power left to the regions but, most prominently, it reflects faithfully 
the populist radical right position of the League:  
   
In Europe there are sane forces, tenaciously committed to the defence of peoples‟ 
identity, of territory, of agricultural products of our land, of cultural and historical 
legacy, of our languages and dialects… Sane forces like the Northern League, always 
committed to the struggle against the rule-less extra-communitarian invasion, supported 
by those who would like a multi-ethnic society which would delete our history and our 
future. There is, however, a Europe, the one that the League fights against, which wants 
to transform the extra-communitarian into a citizen with the same rights but not with 
the same duties…The Europe we fight against and that we do not want is that which 
prefers mosques to cathedrals, which opens the door to Islam and takes away the 
crosses from the walls. (Lega Nord, leaflet for the European election, 2009). 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Due to the exceptional power of the unquestioned founder-leader Bossi, the LN has 
been able to adapt its ideology and policy positions often and quickly.  
As far as the centre-periphery dimension is concerned, the individual leagues, 
and the Liga Veneta in particular, started as ethno-cultural movements calling for a 
special statute of autonomy. In the second half of the 1980s, Bossi‟s Lombard League 
started to propose a more economic-centred regionalism calling for a federalist reform 
based on the existing regions. With the formation of the LN in late 1989 the party 
seemed inclined to take a radical path. However, new opportunities opened up by the 
crisis of traditional parties convinced Bossi to stick with federalist demands. The new 
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proposal was to divide Italy in three macro-regions: north, centre and south. The final 
collapse of the traditional parties in 1993 even led the party to attempt to expand into 
southern Italy as the League of Federal Italy. With Berlusconi‟s entry into politics and 
the approval of a mainly majoritarian voting system, the context changed significantly. 
After a failed attempt to govern together with FI and AN in 1994, during which the LN 
had re-proposed a more acceptable federalist reform based on the regions, the League 
voted the government down and broke up the coalition. It then moved to a secessionist 
position which it maintained until 1998, when it began a rapprochement with 
Berlusconi and the centre-right. Since then the League has pursued a federalist reform 
based on the existing regions which pushed forward the reform passed by the centre-left 
in 2001. Since 2007 the strategy of the party has been to build on that reform in order to 
achieve „fiscal federalism‟, postponing the achievement of „institutional federalism‟ to a 
later stage, most likely by the end of the current parliamentary term. Yet, very recently 
Bossi has re-deployed an independentist and secessionist discourse. Whether this 
prefigures a new policy shift is hard to say at this stage. 
In terms of left-right positioning, the League has emerged as a centre-right right 
party seeking to carry out a neo-Thatcherite revolution. Its approach to internal 
economic policies has hardly changed, although the party has moved from supporting 
free trade to protectionism in the international context. It has mainly absorbed votes 
from the DC‟s electorate of the „deep north‟ who deemed their traditional party to be 
corrupt, inefficient and too oriented towards the protection of southern interests. The 
mainly majoritarian voting system adopted in 1993 pushed the LN to form a coalition 
with right-wing parties FI and MSI-AN in 1994.  With the break-up of the coalition, the 
secessionist turn and the decision to run alone in the 1996 general election (thereby 
exposing itself to the majoritarian logic of the voting system) the League repositioned 
itself as the party of the centre in the bi-polarizing party system. However, the failure to 
exert any leverage on the process of government formation after the election and the 
enduring polarization between the two main blocs forced the LN to reconsider its 
strategy and, eventually, led it back to the centre-right coalition. Throughout its history 
the party has been characterized by its populist rhetoric, mainly directed against the 
established parties and economic and financial elites. Once back with the centre-right 
coalition, the League established ownership over issues of immigration and law and 
order. This led the LN to increasingly resemble other populist radical right parties 
which mobilize against immigrants, Islam, globalization and European integration. 
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As far as European integration is concerned, before the Eurosceptic turn in 1998, 
the party had held different positions. During the 1980s the message of the leagues had 
been rather ambiguous. The intellectual legacy of Salvadori produced an overall 
supportive stance. Yet, some arguments of anti-big business populism as well as anti-
immigrant nativism were already present, albeit not dominant. To be sure, these 
arguments were never completely abandoned, in spite of the shift towards a more 
clearly pro-European integration stance which reached its peak in 1996-97, during the 
secessionist period. The inclusion of Italy in EMU, against which the party had bet, 
triggered the U-turn which has led the Northern League to a populist radical right 
critique of the European project and its current direction. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Explaining regionalist parties’ positioning in the ideological space 
 
6.1 Comparing the four case-studies and generating hypotheses 
The in-depth analysis of the four cases has explored complex relationships 
between the following: the socio-structural environment; the institutional/political 
environment; the perception of these environmental conditions by parties‟ elites - 
including different perceptions and, therefore, intra-party divisions on their 
interpretations; strategy setting; and the impact on ideological re-positioning along the 
three dimensions considered, namely centre-periphery (or level of self-government); 
left-right; and European integration. The aim of this chapter is to provide some 
generalizations on regionalist parties‟ positioning in multi-dimensional ideological 
space. Evidently, such an objective necessitates some loss of complexity, especially as 
far as the intermediate level – party elites‟ perception, intra-party politics and strategy - 
is concerned. The first step, therefore, is to start with a comparison of the four case-
studies and identify the links between external environments (both socio-structural and 
institutional/political) and ideological positioning. 
 
6.1.1 The centre-periphery dimension 
As far as the centre-periphery dimension is concerned, three factors regarding 
the socio-structural environment appear to play a major role: first, the presence of an 
ethnic divide between the region and the rest of the state; secondly, the history of state 
formation, including the timing of the annexation of the region into the state and the 
historical/institutional legacy of the region; and thirdly, the economic relationship 
between the region and the state. The importance of the ethnic (linguistic) divide 
emerged clearly in the case of South Tyrol, where a majority of the regional population 
speaks a very different language from the official state‟s and where the initial 
secessionist stance of the SVP was moderated by the constraints of international 
relations. It also emerged in the case of the PC in Wales. The Welsh nationalists have 
consistently done better in Welsh Wales than in English-speaking Wales, and the 
geography of the referendum results, both in 1979 and in 1997, seems to confirm the 
relationship between ethnic distinctiveness and preferences for self-government. Yet, 
the case of Scotland appears to demonstrate that ethnic distinctiveness is not a necessary 
condition for radical centre-periphery positioning, since the SNP has been the most 
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consistently secessionist party amongst the four cases, in spite of the absence of 
substantive ethno-linguistic or ethno-religious differences. In contrast, the Scottish case 
illustrates the importance of the history and institutions. The institutional legacy of 
Scottish statehood was to some extent maintained within the UK, contributing to the 
survival of Scottish identity. Finally, all cases point to the importance of the economic 
factor. For the LN, this really seems to be most salient factor, as the superior economic 
status of Padania vis a vis Southern Italy has been the main reason for claims of self-
government. Economics, however, has been an important factor for all cases. In early 
1970s Scotland, the SNP tried to use the issue of North Sea oil to portray the region as 
(potentially) richer than the rest of the UK and, therefore, better off as an independent 
state. More often, however, Scotland, like Wales, has been considered as a poor region 
exploited by London. Yet, while the economic dependence of Scotland and Wales on 
(economic transfers from) London has worked against the cause of independence, un-
accommodated grievances of economic exploitation by Rome reinforce the case for 
Padanian secession. The hypotheses that can be drawn from the four cases, therefore, 
are perfectly in line with most of the literature (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan and 
Urwin, 1982; 1983; Gourevitch, 1979). 
 
H1: regionalist parties acting in regions with stronger ethnic distinctiveness will adopt 
more radical centre-periphery positions. 
 
H2: regionalist parties acting in regions with a stronger historical/institutional 
distinctiveness will adopt more radical centre-periphery positions. 
 
H3: regionalist parties acting in regions with a higher economic status will adopt more 
radical centre-periphery positions. 
 
 
As discussed in chapter one, however, regionalist party positioning can also owe 
something to the institutional/political environment. In particular, following Newman 
(1997), regionalist parties competing under majoritarian and two party systems face an 
incentive to radicalize their centre-periphery position, while those competing under PR 
and multi-party systems can choose whether adopt a moderate or radical position. The 
analysis of the four cases appears to substantiate Newman‟s approach to a great extent. 
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The two British cases, which competed under FPTP and in a two-party system until 
1999, have adopted radical positions, though the SNP‟s has been more explicitly radical 
than PC‟s. The LN‟s trajectory also seems to provide a confirmation. It radicalized its 
position in 1996, when it competed alone against the two blocs under a predominantly 
majoritarian system, thus exposing itself to the dynamics of the majoritarian logic. In 
the PR and multi-party system of post-1992 South Tyrol, in contrast, it is possible to 
find both secessionist (dF, UfS and S-TF) and autonomist (SVP) parties. The fourth 
hypothesis concerning centre-periphery positioning is therefore: 
 
H4: in majoritarian and two-party systems we are more likely to find radical regionalist 
parties, whereas in PR and multi-party systems we are likely to find both radical and 
moderate regionalist parties.     
 
 
6.1.2 The left-right dimension 
As far as the left-right dimension is concerned, the socio-economic environment 
appears to play a central role. The two Italian regions, South Tyrol and Padania, can be 
described as „bourgeois‟, characterized by high diffusion of small and medium size 
enterprises. In some cases, especially in the presence of mass immigration and in 
periods of economic slowdown, regionalism in these contexts can assume the shape of 
the „selfishness of the affluent‟ (Harvie, 1994). In contrast, the two British cases 
represent typical example of „working class‟ regions, characterized by declining 
industrial sectors (with consequent high unemployment) and the presence of a 
(relatively) unionized working class. These socio-structural conditions tend to 
produce/enhance demands for high public expenditure on welfare policies, often funded 
by financial transfers from wealthier regions. Moreover, neo-Gramscian analysis, which 
identifies these regions as exploited „peripheries‟ or „internal colonies‟ (Salvi, 1973; 
Hechter, 1975) and which provides a defensible explanation for their relative material 
poverty and cultural assimilation, has been a powerful ideological tool for regionalist 
mobilization in these regions. Therefore, regionalist actors looking for electoral success 
in these socio-economic contexts face strong incentives to develop a leftist ideology and 
policy platform.  
The case-studies, however, have shown how ideological adaptation to the socio-
structural environment is not at all automatic: PC and the SNP have sometimes adopted 
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centrist and even right-leaning positions. Yet, since the 1970s, when they became more 
systematically focused on electoral politics, they have re-positioned themselves left of 
centre. The case of South Tyrol also deserves some attention, as until the 1970s its 
economic status was not higher than the Italian average. Indeed, from the 1940s to the 
end of the 1960s the region could be best classified as „scarcely industrialized‟. The 
right of centre positioning of the SVP in that period owed much to the economic 
interests of the urban elites in Bozen but also to the traditionalist Catholic culture of the 
rural population, as well as to the ethnic, nativist and exclusivist nature of their 
regionalism. In this respect, some similarities with the early PC can be detected, when 
the Welsh nationalists limited their activity to rural Wales and the party‟s right-leaning 
ideology was affected by Catholic conservatism and ethnic regionalism. „Scarcely 
industrialized‟ regions, therefore, appear to be less univocally oriented in respect to the 
left-right dimension. On the one hand, the idea of exploited peripheries and/or „internal 
colonies‟ applies to scarcely industrialized regions even better than to working class 
regions, as the former share more characteristics in common with (former) overseas 
colonies that struggled for their political, economic and cultural independence. In 
addition, relative poverty should generate widespread preferences for leftist 
(redistributive) socio-economic policies. On the other hand, the dominant traditionalist 
culture may generate (especially in Catholic regions) preferences for right-leaning 
socio-cultural policies. The first hypothesis is therefore generated inductively from the 
comparative analysis of the four cases and concerns the influence of the socio-structural 
environment: 
 
H5: Regionalist parties in „bourgeois‟ regions will position themselves to the 
right of centre, while those acting in „working class‟ regions will position themselves to 
the left of centre. Regionalist parties in „scarcely industrialized‟ regions will position 
themselves both to the left and to the right. 
 
 
The case studies have also shown a significant variance in the importance of the 
economic factor in mobilizing regionalism. While for the LN‟s economy was the 
driving element of mobilization (testified to by the stability - leaving aside adjustments 
due to coalition politics - of the party‟s centre-right stance on socio-economic policies), 
it has always been a secondary element for the SVP, which has tried to de-politicize 
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socio-economic questions and to keep the ethnic issue up front. For the SNP and PC it 
was a rather secondary element until the 1970s, when they started their left of centre 
repositioning. The case studies have also highlighted how a region‟s economic status 
does not always (or exclusively) have a direct impact on regionalist parties‟ left-right 
positioning but can be, rather, mediated by a state‟s socio-economic policies. It was the 
Thatcherite „neo-liberal revolution‟ which helped push the SNP and PC to the left 
during the 1980s, and it was the lack of a similar revolution in Italy which pushed the 
Lombard and then the Northern League to the socio-economic right in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. 
Finally, the case studies point to the importance of left-right polarization at 
national level, even for parties like the SVP whose core level is definitely the regional 
one, thus also highlighting the relevance of multi-level politics. Many regionalist parties, 
indeed, tend to adopt a „broad church‟ strategy, that is to maintain a left-right 
ideological position not far from the centre. This allows them to push the self-
government issue onto the agenda and, in so doing, attract voters both from the left and 
the right (Tronconi, 2005). This strategy turns out to be relatively easy in periods of 
consensus and convergence (which often coincide with periods of economic growth) 
since left-right issues tend to be discussed at a technical/policy level rather than at an 
ideological level. In contrast, as shown by recent empirical research, in periods of strong 
social and political polarization, left and right stances become more salient for voters, 
who tend to identify more strongly with one or the other (van der Eijk, 2005). As a 
consequence „broad church‟ regionalist parties face a hard choice. They can ignore the 
new polarization and maintain the previous consensus position, thus running the risk of 
remaining out of the debate currently attracting most attention and interest from voters. 
Or they can follow the tide of polarization choosing either the left or the right, thus 
risking the loss of those members and voters who have an opposite ideological 
orientation. In either case, „broad church‟ regionalist parties find themselves in trouble 
in such circumstances and have to cope with rising internal factionalism. All four cases 
have clearly shown these strategic dilemmas: the two British cases during the 1980s, the 
two Italian cases during the Second Republic – in particular between 1994 and 1998 for 
the LN, between 2006 and 2008 for the SVP. However, while the SNP and PC, let alone 
the hegemonic SVP, have not abandoned the mainstream area, the LN has clearly 
drifted to the radical-right. 
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This difference in strategy leads us to discuss the last two interrelated points: 
electoral niches and the constraints of the voting systems and party systems in which 
regionalist parties act. Electoral niches can open up in the electoral market due to social 
change and political parties contribute decisively to that process by politicizing the new 
salient issues determined by such social change. Old and established parties tend to 
adapt to these changes trying to absorb new issues in their discourses and party 
programs, while new parties trying to establish themselves in the electoral arena tend to 
invest heavily in these new issues. The time of emergence of the different parties has 
therefore affected the extent to which they have been able to tap/create new electoral 
niches. The SVP emerged and established itself as the hegemonic party of South Tyrol 
in the 1940s, when Western European party systems were still „frozen‟ and shaped by 
the traditional cleavages (Lipest and Rokkan, 1967). PC and the SNP broke through in 
the early 1970s, during the „silent revolution‟ which saw the rise of the „new left‟: 
environmental protection, gender equality, self-actualization, sexual freedom, peace, 
solidarity with the third world, etc. (Inglehart, 1977). The two British parties studied did 
politicize some of these issues, especially environmental protection, peace and solidarity 
with the third world countries. In contrast, the LN emerged in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, during the so called „silent counter-revolution‟ which saw the emergence of the 
„new right‟: nativism, anti-immigration, anti-multiculturalism, neo-traditionalism, 
respect for authority, etc. (Ignazi, 1992). The LN, but also the new regionalist 
competitors of the SVP in South Tyrol, politicized virtually all these issues. 
The possibility of fully capitalizing on these new electoral niches, however, also 
depends on the dynamics of the institutional/political environment: i.e. the voting 
systems and party systems. Parties competing in two-party systems under FPTP, like PC 
and the SNP (before 1999), can try and absorb new issues as far as this does not bring 
them too far away from the centre-ground of political competition. In contrast, in multi-
party system and under proportional voting systems, some parties can occupy electoral 
niches outside of the political mainstream. In the South Tyrolean party system, 
competitors of the SVP have created/occupied an environmental „new left‟ niche (the 
Greens) and, most importantly, a populist radical right niche (dF and SfU). In Scotland, 
with the establishment of the Parliament elected with a reasonably proportional system, 
new challengers of the SNP have appeared to its left, tapping the electoral niches of the 
environmental „new left‟ (the Greens) and, before disappearing in 2007, the populist 
radical left niche (SSP and Solidarity). In the Italian multi-party system, the LN was 
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able to occupy the populist radical-right niche thanks to the working of electoral 
alliances which de facto „proportionalised‟ the predominantly majoritarian voting 
system.  And it has maintained a radical right position after the introduction of the new, 
more proportional, electoral system in 2005. However, when it competed alone in 1996, 
exposing itself to the majoritarian logic of the then voting system, it adopted a more 
moderate, quasi centrist position. In the post-1999 Welsh party system, the 
predominantly majoritarian voting system for the NAW has prevented the emergence of 
regionalist (as well as non regionalist) new parties which could occupy electoral niches. 
A second hypothesis concerning the left-right positioning of regionalist parties can, 
therefore, be drawn. This is about the influence of the institutional/political environment 
and is drawn both from the comparative analysis of the case-studies and from previous 
research (eg. Newman, 1997): 
 
 
H6: Regionalist parties competing in two-party systems under majoritarian 
systems will position themselves within the (left-right) mainstream, while those acting 
in multi-party systems and under PR will occupy both mainstream and radical positions. 
 
  
6.1.3 The European integration dimension      
As far as European integration is concerned, the comparative analysis of the four 
cases provides useful insights, mainly supporting the established theses which aim to 
explain the positioning of political parties in general (i.e. not only regionalist parties). 
First, the anti-integration stances of the British cases until the early 1980s and, 
especially in the case of the SNP, in the current phase, as opposed to the pro-integration 
stance of the two Italian cases (consistent in the case of the SVP; ambiguous and limited 
to the pre-1998 period in the case of the LN) provides some support for the „geo-
political‟ model, which suggests that parties in Eurosceptic countries (or geo-political 
areas) lean towards Eurosceptic positions and parties in Europhile countries lean 
towards pro-integration stances. Yet, the evidence is patchy and contradictory in this 
respect: the two British cases turned pro-integration during the 1980s and the LN has 
turned anti-integration since 1998.  
The „domestic‟ model also receives some support from the case-studies. As far 
as the institutional roles of the parties are concerned, the case of the LN appears to be 
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most telling: in spite of a strong and (since 1998) prolonged anti-integration stance and 
just few days after having celebrated the „Irish No‟, the party avoided embarrassing the 
government, of which the LN is a part, by voting for the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2008. The „institutional‟ role as a government party was clearly the only 
reason why the LN voted in favor. Yet, PC and the SNP do not seem to have changed 
their respectively ambiguous and anti-integration stances after getting into office in 
Cardiff and Edinburgh. Clearly, being in office at regional level does not involve the 
same institutional pressure as being in office at national level. Remaining within the 
remit of the „domestic‟ model, the analysis has clearly shown, in the cases of PC, SNP 
and LN, how the pursuit of political visibility may contribute to lead fringe (SNP and 
PC in the 1970s) and/or radical (LN) regionalist parties to adopt an anti-integration 
position, thus substantiating Taggart‟s thesis. Indeed, a commonality between the SNP, 
PC and the LN is their almost continuous demand for referendums on Europe. 
Referendums, indeed, provide opportunities to distinguish themselves from other parties 
and may end up with geographically discordant results (e.g. the outcome in the whole 
UK differing from the outcome in Scotland), thus providing gun powder for the 
regionalist parties‟ cannons. 
As far as the „left-right‟ ideology model is concerned, the evidence emerging 
from the regionalist four parties confirms the trajectory of the main party families. The 
SVP, like the other Christian-Democratic parties, has consistently adopted a pro-
integration position. The SNP and PC have followed the trajectory of many mainstream-
left parties, which became increasingly pro-European during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
LN, since 1998 has shifted at the same time towards radical-right and anti-integration 
positions.  
From the analysis of the cases, two hypotheses can be put forward. The first 
concerns the „geo-political‟ model: 
 
H7: regionalist parties in traditionally Europhile countries will adopt pro-
integration positions, while regionalist parties in Eurosceptic countries will adopt anti-
integration positions. 
 
The second hypothesis stems from the „domestic‟ and the „left-right ideology‟ models: 
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 H8: mainstream regionalist parties will adopt pro-integration positions, while 
(left or right) radical parties will adopt anti-integration positions.     
  
The last set of hypotheses is drawn from the analysis of the four cases in the light of 
explanatory thesis tailored to regionalist parties. These hypotheses, more than the others, 
need to take into account the changing nature of the process of European integration 
through time. On the basis of the relevant literature discussed in Chapter One, three 
distinct phases of European integration can be identified. The 1950s-1970s were 
characterized by a focus on economic integration, dominated by a free market ethos that 
aimed at the creation of the Common Market. The second phase (1980s-1990s) was 
characterized by the rise of social, regional and normative (liberal progressive) Europe. 
As discussed in Chapter One, during this phase the process of European integration and 
regionalization looked mutually reinforcing, at the expense of the state (Keating, 1995). 
The third phase (2000s), has been characterized by the persistence of normative (liberal 
progressive) ethos, the re-emergence of the neo-liberal model, the biggest single 
enlargement and, even more importantly, by the process of „constitutionalisation‟ of the 
EU (i.e. EU Constitution and Lisbon Treaty), aiming at deeper political integration. 
Evidence from the four cases has shown how the free market ethos of the first period 
contributed to alienating PC and the SNP, two leftward moving parties representing 
working class, relatively poor and peripheral regions. In contrast, the centre-right SVP 
supported integration, in spite of some (short-term) negative effects of the CAP in the 
1960s. During the second phase, PC and the SNP were lured by European social and 
structural funds, by the thrust towards the regionalization of member states coming from 
European institutions and by the liberal progressive (and increasingly pro-environment) 
ethos of Brussels. The persistence of the liberal progressive approach of the EU in the 
(current) third phase, especially as far as individual rights and immigration policy are 
concerned, has represented a source of concern for the traditionalist and nativist SVP, 
while it has driven the populist radical-right (post-1998) LN towards strongly anti-
integration positions. 
 In addition, the constitutionalisation process has left all four parties disappointed 
by the latest treaties‟ re-confirmation of the primacy of member states as the building 
blocs of the Union and by the amount of power claimed by the central institutions in 
Brussels. While the SVP has, nonetheless, supported the treaties and PC has taken a 
very ambiguous stance on them, the SNP and the LN have clearly opposed them. This 
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development appears to a great extent consistent with previous studies, already 
discussed in Chapter One, predicting that regionalist parties would be strongly in favor 
of economic integration, but only moderately in favor of political integration (Marks         
and Wilson, 2000, p. 439; Marks et al., 2002, p. 587) and detecting a shift towards 
Eurosceptic positions in recent year (Elias, 2008). The opposition of the SNP (the most 
secessionist of the four cases) to the treaties, on the grounds that extracting Scotland 
from the UK in the context of a more politically integrated Europe would be more 
difficult, highlights a further point: the relationship between the self-government 
position of regionalist parties and their stance on European integration, especially in the 
context of the current constitutional phase. The importance of this relationship had 
already been pointed out by Lynch, as one of the factors affecting regionalist parties‟ 
positioning on Europe (Lynch, 1996). In addition, the centralization of more powers in 
Brussels can come at the expense not only of the member-states but also of those 
regions which, as a consequence of devolution or federal arrangements, have acquired 
many competences (Elias, 2008; Hepburn, 2008a). This outcome, arguably, would not 
be welcome by regionalist parties, whether they are secessionists or autonomists. Two 
more hypotheses can therefore be drawn. The first concerns the relationship between 
ideological positioning on centre-periphery dimension and on the European integration 
dimension: 
 
 H9: secessionist parties are expected to lean towards anti-European integration, 
while autonomist parties are expected to lean towards pro-integration positions. 
 
The second hypothesis concerns the powers (i.e. the level of autonomy) of the regions: 
 
 H10: regionalist parties acting in more autonomous regions are expected to lean 
towards anti-European integration positions, while regionalist parties acting in less 
autonomous regions are expected to lean towards pro-integration positions. 
 
It is worth specifying that these last two hypotheses refer particularly to the current 
phase, characterized by the pursuit of deeper political integration through the adoption 
of new treaties.    
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6.2 Classifying the regions and the parties’ ideological positioning 
 The above hypotheses will be tested on a set of forty-three regionalist parties 
acting in twenty-six regions across seven Western European states, as reported in Table 
6.1. All regionalist parties which have been (or were) active in the period from the end 
of WWII to today and achieved a minimum of electoral relevance were selected. As 
spelt out in Chapter One, the minimum electoral relevance was set as: a) electing 
representatives to the regional assembly on, at least, three consecutive occasions; b) in 
the case of new parties that have not contested three regional elections yet, the criterion 
is either electing representatives on two occasions or getting into office (at regional 
level) at the first election; c) in the cases where an elected regional assembly does not 
exist (or did not exist in the past), the criterion is electing representatives to the central 
parliament. 
In this section several classifications of the regions – according to the salient 
characteristics singled out in the hypotheses (ethnic distinctiveness, economic status, 
etc.) – and of the regionalist parties‟ ideological positions will be provided, so as to 
make possible the testing of hypotheses through cross-tabulations. Starting with parties‟ 
positioning, Table 6.2 shows ideological stances along the centre-periphery dimension. 
For definition, regionalist parties are located in the periphery side of the divide. 
Therefore, they are classified according to their different positions within the periphery 
camp.  
The most important distinction, both in political and analytical terms, is between 
autonomist and secessionist parties. These two categories are in turn divided into sub-
classes. Assertive autonomist parties are those which seek extensive autonomy for their 
region and/or lead requests for federal (or even confederal) reforms, whereas moderate 
autonomists advance more moderate requests for autonomy or follow assertive parties 
in their struggle for federal reforms. Within secessionist parties, the classification of 
extremist/violent parties is straightforward: these parties have stable links with terrorist 
organizations, such as ETA and the IRA, and function de facto as their political wings. 
In contrast, the distinction between strongly committed and ambiguous secessionists is 
more subtle. The former keep their policy of independence and their claims to self-
determination continuously upfront in their discourses and documents, even in periods 
when they negotiate solutions short of independence. The latter either use ambiguous 
formulas (as in the case of PC until 2003 and the PNV since 2002) or leave their explicit 
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objective of independence in the background for some time, as in the case of ERC and 
BNG during the 2000s.
89
  
 
Table 6.1 Western European Regions with Relevant Regionalist Parties  
 
 
Regions 
 
 
Parties 
 
Abbrev. 
Andalusia  Partido Andalucista (1982-2008) PA 
 
Aosta Valley 
Union Valdôtaine (since 1949)  
Union Valdôtaine Progressiste (1973-1983) 
Fédération Autonomiste (since 1998) 
UV 
UVP 
FA 
Aragon Partido Aragonés (since 1983)  
Chunta Aragonesista (since 1995) 
PAR 
CHA 
Balearic Islands Unió Mallorquina (since 1983) UM 
 
 
Basque Country 
Partido Nacionalista Vasco (since 1977) 
Euskadiko Ezkerra (1977-1991)   
Eusko Alkartasuna (since 1986)  
Aralar (since 2005)  
Herri Batasuna – Heuskal Herritarrok - Batasuna (1980-2005) 
PNV 
EE 
EA 
Ar 
HB-Ba 
Bavaria Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (since 1949) CSU 
Brussels Front Démocratique des Francophones (1970-1995) FDF 
Canary Islands Coalición Canaria (since 1993) CC 
Cantabria Partido Regionalista de Cantabria (since 1983) PRC 
Catalonia Convergéncia i Unió (since 1979) 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (since 1977) 
CiU* 
ERC 
Corsica Unione di u Populo Corsu (1982-1998) UPC 
Eastern Germany Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (1990-2004) PDS 
 
Flanders 
Volksunie (1954-2001)  
Vlaams Blok - Belang (since 1978)  
Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie (since 2003) 
VU 
VB 
N-VA 
Galicia Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (since 1985) BNG 
 
Navarre 
Unión del Pueblo Navarro (since 1979)  
Convergencia Demócratica de Navarra (since 1995) 
Basque regionalist parties (see Basque Country) 
UPN 
CDN 
 
 
Northern Ireland 
Sinn Fein (since 1982)  
Democratic Unionist Party (since 1973) 
Social Democratic and Labour Party (since 1973)  
Ulster Unionist Party (1945-1979 and since 1995) 
SF 
DUP 
SDLP 
UUP 
Northern Italy Lega Nord (since 1990) LN 
Rioja Partido Riojano (since 1983) PR 
Sardinia Partito Sardo D’Azione (since 1949) PSdAz 
Scotland Scottish National Party (since 1970) 
Scottish Greens (since 1999)  
SNP 
SG 
Sicily Movimento per l’Autonomia (since 2005) MpA 
 
South Tyrol 
Südtiroler Volkspartei (since 1948)  
Die Freiheitlichen (since 1993)  
Union für Südtirol (since 1993) 
SVP 
dF 
UfS 
Ticino Lega dei Ticinesi (since 1991) LT 
Valencian Comm. Unió Valenciana (1987-1999) UnV 
Wales Plaid Cymru (since 1974) PC 
Waloon region Rassemblement Wallon (1968-1981) RW 
 
Source: compiled by author 
 
*CiU was an electoral alliance which developed in 2001 into a party federation, including Convergéncia 
Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) and Unió Democràtica de Catalunya UDC (Barberá and Barrio, 2006). 
 
                                                 
89
 On the PNV, see Perez-Niveas (2006, p. 45-46). On ERC and the BNG see respectively Argelaguet 
(2006, p. 155) and Gomez-Reino (2006, p. 182). 
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Table 6.2 Regionalist Parties’ Distribution along the Centre-Periphery Dimension, 
(number of cases in brackets) 
 
 
       Non-secessionist parties 
 
 
 
 
Secessionist parties 
 
Moderately 
autonomist 
 
Assertive 
autonomist 
 
Ambiguous 
 
Strongly 
committed 
 
Extremists 
(by violent means) 
 
 
(10) 
PA, PRC, PAR, 
UnV, PR, CC, 
UM, PSdAz, 
MpA, UPN 
 
 
(18) 
FDF, VU, RW, 
LN, PDS, CiU, 
PNV, UV, UVP, 
FA, SVP, CSU, 
UUP, DUP, LT, 
CDN, CHA, UPC 
 
 
 
(7) 
BNG(2000s), 
ERC(2000s), 
PSdA(1980s), 
VU(1990s), 
PNV(2000s) 
PC, SG 
 
(14) 
EE, Ar, SNP, VB,  
LN(1996-98), 
BNG(1980s-90s), 
ERC(1980s-90s), 
EA, SF(2000s), 
PC(2000s), UfS, 
dF, SDLP, N-VA 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
HB-Ba 
SF(1970s-90s) 
 
 
Source: see Appendix.  
 
 
Confirming established views, Table 6.2 shows how regionalist parties‟ stances along 
the centre-periphery dimension are widely spread. 
 Table 6.3 provides a classification of regionalist parties according to their 
ideological positioning on the left-right dimension. It distinguishes between radical-left, 
mainstream left, centre, mainstream right and radical right parties.   
 
Table 6.3 Regionalist parties’ distribution along the left-right  
ideological spectrum, (number of cases in brackets). 
 
Radical-left Mainstream left Centre Mainstream right Radical-right 
 
(7) 
EE, HB-Ba, Ar, 
SF, PDS, 
BNG(1980-90s) 
PSdAz(1980s) 
 
 
(13) 
CHA, ERC, EA, 
PSdAz(1990-00s), 
PC, RW, PA, 
SDLP, SNP, SG, 
UVP, VU(1990s) 
BNG(2000s) 
 
(12) 
UV, FA, FDF, CiU, 
CDN, UM, PR, PRC, 
MpA, VU(1970-80s), 
PSdAz(1950-70s), 
UPC 
 
 
(11) 
CSU, N-VA, 
PAR, PNV, SVP, 
VU(1960s), CC, 
UPN, UnV, UUP, 
LN(1996-98) 
 
 
(6) 
LN, VB, LT, dF, 
UfS, DUP 
 
 
 
 
Source: see Appendix. 
 
Radical-left: communists, anti-imperialists, parties with predominant or strong Marxist influences. 
Mainstream left: socialists, social-democrats, left libertarians, greens. 
Centre: social liberals or moderate Christian-democrats 
Mainstream Right: conservatives (Catholic, Protestant or Liberal).   
Radical Right: anti-immigrant, religious fundamentalist, welfare chauvinist, right-wing populists. 
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The table also shows major shifts in party positioning, such as the move of the PSdAz 
from the centre to the radical left in the early 1980s (Roux, 2006; Hepburn, 2009b). The 
only case of leapfrogging from the right to the left is represented by the VU, which 
moved from the centre-right in the 1960s to the centre in the 1970s-80s and then to the 
centre-left in the 1990s (De Winter, 1998b). As it can be seen from the table ideological 
dispersion along the left-right dimension is very high, ranging from the radical left to 
the radical right.  
  Table 6.4 shows regionalist parties‟ positioning on European integration, 
accounting for the three phases of integration discussed above.  
 
 
Table 6.4 Regionalist parties positioning on  
European integration, (number of cases in brackets) 
 
  
Pro-integration 
 
No position,  
ambiguous or 
deeply divided 
 
Against integration 
 
First phase: 
economic and free-
market Europe 
(1950-1970s) 
 
 
(8) 
CSU, UV, SVP, FDF, 
VU, RW, UVP, SDLP  
  
 
 
- 
 
(5) 
SNP, PC, SF, UUP, 
DUP 
 
 
 
Second phase: 
social, progressive 
and regional 
Europe 
(1980s-1990s) 
(27) 
SNP, SDLP, CSU, 
ERC, EA, PC, RW, 
UVP, CHA, PA, CiU, 
FDF, UM, CDN, UV, 
PRC, PR, VU, PNV, 
SVP, CC, UPN, UnV,  
LN(1990-98), PAR, 
PSdAz, UPC(1990s) 
 
 
 
(2) 
BNG(1990s) 
UPC(1980s) 
 
(12) 
HB-Ba, EE, SF, PDS, 
BNG(1980s), VB, dF, 
UfS, DUP, LT, 
LN(since 1998), UUP 
 
 
Third phase: 
constitutional, 
progressive and 
neo-liberal Europe 
(2000s) 
 
 
(14) 
SDLP, PA, UM, CDN, 
UV, FA, PRC, PR, CC, 
SVP, UPN,  PAR,  
N-VA, MpA 
 
(5) 
PC, CSU, PNV, CiU, 
LN(2008) 
 
(15) 
HB-Ba, SF, BNG, VB, 
dF, UfS, DUP, LT, 
LN, UUP, ERC, EA, 
SNP, Ar, CHA. 
 
 
Source: see Appendix. 
 
 
From the table it emerges very clearly that, while the majority of regionalist parties 
supported integration during the first and second phase, they have become evenly 
divided between support and opposition in the third (current) phase. During the second 
phase, the pro-integration majority was overwhelming (about two thirds). This evidence 
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confirms previous qualitative studies which pointed to the largely pro-integration 
orientation of regionalist parties (De Winter and Gomez-Reino, 2002).  
 
Table 6.5 Structural characteristics of the regions 
 
Regions 
 
 
Ethnic divide* 
 
Former political/institutional status 
 
Economic status 
Andalusia  no Never independent Scarcely industrialized 
Aosta Valley medium Part of a different polity until 1859 Bourgeois 
Aragon weak Independent in the middle ages Bourgeois 
Balearic Islands medium Never independent Bourgeois 
Basque Country strong Never independent (tradition of autonomy) Bourgeois 
Bavaria no Independent until 1870 Bourgeois 
Brussels strong Not applicable Bourgeois 
Canary Islands weak Never independent Scarcely industrialized 
Cantabria no Never independent Scarcely industrialized 
Catalonia medium Part of a different polity (middle ages) 
(tradition of autonomy) 
Bourgeois 
Corsica medium Never independent (part of a different state) Scarcely industrialized 
Eastern Germany no Partitioned (1945-1990) Working Class 
Flanders strong   Not apllicable Bourgeois 
Galicia medium Never independent Scarcely industrialized 
Navarre medium Independent in the middle ages Bourgeois 
Northern Ireland strong (relig.) Part of a different polity in the middle ages Working Class 
Northern Italy no Independent in the middle ages (fragmented) 
(Veneto independent until 1797) 
Bourgeois 
Rioja no Never independent Bourgeois 
Sardinia medium Never independent Scarcely industrialized 
Scotland  no Independent until 1707 Working Class 
Sicily no Never independent Scarcely industrialized 
South Tyrol strong Part of a different polity until 1919 Bourgeois 
Ticino strong Never independent Bourgeois** 
Valencian 
Comm. 
weak Independent in the middle ages Scarcely industrialized 
Wales medium Independent in the middle ages Working Class 
Waloon region strong Not applicable Working Class 
 
Source: compiled by author. The classification draws on OECD Regional Statistics (available at: 
www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/cde_territorial.asp) and on Pertrella (1980, p. 20, Tab. 2.4). 
 
*The classes of ethnic divide („no‟, „weak‟, „medium‟ and „strong‟) are obtained combining the level of 
ethnic difference („weak‟ or „strong‟ ) with the size of the ethnically different group within the region 
(„negligible‟, „minority‟, „nearly half or more‟). The class „no‟ results from „negligible‟ size, even in the 
case of „strong‟ ethnic difference. The class „weak‟ results from the combination of „minority‟ size with 
„weak‟ difference. The class „medium‟ results from the combinations of „minority‟ size with „strong‟ 
difference or from „nearly half or more‟ size with „weak‟ difference. The class „strong‟ results from the 
combination of „half or more‟ size with „strong‟ difference.  
**Ticino is an extremely wealthy region within Western Europe, even compared to the rich Northern 
Italian regions onto which it borders. However, within the Swiss Confederation it represents one of the 
poorest cantons. This makes its economic status rather ambiguous. 
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However, the presence of eleven anti-integration parties partially contradicts recent 
quantitative studies‟ conclusions which point to a homogeneously Europhile regionalist 
party family (Jolly, 2007).
90
 Table 6.4 also shows how the third phase of European 
integration has witnessed a dramatic reduction of pro-integration parties and a 
substantive increase of anti-integration parties, so that the regionalist party family is 
evenly divided. This confirms recent reconsiderations about the general attitudes of the 
regionalist party family towards European integration (Elias, 2008b). In addition, 
several anti-integration regionalist parties are amongst the most successful ones and 
amongst the best represented in the European Parliament. Even more importantly, 
parties that had supported European integration out of conviction in the past have either 
openly opposed further integration (ERC, EA and SNP)
91
 or have shown ambiguities 
and/or deep internal divisions (CSU, PNV, CiU and PC). 
  Table 6.5 provides a classification of the regions in respect to their ethnic 
distinctiveness, institutional history and economic status. As discussed above these 
characteristics of the regions are expected to influence regionalist parties‟ positioning 
on the centre-periphery and on the left-right dimension.  
 
Table 6.6 Classification of states in respect to their traditional  
attitudes towards European integration  
 
Traditionally pro-European 
integration geo-political areas 
Ambiguous geo-political 
areas 
Traditionally Eurosceptic  
geo-political areas 
 
Belgium 
Germany 
Italy 
Spain 
 
 
France 
 
 
UK 
Switzerland 
Source: compiled by author 
 
Finally, Tables 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 provide respectively a classification of the states to 
which the regions belong in respect to their traditional attitudes towards European 
integration, a classification of the voting systems adopted at both regional and national 
level in the states and the regions, and the level of autonomy across regions. These will 
                                                 
90
 Jolly‟s study covers the period 1984-2002, which coincides to a large extent with what I have identified 
as the „second phase‟ period. Beyond the use of different data and methodology, the diverging conclusion 
reached by Jolly‟s research can be explained by the case selection. Seven out of the eleven anti-
integration parties presented in Table 6.4 were not included in Jolly‟s analysis. 
91
 ERC, EA and the SNP have opposed the ratification of both the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaty 
(Aparicio-Romero, 2006; Madorran, 2005; Acha, 2006)  
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be used to test hypotheses concerning parties‟ positioning on European integration (the 
first and the third), and on the centre-periphery and left-right dimensions (the second). 
 
Table 6.7 Voting systems in regional and national arenas  
Mainly majoritarian voting systems Mainly proportional voting systems 
 
 
Italy (1996)* 
Northern Ireland (before 1998) 
Scotland (before 1999) 
Wales 
 
 
Belgium and Belgian regions 
Spain and Spanish regions 
Italy and Italian regions** 
Germany and German regions  
Northern Ireland (since 1998) 
Scotland (since 1999) 
Switzerland and Ticino 
Source: compiled by author 
        
* The voting system in Italy in 1996 is considered primarily as majoritarian because the Northern League 
went alone, thus exposing itself to the majoritarian logic of the system. 
** Some Italian regions with regionalist parties, such as Sicily and Aosta Valley, have adopted a mixed 
system, where the election of the First Minister is majoritarian and the election of the regional assembly is 
proportional with a majority bonus. 
 
Table 6.8 Level of regional autonomy 
 
Low Medium Medium/High High 
 
 
Corsica 
Northern Ireland 
Wales 
 
 
Northern Italy (regions), 
Catalonia, Galicia, 
Andalucia, Aragon, 
Valencian Community, 
Rioja, Balearic Islands, 
Canary Islands, Cantabria 
 
 
Walloon region, 
Brussels, South Tyrol 
Aosta Valley, Sicily, 
Sardinia, Scotland, 
Basque Country, 
Navarre 
 
 
Bavaria 
Eastern Germany (Länder) 
Flanders 
Ticino 
 
 
Source: compiled by author on the basis of the Regional Authority Index (RAI) (Hooghe at al., 2008). 
The RAI is a quantitative index, resulting from a synthesis of several indexes that measure individual 
dimensions of regional authority. The classes used in the table correspond to values below 12 (low); 
between 12 and 15 (medium); between 15 and 18 (medium/high), over 18 (high). The maximum value in 
Western Europe is 21 (German Länder). 
 
 
6.3 Testing the hypotheses 
 In this section the hypotheses spelt out above will be tested and discussed using 
cross-tabulations which aim to highlight the relationship between one of the factors 
singled out above and regionalist parties‟ positioning along one of the three ideological 
dimensions considered. In discussing the positions of the individual parties within the 
cross-tabulations, I will avoid focusing on the four cases analysed in depth in the 
previous chapter, unless these are particularly telling in some respect.   
 
  
264 
 
6.3.1 The centre-periphery dimension 
The first three hypotheses (H1, H2, and H3) concern the influence of the 
structural environment on the centre-periphery positioning of the regionalist parties. 
Table 6.9 shows the putative influence of the ethnic divide (H1). 
 
 
Table 6.9 Strength of the ethnic divide and regionalist parties’ positioning on the 
centre-periphery cleavage (number of cases in brackets)* 
 
  
No 
 
 
Weak 
 
Medium  
 
Strong 
 
Secessionist 
Violent 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
(2) 
HB-Ba, SF 
 
 
 
Secessionist 
Committed 
 
(2) 
SNP,  
LN(1996-98) 
 
- 
(3) 
ERC, BNG, 
PC(2000s) 
(9) 
EE, Ar, EA, VB, 
N-VA, SF(2000s), 
SDLP, DF, UfS 
 
Secessionist 
Ambiguous 
 
(1) 
SG 
 
 
- 
(4) 
PC, ERC(2000s), 
BNG(2000s), 
PSdAz(1980s) 
 
(2) 
PNV(2000s), 
VU(1990s) 
 
 
 
Assertive 
Autonomist 
 
 
(3) 
CSU, LN, PDS 
 
 
(1) 
CHA 
 
(6) 
CiU, UV, UVP, 
FA, CDN, UPC 
(8) 
VU(1960s-80s), 
SVP, FDF, RW, 
LT, PNV, 
DUP(2000s),  
UUP(1945-1972)  
 
Moderate 
Autonomist 
 
(4) 
PA, PRC, PR, 
MpA 
 
(3) 
PAR, UnV, CC 
 
(3) 
UM, PSdAz, UPN 
 
- 
 
Source: compiled by author 
* Parties in bold are the biggest (non-unionist) in their respective region. 
 
 
The most extreme examples of secessionist parties – HB and SF (1980-90s) - are found 
in the Basque Country and Northern Ireland, two regions characterized by strong ethnic 
divisions - ethno-linguistic in the Spanish region and ethno-religious in the British one. 
In these two regions, some regionalist parties committed to non-violent struggle, such as 
EE, EA, Ar, SDLP and SF (2000s), have adopted secessionist positions. Strong ethno-
linguistic divisions are also at the basis of secessionist claims by UfS in South Tyrol and 
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by VU (1990s), VB and N-VA in Flanders. Although the ethno-linguistic divide in 
some regions, such as Catalonia and Galicia, is weaker (Catalan and Galician are closer 
to Castilian Spanish than Dutch is to French, or German to Italian, or Basque to Spanish) 
or the size of the minority ethno-linguistic group is smaller, as in Wales, the 
secessionism of ERC, BNG and PC also displays an ethnic component. At the opposite 
end of the spectrum, the most moderate autonomist parties are found in regions where 
the ethnic divide is either absent, such as in Cantabria, Rioja,  Andalucía or Sicily, or 
weak, as in the Canary Islands, Valencian Community and Aragon. In the case of 
Sardinia, a region with a widespread regional idiom, the PSdAz has remained rather 
moderate in demanding self-government, except in the early 1980s when it deployed for 
the first time an ethno-linguistic type of regionalism elaborated by the neo-sardismo 
movement, which immediately led the PSdAz to endorse an (ambiguously) 
independentist stance (Hepburn, 2009b). In the case of Corsica, a region with a medium 
ethno-linguistic divide, the only regionalist party that has managed to gain some stable 
electoral relevance was the autonomist UPC (Schrijver, 2006, p. 199). However, 
secessionist parties have also been present and have, at some regional elections, been 
moderately successful. Most of these secessionist parties have links with armed groups, 
much in the same way as HB and SF (1970s-90s).  
 Overall the table appears to show a positive relationship between ethnic 
distinctiveness and radicalism in centre-periphery positioning. Indeed, no moderate 
autonomist parties are found in regions with strong ethnic divisions and no 
extremist/violent parties are found regions with weak (or even medium) ethnic 
distinctiveness. If the line is drawn between secessionist and non-secessionist parties, 
regions with no or weak ethnic distinctiveness contain eleven non-secessionist vis a vis 
only three secessionist cases, while regions with medium or strong ethnic 
distinctiveness contain twenty secessionist vis a vis seventeen non-secessionist cases. If 
unionist parties, such as FDF, UUP, DUP, UPN and maybe CDN, are removed from the 
count, then the non secessionist cases go down to thirteen/twelve. If the line is drawn 
between moderate autonomist and all the other self-government positions, then the 
count goes seven vs. seven within the regions with no or only a weak ethnic divide.  
There are just three (two excluding the unionist UPN) moderate cases vs. thirty-four 
(thirty-one or thirty excluding the unionists) assertive and secessionist cases within 
regions with a medium or strong ethnic divide. However, ethnic distinctiveness does not 
explain the assertive autonomism of the CSU in Bavaria, of the LN in Padania (which 
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between 1996 and 1998 turned to secessionism) and, even less, the secessionism of the 
SNP (and SG) in Scotland. The analysis of the following cross-tabulation helps 
explaining these cases.  
Table 6.10 aims to show the putative influence of the institutional history of the 
regions and, therefore, a test for the second hypothesis. 
 
 
Table 6.10 Institutional history or the regions and regionalist parties’ centre-
periphery positioning (number of cases in brackets)* 
 
  
Never 
Independent 
  
Indep. in the 
middle ages 
 
Part of  different 
polity 
Part of 
different polity 
& tradition of 
autonomy 
 
Indep.  in the 
modern age 
 
Secessionist 
Violent 
 
- 
 
- 
(1) 
SF 
(1) 
HB-Ba 
 
- 
 
 
Secessionist 
Committed 
 
(1) 
BNG 
 
(1) 
PC(2000s) 
(2) 
SF(2000s), 
SDLP 
  
(7) 
DF, UfS, Ar, 
EE, EA, ERC, 
LN(1996-98) 
 
(1) 
SNP 
 
Secessionist 
Ambiguous 
 
(2) 
PSdAz(1980s) 
BNG(2000s) 
 
(1) 
PC 
 
- 
 
 
(2) 
PNV(2000s), 
ERC(2000s) 
(1) 
SG 
 
Assertive 
Autonomist 
 
(1) 
 LT 
 
(2) 
CHA, CDN 
 
(5) 
UV, UVP, FA, 
UUP(1945-72), 
DUP(2000s)  
 
(4) 
SVP, CiU, 
PNV, LN 
 
(2) 
CSU, PDS 
 
Moderate 
Autonomist 
(7) 
CC, PSdAz , 
PA, PRC, PR, 
UM, MpA 
(3) 
PAR, UPN, 
UnV 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Source: compiled by author 
 
*Parties in bold are the (non unionist) biggest ones in their respective regions. 
 
 
In order to facilitate the reading of the table I have drawn a line between regions which 
were absorbed into the state in the middle ages and regions which were part of a 
different polity and were annexed by the state in the modern age or even more recently. 
As far as the positions of parties are concerned, if the line is drawn between secessionist 
and non-secessionist parties, the first group of regions count five secessionist vs. 
thirteen (eleven excluding the unionists) non secessionist cases, while the second group 
of regions count eleven (nine excluding the unionists) non secessionist vs. fifteen 
secessionist cases. If the line is drawn between the moderate autonomist and all the 
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other positions, then the first group of regions count eight assertive autonomist and 
secessionist vs. ten (eight excluding UPN and UnV) moderate autonomist cases. This 
balance between assertive/secessionists and moderate autonomists goes against the 
hypothesis. However, in the second group of regions all twenty-four cases fall within 
the assertive and secessionist class, strongly supporting the hypothesis. In addition, 
considering the combinatory effect of the two factors (ethnic distinctiveness and 
institutional history), it can be observed that, out of the eight cases which display a more 
radical position than the institutional history of the their regions would suggest, six can 
be explained by the medium or strong ethnic distinctiveness of their regions - LT, BNG, 
BNG (2000s), PC, PC (2000s) and PSdAz (1980s). Vice versa, the cases that stood out 
from the explanatory capacity of ethnic distinctiveness (LN, CSU and SNP) were better 
explained by looking at the institutional history of the regions. 
 Table 6.11 shows the putative influence of the economic status of the regions 
(H3). As far as the regions are concerned, I have drawn the line between poor regions 
(scarcely industrialized and working class) and rich regions (bourgeois). The evidence 
appears to be much less clear than in the previous two cross-tabulations. If the line is 
drawn between secessionist and non-secessionist positions, then the poor regions count 
eleven non secessionist vs. nine secessionist cases (amongst which SF, a case of violent 
secessionism), while rich regions count seventeen non-secessionist vs. only thirteen 
secessionist cases. In addition, several of these cases – HB-Ba, EE, Ar, EA and ERC – 
give no or very little emphasis to economic issues in their demands for secession. 
However, economic interests can arguably be better accommodated than identity issues 
within the framework of the state, e.g. by fiscal federalism or regional financial 
autonomy. Therefore, as far as this cross-tabulation is concerned it makes particular 
sense to draw the line between moderate autonomists and all other positions, as 
assertive autonomists in many cases seek financial autonomy too. Yet, drawing the line 
in this way provides support for the hypothesis only as far as the rich regions are 
concerned: twenty-six assertive and secessionist vs. only four moderate autonomist 
cases. Within the poor regions, only six cases are moderate autonomists vs. eleven 
assertive and secessionist cases, which appears to go against the hypothesis but does not 
disprove it completely. Indeed, while the number of assertive and secessionist cases in 
poor regions is less than twice the number of moderate autonomist cases, in rich regions 
it is six and a half times that number. Therefore, although the influence of economic 
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status is more ambiguous than that of ethnic distinctiveness, the hypothesis finds partial 
confirmation. 
 
 
Table 6.11 Economic status of the regions and regionalist parties’ positions on the 
centre-periphery dimension (number of cases in brackets)* 
 
  
Scarcely industrialized 
 
 
Working class 
 
Bourgeois 
 
 
Secessionists violent 
 
 
- 
 
(1) 
SF 
 
 
(1) 
HB-Ba 
 
Secessionists strongly 
committed 
 
(1) 
BNG 
 
(4) 
SNP, PC(2003), 
SDLP, SF(2000s)  
 
(9) 
VB, V-NA, EE, Ar, 
EA, LN(1996-98), 
ERC, dF,UfS 
 
Secessionists 
ambiguous 
 
(2) 
BNG(2000s), 
PSdAz(1980s) 
 
 
(2) 
PC, SG 
(3) 
ERC(2000s), 
PNV(2000s), 
VU(1990s), 
 
 
 
Assertive autonomists 
 
(1) 
UPC 
 
(4) 
RW, PDS, UUP, DUP 
(13) 
VU, PNV, LN, CSU, 
CiU, SVP, FDF, UV, 
UVP, FA, LT, CDN, 
CHA  
 
Moderate autonomists 
 
(6) 
MpA, PSdAz, CC, 
PRC, PA, UnV  
 
 
- 
 
(4) 
UM, PR, UPN, PAR 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
*Parties in bold are the (non unionist) biggest ones in their respective regions. 
 
  
 
The fourth hypothesis concerns the influence of the electoral systems under 
which regionalist parties compete (H4). As Table 6.12 shows, under majoritarian 
systems we find six secessionist cases vs. only two non-secessionist (both being 
unionist parties). In contrast, under PR we find twenty-eight non-secessionist cases vs. 
nineteen secessionist ones. The evidence, therefore, seems to substantiate the hypothesis 
that majoritarian systems produce an incentive for regionalist parties to radicalize, while 
PR systems allow regionalist parties to occupy both moderate and radical positions.  
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Table 6.12 Voting systems and regionalist parties’ positioning on the centre-
periphery dimension (number of cases in brackets) 
 
  
Moderate 
autonomists 
 
Assertive 
autonomists 
 
Secessionists 
ambiguous 
 
Secessionists 
committed 
 
Secessionists 
violent 
 
 
Maj. 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
(2) 
UUP, DUP 
 
 
(1) 
PC 
 
 
 
(4) 
SNP, SDLP, 
PC(2000s), 
LN(1996-98) 
 
 
(1) 
SF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PR 
 
 
 
(10) 
MpA, PSdAz, CC, 
PRC, PA, UnV, 
UM, PR, UPN, 
PAR 
 
(18) 
RW, FDF, VU, 
PDS, CSU, LN, 
SVP, UV, UVP, 
FA, CiU, PNV, 
CDN, CHA, LT, 
UPC, 
UUP(2000s), 
DUP(2000s) 
 
(6) 
BNG(2000s), 
PSdAz(1980s), 
ERC(2000s), 
VU(1990s), 
PNV(2000s), 
SG 
  
(12) 
VB, V-NA, EE, Ar, 
EA, ERC, BNG, 
dF, UfS, 
SF(2000s), 
SDLP(2000s), 
SNP(2000s) 
 
 
 
(1) 
HB-Ba 
 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
*Parties in bold are the (non unionist) biggest ones in their respective regions. 
 
 
 
From the table also emerges that, as noticed by Newman (1997), in PR systems the 
biggest regionalist parties in each region tend to occupy non radical positions. Indeed, if 
we consider only the biggest parties in their respective regions (in bold in the table) with 
the exclusion of unionist parties, we find nineteen non secessionist vs. only seven 
secessionist cases. 
 Summarizing the results concerning hypotheses on centre-periphery positioning, 
it can be said that radical (secessionist) parties tend to emerge in regions with a 
medium/strong ethnic distinctiveness and/or in regions which have been independent in 
the modern age or have been annexed by the state relatively recently. However, in these 
regions, if parties compete under predominantly proportional systems, non-secessionist 
but still very assertive parties can be found. Indeed, in most cases, these non-
secessionist parties are the biggest in the region. In a few cases, the radical parties have 
displaced the assertive secessionists. Usually this happens in ethnically divided regions, 
such as in Northern Ireland, where SF has become more successful than the SDLP, or in 
Navarre, where HB-Ba has been the most successful party representing the Basque 
minority. It can also happen if assertive autonomist parties which have been 
accommodated in their request for self-government fail to credibly radicalize their 
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demands, as in the case of VU in Flanders (Breuning, 1997; Deschouwer, 2004, p 196). 
In contrast, if parties compete under predominantly majoritarian systems, non-radical 
parties tend not to emerge. As far as the economic status of the regions is concerned, its 
influence on centre-periphery positioning is more ambiguous, though its explanatory 
capacity appears to increase if a distinction is drawn between moderate autonomists, on 
one side, and assertive autonomists and secessionists, on the other side. 
 
6.3.2 The left-right dimension 
 The fifth and sixth hypotheses concern the effects of, respectively, the socio-
structural and institutional/political environment factors on left-right positioning. Table 
6.13 shows the relationship between the economic status of the regions and the left-right 
positioning of the most successful regionalist party in each region. The inclusion of the 
biggest parties only makes the relationship more evident.  
 
 
Table 6.13 Economic status and left-right positioning of 
major regionalist parties, (number of cases in brackets) 
 
  
Radical Left 
 
 
Mainstream left 
 
Centre 
 
Mainstream right 
 
Radical Right 
 
 
Bourgeois 
regions 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
(6) 
UV, UM, CiU,  
VU(1970-80s), 
FDF, PR 
 
(7) 
CSU, PNV, SVP, 
UPN, PAR,  
LN(1996-98), 
VU(1960s) 
 
(3) 
VB(1990-00s), 
LN, LT 
 
Scarcely 
industrialized 
regions 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
BNG(1980-
90s) 
PsdAz(1980s) 
 
(3) 
PA, 
PsdAz(1990s) 
BNG(2000s) 
 
 
(4) 
PRC, MpA, 
UPC, 
PsdAz(1950s-
70s) 
 
 
(2) 
CC, UnV 
 
 
 
- 
 
Working-class 
regions 
 
 
(1) 
PDS 
SF(2000s) 
 
(4) 
PC, RW, SNP 
SDLP(1980-90s) 
 
 
 
- 
 
(1) 
UUP(1940-70s) 
 
(1) 
DUP(2000s) 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
 
*All parties are in bold, except the unionists.  
 
In line with the expectations of H5, none of the major regionalist parties 
representing a „bourgeois region‟ is found to the left of the centre. The ideological span 
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covered by the most representative regionalist parties of these regions goes, therefore, 
from centrist liberal-progressive or moderate (FDF, CiU, VU[1970s-80s], UM and UV) 
to conservative (CSU, PNV, UPN, SVP, VU[1960s], and PAR) to anti-immigrant and 
populist radical right (LN, VB and LT).
92
  
In contrast, the most representative regionalist parties emerged in working class 
regions tend to position themselves left of the centre, thus providing further 
confirmation to H5. Northern Ireland appears to be, at least as first sight, an exception 
to the rule, since the centre-right UUP was the most representative regionalist party in 
this working class region in the first four decades after WWII until it was overtaken by 
the radical right DUP in recent years. However, two things have to be taken into 
consideration. First, both the UUP and the DUP are unionist parties, i.e. they represent a 
reactive type of regionalism. As discussed above, this type of regionalism develops 
historically from within the most anti-regionalist state-wide party, which in the case of 
the UK was the right-wing Conservative (and Unionist) party. If the non-Unionist 
regionalist parties are taken instead – the SDLP and SF – the Northern Irish exception 
disappears. Second, even within the reactive (unionist) camp, the recent growth of the 
DUP at the expense of the UUP can be interpreted as the willingness of the Protestant 
working-class to reward the leftist socio-economic policies of the former (Evans and 
Duffy, 1997). Indeed, although the DUP‟s populism and ethno-religious 
fundamentalism justifies its classification as a radical right party, its economic policies 
are definitely more sensitive to working class interests. As stated by one of the co-
founders, the DUP is “right wing in the sense of being strong on the Constitution, but to 
the left on social policies” (W. D. Flacks, 1983, quoted in Murphy, 1990, p. 55). 
In scarcely industrialized (and relatively poor) regions, the positioning of 
regionalist parties appears, as expected, to be less patterned. If the unionist UnV is 
excluded from the count, the cases are evenly divided (four vs. four) between radical 
and mainstream left, on one side, and centre and mainstream right on the other. What 
emerges clearly form the table is that regionalist parties on these regions do not develop 
anti-immigrant, radical right ideologies, possibly due to the fact that many immigrants 
may pass through these territories but tend to settle in economically more developed 
regions. 
                                                 
92
 For the last category of regionalist parties, see De Winter et al. (2006a) and Mazzoleni (2005). 
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Table 6.14 shows regionalist parties‟ positioning in respect to the voting systems 
under which they compete (H6). The evidence is, at best, ambiguous, as the distribution 
of parties under PR is exactly the same as under majoritarian systems: the ratio of 
mainstream parties under PR is 29/41 (0.71), while under majoritarian systems it is 5/7 
(0.71).  
 
Table 6.14 Voting systems and left-right positioning 
 
  
Rad. Left 
 
 
Mainstr. Left 
 
Centre 
 
Mainstr. Right 
 
Rad. Right 
 
 
Maj. 
 
 
(1) 
SF 
 
 
 
(3) 
SNP, PC, SDLP 
 
(1) 
LN(1996) 
 
(1) 
UUP 
 
(1) 
DUP 
 
 
 
PR 
 
 
(7) 
HB-Ba, EE, Ar, 
SF(2000s), 
BNG(1980-90s), 
PSdAz(1980), 
PDS 
(11) 
SNP(since 1999) 
SG, EA, ERC, 
BNG(2000s), 
RW, UVP, 
CHA, PA, 
PSdA(1990-00s) 
VU(1990s) 
(12) 
CiU, MpA, 
FDF, UV, FA, 
VU(1970-80s), 
UM, PRC, 
CDN, PR, UPC, 
PsdA(1950-70s)  
 
(6) 
LN(1990-1994) 
SVP, PNV, 
CSU, 
VU(1960s), 
PAR 
 
(5) 
LN(since1999), 
VB, dF, UfS, 
DUP(2000s) 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
*Parties in bold are the biggest in their respective regions. 
 
 
The problem arises with the two Northern Irish cases positioned to the radical wings, SF 
and the DUP. Indeed, the Northern Irish case is a deviant one, as the hypothesis 
assumed that regionalist parties acting under majoritarian systems would compete as 
third parties against two state-wide parties or blocs, like the LN (1996-1998) in Italy, 
the SNP and PC for Westminster elections in Scotland and Wales prior to devolution. 
These cases do support H6 or, in the formal language of hypothesis testing, do not 
falsify it. In Northern Ireland, however, the party system is completely regionalized as 
the largely overlapping ethno-religious and centre-periphery divides represent the main 
dimension of competition and, as a result, state-wide parties had, until this year‟s 
announcement of renewed cooperation between the Conservative Party and the UUP, 
disappeared from the scene. In such a regionalized party system, space has open up for 
both (left or right) moderate and (left or right) radical parties (Newman, 1997).  
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Summarizing the results concerning the hypotheses on left-right positioning, it 
can be said that the socio-economic environment plays a crucial role in orienting the 
choices of the main (usually the first to emerge) regionalist party of the region, which 
usually occupies and maintains the best position. Under majoritarian voting systems, the 
first regionalist party to emerge is more likely to remain the only one, thus having more 
room and more time to identify and occupy such position. Under PR systems, it is more 
likely that regionalist competitors will manage to emerge. The latter have to distinguish 
their ideology and policy proposals by adopting a different position on the left-right - or, 
as discussed above, by proposing a different position on the centre-periphery dimension, 
or by making both moves. As far as the left-right differentiation strategy is concerned, if 
the region is homogeneous at the structural level, it is very likely that any new arrival 
will go in the same direction as, but further than, the pioneer. This is the case of 
Flanders, where the VB and the N-VA positioned themselves to right of the VU (De 
Winter, 2006; Deschouwer, 2004). The same can be said, to a great extent, for the case 
of South Tyrol, where the radical right dF and UfS positioned themselves to the right of 
the SVP. The same process has happened in Scotland since 1999, where the Scottish 
Greens (SG) and the (short-lived) Scottish Socialists positioned themselves to the left of 
the centre-left SNP. However, if the region is more heterogeneous, then the regionalist 
party which arrives second on the scene can try to target the share of the regionalist 
electorate which cannot identify with the left-right ideology of the other regionalist 
party or parties. This is the case in the Basque Country, where the centre-left EA 
emerged as splinter of the PNV. EA, besides adopting a more radical stance on the 
centre-periphery dimension, has targeted the regionalist electorate distributed between 
the centre-right PNV and the radical/extreme left EE and HB-Ba (Acha, 2006). 
Similarly, although they emerged simultaneously in the post-Franco era, the two main 
Catalan parties, CiU and ERC, compete for the Catalan regionalist voters from a 
centre(-right) and a centre-left position respectively, with the latter also occupying a 
more radical position on the centre-periphery dimension (Marcet and Argelaguet, 1998). 
 
 
6.3.3 The European integration dimension 
 The first hypothesis concerning positioning on European integration (H7) is 
inspired by the „geo-political‟ model. Table 6.15 shows the distributions of regionalist 
parties on positions towards European integration across traditionally Europhile, 
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ambiguous and Eurosceptic „geo-political‟ areas, using the classification provided in 
Table 6.6.  
 
 
Table 6.15 Regionalist parties’ positioning towards European integration in 
different ‘geo-political’ areas 
 
  
Pro-integration 
No position, 
ambiguous, deeply 
divided 
 
Anti-integration 
 
Traditionally 
Eurosceptic ‘geo-
political areas’ 
 
(3) 
SNP(1980s-90s), 
PC(1980s-90s), SDLP 
 
(1) 
PC(2000s) 
(7) 
SNP(1960s-70s),  
SNP(2000s), 
PC(1960s-70s), UUP, 
DUP, SF, LT 
 
Traditionally 
ambiguous ‘geo-
political area’ 
 
(1) 
UPC(1990s) 
 
 
(1) 
UPC(1980s) 
 
- 
 
 
 
Traditionally Europhile 
‘geo-political areas’ 
(26) 
FDF, RW, VU, N-VA, 
CSU, SVP, UV, UVP, 
FA, CiU, PNV, ERC, 
EA, PA, PAR, CHA, 
UM, CC, UPN, CDN, 
PRC, PR, UnV, 
PSdAz, MpA, 
LN(1990-98)  
 
(5) 
CSU(2000s), 
PNV(2000s), 
CiU(2000s), LN(2008), 
BNG(1990s) 
(13) 
BNG(1980s), 
BNG(2000s),  
LN(since 1998), VB, 
dF, UfS, HB-Ba, EE, 
Ar, EA(2000s), 
ERC(2000s), PDC, 
CHA(2000s)  
 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
 
 
While there are cases of pro-integration parties in Eurosceptic areas, as well as cases of 
anti-integration parties in Europhile areas, the influence of the traditional attitudes of the 
states in which regionalist parties compete emerges very clearly: pro-integration cases 
are two times anti-integration ones in Europhile areas, while they are less than half in 
Eurosceptic areas.  
 The second hypothesis (H8) concerns the influence of left-right ideology. Tables 
6.16 and 16.17 show the relationship between left-tight and European integration 
positioning during the periods 1980s-90s and 2000s respectively. The expectations of 
H8 are almost entirely met as far as the first period is concerned (Table 6.16): all 
mainstream parties, except the UUP, supported European integration, while all radical 
parties (both left and right) opposed it. 
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Table 6.16 Regionalist parties positioning on the left-right dimension  
and on European integration (1980s-1990s), (number of cases in brackets). 
 
  
Radical Left 
 
 
Mainstream left 
 
Centre 
 
Mainstream 
right 
 
Radical Right 
 
Against 
further 
integration 
 
(4) 
HB-Ba, SF, 
PDS, 
BNG(1980s) 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
(1) 
UUP 
 
(6) 
VB, dF, UfS, 
DUP, LT, LN 
 
No position, 
ambiguous 
or deeply 
divided 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
(2) 
BNG(1990s), SG 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
UPC(1980s) 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
In favour of 
further 
integration 
 
 
- 
 
(11) 
SNP, SDLP, 
ERC, EA, PC, 
VU(1990s), RW, 
UVP, CHA, PA, 
PSdAz  
 
(9) 
CiU, FDF, UM, 
CDN, UV, 
VU(1980s) 
UPC(1990s) 
PRC, PR 
 
(8) 
CSU, PNV, 
SVP, CC, UPN, 
LN(1996-98) 
PAR, UnV 
 
 
- 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.17 Regionalist parties positioning on left-right dimension and on  
European integration (2000s), (number of cases in brackets). 
 
  
Radical Left 
 
 
Mainstream 
left 
 
Centre 
 
Mainstream 
right 
 
Radical Right 
 
Against 
further 
integration 
 
(4) 
HB-Ba, SF, 
PDS, Ar  
 
 
(5) 
SNP, ERC, 
EA, BNG, 
CHA 
 
 
 
- 
 
(1) 
UUP 
 
(6) 
VB, dF, UfS, 
DUP, LT, LN 
 
No position, 
ambiguous or 
deeply divided 
 
 
 
- 
 
(2) 
PC, SG 
 
 
 
(1) 
CiU 
 
(2) 
CSU, PNV 
 
 
LN(2008) 
 
 
 
In favour of 
further 
integration 
 
- 
 
(3) 
SDLP, PSdAz, 
PA 
 
(6) 
UM, CDN, 
UV, PRC, PR, 
MpA 
 
(4) 
SVP, CC, 
UPN, PAR 
 
- 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
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This evidence confirms the thesis of a consensus amongst mainstream parties, 
challenged by radical/fringe parties (Taggart, 1998; Hooghe et al., 2002). In contrast, in 
the third phase (as represented in Table 6.17) the general consensus amongst 
mainstream regionalist parties seems to have been partially lost. In particular the 
majority of mainstream-left regionalist parties have turned to anti-EU integration 
positions, while the majority of centre and mainstream-right ones are still supportive of 
European integration. This seems to confirm the thesis that the neo-liberal character (or 
image) of the EU, which has gained prominence in the last decade, has increased 
Eurosceptic attitudes amongst the left, including parts of the mainstream left. 
 The increased number of anti-integration regionalist parties might also owe 
something to the compatibility of self-government objectives with deeper political 
European integration (H9). As Table 6.18 shows, a certain correlation between centre-
periphery and European integration positions appears evident.  
 
Table 6.18 Regionalist parties positioning on the centre-periphery and 
European integration dimensions (2000s), (number of cases in brackets). 
 
 Autonomist 
(moderate) 
Autonomist 
(assertive) 
Secessionist 
(ambiguous) 
Secessionist 
(committed) 
Secessionist 
(violent) 
 
Against 
further 
integration 
 
 
- 
 
(6) 
PDS, LN, 
DUP, UUP, 
LT, CHA 
 
 
(2) 
BNG, ERC 
 
 
(7) 
SNP, EA, VB, 
SF, dF, UfS, 
Ar 
 
(1) 
HB-Ba 
 
No position, 
ambiguous or 
deeply divided 
 
 
 
- 
 
(3) 
LN(2008), 
CSU, CiU 
 
(2) 
PNV, SG 
 
(1) 
PC 
 
 
- 
 
 
In favour of 
further 
integration 
 
(9) 
PSdAz, PA, 
PAR, PRC, 
PR, MpA, 
UM, CC, UPN 
 
(4) 
UV, FA, 
CDN, SVP 
 
 
- 
 
(2) 
SDLP, N-VA 
 
 
- 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
 
 
All moderate autonomist parties are or have remained in favour of more integration. In 
contrast, amongst secessionist parties, only the SDLP and N-VA are or have remained 
in favour of further European integration. In the intermediate class (assertive 
autonomist), cases are spread, with a numerical majority in favour of anti-integration 
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positions, although the CSU and CiU still lean towards pro-European integration 
stances.  
 Finally, Table 6.19 shows the putative relationship between the level of regional 
autonomy and positioning towards European integration. The expectation of H10 was 
that regionalist parties acting in more autonomous regions would lean towards anti-
integration stances, as deeper political integration could clash with the powers of the 
regions and transfer them to the EU institutions in Brussels.  
 
 
Table 6.19  
Level of regional autonomy and regionalist parties’ positions towards  
European integration, 2000s (number of cases in brackets) 
 
 Low Medium  Medium/High High 
 
Anti-integration 
(3) 
SF, UUP, DUP 
 
(3) 
LN, CHA, ERC 
(6) 
dF, UfS, SNP, 
EA, Ar, HB-Ba 
(3) 
LT, VB, PDS 
 
Ambiguous 
(1) 
PC 
 
(2) 
CiU, LN(2008) 
(1) 
PNV 
(1) 
CSU 
 
 
Pro-integration 
 
(1) 
SDLP 
(6) 
PA, PAR, UM, 
CC, PR, PRC 
(8) 
UV, UVP, FA, 
SVP, MpA, CDN, 
PSdAz, UPN 
 
(1) 
N-VA 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
 
 
 
However, the evidence which emerges from the cross-tabulation does not appear to 
support the hypothesis. The distribution of cases in regions with minimum and 
maximum autonomy is exactly the same. Even grouping the regions in low and medium 
vs. medium/high and high autonomy, the distribution of cases is about the same: 7/9 and 
9/11, drawing the line between pro-integration and the other two categories. 
 Summarizing the results concerning the hypotheses covering positioning on 
European integration, it can be said that the traditional attitudes towards European 
integration of the states in which regionalist parties act do play a role in orientating 
parties, thus substantiating the „geo-political‟ model. However, in recent years the 
number of anti-integration regionalist parties has considerably increased even in 
traditionally Europhile states. 
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 Party positioning on the left-right dimension was nearly a perfect predictor of 
positioning on European integration in the 1980s-90s period, with all mainstream 
parties but one supporting integration and all (left and right) radical parties opposing it, 
thus substantiating the „left-right ideology‟ model. To be sure the model also holds in 
the current phase, in spite of a growing number of mainstream left parties shifting 
towards anti-integration positions. This process may owe much to the perceived neo-
liberal ethos of the EU in the last phase of integration, which alienated parts of the 
European mainstream left. 
 However, the increase in the number of anti-integration regionalist parties may 
also owe something to the constitutionalization of the EU, which is perceived by 
secessionist parties as further obstacle towards their final goal. Indeed, the 
overwhelming majority of secessionist parties now adopt anti-integration or ambiguous 
positions. Even some big regionalist parties that have traditionally been assertive 
autonomist and pro-European integration out of conviction in the past (such as the CSU, 
CiU and the PNV) have been characterized by considerable divisions and/or 
reservations about supporting the constitutional process. In December 2004 the PNV‟s 
Annual Conference passed a resolution in favour of the European Constitution. 
However, about a third of the delegates voted against (Perez-Nievas, 2006. p. 53). 
Convergéncia de Catalunya, one of the two components of the CiU, had to hold an 
internal referendum before taking a position on the ratification of the EU Constitution 
(Madorran, 2005). In the Spanish referendum for the ratification of the EU Constitution, 
both the PNV and CiU participated in the campaign within the „yes‟ camp, but their 
engagement was late and light (Aparicio-Romero, 2006, p. 70). Even more 
controversially, in Germany prominent CSU figures tried to hinder the ratification 
process by proposing a referendum (Financial Times, by Bertrand Benoit, 31/08/04) and 
questioning the compatibility of both constitutional treaties with the German 
constitution (Spiegel Online, 22/04/05; Conservativehome.com, 24/06/08).
93
 These 
reservations and ambiguities from traditionally governmental parties in extensively 
autonomous regions suggest that some regionalist parties could fear that centralization 
of power in Brussels may come at the expense of regional governments too. However, 
there seems to be no general relationship between the level of regional autonomy and 
regionalist parties‟ positioning towards European integration. 
                                                 
93
 The CSU has also criticized the EU for its sanctions against Austria over Haider. See Statham and 
Koopmans (2009, p. 456-57). 
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6.4 Cross-dimensional patterns 
 Some of the tables presented above showed the relationship between regionalist 
parties‟ positioning on the left-right dimension and on European integration (tables 6.16 
and 6.17) and the relationship between regionalist parties‟ positioning on the centre-
periphery dimension and European integration (table 6.18). The last relationship to be 
investigated in order to analyse patterns of positioning across the three dimensions is, 
therefore, the one between left-right and centre-periphery. Table 6.20 shows the 
relationship between these two ideological dimensions. There is no hypothesis to test in 
this case as, to my knowledge, this relationship has not been investigated in general 
terms. As recalled in Chapter One, the only reference to this issue is De Winter‟s 
observation that: “parties situated to the left… also tend to be the most independentist. 
The right or centre-right parties are less independentist” (De Winter, 1998a, p. 211). 
The analysis here is, therefore, purely inductive. 
 
 
Table 6.20 Regionalist parties’ ideological positions on the left-right 
and centre-periphery dimensions, (number of cases in brackets) 
 
  
Radical Left 
 
 
Mainstream left 
 
Centre 
 
Mainstream right 
 
Radical Right 
 
Secessionist 
(Extremist/Violent) 
 
 
(2) 
HB-Ba, SF 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Secessionist 
(Very committed) 
 
(4) 
BNG (1980-90s), 
Ar, EE, SF(2000s) 
 
(5) 
SNP, SDLP, EA, 
ERC(1980-90s), 
PC(2000s) 
 
- 
 
(2) 
N-VA,  
LN(1996-1998) 
 
(3) 
VB, dF, UfS 
 
 
Secessionist 
(ambiguous) 
 
 
(1) 
PSdAz(1980s) 
 
 
 
(5) 
ERC, PC, SG, 
VU(1990s), 
BNG(2000s) 
 
 
- 
 
 
(1) 
PNV(2000s) 
 
 
- 
 
 
Autonomist 
(assertive) 
 
(1) 
PDS 
 
(3) 
RW, UVP, CHA 
 
(7) 
CiU, FDF, UPC, 
CDN, UV, FA 
VU(1970-80s) 
 
(6) 
CSU, PNV, SVP, 
CC, UUP, 
VU(1960)  
 
(3) 
LN, LT, DUP 
 
Autonomist 
(moderate) 
 
- 
 
(1) 
PA 
 
(5) 
PSdAz(1950-70s), 
MpA, UM, PRC, 
PR 
 
(3) 
PAR, UPN, UnV 
 
- 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
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De Winter‟s statement seems to hold to a great extent. First, only radical-left parties, 
such as Basque HB and Northern Irish SF, have pushed their secessionism to the point 
of flanking or fully endorsing an armed struggle. Secondly, counting all secessionist 
cases (ambiguous, strongly committed and extremist/violent), we find seventeen of 
them situated to the left (mainstream and radical), while only six are situated to the right 
(mainstream and radical). However, the presence of those six right-wing secessionist 
parties, as well as other patterns emerging from the table call for a re-consideration of 
the relationship between the two ideological dimensions. The empty boxes of the 
radical-left and radical-right in the bottom row of the table seem to suggest that radical 
parties, whether left or right, tend to eschew very moderate positions on the centre-
periphery dimension. The idea of a relationship between left-right radicalism and 
centre-periphery radicalism seems to be partially strengthened by the fact that all radical 
left parties, (with the exception of the PDS) and half of radical-right parties are 
secessionists – indeed, more than half if unionist DUP is excluded.  
As far as the left-right mainstream area is concerned, centre-left parties are 
divided between secessionist and non-secessionist, with a strong majority of them 
falling within the former class. In contrast, all centre and most centre-right parties are 
not secessionist. It is worth noting that these parties are either social liberal – FDF, VU 
(1970s-80s), CDC, CDN and UV - or moderate Christian-democrats – UM and UDC - 
or (mainly Catholic) conservative - CSU, PNV, SVP and VU (1960s) - while the two 
exceptions, N-VA and, even more, the LN (1996-98) are more detached both from 
Christian democracy, as well as from social liberalism. 
A tentative conclusion points towards the crucial intersection of the two 
ideological dimensions in respect to several issues. The first of these is related to 
attitudes towards social and political change, whereby the difference between 
devolution and secession can arguably reflect the difference between gradual and 
radical political change. As Freeden argues, the common root of all the possible 
variations of conservative ideology is a special concern for social and political change 
which, unless pursued slowly and incrementally, is generally perceived as a threat 
(Freeden, 1996, p. 332-33). From Table 6.20 it emerges that many regionalist parties 
adopt a moderate/conservative and a non-secessionist stance. In contrast, secessionist 
positions tend to go better with ideologies, such as social-democracy, Marxism and 
right-wing populism, which perceive social and political change more as an opportunity 
than as a threat. 
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The second issue is the commitment of the Catholic social doctrine to the 
principle of subsidiarity, which recognizes the legitimacy of territorial claims as far as 
they can be solved by devolution of power within the wider polity. Indeed, from two of 
the case studies presented in this work, PC and the SVP, it has emerged that the political 
doctrine of the Catholic Church has had a moderating influence. The endorsement of the 
Catholic political philosophy by Plaid leader Saunders Lewis in the 1920s was strictly 
linked to the party‟s rejection of the ideology of „independence‟, which remained one of 
its constant features until recently. Similarly, the Christian-democratic tradition within 
the SVP has had moderating effects on their centre-periphery ideology.
94
 Arguably, 
however, the moderating effect of the Catholic tradition (and of the Catholic Church) is 
stronger if the region belongs to a predominantly Catholic state.       
 The third issue concerns whether regional (or ethno-regional) communities can 
be assigned specific rights and whether such rights should get priority over individual 
rights. In the absence of violent repression and/or strong limitation of cultural freedom 
by the state, contemporary liberal thought tends to reject the right to unilateral secession 
by regional communities (Buchanan, 1998; Baubock, 2005). This could, at least 
partially, explain why amongst regionalist parties liberal positions go with non-
secessionist ones, while less liberal stances can go with secessionist ones. 
All three issues point to a certain incompatibility between major centre and 
centre-right ideologies (liberal, Christian-democratic and conservative) and secessionist 
stances, thus reinforcing the idea that the pattern can be explained in terms of internal 
ideological consistency.  
  
 6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has pursued two aims. First it has discussed the four case-studies in 
a comparative perspective, trying to retain a great deal of their complexity and, at the 
same time, point out generalizable patterns or trends. Some of the more complex 
relationships, such as the interplay of socio-economic regional environments and state‟s 
socio-economic policies, or the interplay between the political/electoral environment 
and internal party politics, or the effects of changing levels of socio/political 
polarization, or the implications of multi-level politics, or strategic decision making on 
the priority between votes, office and policy, were discussed and analysed. The focus 
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 Evidence from the case of the PNV also appears to support this interpretation (Ugarte and Perez-
Nievas, 1998, p. 91).  
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then shifted towards empirical testing of general hypotheses, as generalization about 
simpler causal relationships was the second aim the chapter. The hypotheses were 
drawn both from the extant literature and from the comparative analysis of the four 
case-studies. 
As usual in social sciences, the hypothesis-testing aimed to uncover general 
tendencies, rather than exception-free laws. The cross-tabulations supported all the 
hypotheses to a great extent, with the exception of the putative positive relationship 
between higher levels of regional autonomy and a leaning towards anti-European 
integration positions. In some cases, as for the effect of ethnic distinctiveness and 
institutional history of the regions on regionalist parties‟ positioning along the centre-
periphery dimension, exceptions to mono-factor explanations could be accounted for 
considering the combinatory effect of these factors.    
 The main results of the comparative analysis of the 43 parties are: 
1- all structural factors considered (ethnic distinctiveness, institutional history and 
economic status) play an important role on the centre-periphery positioning of 
regionalist parties but none of them, in its own, can explain all the cases. 
2- The electoral systems under which regionalist parties compete offer a solid 
explanation for the likelihood of finding only one or more regionalist parties acting 
in the same region and for their adoption of moderate/mainstream as opposed to 
radical positions both on the centre-periphery and left-right dimension. 
3- The economic status of the regions appears to be a very strong explanatory factor 
for the left-right positioning of the main regionalist party in each region. 
4- Regionalist parties‟ positioning towards European integration has considerably 
changed across time. Support for integration reached its peak amongst regionalist 
parties in the period 1980s-90s, while several parties have turned to anti-integration 
or ambiguous stances during the current period (2000s).  
5- Left-right positioning had an extremely strong effect of positioning towards 
European integration during the 1980s-90s, with virtually all (left or right) 
mainstream parties supporting integration and literally all (left or radical) radical 
parties opposing it. While opposition to integration amongst radical parties has 
continued during the current phase, support amongst mainstream parties has 
become significantly less homogeneous. 
6- All moderate autonomist parties support European integration in the current phase, 
while the majority of assertive autonomist and secessionist parties have adopted 
  
283 
 
ambiguous or anti-integration stances, thus providing some confirmation of the 
hypothesis that assertive autonomism and, even more, secessionism clash with the 
current process of centralization of power in Brussels.      
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
284 
 
Conclusions 
 
The general objective of this work was to push forward our understanding of 
regionalist parties‟ ideological positioning in multi-dimensional space. Its very 
approach, characterised by a focus on party strategy and ideology, rather than directly 
on party success, constitutes an original element of this study. Four research questions 
were addressed concerning respectively the three ideological dimensions taken into 
consideration - centre-periphery, left-right and European integration – and the 
relationships between them.  
The first and most extensive part of the research consisted of in-depth study of 
four regionalist parties, the Scottish National Party in Scotland, Plaid Cymru – The 
Party of Wales - in Wales, the South Tyrolean People‟s Party in South Tyrol and the 
Northern League in Northern Italy (Padania). Their analysis has taken into consideration 
many aspects of the structural and political environment, of the historical context and 
historical sequence of events, of the internal working of political parties, and of the 
relationship between strategic choices and party ideology. A comparison of the four 
cases has highlighted the influence of several factors, often interacting, that impact on 
regionalist parties‟ strategy and ideology.  
Internal party organization and the role of key figures help explain party 
responsiveness and adaptation to the social, institutional/political and electoral 
environments in respect of positioning on all three dimensions. Ideological and policy 
change has often been extremely rapid in the case of the Northern League, the most 
centralized and leader-centred party of the four. This has not avoided internal struggles 
and even the calling into question of Bossi‟s leadership, especially when strategic or 
tactical decisions led to the loss of votes and/or office. Yet, Bossi has always managed 
to impose sudden shifts of priorities between office, policy and vote-winning goals, 
with consequences for ideological repositioning. In contrast, in the other three cases, 
changes of strategy and ideological repositioning needed to pass through a phase of 
maturation, often characterised by prolonged and sometimes uncertain internal struggles 
which, on many occasions, resulted in real change only when the outcome of those 
struggles was a change in the leadership. Even in the case of the SVP, a rather 
centralised party which was led for forty-five years by the same leader, 
ideological/policy shifts were often preceded either by changes in the dominant faction 
around Magnago or by changes in the balance of power between the different 
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sections/factions. In the more internally democratic and decentralised SNP and PC, 
struggles between factions (or tendencies) have been extremely evident any time 
substantive ideological/policy change was at stake. The process of change has therefore 
been slower, sometimes driven by long procedures – e.g. the PC‟s internal Commission 
of Inquiry in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Yet, in the long run the electoral driver has 
steered strategic repositioning in most cases – i.e. the internal faction which proved to 
be more in tune with electoral demands has often managed to impose its view, even 
without seizing the leadership, as in the case of the left-wing faction of the SNP in the 
1980s. 
Another important factor affecting both ideological positioning and internal 
party politics - in this case limited to the left-right dimension - is the level of social and 
political polarization. While parties positioned on the radical left or right, such as the 
Northern League from the late 1990s onwards, do not suffer from high political 
polarization in the political system, and can even capitalize on it, parties of the centre-
left or centre-right, like the SVP and 1960s-1970s SNP and PC, run the risk of being 
torn apart. Leaving aside the polarization of the 1920s and 1930s, when the SNP and PC 
were still more like pressure groups then proper political parties, the analysis has shown 
how the polarization of the British society and politics in the 1980s strongly augmented 
(if not created) internal factionalism and, eventually, determined a clear drift to the left 
of the two „British‟ cases. Similarly, in Italy, the parallel process of bipolarization - i.e. 
the passage from a three-bloc party system in the First Republic to a two-bloc one in the 
Second Republic – and increased polarization (in this case more political than social) 
increased factionalism within the SVP and, between 1995 and 1998, within the 
Northern League. In this respect, governmental policies play a great role in creating or 
responding to emerging polarization. In the UK, the neo-liberal reforms of the 
Conservative governments during the 1980s definitely helped push the SNP and PC to 
the left. In Italy, while the fiscal policies of the centre-left governments created 
problems for both the SVP and LN, pushing the former to distance itself from the 
government and the latter to move to the right, polarization has mostly (leaving aside 
the controversial figure of Silvio Berlusconi himself) stemmed from policies pertaining 
to the socio-cultural sub-dimension, especially on issues related to immigration, multi-
culturalism, education and family.  
A further important feature which has emerged from the comparative analysis of 
the four cases is the link between left-right and centre-periphery orientations of the 
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state-wide (i.e. national) parties, which carries implications for coalition (and multi-
level) politics. In the UK, the British left has traditionally been more sensitive (or at 
least less insensitive) towards regionalist claims than the British right. Before the rise of 
the Labour party, the gap between the Liberal and Conservative parties on the Irish, and 
in turn the Scottish and Welsh, question was very evident. With the rise of Labour, 
especially after 1945, the gap was considerably reduced and rested more on the 
intransigent anti-regionalism of the Tories than on the willingness of Labour to listen to 
regionalist claims. It can also be argued that Labour‟s devolution proposals in the 1970s 
and 1990s were driven more by electoral competition with the SNP and PC than by a 
genuine ideological recognition of territorial grievances. Yet, the fact remains that the 
reference actors of the two regionalist parties in Westminster for constitutional reform 
were Labour and the Liberal Democrats, while the Conservatives remained until the 
early 2000s the implacable enemies. This created, especially during the 1980s and 
1990s, a sort of submergence of two dimensions, centre-periphery and left-right, into an 
encompassing single dimension: left/periphery vs. right/centre. Obviously, these 
alignments can change and there are clear signs that the leadership of the Conservative 
party, both in London and Edinburgh (less so in Cardiff), is now closing the gap.  
While these relationships between left-right and centre-periphery orientations of 
state-wide parties are interesting per se in the UK, they have more serious consequences 
in Italy for three reasons. First, the regional level has existed right across Italy since 
1970 - in South Tyrol (and other special status regions) since 1948. Secondly, coalition 
politics has been more salient in Italy both at national and regional level. Third, while 
the tendency of left-wing state-wide parties to be more sensitive (or less insensitive) to 
regionalist claims than right-wing state-wide parties applies to Italy too, the two Italian 
regionalist parties have been positioned right, not left, of centre. Coalition politics for 
them, therefore, poses a serious dilemma: allying themselves with (or supporting) the 
national left is more likely to be rewarding in terms of centre-periphery constitutional 
policy but is also likely to imply the swallowing of leftist socio-economic and/or socio-
cultural policies. As a corollary, allying with (or supporting) the national right is likely 
to bring about welcome right-wing policies in these domains but may prove 
counterproductive or detrimental to ambitions of self-government. During the First 
Republic, this dilemma was mitigated by the three-bloc party system, with the centre-
bloc (primarily the DC) representing an often, though not always, acceptable 
compromise for the SVP. However, in the Second Republic, the dilemma has 
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manifested itself fully. The LN, in spite of its rhetoric, has de facto preferred to 
prioritize socio-economic and socio-cultural policy achievements over constitutional 
reforms and, indeed, it has achieved more on the former dimension than on the latter. In 
contrast, the SVP has given priority to achieving more self-government than to left-right 
policies at the central level, although this strategy appears increasingly troublesome for 
the party.  
The SVP‟s case is particularly interesting because it shows how right of centre 
regionalist parties can strongly affect national politics (in this case, but in theory 
regional politics too) by diverting votes from the right to the left. For instance, while a 
majority of the SVP‟s votes come from right of centre voters, in 2006 they were 
decisive to the victory of the centre-left coalition in Rome. Given that the tendency of 
left-wing national parties to be more open towards regionalist claims than right-wing 
national parties applies to other states too – primarily to Spain but, since the 1960s, to 
France too – the diversion of votes from the right to the left through regionalist parties‟ 
coalition politics may represent an important issue for the national and regional politics 
of these states. 
The long-term historical perspective adopted in this study also allowed us to 
highlight the importance of historical ideological swings within Western European 
electorates produced by social change and by the politicization of new issues. These 
ideological swings have often resulted in electoral de-alignment and re-alignment, 
generating opportunities for new political actors willing to tap new electoral niches. 
While the SVP attempted to adapt its ideology and policy to the new issues that became 
salient, the SNP and PC were able to fully exploit „new left‟ issues brought about by the 
„silent revolution‟ in the 1970s, while the LN tapped the „new right‟ electoral niche 
created by the „silent counter-revolution‟. 
However, the influence on parties‟ ideological positioning of the complex 
interactions between internal party politics, levels of socio-political polarization, state‟s 
policies, multi-level coalition politics and historical ideological swings manifests itself 
under the constraints of the socio-structural and institutional/political environments in 
which regionalist parties act. The second part of the research, reported in Chapter 6, 
aimed at bringing out general tendencies in regionalist parties‟ ideological positioning. 
The findings of this second part of the research can be best summarized taking into 
consideration one ideological dimension at time. This also allows us to answer the 
questions posed at the outset precisely.  
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Explaining ideological positioning on the centre-periphery dimension on the 
basis of socio-structural environments proved particularly difficult. This is partially due 
to the fact that, by definition, all regionalist parties occupy the periphery side of this 
dimension. Therefore, what needs to be explained is actually why regionalist parties 
adopt different levels of radicalism in their claims for self-government. As the analysis 
of the left-right dimension demonstrates (see below), socio-structural environments 
appear to be more suitable for explaining parties‟ placement on one side or the other of 
the cleavage, rather than explaining different positions within the same side. Indeed, 
none of the three factors analysed – ethnic distinctiveness, institutional history and 
economic status – can, on its own, account for all cases, even if just the most successful 
party in each region is taken into consideration. Yet, their combined effect appears to 
explain a great deal of ideological differentiation amongst the cases. 
Confirming to a great extent previous research (Newman, 1997), the influence of 
voting systems and party systems on the adoption of moderate or radical positions on 
self-government appears to be a very strong explanatory factor. Regionalist (non- 
unionist) parties acting under majoritarian systems and in two party systems do tend to 
adopt a radical position, while under PR and multi-party systems we find both moderate 
and radical parties. Usually, moderate ones are more successful than radical ones, 
though the balance can change in favour of the radicals with the increasing achievement 
of self-government for the region. 
As far as the left-right dimension is concerned, socio-structural conditions and, 
in particular, the economic status of the region go a long way towards explaining the 
position of, at least the most successful regionalist party of the region either side of the 
divide - particularly if the line is drawn between mainstream left and radical left, on one 
side, and centre, mainstream right and radical right, on the other. This is particularly the 
case for „bourgeois‟ regions, where all major regionalist parties are positioned to the 
centre or right of centre, and for „working class‟ regions, where all major regionalist 
parties (with the exception of unionist UUP and DUP) are positioned left of centre. 
While this finding is definitely intuitive, no previous comparative work has addressed 
this point systematically. Evidence is, however, much more patchy for „scarcely 
industrialized‟ regions, where the major regionalist parties are spread between the 
radical left and the mainstream right. 
Voting systems and party systems appear to be good explanatory factors to 
account for mainstream vs. radical positioning along the left-right dimension too. 
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Regionalist parties acting under predominantly majoritarian voting systems and in two-
party (or two-bloc) systems, such as the SNP, PC and the LN (1996), tend to position 
themselves close to the centre, while in PR and multi-party systems we find both 
mainstream and radical parties. 
As far as European integration is concerned, the analysis has confirmed that the 
proportion between pro-integration and anti-integration parties is much higher within 
traditionally Europhile states than within traditionally Eurosceptic ones. Generally 
speaking, the analysis has also confirmed that support for integration amongst 
regionalist parties grew and reached its peak during the 1980s and 1990s. In this period, 
only left-right radical parties opposed integration. In contrast, in the period since 2000, 
support has significantly decreased, especially amongst mainstream left parties and 
amongst parties which are particularly assertive or radical (i.e. secessionist) on their 
self-government claims. These findings represent another original contribution to the 
literature on regionalist parties. Although recent works have started to detect a certain 
shift away from overwhelming support for European integration amongst regionalist 
parties in recent years, the links between this shift and left-right and centre-periphery 
positioning have largely gone unnoticed and systematic analysis has not yet been 
undertaken.          
As far as patterns of cross-dimension positioning are concerned, it has already 
been mentioned how left-right and centre-periphery positioning appear to influence 
parties‟ stances on European integration. A pattern seems to emerge from the analysis of 
parties‟ positioning across the left-right and centre-periphery dimensions too. 
Secessionist stances are very rare amongst centre and centre-right parties, while they are 
more common (about half and half) among radical-right parties. However, it is amongst 
left of centre parties that we find most secessionist cases. They represent a strong 
majority amongst the mainstream left and an overwhelming majority amongst the 
radical left. A tentative explanation based on internal ideological consistency has been 
proposed, pointing to a certain incompatibility between moderate/conservative 
ideologies (especially Christian democracy) and the pursuit of dramatic (and potentially 
traumatic) social and political change, and incompatibility between contemporary 
liberal thought and the putative right to secession – in the absence of violent repression 
and/or violation of human rights by the state.    
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This summary of findings highlights how the present study has pushed forward 
our understanding of regionalist parties' positioning in multi-dimensional ideological 
space, also pointing to consequences for the politics of the regions and states in which 
regionalist parties are important actors. As usual in social science, this research has 
pointed out tendencies, rather than stated deterministic laws. Yet, the awareness of these 
tendencies may even translate into some predictive capacity. If just a few features of a 
regional socio-structural environment (with regionalist mobilization potential) and of 
the relative institutional/political environment are known, informed speculation on the 
ideological complexion of any regionalist party (or parties) which might emerge there in 
the future becomes possible. Many French regions, for instance, have some regionalist 
mobilization potential but have not witnessed the (electoral) emergence of regionalist 
parties. These regions could represent laboratory-like contexts in which the predictive 
validity of these generalizations can be tested.  
As an exercise in theory-building, this study represents a synthesis of previous 
research and a starting point for future research. Indeed, future studies could build on 
this thesis in several ways. The most straightforward one would be to reproduce a 
similar analysis focusing on other democratic contexts, starting from Central and 
Eastern Europe (which would allow European integration to be one of the three salient 
dimensions). Future studies could also aim to improve this research by providing a more 
systematic analysis of the combined effects of the diverse causal factors taken into 
consideration. Another important way to complement this study would be to gather the 
diffuse data (such as opinion polls on social and political attitudes and election studies) 
available at regional level in order to fill the gap between the socio-structural level and 
voters‟ orientations and preferences. This would allow an evaluation of whether the 
assumptions on which this thesis is based (which were drawn from the tradition of 
comparative historical sociology) still hold and would also provide a more rigorous 
account of the social and electoral environments in which parties act. Finally, future 
case-studies (or 'small n' comparative analysis) could draw from this work and adopt a 
more focused approach, in theoretical, analytical and thematic terms. They could help 
shed light on several aspects highlighted in this work: the effect of national (left-right) 
polarization on internal party politics and ideological positioning, the diversion of votes 
from the right to the left through coalition (and multi-level) politics, the deep causes of 
recent repositioning on European integration, and patterns of cross-dimension 
positioning. 
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Appendix 
 
Sources used to code party positions along the three ideological dimensions 
considered (centre-periphery, left-right, European integration)* 
 
 
 
Parties 
 
 
Abbrev. 
 
Sources 
 
Aralar  
 
Ar 
 
Aparicio-Romero (2006); Party website (in Spanish):  
http://www.aralar.net/portada-es?set_language=es 
 
Bloque Nacionalista Gallego  
 
BNG 
 
Aparicio-Romero (2006); Gomez-Reino (2006); Elias (2009).  
 
 
Chunta Aragonesista 
 
 
CHA 
 
Aparicio-Romero (2006); Party website: http://chunta.com/ 
 
Christlich-Soziale Union in 
Bayern  
 
CSU 
 
Hepburn (2008b); Wagemann (2005)  
 
 
Coalición Canaria  
 
CC 
 
Aparicio-Romero (2006); Party website: 
http://www.coalicioncanaria.org/ 
 
Convergencia Demócratica 
de Navarra 
 
CDN 
 
Aparicio-Romero (2006); Party website: http://www.cdn.es/ 
 
Convergéncia i Unió  
 
CiU 
 
Aparicio-Romero (2006); Barbera and Barrio (2006); Madorran 
(2005); Marcet and Argelaguet (1998); De Winter (1998a)  
 
Democratic Unionist Party  
 
DUP 
 
Murphy (1990); Evans and Duffy (1997); party website: 
http://www.dup.org.uk/ 
 
Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya  
 
ERC 
 
Aparicio-Romero (2006); Argelaguet (2006); Madorran (2005); 
Marcet and Argelaguet (1998); De Winter (1998a)  
 
Eusko Alkartasuna  
 
EA 
 
Aparicio-Romero (2006); Acha (2006); Acha-Ugarte and Perez-
Nievas (1998)   
 
Euskadiko Ezkerra  
 
EE 
 
Acha-Ugarte and Perez-Nievas (1998) 
 
 
Fédération Autonomiste 
 
 
FA 
 
Party website: http://www.federationautonomiste.org/ 
 
Die Freiheitlichen  
 
dF 
 
 
Pallaver (2007); party website: http://die-freiheitlichen.com/ 
 
Front Démocratique des 
Francophones  
 
FDF 
 
Deschouwer (2009); Buelens and Van Dyck (1998); De Winter 
(1998a) 
 
Herri Batasuna – Heuskal 
Herritarrok - Batasuna  
 
HB-Ba 
 
Aparicio-Romero (2006); De Winter (1998a); Acha-Ugarte and 
Perez-Nievas (1998) 
 
Lega dei Ticinesi 
 
LT 
 
Mazzoleni (2005); Albertazzi (2006); party website: 
http://www.legaticinesi.ch/ 
 
Movimento per l’Autonomia  
 
MpA 
 
Party website: http://www.mpa-italia.it/portal/ 
 
 
Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie 
 
N-VA 
 
Deschouwer, K. (2009); party website: http://www.n-va.be/ 
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Partei des Demokratischen 
Sozialismus  
PDS Hough (2001); Hough and Koss (2009) 
 
Partido Andalucista  
 
PA 
 
Aparicio-Romero (2006); Montabes et al. (2006); party website: 
http://www.partidoandalucista.org/ 
 
Partido Aragonés  
 
 
PAR 
 
Aparicio-Romero (2006); Party website: 
http://www.partidoaragones.es/  
 
Partido Nacionalista Vasco  
 
PNV 
 
Aparicio-Romero (2006); Perez-Nievas (2006); De Winter (1998a); 
Acha-Ugarte and Perez-Nievas (1998)   
 
Partido Regionalista de 
Cantabria  
 
PRC 
 
Party website: http://www.prc.es/ 
 
Partido Riojano  
 
PR 
 
 
Party website: http://www.partidoriojano.es/ 
 
Partito Sardo D’Azione  
 
PSdAz 
 
Roux (2006); Hepburn (2009b)  
 
 
Rassemblement Wallon  
 
RW 
 
Deschouwer (2009); Buelens and Van Dyck (1998);  De Winter 
(1998a)  
 
Sinn Fein  
 
 
SF 
 
Ruane and Todd (1992); Evans, G. and Duffy, M. (1997); party 
websites:  http://www.sinnfein.org/ and http://www.sinnfein.ie/ 
 
Social Democratic and 
Labour Party  
 
SDLP 
 
Ruane and Todd (1992); Evans, G. and Duffy, M. (1997); party 
website: http://www.sdlp.ie/ 
 
Scottish Greens  
 
SG 
 
Massetti (2009b);  Bennie (2002); party website: 
http://www.scottishgreens.org.uk/ 
 
Ulster Unionist Party  
 
UUP 
 
Murphy, S. (1990); Evans, G. and Duffy, M. (1997); party website: 
http://www.uup.org/ 
 
Unió Mallorquina  
 
UM 
 
Party website: http://www.unio-mallorquina.com/ 
 
 
Unió Valenciana 
 
UnV 
 
 
Party website: http://uniovalenciana.org/ 
 
Unión del Pueblo Navarro  
 
UPN 
 
 
Party website: http://upn.org/ 
 
Unione di u Populo Corsu  
 
UPC 
 
De Winter (1998a); Olivesi (1998); Cheney (2007); Elias (2009) 
 
 
Union für Südtirol  
 
UfS 
 
Pallaver (2007); party website: http://www.unionfs.com/ 
 
 
Union Valdôtaine  
 
UV 
 
Martial (1996); Boiardi and Di Capua, (1994); party website: 
http://www.unionvaldotaine.org/uv/index.php 
 
Union Valdôtaine 
Progressiste  
 
UVP 
 
Martial (1996); Boiardi and Di Capua (1994) 
 
Vlaams Blok - Belang 
 
VB 
 
 
Breuning (1997); De Winter et al. (2006a); Deschouwer (2009) 
 
Volksunie  
 
VU 
 
Breuning (1997); De Winter (1998b); De Winter (1998a), De 
Winter (2006) 
 
*The appendix does not include the four case-studies dealt with in this thesis (PC, SNP, SVP and LN), as 
the sources for desuming their ideological positioning are presented in the relative chapters. 
